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Ever since the United Nations' Declaration of 1974 concerning the 
New International Economic Order "NIED", the question of the transfer 
of technology has become the centre of an extensive debate and 
considerable controversy. Both the debate and the controversy are the 
result of a complex set of separate but closely linked issues. 
Principally, these issues include the present unequal distribution of 
wealth, industrial activities and scientific and technological 
knowledge-throughout the international community. Such inequalities are 
no more apparent than between the economies of the privileged and 
developed North, and the underprivileged and developing South. While 
the countries of the North, which'represent only one third of the human 
race, are today occupied with the standards and qualities of life, the 
other two thirds are fighting for their survival in which they are 
confronted by the domination of the former. 
The inequality in the distribution of wealth and technical means 
is made even worse by the prevailing inequality in trade transactions 
between partners of different technological levels and states on 
unequal footing with one another. In general, they are intermittent 
relations in which it is customary to exploit to the utmost the 
superior strength and the dominant position which such strength 
procures. 
When the formerly colonized nations acceded to political 
independence, they became confronted by an international law without 
their consent or participation. Such law had ignored their aspirations 
and sometimes was even in complete contradiction with their interests. 
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The international law which had allowed their subjugation and 
exploitation had to be met with suspicion if not hostility from the 
newly independent nations. Thus, the first consequence of 
decolonization was the questioning of the very foundations of that law. 
This questioning process was characterized first of all by an intensive 
and legitimate distrust of the former colonial powers. Then it took a 
more precise form as the developing countries became more aware of 
their rights and obligations, and more familiar with international 
relations and mechanisms. 
By becoming aware of their own problems and by proposing solutions 
in line with their own vision of the world, the developing countries 
know that to some 'extent they are opposing the interests of the 
industrialized nations. However, their action is not aimed at 
correcting injustice by creating another one, nor that their vision is 
of an utopian world that would banish the inequalities of power and 
wealth. They recognise that these inequalities will persist inspite of 
all the efforts aimed at mitigating them. But equally, the developing 
countries have concluded that the present international law must be 
revised in its principles, priorities and structure. 
Moreover, the rationality and the balance of international law are 
continually tested by the progress of science and technology. With 
such progress, the technological gap between developed and developing 
nations widens, and so does the economic disparity between them. For 
example, the development of deep sea mining technology and the 
discovery of new mineral resources not only decreases the developed 
nations' dependence on raw materials, but severely affects the 
economies of many developing countries whose livelihood depend on the 
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export of such raw materials. It goes without saying that the new 
technology is being developed within - and for a long time will be - 
the exclusive monopoly of the developed countries. Against this back 
ground, the developing countries continue to depend on the developed 
countries for the technology necessary to carry out their developmental 
projects. 
Due to the increased awareness and realization among the 
developing countries of the social, economic and political impact which 
science and technology could have on their development programmes, they 
began to press harder the scientific and technological inequality. The 
immediate effect of this awareness has been to put in the forefront of 
the international debate - or at least among the most important issues 
- the problem of science and technology acquisition. The developing 
countries captivated by the technological factor have begun the process 
of hiring such technology on a massive scale from a vast pool of 
industrial technology accumulated in the industrialized nations 
(capitalist and socialist). The large scale operation is due to the 
significant technological delay which has been accumulated by the 
developing countries and the lack of viable indigenous technology base 
from which these countries can initiate and sustain the desired tempo 
of industrialization. However, as technology transactions take place 
largely in a highly imperfect world market, there are serious obstacles 
to the access and the acquisition of foreign technology. For the 
transfer of technology to have a chance of equity there must first 
exist a technology market for supply and demand which would allow for 
the appreciation, comparison and exchange of information on the value 
of the sought technologies. Such a market rarely exists at the present 
time. 
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Technology is generally but not exclusively, transferred under 
licensing agreements. A license agreement often consists of protected 
property rights, as it may be in the form of rights created and 
protected by contracts and dealing with technical information and 
know-how. It is also common to transfer technology with an implied 
license. It might be incorporated in machineries or equipment which 
are essential for the manufacturing of products from the codified 
technology. A common form for combining licenses, machineries and 
other services is the method of Turnkey plants. The countries with 
more developed industrial structure tend to opt for licensing 
agreements, while countries at their early stage of industrialization 
tend to rely more heavily on transfer mechanisms such as direct foreign 
investment and turnkey plants. 
Technology contracts are not easily classified into a distinct 
number of categories. Very often they are complex and involve features 
found in more than one of the classifications identified in chapters 
two and five. These classifications are namely: licensing agreements, 
service contracts - [i. e. training, consultancy, management and 
technical assistance contracts] -, turnkey and plant in production 
"produit en main" contracts and joint venture arrangements. The 
novelty in the field of contractual relations meant that technology 
contracts can vary significantly from contract to contract in terms of 
what might be embodied in them, and in terms of the rights and the 
obligation of the contracting parties. The highly diversified 
contractual practices comprised in national legislations and the 
UNCTAD's Code of Conduct on technology transfer are in fact a 
manifestation of the laissez-faire approach which has prevailed in the 
area of contractual freedom. 
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Originally, technology contracts consisted mainly of industrial 
property, but now have assumed a more complex and differential forms, 
the more recent of which being the plant-in-production method of 
contractual relations. Therefore, the scope of technology contracts 
have expanded to include a variety of services. The expansion is 
essentially the result of two factors: the need to meet the 
requirements of many developing countries who cannot otherwise work 
licenses without additional services, and the packaging of technology 
contracts by licensors and suppliers. It follows, that the scope of 
technology contracts can be used on one hand to indicate the strong or 
weak bargaining power of the recipient enterprise, and on the other 
hand to show the extent of that enterprise technological dependency in 
a particular field of technology. In other terms, the wider the scope 
of a contract, the weaker the bargaining position of the recipient 
enterprise has been during the negotiations, or the more 
technologically dependent the recipient is. 
Basically, a technology contract in one form or another embraces 
elements of at least one of the following: (a) the right to exploit or 
use industrial property i. e. patents, know-how, utility models and 
trademarks, (b) the means to do i. e. direct foreign investment, 
equipment and machinery; and (c) the ability to do such as training and 
direct intervention of foreign experts. 
The basic purpose of this study is to analyse the function of the 
patent system not only in the developing countries but also in the 
developed countries, and to assess what impact the system might have on 
the national economies of the former and on the generation of 
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technological knowledge in the latter. Equally, it illustrates that 
the central issue in the acquisation of technology by the developing 
countries is not the patent system itself, but rather the local 
technical ability - or the lack of it - to put things together, to make 
them work, to maintain efficient operations and to put the patented 
technology into useful products. 
To achieve these objectives, it was necessary for me to divide 
this study into two parts, each comprising of three chapters. The 
first part is confined to the preacquisition of technology, in which I 
shall describe the significance of the patent system in relation to the 
generation of technical progress; or in more specific terms the 
economic justification of patent protection within the capitalist 
framework. Then, I shall go onto describe the current national and 
international efforts aimed at redefining the role of the patent system 
to meet the problems of technology acquisition by the developing 
countries. 
Furthermore, it is my objective to examine some of the newly 
introduced national and regional legislations regulating the inflow of 
foreign technology, especially those of the Andean Pact, and finally to 
assess the work of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development "UNCTAD" in this field. 
Since the accquisition of technology calls for a high level of 
knowledge and efficiency, a great many legal barriers have been put 
around it. Those legal barriers of which the patent system is one, are 
very effective when applied to the developing countries. Advances in 
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technology are protected in such a way that it is virtually impossible 
for a developing country to obtain them. To obtain the knowledge and 
equipments which the developing countries believe are essential to 
their progress, they became supplicants before the high priests of 
technology namely the multinational corporations. 
The patent system is being advanced by the technology producing 
countries as an indispensable channel for passing technical knowledge 
and as the means for disseminating inventions and an instrument of 
international cooperation in the field of science and technology. We 
are told that the purpose of the patent system is the renumeration of 
inventors whose genius led to the progress being made in the first 
place. However, the function of the patent monopoly is not so much to 
reward inventors since it has become another way of rewarding capital. 
Furthermore, the patent grant is supposed to encourage inventors to 
disclose their inventions by means of patent specifications, so that it 
can stimulate further technical progress and finally to make the 
invention available to the public either through use of after the 
expiry of the patent life. 
However, patent specifications which may be sufficiently clear to 
an experienced manufacturer in the industrialized countries, are of no 
practical use to a company in a developing country who has to spend yet 
more money and sign more contracts in order to obtain the necessary 
know-how. Patent specifications are rarely sufficient to allow for the 
production of the patented product, which is precisely what the patent 
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holders intended it to achieve. It is in this way that firms which 
develop inventions, contrive to protect themselves illicitly from, the 
compulsory licensing systems adopted by many countries, by means of 
misleading patent descriptions and withholding vital details. In 
return for a substantial payment, rarely less than few hundred thousand 
dollars, the licensee gets no more than a brochure containing few 
instructions wherein the secret, instead of becoming entitled to use 
the patented technology. Under such circumstances the cost of licenses 
correspond at most to the right to understand, but not to use. The 
result of this is the proliferation of contracts and more expenditure 
without matching returns for the licensee and opportunities for the 
licensor to make money without giving anything away. 
When one talks about patent protection one has to bear in mind 
that not all the scientific and technical knowledge is subject to 
patent protection. On the contrary, technology ranges from simple and 
traditional to sophisticated and fast changing. Overall, only a small 
portion is protected and even a smaller portion is secret, but most is 
in fact in the public stock of knowledge in the form of published 
information. However it required knowledge of their availability and a 
level of competence and sophistication to even select and make use of 
such information. Apart from the lack of information, the developing 
countries cannot, as a rule, put to adequate use the technological 
information which has been disclosed by means of world wide patent 
protection. Therefore, while it is true that the knowledge contained 
in patent documents falls in the public domain, this is only a purely 
theoretical proposition as far as the developing countries are 
concerned. 
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Today we often hear of the patent system being denounced as a 
major obstacle to technology acquisition, especially from the 
developed to developing countries: we also hear that such a system 
should be substituted by a more just system under which scientific and 
technological knowledge are treated as a common heritage for all 
mankind, and that its transfer should not be subjected to any 
restriction. Economists from developing countries have come to the 
conclusion that the patent system does not contribute to technical 
progress in the developing countries and that it hinders it in certain 
cases. Accordingly, it would be more appropriate to abolish the system 
altogether. 
In my view, it has yet to be proven in a more decisive manner that 
the abolition of the patent system would necessarily contribute to 
local technical progress, nor that it would facilitate local 
manufacturing of products which have'been so far imported. To make the 
abolition acceptable, not only to the developing countries themselves, 
but above all to the technology producing countries, it is required to 
have convincing evidence against patents. It is also required to show 
that the social cost outweighed the social benefits, and to 
demonstrate that it had negative effect or no effect on the generation 
of knowledge. Thus, the abolition of the patent system on present 
evidence may be a false solution to a real problem. 
Some 50 developing countries are members of the Paris Convention 
and none has yet to experiment the abolition of the patent system. On 
the contrary, there has been extensive legislative in the field of 
patents in the last two decades. Whether the enactment of new patents 
by the developing countries is due to a basic confidence that the 
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patent protection can also fulfill its role of promoting their 
technical and economical progress, or due to the fear of the unknown 
consequences, it is not clear. The one thing that is apparently clear 
from the new legislation is that the alteration of the system - to make 
the patent law more strictly subordinated to their development 
objectives - rather than the abolition may be the limit of the 
practical. 
The criticism of the patent system is as old as the system itself. 
However in the last decade or so there has been persistent criticism 
from the developing countries. In some cases, the scope of patent 
protection has been substantially reduced by the newly introduced 
patent laws (Chapter Zwo). In particular the new legislation is 
designed to achieve the following: (1) To subordinate the individual 
right of the patent holder to the public interest. Or, to weaken the 
notion of patents as a private property in favour of a public policy. 
(2) As a result of the shift from private notion to public policy, the 
scope of patent protection was limited to specifically exclude the 
right to import. Such measure is intended to exclude patents from 
being used as an import monopoly by the holder and to allow the 
granting country to import identical products at a cheaper price from 
other competitors in disregard or non-observance of patents (i. e. 
pharmaceutical products). 
(3) To ensure that the technology which is important to development can 
be imported without the obstacle of private monopoly, general and 
specific restrictions on patentability were introduced. Specific 
restrictions first and foremost affect' chemicals especially 
pharmaceutical inventions, while general restrictions exclude the 
granting of patents for inventions affecting the developing of the 
concerned country. 
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(4) Furthermore, to ensure that the patented technology becomes 
available to the general public as soon as possible, the duration of 
the patent protection was drastically reduced to seven and five years 
in India and Peru respectively. 
Finally, these reforms and others will not be sufficient unless 
the international patent protection is also reformed. The Paris 
Convention for the protection of Industrial Property of 1880, is no 
more than a cartel serving the interest of the technology producing 
nations. The Convention was intially based on the assumption that the 
member states are economically of an approximately equal standing. 
However, the accession of many developing: countries to the Convention 
meant that such supposition can no longer be upheld. Accordingly, 
appropriate amendments to the Convention ought to include preferential 
treatment in favour of the developing countries. 
The transfer of technology can be made to serve the national 
objectives of the recipient developing country provided that additional 
and appropriate measures are adopted at both national and international 
levels. One manifestation of such measures has been the initiation by 
some of the Latin American countries of regimes of control of the 
importation of foreign technology. These regimes are designed to allow 
the state to exercise the control and the direction in the use of 
foreign technology. They also aim at obtaining the transfer on as 
favourable conditions as possibly by strengthening the negotiating 
position of national companies. Under these regimes, technology 
contracts must be submitted to national competent authorities for 
approval and registration, otherwise those contracts will have no legal 
force, in particular the licensor may not claim royalty payments. 
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Another manifestation of national policy measures could be to make 
a concentrated effort towards progressive and parallel building of 
local technological capabilities in terms of indigenous skill and R& 
D. The more a country acquire technological capital, the less the 
patent system becomes a problem for that country. Compulsory licensing 
will become more effective, information contained in patent documents 
becomes valuable and bargaining position will be enhanced. 
In my view, the two policy measures are interdependent and should 
be dealt with concurrently. To do otherwise would only lead to_ 
disastrous results as the Algerian experience indicates. In fact, the 
whole process of the transfer of technology is so closely interwoven 
with the socio-politico-economic prerequisites of develoFxnent, that 
policy and, organisation for its execution cannot be viewed in 
isolation, but on the contrary ought to be coherently coordinated with 
the national policies on science and economic planning. This is 
studied in the second part of this study as surnarised below. 
To overcome historical dependence and stagnation Algeria needs to 
master the technology which is mostly imported from the Western 
industrialized countries. Thus, I shall start with a very brief 
description of Algeria's main industrial and technological policy 
(Chapter Four). The strong emphasis is on economic independence which 
is regarded as the basic factor for a highly integrated and dynamic 
economic structure. 
Basically, the industrial and technological policy of Algeria is 
based on breaking the vicious circle of underdevelopment (i. e. small 
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market, return on capital and trained manpower) and on establishing 
what became known as the industrializing industries (the establishment 
of key manufacturing industries). The Algerian planners also believe 
that progress does not only mean the importation of foreign technology, 
but equally its assimilation. What the Algerians were seeking was not 
the mere purchase of the means of production, but rather to be taught 
how to produce those means. In this context, the transfer of 
technology is considered to be possible only when a country joins the 
industrial process. Both the industrial process and the acquisition of 
machinery and equipnents will have the effect of allowing Algeria to 
acquire technological capital. 
Perhaps the most important issue of Algeria's technological policy 
are the innovations in the field of contractual relations with the 
suppliers of technology. The innovation concerns the introduction of a 
new contractual method called "plant in production" (produit en main). 
Under this form of contracts, the contracting foreign company is 
required to provide the following services to the client national 
enterprise: - 
(a) the delivery of an industrial plant in the form of a 
turnkey; 
(b) theý. guarantee to train Algerian personnel both abroad 
and in Algeria; 
(c) to provide technical assistance for the functioning of 
the constructed plant and to guarantee its initial 
management up to the cruising stage. 
(d) to guarantee production both in terms of quality and 
quantity corresponding to a fixed calender in the contract; 
and 
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(e) finally, to correnunicate to the client national enter- 
prise licenses and documents of fabrication, the know 
how and show-how in order that the contract results in 
a transfer of technology. 
The plant in production method has been developed by Algeria as a 
result of the failure of turnkey contracts. Unlike turnkey contracts, 
the contracting foreign firm under the plant in production "PIP" is not 
systematically absolved from responsibility at a specific date 
following the putting into service of the installations, but at times 
and conditions which are not negotiable under turnkey. For example, 
the foreign contracting party may be absolved from responsibility after 
the installations has been operating for a lengthy period of time with 
the national enterprise own personnel whom the supplier is responsibile 
for training. 
The PIP method-aims at ensuring - at least theoretically - the 
total collaboration of the contracting foreign parties. It combines 
licensing agreements, technical assistance, engineering, purchase of 
equipment and machinery, erection of installationsl and training of 
operational and managerial manpower in a single contract. This 
unquestionably provides a greater protection for the client enterprise, 
who instead of having a multitude of partners taking advantage 'of its 
incompetence deals with only one partner who is responsible for 
everything. In other terms, it is easy to pinpoint the areas in which 
there is deviation from the contractual specifications for which the 
supplier can be held responsible since his responsibility is global. 
The global responsibility is also an element of turnkey contracts, but 
does not cover the overall handling of installation, training and 
organization. 
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It is true that the global responsibility makes the plant in 
production a more packaged form of technology transfer, but in my 
opinion, there are reasons to believe that it is an ideal method for 
countries who lack technological capital or lack industrial experience. 
Since contractual relations constitute a major problem in the 
transfer of technology, a particular attention will be given to the 
different contractual forms binding national enterprises and their 
foreign partners. The gaps between formal contracts and the effective 
application of their provisions indicates the weak governmental 
monitoring of these relations and the absence of a coherent policy in 
the field of technology acquisition. No effective performance 
guarantee appeared to exist, although the need for performance was 
often advanced as an argument for minimizing the use of national 
inputs. If the contracting foreign company did not attain the 
performance within the stipulated time, the firm could be penalized for 
the delay, but never on account of the income foregone in the loss of 
production or commercialization. If we take the ultimate purpose of 
the contract from the recipient national enterprise's point of view 
into consideration, the direct prejudice suffered by that enterprise is 
not the same as that suffered by a company in the industrialized 
countries. If we evaluate the direct prejudice as the value of what the 
client expected to get under the term of the contract and which he did 
not get because of malpractices on the part of the supplier, then it is 
clear that the direct prejudice has no absolute value. 
In the industrialized countries, companies tend to view that the 
caused prejudice must be confined to the loss of cash flow which would 
have resulted had the delay not occured. However, in the case of 
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Algeria or any other developing country, the loss to the recipient 
company should be corresponding not only to the loss of cash flow but 
also operating costs, and expenses which the national enterprise has to 
meet without receiving any counterpart for them. 
Throughout the execution of the contract, the recipient national 
enterprise does not benefit from the entitlment of the contract 
provisions, because it lacks the mastery of the technology, it cannot 
exercise its legitimate and often contractual right while work is in 
progress. It is not able to carry out the necessary controls and 
insists on the foreign partner taking steps to rectify any errors 
should the need rise. Therefore, the national enterprises play an 
altogether passive role throughout the duration of contracts. 
Furthermore, there is a striking contrast between the precision with 
which the risks assumed by the technology supplier are defined and the 
vague character of provisions regarding his contractual 
responsibilities. 
The analysis of these and other aspects of contractual relations 
between the national enterprises and foreign firms is essentially 
intended to show that, on one hand, the present contractual relations 
between unequal partners accentuates inequalities between the 
contracting parties instead of reducing them. This constitutes an 
additional source of domination. On the other hand, the transfer of 
technology and all its associated problems do not for many developing 
countries end once contracts or licenses have been signed, even if the 
terms of the transfer were favourable to- the recipient. On the 
contrary, the problems for the recipient have just begun. It is an 
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analysis of what happens to the technology once it is imported, and how 
the actual transfer takes place. These aspects tend to be ignored in 
most discussions and writings on the transfer of technology. 
Finally, the problem with Algeria's industrialization process is 
not of course limited to contractual relations, but also to whether the 
emphasis on the competitiveness of products with those of the 
industrialized countries would not make the building up of 
technological capability through the importation of technology a 
practical inipossibility while it is theoretically possible. 
. ,; 
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QIAPrER ONE 
ECOMMIC EVAIWTIQN OF PNrFNIS AND SIR FUNCTION IN_ THE 
PROCESS OF M MIM PROD X rich WITHIN ME CAPITAILST FRAMEWL)1 
Any discussion of the transfer of technology "TOT" quickly 
brings to the mind the controversy over the patent system as a legal 
device designed to encourage industrial creative activities, through 
the grant of a temporary monopoly. Also, it brings to atention the 
widespread confusion over the true values of patents in the context 
of technology transfer to developing countries. The significance of 
patents in the present debate stems from the fact that inventions are 
legaly protected for a defined period. In principle, the passing of 
those inventions to developing countries cannot be ceded without 
financial return, in the form of royalty payments, or a lump-sum, or 
both, to the patent holder. However, patented technology is only the 
visible part of the process of technology transfer since, more often 
than not, additional know-how is required. For a patented' invention 
to be exploited in the majority of developing countries, equipments 
and direct intervention of foreign personnel may also be a pre- 
condition. This is mainly due to the low level of domestic 
technological capacity which cannot absorb the imported technologies 
on its own effort. 
Within the last few years, two opposing approaches concerning 
the legal issues of technology transfer have become apparent. The 
first approach is advocated by the technology producers of the 
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industrialised countries of the West, claiming that the legal 
protection of industrial property rights, in the form of an exclusive 
use for a definite period of inventions by investors, must remain and 
that licensing agreements should only be restrained when they 
conflict with anti-monopolies laws (i. e. when they restrain 
competition). 
The second approach represents the views of the developing 
countries, which challenges traditional ideas and seeks to gain 
easier access to technology. Developing countries argue that 
industrial property protection and the sanctity of contracts must be 
balanced with the economic and social needs of the society'which it 
serves. Such balance can be facilitated by the recognition of their 
inherent right to preferential treatment, and that governments of the 
industrialised countries should use their power to compel their 
private enterprises to grant such terms[1]. 
Due to the widely shared economic concept among the Western 
economies, the legal rules appear to create little problems. In 
contrast, the legal framework within the developing countries is 
considered as insufficient, and as a result of which, countries have 
began to take unilateral national "action rather than to rely, on 
international cooperation. Undoubtedly, most economists would agree 
that there is a very* real need for developing countries to acquire 
technology. Most of the technology is in the hands of private 
companies of the West. Thus any national regulation of its transfer 
must find a balance in which the concerns of the recipient countries 
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are recognised, but equally does not discourage the foreign 
suppliers. 
The legal issues raised by the international transfer of 
technology can only emerge from the consideration of a wider process 
within which the narrow technical issues of the transfer are located. 
On one hand, the present systems governing the production of 
technology and its diffusion are the intended outcome of few 
decisions taken by the industrial power nations. In other terms, 
those decisions taken by the industrial power nations were intended 
to establish principles and standards at the national level, and were 
later adopted as major elements and regulations of existing inter- 
national standards. The development of those principles and 
standards was designed to provide increasing protection to the 
technology's owner and those who produce it. on the other hand, the 
development of the legal process, at national and international 
levels, was a response to the needs of politically and economically 
social strata[2]. 
The basic purpose of this chapter is to trace the sources of 
technology production, within the framework of the first approach 
advocated by the industrial countries. Such production continues to 
be the main reason for enacting patent legislations. Only then we 
might be able to appreciate and discuss the relevance of patents in 
the process of the transfer of technology to developing countries. 
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THE PATIENT SYSTEM IN A CAPITALIST FRAANEWORK 
A patent may be defined as a legally binding monopoly awarded by 
governments to inventors to exclude others from manufacturing, 
selling, or using the patented invention, - without the patentee's 
consent for a defined priod of time. In return inventions become 
freely available to the public after, the expiration of the patent 
life[3]. This legalised monopoly right can be looked at as a kind of 
bargain, between the state and the inventor, in which the invention 
may assist the generation of industrial knowledge by becoming a part 
of the public stock of knowledge. To the inventor, the grant of a 
patent monopoly expresses the moral right of -inventors to their 
knowledge and financial rewards to be obtained from the exclusive 
exploitation. of the patented invention. In return for the prompt 
disclosure of new inventions the state grants a limited exclusionary 
right to inventors. Limited monopoly in return for disclosure, 
therefore is being seen in the industrialised countries as to provide 
the basic incentive for continued industrial progress. 
One of the major components of the process of technological 
changes is the creation of new ideas and their first introduction to 
practice. We are told by economists that in a framework of a 
capitalist economies, private enterprise demand a constant flow of 
technological innovation. Further, such demand principally leads to 
the rely on patent protection - patent for inventions in return for 
substantial technological innovation -, thus, the temporary monopoly 
rises out of an economic necessity. 
The rationality of patents stems from the characteristics of the 
marketability of invention, which neither depend on demand and 
supply, nor its acquisation diminishes the stock of knowledge. It is 
also accepted that the cost of reproducing information is less than 
that of its production. Therefore, it can not be revealed to the 
buyer to allow him to assess its merits and values, nor it can be 
sold in parts, since information is indivisible. If an invention was 
disclosed, the inventor would lose the property as it cannot be 
retrieved. To avoid a negative impact on the generation of 
knowledge, the assumption that knowledge is expensive to produce, 
cheaper to copy, was not adopted, for no further knowledge would be 
forthcoming if it was applied. Such fear takes into account the zero 
cost of transfering knowledge[4]. 
The patent monopoly is thus created to prevent "free riding" and 
to provide a better balance between the cost of transfering knowledge 
and the generation of new knowledge, which is necessary for the 
progress of society, so that private useful source "new inventions" 
can be employed and remunerated. In this sense, the apparent 
function of patents is to allow for the marketability of knowledge as 
a product, determined by the distribution cost rather than the 
production cost. 
The aim of patent laws in the present capitalist framework is 
not so much to reward inventors, but rather to encourage innovators 
to risk capital and time in developing inventions and marketing them 
as products or servicest51. In fact, the inventors reward takes a 
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second place to that of innovators, for there is unlikely to be a 
reward for the former if the latter do not exploit inventions [61. 
Thus, the grant of a patent monopoly to inventors is a means for 
creating a favourable climate for investors to invest in innovation. 
THE ECOIE4IC THEORY OF PATENTS 
The economic logic behind the patent system appears to be based 
on the production of new technological knowledge. If such knowledge 
was made freely available as soon as it was discovered, it is feared 
that the free availability would destroy the incentive to take risks 
in conducting research in order to obtain inventions. Thus, if no 
means were available to those who produce information, there may not 
be new inventions. In this context, patent laws can be seen as 
deliberately designed by the state to support monopoly at the expense 
of competition, on the grounds that the comanunity as a whole would in 
the end benefit from adding new knowledge to the already existing 
" body of knowledge. 
The patent system seems to help the individual inventor to 
benefit from his ingenuity, since it allows him to sell or license 
the invention, as he may not be able, under the present 
characteristics of the market, to exploit the invention himself. If 
no patent protection was available, the inventor would be forced to 
undertake the production and marketing of his invention. Whether the 
undertaking of production and makreting would enable him to benefit 
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from his invention is open to doubt, especially if the invention was 
of significant importance. There is a high possibility that large 
firms will attempt to produce it. In such situations, the inventor's 
investment may be jeopardised since the invention may be difficult to 
keep as a trade secret. Thus, the patent protection is seen as the 
only form which protects investment in ideas. It might also help the 
individual inventor who may choose to undertake the production of his 
invention to get financial assistance, as the patent constitutes a 
tangible and precise claim to an invention. 
The role which the patent system had played in inducing new 
technical changes in the now industrialised nations was recognised by 
President Johnson in his proposed "Patent reform Act of 1967" to the 
U. S. Congress. He observed: 
"The patent system has played an indispensible role in 
stimulating the nation's progress and prosperity. It has 
spurred the creative work of inventors and scientists. It 
has faltered the most far reaching technological advances 
in the history of civilisation. It has helped American 
business to translate the fire of genuine into the products 
and the processes that have enriched the lives of all of 
us" (7] . 
However, the past achievements of patents, as an incentive to new 
technological changes, may not justify the continuation of the system 
if one takes the view that it was originally designed to reward 
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individual inventors[81. This is mainly because of the lack of 
available facilities to individual inventors to put their inventions 
into conenercial forms and because of litigations cost. 
In the end, the patented invention will be sold on a lump sum 
rather than on a royalty basis to a corporation which holds roost 
patents in a specific field of technology, and which can practically 
dictate the purchase price of the inventor's patent. However, if one 
looks at the patent system as a public policy, designed to reward 
innovators, the system then may have some justification. 
Professor J. B. Clark reviewed the patent system as a desirable 
stimulus to inventions. He held the view that, little inventing 
activity and very little of adopting of inventions by producers would 
occur without the patent system. He advanced the following 
proposition to justify the system: 
"If the patented article is something which the society 
without a patent system would not have secured at all, the 
inventor's monopoly hurts nobody ... his gains consist of 
something which no one loses"(91. 
Such proposition cannot withstand the realities of the present time, 
where the absence of patents is unlikely to prevent competitors from 
seeking to improve their position in the market through the 
introduction of new technical advances. 
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Annex 1: 1 shows how the availability and non-availability of 
patent protection is likely to effect the introduction of new 
inventions in relation to the size of companies. The sample consists 
of 1200 patents examined in the Federal Republic of Gernany[10]. 
The sample indicates that the size of companies plays a 
significant role in deciding whether or not to commit resources to 
research and development "R & D". In the small and medium sized 
companies only 3% and 8% of inventions respectively are claimed to 
have been patent-dependent discoveries, and would have not been 
undertaken without the patent protection. In other terms, 97%, 92%, 
and 90% of all discoveries by companies with less than $250 million 
annual volume, are non-patent dependent and would have occured 
without the patent protection. The situation is completely different 
with regards to lager firms with more than $250 million; 53% of the 
discoveries are patent dependent. The high percentage may suggest 
that large companies tend not to conmit resources to R&D efforts 
unless it can be justified in terns of expected future profits. 
The overall propositions which Annex 1: 1 suggests are: (i) There 
are two types of inventions, those which are patent dependent and 
those which are not. The value of the patent system in the 
capitalist framework would be great if'it can only cover the patent- 
dependent inventions, and (ii) Industrial Knowledge in the form of 
new invention, contrary to what Professor Clark have suggested, would 
continue to occur. The occurrence may be at a lesser rate, 
especially with regards to lager companies, if the legal protection 
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was to be abolished[11]. 
The same IFO study showed the connection between patents and the 
size of companies, when the question of time between discoveries and 
their first economic use was considered. Annex 1: 2 indicates that up 
to 40% of patents taken out by small firms had economic use in the 
first year, and up to 87% in four years. When this percentage is 
compared to the 15% and 50% for the first and four years respectively 
of patents taken out by large firms, it means that the larger the 
company becomes, the longer it takes to put its patents into an 
economic use. 
When Annexes 1: 1 and 1: 2 are combined, they-seem to suggest, 
that small companies in West Germany, although they take out patents 
and quickly convert them to economic use, prepared to innovate 
without patent protection. on the other hand, large companies are 
unlikely to invest in R&D projects, especially risky ones, without 
the patent protection. However, when large companies invest, they 
tend to take longer period of time to convert the discoveries to 
economic use. It is possible that large firms are mostly concerned 
with complex technologies, the development of which take a longer 
period of time. However, this trend may also be interpreted as a 
deliberate policy, by large companies to exclude the entry of 
competitors from a particular field of technology. 
In order to block the entry of competitors in a particular 
technological field, large companies may acquire a substantial 
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proportion of patents, either through R&D effort or the acquisition 
of companies. In such cases the result is likely to be a suppression 
of technological advances in that particular field, since competitors 
will find it difficult to innovate around the dominant company's 
technologies. The company's position is thus protected by the number 
of patents it holds, instead of its innovative quality. When the 
dominant position is the result of patent holding, technological 
progress in the field in which that company operates becomes solely 
dependent on the progress that such a firm may make. 
To this end, the patent system appears to have run into 
contradiction within the capitalist framework. Instead of being a 
source of continuous flow of technological improvements, it has 
become a source of blocking such flow. 
The decline of the role of patents in spreading technological 
knowledge has much to do with the shift of patents ownership from 
individual inventors to business firms. The present inventor is more 
likely to be an employee, who has possibly agreed to assign his 
invention in advance to his employer as a condition of employment. 
Or he might be a member of an organized research group employed to 
invent in competition with other organized groups so as to get into 
the market first. Such shift also has the effect of transforming a 
temporary monopoly to an unlimited period through the use of 
improvements which take the place of the expired patent grant. 
The shf it in the ownership of patents may in fact facilitate 
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patent abuse by large companies, and thus tends to indicate that the 
existin patent laws favour large companies and allows to maximise 
their profit. The following example, cited by Khan, shows how large 
companies use patents to dominate an industrial field: 
"... Patent applications are being made as to prevent the 
use of improvement of any existing or possible substitute 
of the bottle-making machine. This ... seek to block 
competing devices which would lessen our income ... We now 
have a number of applications which were filed to 
definitely forestall the development of competing machines 
by Others"[12]. 
Therefore, the function of patents appear to act as means 
facilitating the dominance of companies in industrial fields. once 
such dominance is achieved, a company "creates the very conditions 
for its perpetual control"(131. Even when competitors succeed in 
taking patents in the same field as the dominant company, the 
exploitation of such patents may not take place due to the fear of 
litigation cost. The cost of litigation may also lead small 
companies and individual inventors not to take action when their 
patents are infringed by large companies since the, cost of litigation 
is likely to be outside the means of small firms let alone individual 
inventors. Equally, such cost may be a deciding factor in the first 
place for not innovating in the field of the dominant company. 
If an invention is not developed, because it lacks merit the 
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public may not lose much. However, when the non-use is deliberately 
intended to scare other inventors from a- particular field of 
technology since the patented invention is neither invalid nor 
unworkable, the public interest is greatly affected. The public loss 
consists of the slowing down of the innovative process, which is 
legalised by the grant of patent monopoly. 
The strong connection between patents and large companies is 
further indicated by Scherer who suggested that the number of patents 
taken out by firms increases with the size of firms[14]. However, 
the number of patents may also be an indication of increasing 
innovative activities undertaken by large firms, especially, those 
firms with relatively high R &'D activities. In such a case, patents 
are almost the byproduct of R&D activities. 
The increase of patenting in conjunction with the increase of 
firm's size is shown in Annex 1: 3 in three United Kingdom based 
industries: chemical, electronical engineering and machine tools 
industries. The same Annex shows that non-patenting in the three 
industries is relatively small as compared to patenting. The 
non-patenting section of the Annex may in fact indicate that whenever 
an invention is possible to keep as a trade secret, firms tend to 
ignore taking patents providing that concentration and barriers of 
entry were high; Since, to take patents' would only enforce an 
existing situation. Thus, 'the invention and the firm's interest 
become protected by the prevailing economic circumstances of the 
industry. 
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PATENT MONOPOLY VERSUS TRADE SECRET MONOPOLY 
Inventors whether individuals or corporates can protect their 
industrial knowledge, either by keeping the invention as a trade 
secret or by taking a patent. To secure a monopoly without a patent 
protection, the inventor has to include manufacturing in his 
activities. Apart from 'a certain degree of market power, a sizeable 
investment is required before protection can take place. 
The monopolistic position over competitors and potential profits 
may be lost if within a short period the invention becomes known to 
others. It is unlikely that individual inventors would gain an 
economic advantage from keeping their inventions as trade secrets 
since the above factors may not be available to them. Thus, the 
economic advantage of an invention which is kept secret will be 
demolished once it becomes public. 
If the inventor chooses to secure his invention through a patent 
monopoly, the advantages over competitors would be lost by the expiry 
date of the patent life, as the invention will be freely available to 
competitors. If the inventor is an individual or a small firm, the 
patent monopoly may not in itself represent a real protection as 
competitors will be alerted to the invention's values. In such a 
case, competitors might proceed to produce it, especially if the risk 
of litigation was less significant. 
The choice between either options depend on many complex issues 
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involving the invention in question, the rate in which technology is 
being developed in the field of the invention, the market position of 
the inventor and the current and future demand for the invention. If 
one assumes that an invention retains its coirmercial advantage, the 
loss to the inventor of keeping the invention as a trade secret or 
patenting it, is related to the time which passes between the date 
when the trade secret becomes known to others and the expiry date of 
the patent life [15]. In certain cases, the inventor can only keep 
his invention as a trade secret if the subject matter is unlikely to 
satisfy the patentability requirements. 
Fxually, the legal differences in both patents and trade secrets 
have advantages and drawbacks. Firstly, if the patent monopoly was 
to be favoured by the. inventor then such monopoly will be 
territorially limited to the granting country or countries. on the 
other hand, it gives the patent holder the right to, prevent others 
from using the patented-invention in those countries which he holds a 
patent for the whole life of the patent. Secondly, the conmercial 
benefits of trade secrets can be exploited worldwide with no 
territorial limitations and can continue to do so, as long as the 
invention is kept secret [16] , whereas trade secrets do not give the 
holder the right to prevent others from developing or using the 
invention[17]. 
Process and product inventions are quite difficult to keep 
secret since it is possible for competitors to break up the secracy 
through reverse engineering from products and services available in 
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the market. 
In certain industrial fields (i. e. engineering and electronics), 
more and more role is being given to unpatented technology. In such 
fields, the complexity of trade secrets is quite substantial which 
makes it more attractive for companies to rely on head start coupled 
with economies of scale. Equally, the shift from-market power 
through patenting to marketing techniques, product differentiation 
and advertising. 
Jacob Schmooker[18] has suggested that the number of privately 
hired inventors by corporations increased by sixfold in the United 
States between 1938-1954. In contrast, the number of patents taken 
out by corporates, increased only one of less than quarter. He cited 
the following reasons as the cause: (a) the hostil environment, 
politically and legally to patents; (b) slowness of the Patent office 
operations; (c) more corporate dependence upon, the advantage of the 
early start; and (d) more incentive input is needed per patent as 
technology becomes more complex. 
There are certain circumstances where keeping an invention as a 
trade secret may be favoured by corporates: 
(1) If the return on investment would be inefficient to justify 
the cost and risk of patenting119]. Such cost can be estimated from 
whether or not the market for a patented invention is limited, or if 
the invention was in a field where obsolescence is rapid which 
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makes it impossible to acheive a long run of production for a 
particular model. This was the case of the computer industry, where 
the fast improvement between 1950-1960, nearly led to the economic 
ruin of the industry and forced the British Government to intervene 
to save it(201. 
(2) If the company was contractually bound to license its 
patents in certain areas to competitors, but does not wish its 
competitors to be made aware of the invention, especially if the 
agreement does not apply to trade secrets. 
(3) If the invention was patented, and then ruled out as 
invalid. Or simply to avoid the risk of compulsory licensing which 
is required in many national laws, particularly when the company has 
no intention of working the invention in foreign countriest21]. 
However, no generalisation can hold when the discussion concerns 
patents, since it can be argued that patents are,, taken out by firms 
as a form of insurance designed to reduce uncertainty. In the sense 
that it might slow imitation by competitors, and that the coinercial 
position of a firm is defended by the continued development of 
further products and processes. 
There are those who argue that the grant of patent monopoly is 
not designed to induce inventors to invent, but rather to disclose 
their ideas, instead of keeping them as trade secrets. In order for 
social progress to take place in any society, knowledge becomes a 
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necessity. To ensure the flow of such knowledge, new ideas must 
appear continuously and if new ideas were not disclosed, new 
inventions would not become a part of the public stock of knowledge. 
So, the choice appears to be, between full disclosure rewarded by the 
patent monopoly, or a secret practice, to the extent and with all the 
safeguards that inventor's ingenuity can devise. 
Patents if fully disclosed are a priceless background record of 
information which provides each industry with a chronological 
description of its particular art. Difficulties can be forseen in 
advance, the path for related research may be followed, and new 
inventions may be discovered rapidly, thus saving both money and 
time. The user of disclosed information pay nothing for R&D which 
went into it, nothing for the instruction and nothing for the cost of 
failure. If inventions were kept secret, all such freely available 
information would need more money and time to gain access to it. 
However, the question of free information is ambiguous since it is 
not clear whether it is free for all or only in those countries where 
patents were taken out.. 
Nonetheless, exanipls exist where information disclosed through 
patent specification after it has expired has led to valuable 
research in the pharmaceutical industry where the improved drug may 
not have been discovered had the earlier invention not been 
disclosed[22]. 
For an invention to add to the public stock of knowledge it has 
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to be disclosed to an extent where a qualified person in th field can 
put the discovery into practice. If secrecy can be maintained, 
inventors are likely to keep their invention secret, it follows that 
the patent monopoly could in fact restrict the use of invention which 
cannot be kept secret anyway, rather than to disclose inventions. 
Even when patents are taken out, little is disclosed since examiners 
in patent offices and their experts are unlikely to have as much 
knowledge as those of a particular technological field. Thus, the 
exchange of patent monopoly for disclosure may be a one sided 
exchange: patent monopoly for secrecy. This is the case, when the 
disclosed information is insufficient as not to add to the public 
stock of technological knowledge. 
PATENTS AND THE PRODUCTION OF TECHNOLOGY 
The issue of the role of patents in the production of technology 
in our century may not be fully understood without taking into 
account the changing circumstances between the role of science and 
technology. In the past, technological innovations and improvements 
were largely the result of individuals with little or no scientific 
training. The link between science and technology was slight in the 
sense that research'was not a function of manufacturing [231. Pure 
science was separated from the production process and was 
autonomously developed, not because it was independent of society but 
because it was related to ideological superstructure rather than 
serving the production base[241. 
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At present, the link between science and technology has become 
increasingly close. The days of the individual inventors may have 
passed and in their place came industrial research laboratories. 
Inventors have become absorbed in research institutions, their skill 
highly evaluated and surrounded by expensive equipments. Patented 
technology is no longer the result of creative effort by individuals. 
It has become a captive technology, - to the extent that it can be 
anticipated in advance. As a result of these changes, science has 
passed into direct service of technology through the closer 
association between the two fields and inventions have become less 
and less the result of genius flash, but rather a deliberate design. 
The decrease of individual inventor's role in the process of 
technology production is being replaced by the increasing state 
support for R&D projects carried out by private enterprises. 
(A) The individual inventor-, 
The discussion of the individual inventor in its modern form 
owes much to Jewkes, Sawers and Stillerman in their-book "The Source 
of Inventions" [25]. The main conclusion in this was that individual 
inventors continue to play an important role in providing the society 
with new inventions, despite the increase of corporate R&D. 
A sharp conflict of opinions exists between those who suggest 
that individual -inventors are about to leave the scene or have 
already done so(26], and those who think that the days are by no 
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means over[271. 
Patent statistics are assumed to provide strong evidence of the 
dissappearance of individual inventors. Statistics show that the 
increase of firms inventions in the 20th Century is not only in terms 
of patents taken out by firms, but also in terms of the steady rising 
proportion of the total. In the United States, it is estimated that 
the proportion of corporate patents has risen from . 18% in the 
beginning of this century to over 60%. Similarly, in the United 
Kingdom, the corporate proportion has risen from 15% in 1913 to 70% 
in 1960) [28]. When patent statistics concern single industrial 
fields, they tend to show that in some sectors, the role of 
individual inventors may have ceased to exist(29). 
However, the reliability of patent statistics is being doubted 
by Jewkes on the grounds that not every corporate invention is 
patented while almost all individual inventor's inventions will be 
patented and that there is no evidence to show that corporates rely 
more on patents or trade secrets. Equally, there is no way to show 
how the rigorous standards of patentability have affected the 
individual corporate ratio, as what was patentable earlier may not be 
so today. These two grounds may not weaken the fact that the role of 
individual inventors in the production of technology is becoming less 
and less important. The fact that there is no evidence to show the 
rely of corporates on trade secrets may in itself suggest that 
corporates share is higher than what we know. As to the more 
rigorous standards of patentability, it might be true that the vast 
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existing body of knowledge had led to stronger examination systems, 
which in turn rendered the patentability of inventions more 
difficult. once again, patent laws do not discriminate between 
individuals and corporates inventions. However, in practice the 
position of a corporate may well lead to an easier claim of patents. 
The individual inventor over whose work no one has any control, 
who chooses his own field of research, who employs his own resources 
may not continue to exist in the future or only in a small number. 
This is mainly due to the fact that inventors require financial' 
backing to test out ideas and to change ideas as well. Finally, 
because the individual inventor may not be able to make living out of 
his work, especially in sectors where costly and complex equipments 
are needed. . 
(B) The Role of the State in R&D 
In all industrialised nations, governments-work to promote and 
shape technological development. Each has concluded that free action 
of the market may not be sufficient to achieve the desired long term 
of technological strength and independence. Accordingly, the 
structure and the functioning of scientific and technological systems 
constitute an essential function of the state in most industrialised 
countries. 
The theoretical justification of the state's intervention is 
based on the economic characteristics of knowledge as goods and the 
uncertainty relating to its production due to the indivisibility and 
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non-appropriation which characterise knowledge, and also because of 
the nature of economic systems in the capitalist framework, and the 
imperfection of the market. As a result, the optimal allocation of 
resources to the production of technology cannot be met or assured by 
the market mechanisml30]. 
The funding of scientific R&D by the State conceived in the 
present time as an investment in the infrastructure was not 
traditionally granted to the state. The intervention by the state 
can be seen at two levels, that of the global organisation of 
scientific system, and that of the articulation between scientific 
and industrial system. In this articulation, it is obvious that R& 
D expenditure attached to national defence plays an important role in 
so much as, to exercise influence on the sectorial structure of 
industrial R&D. 
The contemporary methods according' to'which technology or 
knowledge is inserted into the production system are characterised by 
(i) the role of the state at times in the funding of industrial R&D 
is a direct support for certain sectors and large enterprises in 
relation with miliary expenditure. The objectives to which public 
finance of R&D is directed in the United States, United Kindom, 
Japan and West Germany are shown in Annex 1: 4. (ii) The 
concentration of R&D resources in certain sectors, and large 
enterprises which control the technological changes; and (iii) the 
orientation of R&D towards new products, an orientation which tends 
. to be attached to the size of enterprises and the intensity of the 
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sector technologically. 
Based on Annex 1: 4, two forms of state intervention can be 
distinguished. Cne one hand, Japan and West Germany, the military 
sector's influence is not as apparent as in the other three 
countries. The intervention is directed towards the institution of 
favourable climate, concerned with the support given to fundamental 
research and associated research of community services (i. e. health, 
anti- pollution). Equally, the intervention is designed to 
compensate for the weakness'of private sector initiative in these 
fields and others, to create a generating infrastructure of external 
benefits. It is possible to think of this intervention in terms of 
socialisation of cost and risks, specially the support of basic R& 
D[31] .` 
On the othe hand, state intervention in France, UK and US 
correspond to a transfer of public funds to the private sector, 
either by complementing enterprises effort, or as an aid to specific 
projects [321 
The direction of public finance, makes clear that the 
orientation of industrial research - (carried out by enterprises) - 
is largely dependent on the objective set-up for public funded R&D. 
The social demand expressed through these objectives, notably in 
matters of defence, influence in a decisive manner the creation and 
distribution of technology. The effect'of public funding of R&D is 
to reduce cost and riskst331, which' private enterprises have 
supported and to render very important projects possible for the 
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private sector. The abridging of the delay between a basic idea and 
its comercial development which shows the evolution of innovation in 
the 20th century is attributed to State intervention despite heavy 
cost[34]. 
State intervention in support of R&D is re-enforced by the 
fact that the state acts as a client of the new products. The 
sectorial studies published by the O. E. C. D. in 1970, on technological 
gaps, underline the stimulating role by the public market in the 
field of electronics for example[35]. The development of a number of 
new branches was based on the principle of initial market which 
allowed enterprises to amortize the cost of research and to become 
later competitive in civil market. The space defence demand in the 
United States did not only stimulate the growth of the semiconductor 
and computer industries but also helped to stimulate and maintain 
competition in these fields [36J . 
Apart from the economic impact, resulting from state inervention 
in the development and growth of high technology, the specification 
set by the military agencies and NASA accelerated the learning and 
improved production processes. Specifications set up by military and 
space agencies for the type of components they required, prompted 
competitors to develop semiconductors at least as good if not better. 
The articulation between scientific and technological systems on 
one hand and the industrial system on the other have led to the 
concentration of resources of some large corporations and certain 
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sectors, as well as the orientation of product's innovation. When 
the two are attached to the behaviour of enterprises in an oligopoly 
situation, the result becomes obvious: the sectors and enterprises 
where R&D is concentrated, control and orient the technological 
changes. In such circumstances, competition is characterised by the 
existence of barriers of entry in the branch and by the behaviour of 
enterprises in matters of pricet371. The rejection of price 
competition and the acceptance of price fixing becomes the principle. 
New equipments become slowly adopted and only when there is an 
increase in demand that the enterprises of the sector may decide to 
adopt new equignents. This is due to the fact that the existence of 
barriers of entry govern the threat of new enterprises coming to the 
branch utilising new equipments and producing cheaper. 
The situation is different in the other form of technological 
changes "product innovation". In this category of technology the 
freedom in fixing the price of new products represents a more 
favourable occasion for increasing the profit by introducing it to 
the market as soon as possible. The concentration of R&D in 
certain sectors is explained by the type of competition associated 
with the concentration of production. The sectors with intensive R& 
D (electric, chemistry, Aeronautic and electronics) are characterised 
by the oligopolistic structure of the market and the possibility to 
play product differentiation [38], In these sectors, the technology 
does not constitute only an external barrier destined to prevent 
entry of competitors to the market, but also an internal one, since 
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it allows those firms to control the technical changes of products 
and processes. In other terms, technology in an oligopolistic 
structure has a double function, thus the aid of the state to those 
sectors in the form of public funding of R&D; assured demand and 
technological specifications amount to the support to enterprises 
confronted with competition [39]" 
The sectors where R&D is concentrated are also the sectors 
where the oligopolistic competition prevails. Consequently, the 
technological creation in these sectors covers the form of product 
innovation in conformity with an oriented strategy toward improvong 
the retained part of the market and the increasing of profit margins. 
While in modern industries technological changes take the form of 
improving products, in the traditional sectors techncial changes are 
related to improving processes and equipment. Thus, the increase in 
productivity in the latter sector is attached to the elevation of 
capitalistic intensity. The different occurrence of technological 
changes between the two sectors may on one hand explain the 
phenomenon of differential increase between industrial activities. 
Also, on the other hand, the relaive play in the evolution of prices 
and the spreading of productivity benefits between industrial 
branches. 
The unequal dynamism of the process of technology production of 
national economies can be explained through the analysis of the main 
features of the production of technology. 
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(a) The state intervention - (the government's overall expenditure 
on R& D) is a measure of commitment closely involved with the 
innovation process. The organisation of research in technical and 
scientific systems correspond to the institutionalisation of 
technological products. 
(b) The degree of state intervention in organising the different 
system as a national system determines the character of technological 
production and international concentration of resources devoted to R 
&D which is the main source of technological progress. As well as 
the inequality of development, it also results in the techncial 
changes being very inequally divided among nations. 
(c) The inequality in the production of technology is the obvious 
result of the concentration of such production at international, 
sectorial and enterprise levels. 
State intervention in the production of technology goes beyond 
the mere subsidisation of R&D, either by assuming directly a 
proportion of R&D, or by stimulating innovation through the 
awarding of governmental contracts to private enterprises. Or by 
granting aid to. private individual projects to include education,. 
scientific and technological information and tax incentive either 
applied to R&D only or to the purchase of sites and equipments. 
Equally important are the policies of the state with relation to the 
general condition of competition, such as anti-monopolies laws which 
are designed to stimulate competition which is in return favourable 
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to innovation. However most probably, the oldest form of state 
intervention in stimulating new technologies is the grant of patent 
monopolies. 
NATIONAL PATENT LAWS 
The extent of patent protection differs from one country to 
another. The main aspects and the fundamental differences among 
national patent legislations are discussed below, taking as examples 
the French and the US patent laws. 
(i) Examination versus Registration: In France, the patent grant 
may be issued regardless of whether or not the claimed invention was 
patentable and noval. The'only situation where a patent grant can be 
refused is if the invention was expressly excluded by law[40]. The 
question of the validity of the-granted patent is left to the courts 
to decide, as the examination of the application is'merely a check on 
whether the application and accompanying documents are in proper 
form[41]. If the requirements are satisfied, the application is then 
subjected to examination for novelty and inventive merits after which 
a documentation report is issued. The report is only of an advisory 
nature and not binding on the applicant. Whereas in the United 
States, an exhaustive examination system to establish the invention 
sought to be patented is in operation. The emphasis under the 
examination system is based on the official search whih include 
novelty[42], unobviousness[43], foreign patents[44] , and 
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relevant literature. 
Under either the registration or the-examination systems, the 
ultimate test of patent validity is at court, since the law does not 
say to the patentee that his invention is entitled to protection but 
rather that the patentee is entitled to protect his invention. 
However, it appears tha under the examination system if a patent was 
granted in most cases it will prove to be valid[45]. The fact that 
the applicant is heard in secret without a record or an obligation to 
disclose the facts. to his application has led to many criticisms of 
the American system. Such criticism was summed up by Justice Fortas 
as follows: - 
"Most judges, rightly or wrongly, are inclined to think 
that a strong well financed applicant has pretty good 
chance of getting at least some patent claims allowed some- 
where along the line, and they don't have much confidence 
in the process or respect for the results"[461 
Most of the critics of the US examination system tend to compare 
it to the examination system of West Germany. For example, the 
numbers of issued patents to US residents between September 30,1977 
and September 30, '1978 was 70,292 patents out of 108,744 
applications [471; or approximately 70% of applications were granted 
patents. In sharp contrast only 18,290 patents were granted in West 
Germany out of 60,095 applications in 1975(48]; or 30.4% of all 
applications were granted patents. The lower percentage in West 
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Germany is due to the fact that it has the most rigorous examination 
system of patents which allows for public opposition, where 
competitors seek to destroy applications conflicting with their 
interest. A West German patent application is judged on the 
following criteria: novelty, progress in the art and inventive merit, 
the latter being the major cause for rejecting applications. 
Although the same criteria are required by the American Patent Law 
inventive merit does not play a major role. The high nullification 
of US patents seems to be caused by the fact that a US patent is so 
specific which makes it easy to nullify and to determine an 
infringement; while a West German patent is based on more general 
principles which is in favour of the patentee and rendering the 
patent more difficult to nullify. 
(ii) Fist to file versus first to invent: Only the United States, 
Canada, and Philippines have a priority system, which determines who 
should receive the patent grant if more than. one individual have 
applied. Under the US Patent Law if an inventor can prove that he 
conceived the concept first, even though he had filed later, the 
patent monopoly shall be granted to him. The first to invent 
principle is deemed to have its justification from the individual 
point of view in the United States tradition since it avoids 
iniquities which may result from a race to the patent office if the 
first to file was adopted. Thus, in the US if a conflict between two 
inventors rises each claiming the same invention, the patent grant 
goes to the one who can prove that he was first to invent[49]. 
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In France, the right to the patent grant belongs to the first to 
apply[501; assuming that the first to invent is likely to be the 
first to apply. 
Less developing countries "LDCs", or at least those who are 
members of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property of 1883, may avoid the full implications of the priority 
rights envisaged under Article 4 of the Convention if they were to 
adopt the first to invent principle. It is possible that an 
invention can be conceived first in LDCs, but because of the slow 
experimentation in these countries an inventor from a member country 
with a priority right of 12 months and more facilities would 
certainly beat the L DC inventor to the Patent Office. 
(iii) Comp sory Licensing The non-working of the patented 
invention is recognised under the French Patent law as a ground for 
compulsory licensing. The applicant for such a license must prove 
that he has not been able to obtain a license from the patentee and 
that he can work efficiently[51]. A compulsory, license may be 
granted after three years from the grant or four. years from the 
application, if without legitimate reasons the patented invention has 
not been worked effectively or the working has been disrupted for 
more than one year [52]" Compulsory licensing can also be applied for 
in cases when a holder of improvement patent to a patented invention 
by another patentee cannot work his improved invention without a 
license from the earlier patentee. Equally it applies when the 
earlier patentee cannot work his invention in its improved form 
without a license from the owner of the improved patent. 
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In the United States, compulsory licensing is not allowed in 
most cases and the working of the patented invention is left to the 
patentee's discretion(53]. Th epatentee has no duty other than to 
spread the description of the invention on the record of the Patent 
Office. So, as soon as the patent expires the invention will be 
freely available to the public. He has no duty whatsoever to publish 
his invention to introduce it during the life of the patent. If the 
inventor chooses to leave the invention unused, there is no law in 
the United States to stop him from doing so. 
It is doubtful, whether the US Patent law with regards to the 
non-working of patented inventions contributes in any way to the 
constitutional objective "... to promote the progress of science and 
useful art ,... 
"[54]. It is deemed necessary to impose upon the 
patentee the obligation to work the invention or let others work it 
under a license. Such necessity is based on the fact that the 
patentee monopoly is primarily granted to encourage industrial 
progress to an extent where the grant amounts to an implicit contract 
between the state and the patentee. Thus, to allow for the benefit 
of the invention to spread in the community, the grant of a patent 
Monopoly implies that the patentee does exploit his invention in the 
granting country. 
However, one may argue that the industrial progress is achieved 
despite the non-exploitation of the invention since the invention 
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becomes freely available at the end of the patent life. But, when 
one takes into account the rate at which technological changes are 
taking place in many industrial sectors, the argument cannot be held 
valid. The rapidity of the change makes it more likely that an 
invention becomes obsolete before the expiry date of the patent life. 
Consequently, no public benefit would have been derived from the 
patent monopoly. 
Despite the foregoing argument the non-working of national 
patents does not provide any serious problems within national 
boundaries. The issue of non-working of patents is appropriately 
discussed within the context of the non-use of foreign patents in 
IDCs in Chapter Two. 
Other aspects of the French Patent Law which cannot be found in 
the American system include the certificate of utility and the annual 
registration fees. Under Article 3, the certificate of utility - 
sometimes known as a petty patent -, is limited to six years and can 
be taken out for any minor invention or improvement other than 
medicine[55]. More important, patent holders are required under the 
French Patent Law to pay an annual registration fee. The annual 
registration fee is designed to discourage firms and inventors from 
obtaining patents and using them for monopoly purposes without their 
exploitation. It also adds to the overall social cost of acquiring 
patents on products that are not made available to the economy in 
general. The provisions of annual fees were described by E. 
Mansfield as having the effect of serving to weed out worthless 
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patents[57]. Scherer agrees with such conclusion and argues that 
this provision of the law forces patent holders each year to assess 
whether or not it is worth maintaining their exclusive rights[58]. 
It might be possible that a significant number of patents are 
eliminated from the registry because of the annual fees 
provisions[59]. However, such provisions may not have a great impact 
in eliminating monopoly power, since companies will continue to pay 
fees for significant patents. 
In both French and the American Patent Laws, the patent grant is 
designed to allow for a monopoly which is not limited in its scope to 
a reasonable return on investment, but rather offers very large 
profits to the patent holders. It protects the patentee's local 
market from imports and acts as an aid to the holder in gaining entry 
or remaining in foreign markets. To sum up both laws prohibit 
competition in the patented invention and that is the real reward to 
patent holders. 
THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 
Under the principle of territoriality, the exclusive patent 
monopoly is only applicable within the boundaries of the country that 
conferred it. Furthermore, all legal dealings concerning the patent 
grant maust be determined by the laws of that country. Accordingly, 
the protection of foreigners in the field of industrial property, 
prior to 1883, depended mainly on reciprocity between states. The 
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dissimilarities among national legislations meant that foreign 
inventors were met with greater and sometimes insurmountable 
obstacles to the protection of their inventions in foreign 
countries [60] . 
.A widespread awareness began for the formulation of minimum 
rules and standards and to provide as much as possible uniform 
protection for inventors, which were to be observed by different 
countries. The development of manufacturing, communication 
industries and commerce in the 19th century, created new relations 
and new interests among nations. Thus, "when the intenational trade 
became critical to the economic life of what were then the major 
countries it became increasingly obvious that national regimes of 
exclusive rights in industrial and intellectual property in countries 
other than those of the inventor and innovators had to be 
Many countries felt the need of making use of the 
knowledge and experience, acquired in other countries which enacted 
industrial property rights before them[621. In the words of LADAS, 
the international protection was "still primitive"[63] prior to the 
Paris Convention of 1883 and non-nationals still suffered from the 
effects of the dissmilarities of national property laws. 
The first attempt to lessen the difficulties inherent in the 
principle of territoriality was the Convention for the International 
Protection of Industrial Property - better known as The Paris Union 
of 1883. The industrial power nations at that time played a major 
role in the evolution of the international patents regime[641. 
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It is important to note that from the start there was opposing 
views with regards to the grant of a patent monopoly. The opposition 
was not based on the improvement of the patent regime, but rather on 
its abolition [65]. In England the patent Law was brought up for 
consideration two hundred years after it was first introduced in the 
Statute of Monopolies of 1623[66]. In Germany the position was 
almost unanimous in condemning the patent protection[67]. 
The organisers of the Vienna Conference of 1873 were aware that 
in a competitive economy, the world could not be half with patent 
protection and the other half without it. Under such circumstances, 
the patent monopoly in the granting countries becomes a non- 
profitable restriction since the same invention without limitation or 
price increase becomes a common property in the neighbouring non- 
patent protection countries[681. 
The 1873 Conference settled the issue of patents versus no 
patents by adopting a resolution which affirmed that the right of the 
inventor "should be protected by all civilised nations"[691. Another 
dispute involved the US who supported the notion of patents as a 
private property right and the host country Austria who viewed 
patents as a public policy instrument, and thus allows for the 
forfeiture of patent rights, if local manufacturing did not begin one 
year from the grant of monopoly. The problem was whether or not the 
patentee has the right to lock up his invention and not allow anybody 
to use it. At the end, the notion of patents as a property right was 
adopted by most of the European countries except Germany, Holland and 
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Switzerland'701. Nonetheless, as previously explained, the notion of 
patents as a public policy instrument appears to prevail in most 
present patent legislations, of both developed and developing nations. 
The International (Paris) Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property of 1883 was adopted on March 20,1883, and cane 
into force a year later, on July 7,18841711. The Convention is 
governed by four major Articles relating to: - 
1. National Treatment: 
Under Article 2(1), the reciprocity of treatment for individuals 
and states was rejected by the Convention and instead the equal 
treatment principle was endorsed: 
"Nationals of each of the countries of the Union shall, 
with regards to the protection of industrial property, 
enjoy in all other countries of the Union the advantages 
that their respective Laws now grant or may thereafter 
grant to nationals without prejudice to the rights 
specially provided by the present convention"[721. 
According to this provision, a patent holder in a country is 
subjected to the laws of that country with regards to patent 
protection and intellectual property in general and not to the laws 
of his country. In practice a patent holder from a non-member of the 
Union enjoys the same benefits in the member country since the 
provision does not allow him to claim the same treatment he receives 
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at home. If the holder was allowed to receive different treatment, 
local competitors may be affected in cases where the home treatment 
contains more economic advantages than those which exist in the 
country where the patent is taken out. 
2. Import Monopoly: 
Article 5(a) provides that importation of patented articles in 
the countries where patents are taken out cannot be ground for the 
forfeiture of patents. In other terms, such provision appears to 
suggest that the monopoly to import should prevail, or that the 
patent monopoly is in fact a license to import. Since without such 
provision, the foreign patentee will be forced to set up 
manufacturing facilities in each of the countries where he chooses to 
take patents. 
3. The Priority Right: 
Under the privisions of Article 4, inventors are allowed to 
acquire patents in all member countries with a 12 months period limit 
of priorityt731. Within one year from the filing date in the country 
of origin, the patentee must apply in the Union member countries if 
foreign patenting is considered. The priority right is designed to 
overcome the disadvantages of prior publication which would destroy 
patentability. Thus,. the inventor can with the help of the priority 
right principle take patents in more than one country. If no 
priority right exists, inventors will be forced to file a single 
application. Such single application may be filed in countries where 
it would be of greatest value to him. If such 
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proposition was allowed to occur, it could lead to the concentration 
of knowledge in few leading countries, mainly in the industrial power 
nations. 
However, the assumption that technological knowledge will be 
concentrated without the priority right principle is misleading since 
it is already concentrated in the industrialised nations. Further- 
more, technological knowledge still can be transferred through 
licensing agreements which may be an effective instrument of 
combating abuses of non-working of patents and their use as import 
licenses. 
4. The Independence of Patents: 
The independence of patents principle is an inevitable 
consequence of the fact that countries remain free to decide for 
themselves on matters such as patentability, renewal duration and so 
on. In this respect, the principle is consistent with the notion of 
each country settling down its own standards with regards to the 
grant of patent monopoly. However, the result of such dependence 
means when a patent is invalidated in one country it will not be 
automatically invalidated in other countries. This is due to the 
fact that the patent life is governed by the laws of the granting 
state rather than the-country of origin. 
Finally, the Paris Convention as a whole appears to be designed 
to favour large companies. It is unlikely that the convention could 
have a significant impact on either individual inventors or small 
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firms, since the international scale of operations may be beyond 
their means. The only way in which they may benefit from the 
international protection of patents could be in the. nature of 
bonuses. 
The picture is different for multinational companies for which 
research and development efforts are directed at world wide markets 
and international operations are an essential element of companies 
structure. Thus, the international protection of patents would 
certainly have positive effect on their incentive to invent. These 
advantages are further enhanced by the independence principle as the 
chances of acquiring at least one patent through worldwide 
application are higher than for a company with a single application. 
The Paris Convention of 1883, although remains the cornerstone 
of the present international protection of industrial, property is by 
no means the only effort in this field. Various international and 
regional agreements have come into being since. 
A- INPFRNATIONAL AGREEMEN'T'S 
1. The Convention for Establishing the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation: 
The WIPO Convention was adopted at Stockholm in 1967 by the same 
diplomatic conference which revised the Paris Convention for the 
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sixth time[741. It contains no substantive treaty Obligations 
concerning the national laws of member states in the field of 
intellectual property. Unlike any other convention, it is open to 
non-member states of any of the Unions which WIPO administers [751. 
By virtue of the Convention WIPO is entrusted with (i) the promotion 
of the protection of industrial and intellectual property worldwide, 
and (ii) to ensure administrative cooperation among Unions 
established by multilateral agreements for the promotion of 
intellectual property[76]. 
2. The Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the International Patent 
Classification: 
The Strasbourg Agreement was concluded in March 1971, as a 
special agreement within the framework of the Paris Convention. 
However, the International Patent Classification (IPC) itself has 
been in force among certain states belonging to the Council of Europe 
since 1968(77]. Since the majority of national patent laws consider 
that a patent issued in another country is prior art, the patent 
examiner of the country where the application is filed must search 
out all patents closely related to an application. Thus, examiners 
faced a difficult and a time consuming job because of the different 
systems of classification employed by countries worldwide. Zb ease 
this task, the Strasbourg Agreement provides for a system to be 
known as the "International Patent Classification" (IPC). 
Under the IPC, technology is divided, into eight main sections. 
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The eight sections are divided into classes, which are themselves 
further divided into approximately 51,000 subdivisions [781. These 
classification symbols are reserved for national patent offices and 
appear on patent documents (published patent applications or patent 
grants)[791. The IPC Agreement is in itself an element without which 
it would be more difficult to image the Patent Cooperation Treaty. 
3. The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT): 
In order to extend its bilateral approach of search(801 into a 
broad-based international approach, the United states proposed at the 
executive meeting of the Paris Union on September 29,1966 "that the 
Director of the BIRPI undertake urgently a study on solutions tending 
to reduce the duplication of effort both for the applicant and 
national patent offices ... "[81]. 
The PCT provides for a "Union for cooperation in the filing, 
searching and examination of applications for the protection of 
inventions" [82]. The PCT, basically, aims at reducing the cost and 
complxity of international filing of patent applications for both the 
applicant and national patent offices and the applicant(83]. The 
saving of effort for national offices would primarily consist of 
receiving search reports and possibly also preliminary* examination 
reports, both of which would considerably reduce the work of 
examiners. As to the applicant, the PCT allows him to file a single 
application (in one place, in one language, for one set of fees) 
which will have the effect of a national application, in each and all 
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of the contracting states in which he is seeking protection. 
The PCT consists of three features: internal application, 
international search and internaitonal preliminary examination. The 
first two features constitute what is known as the "First Phase" of 
the PCT. Equally, these two features are inseparable in the sense 
that the only way for an applicant to get an international search is 
through international filing of applications, and that all 
international applications are subject to international search(84]. 
The third feature - international preliminary examination constitute 
"Phase II" of the Treaty and is optional. Any contracting state 
could decide not to adhere to his "Second phase" of the Treaty and 
each applicant could decide not to take advantage of the 
international preliminary examination[85]. 
The Fist Phase provides for the filing of international 
application by the applicant in his national patent office (the 
Receiving Office) where protection is sought in several 
countries[861. The Receiving office would check the application to 
see whether or not it complied with the minimum requirement which 
would enable it to acquire a filing date[87]. The same receiving 
office would send a copy of the international application (record 
copy) to the International Bureau and a "search copy" to the 
Searching Authority and one copy "home copy" shall be kept by the 
receiving officel881. 
It is expected that the International Patent Institute1891 
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will be one of the Searching and Preliminary Examining Authorities. 
However, Article 16(2) is so constructed that even the establishment 
of a single International Searching Authority could be instituted if 
the Contracting States desired so[901. The Searching Authority would 
try to discover any relevant prior art and would establish a report 
(search report)(911. The search report would first be transmitted to 
the applicant and the International BureauE92l, then together with 
the application it would be sent to the designated Contracting 
States. 
Under this First Phase, the filing of international application 
wuold have two legal effects. (i) It would have the effect of a 
national application within each and all the designated contracting 
parties. The practical consequence of this is that the application 
could cause the existence of applications in many countries by filing 
a single application in one language and paying a set of fees. (ii) 
The processing of applications before national patent offices would 
not start at least until the expiration of 20 months - (except at the 
express request of the applicant) -, and normally until the 
international search report has become available[931. Thus the 
national processing will start under far more advantageous conditions 
for both the applicant and the national patent offices. For the 
applicant there would be a more informed opinion of the value of his 
inventions, while for national offices the examination task would 
have been partly completed - (namely, the searching for prior art). 
The Second Phase - international preliminary examination is 
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optional in the sense that any contracting state could decide not to 
adhere to those provisionst941 and each applicant could decide 
whether or not to take advantage of this PhaseI951. By. contrast to 
searching the international preliminary examination is a highly 
subjective procedure which allows the Preliminary Examining 
Authorityt961 to determine it, on the basis of the prior art 
discovered, the claimed invention met standards of worldwide 
non-obviousness, usefulness (industrially acceptable) and was 
novel[97]. The international preliminary examination report, apart 
from being non-binding[98], would not contain any statement on the 
question of whether or not the claimed invention is patentable 
according to any national law(991. The earlier PCT draft of 1967 had 
envisaged the issuance of an International Certificate of 
Patentability [100], However, such term was abandoned in the signed 
Treaty because it proved impossible to unify substantive patent law 
with regards to the applicability of the criteria of novelty, 
inventive advance and industrial application[101]. 
The only legal effect of adhering to the Second Phase would be 
as already indicated - that the processing of the application before 
national offices would be delayed at least until the expiration of 25 
months[102] and normally until the international preliminary 
examination report has become-available. Otherwise, the Treaty makes 
no provision for the national phase. 
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THE MAIN ADVANTAGES OF THE PCT 
The major advantages of the PCr concerns the benefits to be 
gained by both the applicants and the national examining patents 
offices which are almost exclusively connected with industrialised 
countries. However, the Treaty, also contains significant advantages 
for developing countries. 
Firstly, the applicant would have more time to make up his mind 
in selecting the foreign countries in which he wants . to seek 
protection. He would also spend less in terms of cost prior to the 
grant of patent than at present[103]. Both the search report and 
international preliminary examination report helps the applicant to 
make up his. mind on whether it is worthwhile, continuing his effort 
and to press for national patents. 
Secondly, the national examining Patent offices would be able to 
make substantial economies, since most of the work of searching and 
part of the examination for applications by-foreigners, will become 
available through search and preliminary examination reports. It is 
important to note that in the overwhelming majority of countries 
foreign applications exceed the national ones (except in the United 
States, japan and West Germany)(1041, but even-in these countries the 
number of foreign applications is in itself impressive. Whether 
national patent offices follow a system of examination or 
registration, such offices under the Treaty would make economies in 
the cost of handling applications, as their work of verification 
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would become practically superfluous. 
Thridly, for developing countries the "dilemma between the 
danger of a distorted patent system and the practical difficulty if 
not impossibility, of marshalling the broad range of highly qualified 
technicians and scientific source materials which would be needed to 
permit an adequate novelty, ssearch" [105], finds a solution within the 
framework of the PCT. Furthemore, the majority of developing 
countries have a non-examination system coupled with a high rate of 
foreign patenting. Therefore, the chance of granting worthless 
patents by developing countries cannot be ruled out by expertise 
examination and courts as in the developed countries[106]. 
Based on these facts, the PCT may offer a practical solution to 
a practical problem, since manpower and scientific materials would 
not be required to make a novelty search or even preliminary 
examination [107]. However, this solution embodies a continuous 
dependence in matters of search and examination if it is to be taken 
other than a short term solution. Although the Treat (Art 51) 
provides for the establishment of a Committee for Technical 
Assistance, to help the Contracting developing countries in 
developing their patent systems (to train specialists, to loan 
experts and to supply equipment), it does not totally, satisfy the 
expectation of developing countries. The treaty could have included 
more positive and specific provisions with regards to such 
assistance, for example to make it obligatory for the International 
Searching and Preliminary Examining Authorities to take trainees from 
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developing countries. 
Nonetheless, under the PCT, the patent systems of developing 
countries would not be distorted since the international application 
accompanied by search and preliminary examination reports would give 
a high degree of reliability to their patent grants. In other terms, 
the PCT may protect developing countries from granting unjustified 
monopoly restrictions to foreign applicants [308]" 
B- REGIONAL AGREEMENTS 
One of the earliest regional agreements in the field of 
industrial property was the Montevideo's Convention on Patents of 
invention of January 16,1889[109]. This Convention provided for 
reciprocal treatment and a priority right of one year[110]. A 
subsequent and more significant inter American Convention of 
Inventions was signed at Buenos Aires on August 20,1910 and has been 
into force since[111]. It is modelled on the Paris Convention (i. e. 
adopted the principle of national treatment, priority right and 
independence of patents embodied in the said Convention), and remains 
in force among 14 states including the United States. A further 
Convention was signed at Caracas on July . 18,1911[112], 
between the 
countries which form the present Andean Pact. Anyone obtaining a 
patent for the first time in any of the five countries will enjoy 
national treatment, providing he registers his patent within the 
maximum period of two years. These agreements allow a 
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non-member of the Paris Union to obtain some benefits of the Union 
and at the same time remain free to deal only with selected countries 
(i. e. Bolivia which is not a member of the Paris Union but a member 
of the Buenos Aires Convention of 1910). 
In Europe there have been several conventions which unlike other 
conventions were not limited to easing some of the disadvantages of 
territoriality, but also attempted to unify certain aspects of patent 
laws. Among these, the European Convention on the International 
Classification of Patents for Invention of 1954 and which has been 
transformed into an international agreement - (the Strasbourg 
Agreement). The Council of Europe which is composed of a majority of 
Western European countries, has taken several steps towards the 
harmonisation of patents[113]. The initial step towards 
harmonisation was the European Convention Relating to the Formalities 
Required for Patent Applications signed at Paris on December 11, 
1953[114]. The last and most ambitious step taken by the Council was 
the European Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of 
Substantive Iaw on Patents for Invention, signed at Strasbourg on 
November 27,19631115]. The Convention provides for certain uniform 
principles such as the definition of novelty and patentability. The 
provisions embodying these principles makes the Convention less 
likely to be adopted in the near future, since they necessitate 
changes in the patent laws of several member states. 
However, the first European attempt to construct a completely 
new supernational patent system was the European Patent Convention 
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(EPC) of 1973[116]. The EPC provides for the establishment of an 
European Patent Office and European patent[117]. 
To further the economic and political integration among EEC 
countries, the Community Patent Convention (CPC) was signed in 
1976[118]. Unlike the EPC, the CPC is not yet in force, and is 
unlikely to be so for some considerable time[119]. By contrast with 
EPC, the CPC provides for a unitary patent grant throughout the EEC 
menbers[120]. The community patents is in effect an European patent, 
which is governed by the EPC provisions and enjoys a unitary 
character within the EEC[121]. 
In Africa, efforts to obtain greater unification and 
administration of patents has been implemented by the African and 
Malayasy Industrial Property Convention[1221 - (Office Africain et 
Malgache de la Propriete Industrielle (OAMPI)) signed at Libreville 
on September 13,1962[1231. The main principles on which the 
Libreville Accord is based are centralisation, protection and 
sovereignty of each of the member states and complete equality among 
them. A Central Patent Office was initiated by the Accord located at 
Ya Ounde (CAMEBCQN) which has the duty to register the filing of 
applications, to apply the administrative procedure and issue patent 
grants that are effective in each member state. However, those 
rights are regarded as a separate national right for which the courts 
of specific countries are competent[124]. 
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THE INFLUENCE OF PATENT PJX7 = ON, ACOGRD]T TO THE SIZE OF CCt' PANIES, 
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC GF GEM M 
Discoveries, the Discoveries the 
Company Size company would have company would have not 
Annual volume Nu=ber of embarked upon without crbarked upon without 
(in US $ patents the patent protection the patent protection 
millions) examined (in percentage) (in percentage) 
4- 20 159 97% 3% 
20 - 100 273 92% 8% 
100 - 250 229 90% l0% 
Over - 250 539 47% 53% 
Source: IFO, from a paper entitled "Patent and license Policy", 
Institute for Economic Research, Munich, April 3,1974, in 
ARTHUR GERSTENFELD (1977) "Innovation: A Study of 
Technological Policy", University Press of America, p61. 
A= l: 2 
TIME BEM DISCOVERY AND FIRST DOCW. IIC USE, 
IN ACC I )ACE j]I'IS THE SIZE OF OCt4PANIES 
Corany size 
Annual Volume Number of 
Time between discovery and first economic use 
according to the size of the company (in %) 
----- ------ (in US $ 
millions) 
patents 
examined 
up to 
1 year 
up to 
2 years 
up to 
3 years 
up to 
4 years 
4- 20 159 40% 70" 78% 87% 
20 - 100 
100 - 250 
Over - 250 
273 
229 
539 
32% 
26% 
15% 
58% 
55%) 
(53% 
66% 
65% 
43% 
70% 
69. 
50% 
SOUR : IFO in Arthur Gerstenfeld op. cit. p62. 
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TWA 
THE PATEN SYSTEM N THE INrERFST OF THE DEVF1OPI X OOIJNTrRIES 
In the past two decades, economists, lawyers and politicians from 
both the industrialized and developing countries have been 
re-examining the influence and the impact of technology on the growth 
of the nations. Technology transfer and how such a transfer can be 
achieved best have become a familiar topic of research and public 
discussion, in which much have been said yet little has been done. 
Developing countries are being characterized by the inefficiency and 
the relative failure of technological efforts during the period 
following the second World War, as opposed to the technology gaining 
countries of the free market economies. They are also characterised 
by their massive dependence on foreign science and technology. The 
wide range of such dependence can be provided, for example, by the 
analysis of the quality and quantity of local scientific progress, the 
number of licenses and patents imported or exported by the developing 
countries. The extent of the use of turnkey contracts and foreign 
technical assistance are also indicative to technological dependence. 
No one could argue with the aims of the developing countries to 
obtain economic self-sufficiency. These long term aims can only be 
achieved through the legal means which are currently being attacked in 
their present form. One of these legal means is the patent system 
which is described by the UNCTAD secretarial as follows: - 
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"The available evidence suggests that the international patent 
system is not in its present form proving to be of benefit to 
the developing countries and that it is instead having a negative 
effect on their economic development. [also] .... patent laws 
and practices of developing countries, following international 
standards have legalized an anomalous situation which had to 
come to act as a reverse system of preference to foregin patent 
holder in the market of the developing countries"[1]. 
However, technology transfer is not only patents, designs and 
technical data but more importantly the ability to put things 
together, to make them work, to maintain sufficient operations and 
uniform quality. It is the ability to receive, absorb and apply in a 
suitable manner the knowledge and techniques transferred from abroad 
which is accompanied by a requirement for teams of engineers and 
learned experts, themselves in contact with R&D activities. 
Engineers and experts are the only qualified people capable of 
selecting what is convenient to local objectives. Moreover it is 
essential to adapt the imported techologies to local conditions. 
Developing countries should take into consideration the different 
levels of structure, the manpower problem and management as well as 
the local physical conditions. Since even if the problem of access to 
foreign markets of technology (patents, know-how, licenses etc) were 
to be drastically changed in favour of the receiving countries, this 
would probably not be an easy way to technological transformation[2]. 
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The problem of the transfer of technology should no longer be 
conceived as acquiring the mere physical transfer of equipments, 
products or the conception of the technology as a product rather than 
a process. Technology is not a world of products but one of 
information, the ability to produce own information and to employ it 
in socially useful activities[3]. To have own capability to produce 
information from scientific research is a necessity, as we have seen 
in Chapter One. It occupies an essential place nowadays in the 
process of technology production in the industrialised countries. The 
organization. and the promotion of research and development constitute 
an indispensable condition to the mastery of, techniques in the 
developing countries which are condemned, up to the present time, to 
comtemplate economic and industrial breakthrough solely based on 
inventions- and processes developed elsewhere[4]. The actual 
scientific potential of the developing countries in relation to their 
needs is completely marginal, more over such phenomenon tend to 
aggrevate continuously under the influence of different factors[5]. 
In fact, the whole of scientific research activities of developing 
countries do not produce the new scientific and technical information 
necessary for the production and transformation of those societies[6]. 
A country can not be considered industrialized unless in addition 
to the factories, it has developed a research capacity for the purpose 
of innovation. Without such capacity and without the importation of 
foreign technology, factories would cease to be a decisive factor in 
the economy of that country. As developing countries do not yet 
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possess the capacity to produce own technology, they are forced to 
rely on the importation of such technology from the industrialized 
nations mostly those of the free market economies where inventions are 
prreceived as the core of technology and thus legally protected by 
patent legislation. The transfer of such technology signifies the 
passing of technological innovation to developing countries. This 
passing has the effect of putting them in possession of industrial 
knowledge obtained in the industrialized countries. In principle such 
knowledge cannot be ceded without financial return. However, the 
process of technology transfer would have been easier if all depended 
on the written or codified technology, since what is patentable is 
only the visible part of it. 
It is 'not an easy task to put limitations on the field of 
international technology transfer. There appears to be a delimitation 
problem of what can or cannot be considered as transfer of technology. 
Should the term include all the international technological factors 
such as patents, trademarks, design, written information related to 
the setting up of equipments, technical assistance, the control and 
operating methods of machines and the commerce in equation which 
materialize the production techniques of other goods and the training 
of personnel? Or should the reverse be preferred? A precise 
delimitation of the transfer of technology "TOT", in other words to 
reserve the term "TOT" to explicitly one onerous transmission of 
specific knowledge operations in which TOT is treated as co=ercial 
operation[71. The first approach is the one to be retained in this 
chapter with the main emphasis being the patent system. 
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The transfer of technology is widely carried out under the form 
of licensing agreements for those developing countries who possess a 
substantial industrial basis such as India and some Latin American 
countries and under the form of equipment and machines acquisation 
which are essential since they allow the fabrication of products from 
the codified technology originally held by firms in the industrialized 
nations. The latter form is mainly used in those developing countries 
with no domestic or little industrial basis. 
To evaluate the role of the patent system, or the lack of it on 
the transfer of technology to the developing countries, this chapter 
will be dividied into three parts: 
First: The characteristics and cost of the patent system to the 
developing countries. 
Second: The changes in national patent legislation and their impact. 
Third: Grounds for the revision of the Paris Convention. 
1. Character_istics and cost the patent system-in 
to the developing Countries, 
To assess the economic significance and implication of the patent 
system as a means which might influence technology transfer 181 . one 
has to assess the social cost and benefit of the system. As well as 
this one needs to take' into account the underlying rational which 
justifies the system in the developing countries. As far as the 
developing countries are concerned, the rational of the system appears 
to be that the patent protection acts as an inducement or, a stimulus 
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for technology transfer or that the transfer depends on the 
availability of the patent protection. This assumption does not go 
unchallanged since, for the patent system to act as a stimulus to TCT, 
developing countries would have to have a share of world patents in 
order to benefit from the exchange of knowledge[9j. Even if the above 
assumption was considered to be true, to work it, the cooperation of 
patent holders in providing the necessary know-how which the receiving 
developing countries do not possess, or such know-how can not be 
obtained elsewhere. To gain the patentee's cooperation, patent 
protection must be extended to him(10]. 
The evaluation of the developing countries patent systems can be 
seen through the characteristics of these systems and their impact on 
the economies of these countries: 
A. Foreign ownership of patents as compared to local ownership: 
As Vritsos rightly put it "when one talks about patents in 
developing countries one really means patents owned almost in their 
totality by foreign companies or foreign nationals" [11]. Amex 2: 1 
illustrates the extent of such foreign dominance. The degree of 
patent ownership by non-residents in each of the selected developing 
countries indicate that, unlike the developed countries, the existence 
of the patent system in the developing does not depend on the domestic 
inventions[lla]. It might be in the best interest of a country's 
economy to grant more patents to foreigners, providing that the 
granting country is almost at an equal technological level with the 
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most inventive nations. Obviously, this suggestion does not qualify 
for the developing countries since their present level of 
technological capacity is very low in comparison with the 
industrialized nations. Equally, the suggestion is based on 
reciprocity qualification. Thus such suggestion is irrelevant as far 
as the developing countries are concerned'12]. 
Among the patents registered by foreigners in developing 
countries the majority correspond to patents originating in six 
industrialized countries[13]. Amex 2: 2 shows the evolution of 
foreign patenting registered in Algeria from 1966 to 1978. 
Although Annex 2: 2 shows that only 5170[14] patents were 
registered by foreigners from 1966 to 1978, the actual number of 
patents held by the Institut Algerien de Normalization et de Propriete 
Industriele "API" is well above 3 million. It is claimed by the 
INAPI that the majority of these patent documents were received free 
of charge from nine countries[15]. It should be noted that the 
majority of these patents have expired in 1980. However, the holding 
of such a number of patents, no matter how recent it was, or whether 
it was obtained at no cost, is irrelevant to the industrialization of 
Algeria because, (i) most patents require additional know-how to be 
worked and which Algeria has not acquired yet, (ii) the absence of an 
adequate structure meant that these documents are not available to the 
public[16], and (iii) even if there was an adequate structure, the 
availability to the public would not have benefited much Algeria, due 
to the lack of qualified people who might be able to obtain useful 
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information from those patent documents. Thus, the free depositing of 
patent documents in Algeria is a misleading issue which may be 
designed to obtain the goodwill of Algeria. It is like A allowing B 
to have the use of his car in the next 3 months while he knows that B 
will be spending the next six months in hospital, he is also aware 
that B cannot drive if he comes out during the first 3 montsh. This 
is a clear indication of the non-significance of patents in themselves 
in the transfer process. To my mind what matters really is not the 
high percentage of foreign patenting in developing countries but 
rather the low participation and the lack of adequate resources 
devoted to increase local inventive activities. The high proportion 
of foreign patenting can be controlled, as we shall see later, or at 
least reduced in the case of the few developing countries who brought 
new changes into their patent laws. 
The significance of the fact that the majority of foreign 
patenting in developing countries is being held by six industrialized 
countries is that techniques utilized in the developing countries 
economies carry certain number of characteristics determined by 
technological orientation of the industrialized countries 1171. The 
transfer of these techniques necessarily lead to the question of their 
maladjustment to the receiving environment. Two types of 
maladjustment or non-adaptation may result from such transfer of 
techniques. Firstly, the maladjustment of imported production 
techniques presents three aspects:. the inadequacy of the available 
local resources particularly manpower, exceeding installed capacity to 
the size of the market and weak diffusion of productivity gains at the 
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industrial structure level 1181. Secondly, the non-adaptation of 
consumption goods to the demand and to the productivity structure[19]- 
This means, even if the technology embodied in those patents was 
available at a reasonable cost, patents are unlikely to have a 
beneficial effect on the economies of the developing countries. This 
is because patents (the majority of them) - tend to enforce the 
monopoly in the use of advanced technology which is enjoyed by those 
inventive industrialised countries. 
'Po realize how serious the domination of foreign patenting in 
developing countries is, one has to look at their participation in the 
operation of the patent system worldwide. Annex 2: 3 for instance 
shows that the annual application in the three selected economic 
groups in 1969 was 391554 applications. The share of the developing 
countries was only 5992 applications of which 76 per cent were filed 
by non-nationals, or the participation by the selected 21 countries in 
that year was only 1438 applications. The situation has not changed 
much. In fact out of the 425024 applications filed in 1978 in the 
three groups,, applications filed in-the 21 developing countries were 
9527 taking out 85 per cent from this figure which was applied for by 
non-nationals we find that only 1429 applications were filed by the 
nationals of these 21 countries. It can be estimated that the 
developing countries as a group, accounted for 1.8% of the patent 
application in the three groups which is 75866 applications out of 
4,195,773 applications. Of these only less than 0.5 per cent or 20257 
applications were filed by nationals of the selected 21 countries(20]. 
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B: Corporate ownership of patents: 
The shift of patents ownership from individuals to corporates was 
a direct result of the decline of the individual inventor's role as a 
source of invention which is in return, a result of the increasing 
cost of research and development activities. These increasing costs, 
as well as the complexities of research which often requires a group 
of researchers to deal with them, are in financial and practical terms 
beyond the means of the lone inventor 121]" Since patents are the 
result of R &. D,. their useE221 have become different; "Today the 
great mass of grants are taken out by technicians working in the 
laboratories of large cooperations.... it removes the patent from the 
inventor's to the executives world. Its use is then no longer 
attained to the folkways of science but to those of business (231. 
The obvious result of the shift was the concentration of patents 
in the hands of a few large corporates. Both the present 
international patent system as well as governments in the 
industrialized countries contributed to such a concentration. The 
former contributed to this by allowing for equal treatment and the 
taking out of many patents. In theory this is available to any 
patentee whether it may be an individual; or a corporate. However, in 
practice it implies that only those firms with worldwide production 
could maintain patents, in foreign countries. The latter contribution 
came in the form of public funding of R&D activities through the 
state. 'It is estimated by Watson and Holman that 50 per cent of all 
the patents acquired by private contractors as a result of public 
funding of R&D in US between 1946-1962 are owned by large 
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cooperations[241 . The degree of patent ownership by firms as compared 
to individuals in developing countries may be higher than in the 
industrialized countries because of the high proportion of foreign 
ownership of patents in the developing countries. 
C: The Non Working of Patents: 
If one assumes that foreign patenting in developing countries are 
of importance to the process of technology transfer, than the number 
of patents exploited in these countries will at least indicate the 
theoretical possibilities for such a transfer. The quantitative 
evidence that is available shows the extent to which patents are not 
being worked in developing countries is roughly between 90 and 95 
percent[25].. For example, out of 8603 patents registered in 
Mexico(261 only 1951 were worked, representing only 22.6% of the 
total. An official report of the Indian Government concluded that: 
".... Those patents are therefore taken not in the interests 
of the economy of the country granting the patent, or with a 
view to manufacture them, but. with the main objective of 
protecting an export market from competition from manufacturers, 
particularly those in other parts of the world"1271. 
Why then firms take patents in developing countries and suppress them? 
A survey of 69 companies holding patents in 17 African countries'281 
up to 1968 by Grundmann shows the motivations advanced by the 34 
companies which answered the questionnaire in order of importance: 
- 24 companies gave "importation" into the country as one or the sole 
motivation for taking out patents in these countries and to be 
protected from imitators imports. 
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- 23 companies gave"defence" as one or the sole motivation to prevent 
others from obtaining patents in those 17 countries, in other words to 
protect their export market. 
- 21 companies advanced "licensing" for the production in these 
countries. This may be more applicable to Algeria where import is the 
monopoly of the state, and direct foreign investment is not welcomed 
except in few industries such as oil and chemicals joint venture with 
51% minimum captial participation by the state. [Service companies]. 
- 19 companies advanced "production" in these countries as the ground 
for patenting in these countries. 
The questionnaire reveals that a substantial number of patents 
taken out by the 34 companies in the 17 African countries are not 
intended to be exploited or to transfer the patented technology - 
(importation). Furthermore, they are defensive patents which imply 
the intention to forestall the transfer of a particular patented 
technology. However, even if there is an intention of licensing and 
producing in these countries, which if applied could lead to the 
transfer of technology, one must not forget that intention in itself 
does not lead to the actual transfer(291. 
The developing countries believe that the local manufacturing of 
patented products or patented processes can neither be substituted by 
the importation into the country, nor by the non-working of 
patents[30]. The working of a patent in the granting country 
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carries with it the use of local raw material and more importantly, 
employment resulting in the much needed training of the local workers. 
Equally, the removal of import monopoly from the exclusive right of 
the patentee may create competition, and thus enable developing 
countries to obtain goods at a comparatively cheaper price. However, 
the cost imposed through the patent import monopoly can only exist if 
the price paid for products is higher than it would be in the absence 
of the exclusion of import monopoly or the absence of patents 
altogether[31]. 
It has been argued that if patents were to be worked in the 
developing countries instead of importation into these countries, the 
concerned goods will become more costly to produce. Despite the cheap 
labour, it is often more expensive to produce in the developing 
countries. This may be because of the small size of their markets. In 
most cases one or two plants operating under favourable conditions are 
sufficient to supply the whole world with a particular product[32]. 
If the above situation is the case, then what is the justification for 
the patent holders to take patents in developing countries since the 
recourse to the products of these plant's will be automatic. The only 
function then of such patents is to stop the development of a similar 
or a substitute technology in these developing countries where the 
concerned patents are taken out[33). 
It is also suggested by those who do not adhere to the ideas of 
local production of patented inventions,, that the reduction of the 
patentee's right, either by compulsory licensing, revocation or 
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removal of the right to import would lead to a reduction in R&D 
activities and that the existence of strong patent protection can 
induce a company to engage in R&D and market inventions 1341. In 
other words, the above suggestion can be read as follows: developing 
countries should provide patent protection to companies in order that 
the latter can carry on with their R&D efforts and to obtain more 
benefits. 
Data concerning the number of non-worked patents in developing 
countries may over-rate the costs of unused patents, since, such 
patents can only be a ground for social cost if their local production 
could be proved economically beneficial and was prevented by the 
patent holder. There is no additional cost to the economy if local 
production is-neither economical nor it can be undertaken by other 
companies[35]. For example, in Argentina out of the 102 patents held 
by multinationals, 58 patents were not worked at all, 15 were worked 
and the rest 29 patents were used to protect imports[36]. 
D: The Cost of the Patent System: 
Having shown that the majority of patents taken out in developing 
countries belong to non-nationals most of which are used for purposes 
other than local production, we can now go onto consider the main 
costs resulting from such unused patents. These costs arise from the 
blocking of local development of similar or substitute technologies 
and also from the importation of the unexploited patented products in 
the absence of restricted competition due to the patent monopoly, 
which may lead to overpricing. It is only the small number of 
patents, worked in the granting countries, which can represent a real 
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transfer of technology. Even for such a small proportion, the cost is 
quite high and include the following: - 
(i) Royalty costs which are associated with monopoly power. The 
economic consequences of these royalty payments can be seen in the 
form of a direct foreign exchange to previous transfers to the 
developing countries in 1968. According to Patel, this was estimated 
at 1.5 billion dollars, equaling 5 per cent of developing countries 
exports - (excluding oil) - or about 40 per cent of their debt 
servicing obligations. Because of rapid growth, these costs are 
projected to be about 9 billion by 1980[37]. 
(ii) The transfer of technology is grounded on business motives, 
usually to locations where sufficiency in production exists and where 
transportation is more available. The transfer takes place under 
imperfect conditions due to the domination by the multi-nationals and 
because of the, fact that the technology cannot be sold on its own. 
The consequence of the imperfectness of the technology market means 
that the receiving enterprise from the developing countries or the 
subsidiaries working in these countries are not free to use the 
acquired technology for export. Thus, the consequences of this denial 
of opportunity to export is a loss of foreign exchange earning and 
higher costs of production due to the artificial limitation placed 
upon the developing countries. Annex 2: 4 illustrates the extent to 
which restrictive practices relate to export and others are employed 
in technology agreement in India and the Phillippines. The Annex 
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shows that prior to March 1964,43.3 per cent of the approved 
agreements in India included explicitely one type or another of export 
restriction. Despite the decrease in approved agreements - less than 
40% of that of 1964 - the percentage increased to 47.1 in March 1969. 
In the Phillippines it was 32.1 per cent of the total number of 
agreements which contained explicit restriction of export[381. 
However, the abolition of export 'restrictions does not lead to an 
automatic export in every case, but nonetheless it is a necessary 
condition if full export capability was to be realised by developing 
countries. The abolition of the restriction may also help to reduce 
the monopoly power of the licensor, particularly where patents are 
concerned, as markets where he holds no patent protection will be open 
to him and his licensees more competitive grounds. 
(iii) Much of the licensing is being done on an exclusive basis, which 
means that only one firm in the receiving country can actually use the 
licensed technology. This leads to a limited competition which is 
used by the licensor to charge higher prices than he would have been 
able to if there were no competitors. 
(iv) Other costs are also associated with the wide variety of 
restrictions. Annex 2: 4 shows that prior to March 1969 of all the 
approved Indian agreements 12% included explicit tie-in clauses. For 
the Phillippines this figure is shown at 26%. However, the impact of 
restrictivce practices on patent costs is not easy to assess since 
licensing agreements involve other tangible and intellectual property 
as Annex 2: 5 shows. There is rarely a case where patents existed 
alone, in most cases existing in combination with the sale of know-how 
or trade marks[39]. 
118 
According to the figures shown in Annex 2: 5, concerning licensing 
agreements it seems that non-patented technology - (know how) - play a 
more significant role than the patented one. This is achieved by 
comparing the total of assests transferred involving patents to the 
total of transferred assets involving non-patented technology[401. 
except in Algeria[41], the balance between the two assets in India, 
Latin America, and the Phillippines is in favour of the non-patented 
technology. 
The co-existence of patented and non-patented technology in 
licensing agreements and the high percentage of non-patented assets 
suggests the tying of 'the two assets by the licensor. The high 
percentage of non-patented assets may suggest that patents are tied to 
know-how. In such a case patents have no significance in the transfer 
process. As the packaging of patents with know-how means that the 
former cannot be sold on its own value. Even when the situation is 
reversed, it indicates no better signs since the tying of know-how to 
patents can only mean the lack of supply sources available to 
developing countries. Equally, it shows the lack of sufficient 
knowledge in the recipient developing countries. The significance of 
patents in the transfer of technology process appears to be positively 
associated with the level-of economic achievement, demonstrated by the 
high percentage of patents in the transfered assets by the American 
firms to other firms in industrialized countries. 
To summarize, it appears that most developing countries in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America have been granting monopoly power to 
foreigners, mainly big firms, through their own patent legislation. 
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Foreign ownership signifies the non-importance of patents as an 
incentive to domestic inventive activities in the developing 
countries. The non-working of these foreign owned patents indicates 
that the main function of patents in the developing countries is to 
protect the import of the foreign companies into the developing 
country against imitators. Such patents forestall possible imports or 
local production by imitators and more importantly. cancel or delay the 
development of similar or substitute technology by local enterprises. 
In this way, the function of patents appears to be the maximazation of 
profits by foreign firms and thus patents are an incentive to 
inventive activities, not to the granting countries but to those firms 
who use it to dominate markets or expand them. 
Even when patents are licensed to developing countries-they have 
a different function from that of the part they play in the 
industrialized countries. When patents are licensed to developing 
countries, they generate a set of tied purchase from the licensor 
(i. e. know-how, intermediate goods, capital goods and the supply of 
capital) - allowing a higher return to the licensor and more burden on 
the purchaser of the technology. 
There is now a greater awareness among the developing countries 
that the present system and the principles embodied. in it are 
inflicting a heavy burden upon them in relation to their technological 
development in general. At the same time and for practical reasons 
they recognise that the system has to stay but not in. its present 
form. No single country can take such a dramatic action as to abolish 
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the system. Furthermore, it seems most unlikely that all the 
developing countries would agree to the abolition of patents. In my 
own view, the question facing developing countries is not whether or 
not to have the system, but how to reform the system and make it work 
in their favour. 
2. SSE QIUXM IN r rcP1i EPj Am 1 THEIR IMPACT 
The Change: 
Patents and other industrial property have so far failed to 
contribute either to encourage rapid transfer, appropriate adaption 
through assimilation and widespread diffusion of imported technology, 
or to stimulate local inventive activities among nationals of the 
developing countries. The only way developing countries can benefit 
from patents is to put the technical knowledge embodied in patents 
into an effective use through their local production facilities. To 
do that, national patent legislations have to be properly designed in 
order to contribute to the creation of a favourable environment where 
the heavy economic and social responsibilities of the state in 
developing countries must be balanced with the rights of individual 
patentee's and corporation. In other words, national legislation 
should find a balance between the public interest and the monopoly 
rights of the patent holder. Thus, patents should be conceived as an 
instrument of national economic policy to be used in conjunction with 
other policies to achieve the desired national objectives and to 
govern the legal monopoly by the criteria of public interest and 
national sovereignty. The function of patents should be the promotion 
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of scientific and technical capabilities in developing countries, to 
generate and diffuse technical knopwledge, to incorporate such 
knowledge into production process and to facilitate the access to 
foreign technology markets under fair and reasonable terms. 
Most developing countries have patent laws varying in their form 
according to the country [421. Several, such as India and Mexico have 
very modern and elaborate systems. During the 1970's decade, major 
changes were introduced into the national patent legislation of 
certain developing countries. These changes excluded certain products 
and processes from patentibility on the grounds of public interest and 
the need to accelerate national economic development. They also 
concern the working of patents locally and the exclusion of the right 
to import by the patentee as a means of working. The discussion of 
these undertaken changes will be concentrated mainly on the Andean 
Pact countries, Argentina, India and Mexico. 
A. PATENTABILITY: 
An essential requirement in most patent laws is that the invetion 
sought to be patented must contain an "inventive step". Such a 
requirement ensures that the patent monopoly can only be granted to 
the inventions which contribute, in a genuine manner, to the public 
stock of knowledge. For example, Decision 85 (Art 1) of the Andean 
Pact prescribes that the subject matter must be capable of being 
manufactured or used in any kind of industry: 
"An invention patent shall be granted for new creations 
capable of industrial application and for those which may 
complement such creation"[43]. 
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Not all inventions are of value to the developing countries, thus 
a certain number of products and processes have been excluded from 
patent protection basically through their exclusion from 
patentability[441. Colombia first changed its patent law in 1971 then 
in 1978 incorporated Decision 85 of the Andean Pact to exclude, food; 
drugs and beverages from patent protection[45]. However, the 
manufacturing process of the products are allowed as long as the 
applicant can prove within a year that the process used locally to 
supply the market is based on reasonable terms as well as quality, 
quantity and prices. 
B: THE SCOPE OF THE PATENTEE'S PRIVILEGES 
The privileges conferred to the patentee vary from one country to 
another. However, traditionally patents confer the privilege to 
manufacture, utilize, to distribute in the course of trade the product 
or process covered by the patent(461. The extent of the privileges 
and their applications in the developing countries where there is a 
lack of appropriate measures relating to the exploitation of 
inventions, led to abuses of these rights, -mainly the use of 
importation as a substitute to the working of patents locally in the 
granting countries. To combat such abuses, the right to import was 
excluded by some of the developing countries from the conferred 
privileges to the patentee. 
Based on Article 28 of Decision 85, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia, 
the right to import was excluded from the exclusive rights conferred 
to the patentee[471. The same exclusion was included in the Mexican 
law of 1975 Art. 37(2): 
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"The patent shall not confer the right to import the patented 
product or a product manufactured by means of the patented 
process". 
In practice, the possible effects of excluding import monopoly 
from the patentee rights means that he can not prevent third party 
from importing into the country the patented product but can prevent 
the local production of the patented product. Thus, the function of 
patents is seen as an industrial instrument, at the same time limits 
the function of patents as private instrument for the regulation of 
trade[48]. However, the exclusion or reduction of import monopoly is 
a desired measure in the case of the developing countries, since it 
may prevent the patent holder from obtaining legally, monpolistics 
rents by being the-sole importer and thus could charge higher prices 
of imported products. Nonetheless and despite that the scope of the 
exclusive rights belongs to the concerned national law, the exclusion 
of import monopoly conflict with Article 5 Quarter of the Paris 
Convention, which was incorporated in the Lisbon Act of 1958. Such 
conflict arises when the national law extends the protection of the 
process to the product manufactured by such process, "Product by 
process protection"[49]. 
Patent legislation reforms also included measures relating to the 
non-voluntary licensing of patents. In this context, the exclusive 
rights of the patentee to use his 'invention locally are granted only 
for five years providing that he exploits the patent. Such rights for 
the exploited patents, continue for five years more 'subject to 
non-exclusive compulsory licenses(501. Thus the exclusive right to 
use in the second five years does not belong to the patentee, but is 
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shared with any interested person who may ask for an authorization to 
use from the competent authority subject to paying royalty[51]. 
Governments of the Andean Pact may also at anytime grant compulsory 
licenses if public health and national development require so(52]. 
The Colombian Decree 410 of 1971, prior to the incorporation of 
Decision 85 provided fro non-voluntary licenses in cases where the 
patent was relevant to public health or the need of economic 
development. Such a patent could be subjected to "licence of 
authority"[53] "license of rights" are also granted under the Algerian 
Patent Law, but unlike other patent-laws it is left up to the patentee 
to apply for the mention of "license of right", "license de plein 
droit" to be entered into the register in respect to his patent at any 
time to the competent authority. Any person shall be entitled to 
obtain a license to exploit such a patent upon terms which shall be 
fixed by the court in the absence of an agreement between the parties. 
If no license was granted, or all the licensees agree thereto, the 
patent owner may at any time apply for the cancellation of such 
entry[54]. This provisions appears to be designed to attract foreign 
individual patent holders to benefit from their patents through the 
application for "license of right". Since the mere patenting in 
Algeria would not necessarily entitle the patentee the right to 
exploit it in the country as most of the industrial sectors are state 
owned, moreover imports and exports are the monopoly of the state. It 
would be more beneficial to Algeria to change such a provision and to 
give the state the right to grant non-voluntary licenses which would 
cover those sectors where foreign private investment is allowed. To 
leave it as it is, the provision would have 
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no impact on foreign patent holders as direct licensing would possibly 
be more beneficial to them (i. e. more tie-in purchase). 
C: THE WORKING OF PATENTS: 
As we have seen earlier the problem of non-working of patents is 
an international matter as far as the developing countries are 
concerned. Since the majority are owned by non-nationals, this means 
without their co-operation the developing countries will find it 
difficult to work patents even with such measures as compulsory 
licensing and other provisions. Thus, the developing countries are 
attempting to find the right legal approach to. render patents 
exploited locally; such trend is underlined by India Patent law of 
1970 (Article 83): 
"Patents are granted to encourage inventions and to secure 
that the inventions are worked in India on a corrmercial 
scale and to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable 
without undue delay, and .... that are not granted merely to 
enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for the importation of 
patented article". 
The general trends in the reforms of patents with relation to the 
working of patent through legal forms, included the following: 
FIRST: The duration of patent life: as noted earlier, Decision 85 
provided for five years, which can be extended to another five years 
as long as the patent is adequately worked[55]. Even before Decision 
85 Colombia granted patents for 8 years with an extension of 4 years 
if the patentee can prove that the invention was being exploited[56] 
and in Peru the term was 10 years[57]. 
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SECOND: Definition of exploitation: specific definition of 
exploitation is included in the Mexican Law of 1975. "... Exploitation 
shall be the permanent use of the patented process or the manufacture 
of the product covered by the patent, either directly by the patentee 
or by his successors in title or licenses, in quantities that amount 
to effective industrial exploitation on a satisfactory conditions as 
the quality and the price"[58]. The inclusion of the words 
"permanent" and "stable"[59] automatically excludes interuption as a 
means of exploitation. Equally, the exploitation of'the patented 
invention must satisfy the local market reasonably[60]. 
THIRD: Exploitation and Imports: Recognition in the new patent laws of 
the fact that importration should not be taken as to constitute 
working of patents. As well as the above definitions of exploitation, 
the Mexican Patent law (1975) explicitely excluded importation: 
"Importation of a product covered by the patent or of a product 
manufactured by means of the patented process shall not be deemed 
explitation"[61]. 
FOURTH: Exemption grounds: 'One of the key elements in determining the 
effectiveness of legal measures directed against the non-working of 
patents are the legal grounds exempting the patentee from his 
obligation to work the patent locally. Under Article 5A of the Paris 
Convention, the patentee may justify the non-working of patents by 
"legitimate reasons". However, the term "legitimate reasons" is a 
very wide term and cover all sorts of excuses from technical to 
economic justification. The concept curtails the freedom of national 
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authorities to lend its own interpretation to its application, the 
term could be replaced with a more adequate term such as "force 
majeure", to protect the public interest of the developing countries 
as well as to simplify the task of national authorities or courts 
concerned with grant of compulsory licenses. 
"Forcemajeure" is admitted as the only justification for the 
non-working of patents under both the-Argentinian and Brazi lian Patent 
laws[621. Decision 85 Art. 35, left the question of legitimate 
reasons to the competent national authority of the member states[63]0 
The, Algerian Patent Law excluded importation from being a legitimate 
reason for non-working patents[64]. 
FIFTH: Measures against the non-working of patents: Compulsory 
licensing is the primary remedy in most patent laws. Under the 
Algerian Patent Law (Art. 44), any interested person can apply after 
three years following the grant or four years from the application 
date whichever is longer for a compulsory license if one or more of 
the following conditions are met: 
(a) The patented invention capable of being worked within the country 
has not been worked, applied or used by an establishement existing 
within the country and not on a scale which is appropriate and 
reasonable in the circumstances. 
(b) The demand for the. patented product is not met to a reasonable 
extent within the country. 
(c) The working of the invention in the country is prevented or 
hindered by the import of the patented article. 
(d) The owner of the patent refuses to grant licenses on, reasonable 
terms. 
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(e) A substantial export market for the patented article which is 
manufactured within the country is not supplied. 
(f) The establishment or development of industrial or commercial 
activities in the country are unfairly prejudiced. 
It should'be noted that the inclusion of the word "capable" in 
(a) above, means that compulsory licensing may not apply to those 
patented inventions in certain industrial sectors which are the 
monopoly of the state. Compulsory licenses are also granted in the 
cases where a protected invention in Algeria cannot be worked without 
infringing the rights attached to an earlier patent with conditions 
that the latter invention represents a notable technical progress in 
relation to the former or that the final industrial use is 
different (65] 
THE IMPACT OF THE CHANGES: 
1. Foreign patenting: A decline in patent applications can at least be 
expected in those countries concerned with the changes, as the new 
exclusions from patentiability and higher standards would in theory 
leave out inventions which would have been qualified without the 
changes. Foreign applications would, according to the changes, be 
more affected as most of these changes are directed towards 
foreigners, whether explicitley by the stringent conditions on the 
working of patents and the exclusion of import monopoly, or 
implicitely due to the fact that the majority of patents are owned by 
foreigners. Equally, the reduction of the life of patents could lead 
to a decline in patenting both domestic and foreign. 
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As we have seen in Annex 2: 3, the share of industrialized 
countries during the period 1969-1978 was 3,960,265 applications or 
94% filed in these countries, which heavily influence total world 
patenting. We also saw in the same annex that the share of the 
selected developing countries continued to increase and carrying with 
it another increase which concern the share of non-nationals to reach 
85% of the applications filed in these countries in 1978. In 
contrast, both in the socialist group and in the, industrialized 
countries there was a decrease in the share of non-resident 
application. 
A different trend in patent application can be noticed in Mexico, 
India, Colontia and Argentina with a decrease of 45%, 46%, 67% and 39% 
respectively compared to a 59% increase in the selected 21 countries 
[compare Annex 2: 3 and 2: 6]. In Algeria patent applications continued 
to increase'661. At the same time foreign application decreased by 
48% in Argentina; 66% in Colombia; 57% in India and 49% in Mexico, 
while there was an increase of 78% in. the 21 selected developing 
countries. However, the drop in foreign patent applications was far 
more pronounced than in domestic patent applications, suggesting that 
the changes may have affected and discouraged foreign applicants more 
than the nationals (i. e. import monopoly). 
The changes in patent legislation appears to have played a role 
in reducing patent application particularly by foreigners. However, 
it seems to have not affected or hindered the flow of technology to 
the concerned countries. A UNCTAD study shows that neither the flow 
of technology through contractual agreements did fall during the same 
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period in both Argentina and India for which information is 
available(671, nor that direct foreign investment was affected in 
either of two countries as Annex 2: 7 illustrates. 
2. The Working of Patents: 
Despite the expanded grounds for granting non-voluntary licenses, 
only 8 compulsory licenses were reported in India between 1973 and 
1977, suggesting the non-effectivenessýof such measure as a remedy to 
non working of patents in the developing countriest681. According to 
another UNCTAD study the Indian Patent Law of 1970 might have led to a 
higher degree of working than before the reform, although there is no 
statistics on the working of patents neither before nor after the 
1970's changes. Although the study suggests that there was an 
increase in the patent application's share- of the Indian- nationals, 
the rejection was higher for national-, applications than that for 
foreign applications (50% of domestic application compared to 7% of 
foreign applications). Equally, the increase of patenting of 
enterprises and institutions from 41% in 1967 to 63% in 1976-79, 
assuming that enterprises and institutions are more likely to work 
inventions than individuals. On the other hand, the strigent working 
obligations and the exclusion of importation as a' means of 
exploitation are likely to discourage foreign firms patenting 
particularly those who neither intended to work the patents nor to 
license them(69]. 
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To suMnarize, during the last decade major changes were gradually 
introduced in the national legislation of some developing rather than 
to wait until a mutual agreement is reached through the revision of 
the Paris Convention. The most desired changes concern higher 
patentability standards, the reduction of import monopoly and patents 
duration as well as a. wider scope of exclusion from patentability. 
The reform was also concerned with the working of patents in the 
granting countries such as the definition of exploitation, the 
exclusion of importation explicitely as a means of working patents, 
the limitation of the exemption grounds for the non-working of patents 
and the application of revocation, as a remedy when compulsory 
licensing fails to be effective. 
Despite the effect on patents application, particularly foreign 
ones in the concerned countries, it is early yet to know the full 
impact of these changes. Nor that it can be said for sure, that the 
decline was a direct result of the changes. However, when the limited 
information available is compared, it suggests that they may have 
influenced such a decline. 
3. Grounds for the Revision of THE PARIS CONVE ION 
Most of the argument about the need for a change or reform of 
industrial property system has been concentrated on the revision of 
the Paris Convention. The Convention binds its members to give to all 
nationals of the member countries. 
(a) the same treatment accorded to their own nationals; (b) a priority 
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period of one year to the applicant in one country for filing his 
applications in all the member countries without being exposed to 
objections based on prior publication or use, (c) the independence of 
a patent in time and validity from patents granted in other countries, 
particularly where the application was first filed. In the light of 
the New International Economic Order, the present revision of the 
Convention is required to adopt to the needs of the developing 
countries[701. 
The Paris Convention has already been revised six tines (71]" 
However, the developing countries have played no important role in 
these revisions and the results of the previous revision were designed 
to strengthen the patent holders position. The present Convention is 
not considered by the developing countries as representing an 
equitable balance between the rights of the patent holder and the 
public interest of the granting country. Developing countries are 
hoping to obtain the reform through mutual agreements instead of 
introducing these changes themselves gradually in their national laws. 
I am of the view which favours the latter process to the former. 
However, this is not to say that the international process is not 
desirable but that it is a lengthy process and one that may prove to 
be costly for the economies of the developing countries. [721 
The present dependence of the developing countries on the 
industrialized countries is fundamentally technological in nature. 
The majority of the developing countries are substantial importers 
without corresponding exports (except raw material), therefore are 
used as granting market power to foreign patent holders - (import 
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monopoly of patented products and products protected by a patented 
process) - So the principle of non-discrimination initiated by the 
rule of free trade cannot be relevant to industrial property, as 
Vaitsos put it "Equal treatment of unequals is a questionable 
principle"(731. The legal equality, which is the corner-stone of the 
Paris Convention is spurious since the developing countries are not at 
present equal to the developed countries. In a world of extreme 
unequalities between developed and developing countries, the enactment 
of discriminatory rules at the national level may be justified. The 
major provisions which developing countries are seeking to get a 
mutual agreement on their reform, are those concerning: - 
FIRST: the national treatment principle: The application of the 
national treatment and international standards embodied in Article 
2(1) of the Paris Conventiont741, by developing countries raises 
several issues. Since developing countries are economically poor and 
scientifically far behind the developed countries, the application of 
the principle does not make sense as the parties involved are not 
equal. Under the present circumstances, the application of the 
principle simply gives the stronger party - developed countries - 
unlimited freedom to exploit the weaker party - the developing 
countries -. An alternative strategy suggested by E. T. Penrose and 
based on the shift from the patent owner to the patent status: 
"As such, foreigners and nationals would be accorded the 
same treatment, thus avoiding question of discrimination 
according to nationality. Yet patents coverning know-how 
which was developed locally (by foreigners and nationals 
/ 
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alike) could be treated differently from patents covering 
technological advances realized in the'rest of the world" 
(75). 
This proposed alternative, bases the treatment not on the origin of 
the inventor as in the Paris Convention, but on the geographical 
origin of the invention. Under the convention, the principle of 
national treatment was based on the assumption that there would be a 
reciprocity and mutual benefits in the form of an exchange of patents 
and licenses between members fo the Union. However, as the level of 
industrialization and technological capabilities as well as the 
inventive abilities is different among the member countries, equality 
is not guaranteed. The result is that developing countries found 
themselves protecting invetions developed elsewhere and without having 
anything protected for them in the other member countries. As it was 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the national treatment principle in most 
cases, even in the industrialized countries benefits only the 
multinational corporations. It cannot be seen (as it stands) as a 
means of inducing local invetiveness and initiatives in the developing 
countries. 
SECOND: Importation of patented goods and the working of 
compulsory licenses. In' general the protection of an invention 
depends on the patented invention being worked locally either by the 
patentee himself or his licensee. The economic rationalization of 
compulsory licensing is the need to encourage domestic exploitation of 
patents held by foreigners, 'and- more importantly to avoid the 
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importation of the patented products or products produced by means of 
the patented process. Such importation render the patent protection 
to a "license to import". It is specified in Article 5(A) of the 
Paris Convention that the importation of the patented products into 
the granting country shall not be a ground for forefeiture of the 
patent, suggesting that the monopoly to import can prevail, even when 
the patent is not worked locally. 
The period needed to apply for a compulsory license (Art 5 A(4)) 
can be delayed due to the presence of legitimate reasons and the 
judicial process which are likely to reduce the value of compulsory 
licensing. Another delay can be created if the patent holder is 
multinational corporation. In such a situation the MNC may conclude 
an agreement. with its subsidiary in the patent granting county. The 
existence of the agreement would suggest that the patent is being 
used, but the mere existence of the agreement does not necessarily 
lead to the exploitation of the patent within a reasonable period, 
thereby causes more delays before a compulsory license procedures 
could take place. 
But how effective the grant of compulsory license has been as a 
measure designed to facilitate the working of patents? Such 
effectiveness can be measured by the following example: 
"In Peru, out of the 4872 patents granted between 1960 and 
1970, in electronics, chemicals, food processing, pharma- 
ceuticals and others, only 54 were registered as being 
exploited which is less than 1.1% of the total. Similarly, 
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in Colombia out of a total of 3513 patents evaluated (2534 
of which belong to the pharmaceutical sector and the rest 
to the textile and chemical ones), only ten were being 
exploited in the country"[76]. 
Although Coloirbia does not impose compulsory licenses (prior to the 
incorporation of Decision 85 and prior to the Decree 410 (1971)) while 
Peru did, it is clear than in both countries there was not much change 
and that Peru's compulsory license provisions did not attribute to the 
fact that 98.9% of patents were not worked. Another reason to doubt 
the effectiveness of compulsory licensing is that foreign patent 
holder may consider such measure to be a lesser evil compared with 
losing his patent through revocation or lapse, and the danger of being 
faced with an uncontrolled use of his process or invention, or to 
share the market with new competitors. Equally, the grant of 
compulsory license may not lead to the actual working of patents since 
additional know-how would still be required to work the patent even if 
patents were successfully disclosed, there are other aspects which are 
beyond the patent document. In such a situation and if the granted 
compulsory license cannot be worked without the co-operation of the 
patentee, plus if he witholds his co-operation it may be in the 
interest of the granting country to make the patent laspe. However, 
not all patents can be worked since some may have lost their economic 
value or may not be economically feasible to exploit. So, compulsory 
license should be first directed towards those patents which are being 
worked abroad and use the granting country only as a market. 
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Compulsory licensing as embodied in Article 5(A) with no 
additional instrument such as revocation does not allow developing 
countries to employ the full of economic instruments at their 
disposal. Thus, it is essential for the developing country to move 
from the limited instrument provided by the Convention, which has so 
far proved to be a poor remedy. A maximum flexibility in the 
selection and application of instruments other than compulsory 
licensing may lead to the direct industrial use of information derived 
from the patent and avoid lengthy and costly delays, which may be 
reduced if revocation and expropriation were included. 
THIRD: Independence of patents. The principle of dependence of 
patents is an inevitable consequence of the fact that countries remain 
free to decide for themselves on matters concerning patentability, 
duration, renewal, examination or registration and so on. In this 
respect, the principle is consistent with the notion of each country 
setting its own standards as far as patents are concerned. However, 
the principle carries unfavourable impact on the developing countries, 
where there is a shortage of technical staff to examine patent 
application carefully. The consequence of the principle is that, when 
a patent has been forfeited in one country it can remain in force in 
other countries, unless positive measures are taken to render it null. 
The result is that the developing countries under the present Article 
4 bis can continue to grant monopoly privileges to products which have 
been declared as non-patented in the country of origin, because the 
majority of the developing countries depend to a great extent on 
decisions of novelty made in the developed countries when granting 
monopoly rights in their markets to foreigners. 
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The above situation would not occur, if developing countries were 
to incorporate in their patent legislation provisions requiring the 
applicant for a patent to submit to the competent authority the result 
of earlier applications in other countries and in particular the 
result of the first applicationt771. 
This requirement would certainly reduce the cost for the 
developing countries, as some of the developed countries such as the 
United States require their nationals to file application first at 
home. It would be more helpful to the developing countries, if it was 
made compulsory to exchange information between patent offices when 
required of all orders - judicial and administrative-concerning the 
validity of patents. 
FOURTH: The priority right: The principle of priority right 
embodied in Article 4 of the Paris Convention allows. any person who 
has filed an application for a patent in one of the countries of the 
Union to have a priority right of twelve months. Such principle is 
seen by the developing countries as a disincentive to local R&D 
since someone by virtue of priority right will be granted the patent. 
It is also claimed by. the developing countries that foreign applicant 
deliberately delays filing in developing countries until the last 
month of the priority period in order to lengthen the life of the 
patent[78]. However, earlier or later filing would not effect the 
duration of. the patent, since patents merely run from an earlier or 
later filing date, but when coupled with the principle "independence 
of patents" it would lead to an extension which can be calculated on 
the difference between the patent lapses in two countries where the 
139 
term of patent life is equal. The remedy to such an extension can be 
done in national legislation through the shortening of the duration of 
patents as some developing countries have already brought such reform. 
The legal details embodied in the Convention, for the 
establishment of the priority right principle can only serve to 
safeguard the interest of the applicant. Section (B) of Article 4 
establishes that the novelty of an invention cannot be affected by 
reasons of any act accomplished during the priority period. In other 
words publication or exploitation of the invention by any one does 
not, during the priority period, invalidate the patent application in 
other countries in which the priority privilege is required. 
To safeguard the interest of the developing countries, certain 
reforms ought to be included when the principle of priority right is 
applied for such as, the applicant for the right should be obliged to 
submit the results of his earlier application, and to allow the 
developing countries to exploit their inventions, if they have, in 
good faith, filed an application during the priority period. Further, 
to accord preferential right to inventions originating in developing 
countries with regards to the duration of the priority period. 
The principles embodied in the present Convention governing the 
industrial property, and despite its revision six times remain in 
favour of patent holders (in most cases multinational Corporation). 
So far patents have failed to contribute either to encourage rapid 
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transfer of the technology or to act as a stimulus to local 
inventiveness. If these standards are to contribute to the needs of 
the developing countries, a balance must be found between the right of 
the patent holder and the public interest of the developing countries. 
A more stringent provision should be included for the working of 
patents, which would contribute greatly to the diffusion of imported 
technology. Some hopeful signs are coming from some of the developing 
countries who already have introduced certain noticeable reforms in 
their national legislation. 
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[1] UNCTAD "The Patent system as an instrument of policy for national 
development" TD/B/C. 6/AC. 2/3 Geneva (24th July 1975) p2 para 5 and p28 
Para 94. 
[2l According to Francis Stewart, there are still four problems for 
the developing countries which would continue to exist if such access 
to foreign technology was drastically changed. 
First: technology trade is one of the financially most expanding and 
thus considerable direct and indirect costs for importing technologies 
will remain. 
Second: Imported technology - (large portion of it) - would have to be 
adapted to new economic structure of the receiving countries, which 
would add to the social cost of technical charges and force the 
receiving developing country to devote its scarce R&D resources to 
purposes other than those necessary. 
Third: the control of imported technology would remain since the 
suppliers would restrict its use whenever possible (i. e. export 
restrictions). 
Fourth: The development of an effective and independent innovative 
capacity of the developing countries is impeded. See Francis Stewart 
(1977) "Technology and underdevelopment" Macmillan London. Also in 
UNCTAD is "Coordinated Technological Research and Development in 
Developing Countries, Regional Co-operation to Strengthen Indigenous 
Capacities for Innovations" TD/B/C. 6 (14.10.80) pl. 
[31 Peter Nanyenya, T. (1980) "Technology transfer and International 
Law" PRAEGER US. p120. 
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[41 A. King et A. Lenuna "Recherche scientifique et developpement des 
techniques in Nord, Sud: du defi au dialogue 73eme Repport du club de 
Rome (1978) p345. 
[5] It is clear that even the very high number of researchers is not 
synonymous of technological autonomy. Thus India, for example, is not 
exceeded in this field except by the United States and USSR: Kamel 
Bougguera (1976) Annuaire de L'Afrique du Nord p44. 
[6] S. Thebaud (1976) "Les systemes de Recherche scientif ique et 
technique des pays envoie de developpment "THERS MONDE T: XVII no. 65 
(Janvier-Mars) p135. 
(7] The term technology made its first appearance in Germany around 
1770 according to H. Rose and S. Rose (1970) "Science and Society" 
Pellican Book p16. Technology transfer was defined. as follows: 
"Technology viewed as a commodity and embodied in capital and 
intermediate goods, in highly skilled manpower and in blue print 
process formula or other kinds of proprietary ... and non-proprietary 
information is the subject of world-wide transaction" See Guidelines 
for the study of the transfer of technology to developing countries 
UNCTAD TD/B/AC. 11/9 (UN Publication Sales no. E. 72 11.0.19) "Process 
whereby a technology (industrial or otherwise) developed and 
eventually applied by an organization is utilized for production 
purposes by other's organization or enterprise". See Economic 
Commission For Europe" Glossary of terms relating to technology 
transfer, industrial co-operation and business planning" Note by the 
Secretariat (SC. TECH/SEM. 3/R2). 
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[8] To Vaitsos, it is a mistake to consider patents as a vehicle for 
TOT: "a patent is a legal document which gives an exclusive privilege 
to undertake production, make sales or import sepcified products or 
processes which meet certain legal requirements. In itself therefore, 
the patent has no more to do with technology transfer proper than for 
example a document which confirms the lease of a factory or a legal 
paper which verifies the ownership of a house". Constantine Vaitsos 
(1972) "Patent Pevisited - their function in the developing countries" 
Journal of Development Studies, Oct. p80. 
[9] Freeman, C. C., H. G. Oldham and Tirkean (1968) "The transfer of 
technology to developing countries" UNCTAD 2nd World Conference. 
[10] Douglas F. Greer (1973) "The Case against Patent Systems in less 
developed countries" Journal of International Law and Economics p240. 
., -See also, E. T. Penrose (1973) "International Patenting and the 
less-developed countries" Economic Journal Vol: 83 pp771-2. 
[11] C. Vaitsos op cit p73. 
[11a3 The United States in its preliminary comments on paragraph 6 of 
the UNCTAD Secretariat report (TD/B/C. 6/AC. 3/2) which expresses 
concern on the ownership of patents by foreigners in developing 
countries also claims "that the vast majority of inventions in 
developed countries are not patented at all in any developing 
country"'. It stated Argentina as an example, where in 1975 a total of 
1341 patents were granted to the residents of US, Japan and the 
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Federal Republic of Germany. In the same year the three countries 
granted 92,672 patents to their own residents. The preliminary 
comments of US also claims that most of the patented inventions in the 
developed countries are available on a "royalty-free" basis in the 
developing countries. For more details see: the UNCTAD United States 
of America: Preliminary comments on the REPORT BY THE UNCTAD 
SECRETARIAT entitled: The International Patent System: the Revision of 
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (UNCTAD 
TD/B/C. 6/AC. 3/2) in (TD/B/C. 6/24/add. 1) and TD/B/C. 6/AC. 3/4 Add 1) 
Annex V. P8. 
[12] The high percentage of patents ownership by non-residents in 
France, Canada and U. K. in Annex 2: 1 cannot be seen in the same way as 
other developing countries. 
It is clear from WIPO statistics that the high percentage of 
foreign ownership in developing countries is correct. 80% of patents 
granted in developing countries were to foreigners in 1975. See WIPO 
Industrial Property Statistics 1975, IP/STAT/1975/2,1 June 1977, 
pp8-11. However, the high percentage is not peculiar to developing 
countries as in some other industrialized countries the figure is 
higher; such as Belgium and Austrialia 92% and 91% to Denmark. On the 
other hand, for several. other developing countries the percentage is 
lower; such as South Korea (around 50%) and Greece (around 30%). 
Except in the US, Japan; foreigners share is regularly above 50%. 
Based on this, the assertion of foreign domination may become 
questionable. 
145 
[13] The importance of patenting by nationals of developed countries 
in each of the developing countries differ from one country to 
another, but on the whole USA, F. R. of Germany, Japan, France, UK and 
Switzerland often occupy the first- six places: See UNCTAD 
TD/B/C. 11/R/Rev. 1 op cit. table 9. 
[14] The 5170 patents registered by foreigners in Algeria consist of 
the following type of protection: - 
(i) 4730 patents, representing a total of 89.5%; 
(ii) 272 patents of confirmation or 5%, they concern patents 
granted in foreign countries prior to March 1966 the date 
in which the patent law of Algeria was enacted: Ordinance: 
66.54 du 3 Mars 1966 RELATIVE AUX CF fiFICATFS D'INVETrEURS 
ET AUX BREVETS D' INVENTION: ' Journal official 8 Mars 1966. 
(iii) 69 certificates of addition or 1.3%, granted for an appro- 
priate addition to the invention. 
(iv) 99 maintenance or preservation "maintien en vigueur" patents 
registered in 1966,1967 and 1968 and concern inventions 
which were protected in Algeria before July 3,1962. 
During the same period the total of inventor certificates which 
is the only form of protection open to Algerians (Art. 7 of 1966 law, 
was 113 or 2.1%. 
(15] The free patent documents received by the INAPI came from the 
following countries in order of importance: 
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COUNTRY PERIOD SERIAL NUMBER NUMBER OF LANGUAGE 
OF DOCUMEWS DOCUMENTS 
(b) 
FRANCE 1902-1980 317.502-2,434,000 1,870,000 FRENCH 
SWITZERLAND 1889-1980 1-618,620 618,000 FRENCH 
GERMAN 
ITALIAN 
CANpDA(a) 1950-1974 462,201-955,900 (b) 493,000 ENGLISH 
FRENCH 
E. GE14ANY 1963-1971 26,001-85,500 
1974-1980 104,073-141,967 (b) 
U. K. 1975 1,376,876-1,4191986b) 
AUSTRIA 1969-1980 267,501-357,800(b) 
BELGIUM(a) Not Specified 731,101-760,101 
BULGARIA 1976-1980 - 
HUNGARY 1978-1980 - 
97,000 GEBMAN 
43,000 ENGLISH 
30,000 GERM 
29,000 FRENG 
4,000 BULGARIAN 
3,000 HUNGARIAN 
(a) documents obtained with the help of WIPO. 
(b) no continuous documents provided. 
Source: Unpublished INAPI Document No. ST/ALC/80/6, November 10,1980. 
The bulk of patent documents held by INAPI appears to be constituted 
of patent documents of- the industrialized nations. However, these 
documents represent only a relatively important portion of world 
techniques. In fact, it is generally held that the collection of 
patents by USA, UK, F. R. of Germany, France and Switzerland represent 
about 80% of world techniques. It was explained to me by an official 
of INAPI, that the absence of US collection does not matter much, 
since for example the majoritiy of patents deposited in France are of 
foreign origin including those of USA. 
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[161 The non availability of patent documents to the public is mainly 
due to the limited resources of INAPI. However, the INAPI is planning 
to have a consultation room in the near future, but these docuemtns 
are now kept in an Archieve Cellar at Boumerdes: See INAPI Doc. 
ST/ALG/80/6 op cit. p6. 
[171 A study of 1866 inventions introduced between 1945-1974 in 
Europe, US and Japan furnished indications on the nature and 
orientation of those innovations: 
- 59% were product innovations and 41 process innovations; 
- 40% of the first and 47% of the second originated in US; 
- 15% of product innovations and 38% of process innovation were 
directed toward the economy of labour saving, or 24% of the total 
(40% for US innovation saving); 
- 22% of process innovations directed toward a capital economy; 
- 33% of product innovations and 37% of process innovation were 
directed toward the economy of material saving which 35% of the 
whole calculated, according to W. H. DAVIDSON (1976) "Patterns 
of factors saving innovations in the Industrialized World" 
European Economic Review Vol. 8, no. 3, October 1976, tables 
2 and 3 pp214-215. 
[18] The non-adaptation of imported techniques will be discussed in 
full detail later in the case of Algeria. The problem is also 
discussed by C. COOPER (1972) "Science, technology and production in 
the underdeveloped countries" Journal of Development Studies Vol. 9, 
no. 1, October 1972; P. H. HASON (1974) "The Selection of Technology" 
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Colombia Journal of World Business Summer 1974 pp29-34; J. BARANSON 
(1966) "Transfer of technical knowledge by International Corporations 
to Developing Economies" American Economic Review May 1966, pp259-267. 
[19] According to F. Stewart the adaptation by consumers in the 
developing countries to modern goods is inspired by optical normative, 
F. Steward "choice of techniques in developing countries", Journal of 
Development Studies Vol. 9, no. 1, Octobner 1972. Since the goods 
were conceived to satisfy the requirements of consumers at a high 
level, their consumption in developing countries appears to be 
unjustified when one takes into account the limited incomes. 
[20] The sample of the selected developing countries may not be 
respresentive to the situation in developing countries, since the 
majority are African countries with little industrial basis let alone 
inventive activities. Other countries (India, Mexico, Colombia and 
Argentina) will be studied later as a group by themselves. 
Nonetheless, a UNCTAD study concerning patent distribution from 1920 
to 1970 shows that the percentages of the 8 developing countries 
(Brazil, Cuba India, Israel, Mexico, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia) 
were 1.9%, 1.7%, 1.8%, 4.4% and 3.9% in 1920,1940,1950,1960,1970 
respectively. It was estimated that the share of the 8 developing 
countries was 6 per cent of the world patents or 200,000 patents out 
of the existing 3.5 million patents, of these only one percent was 
being held by national of the developing countries, 84% of the 200,000 
patents were held by non-nationals mainly corporations of 5 countries 
namely U. S., U. K., France, F. R. of Germany and Switzerland. See 
UNCTAD/TD/B/AC. 1l/19/Rev. l table 6, p81. 
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[21] See Caphter One "Source of Inventions". 
[22] Four possibilities can be distinguished in which patents can be 
used. Firstly the working of the patented invention by the patentee 
or associated company; to manufacture goods of the patented product, 
or the use of the patented process in other than the country which 
originally granted the patent involves foreign investment. Secondly, 
to let the patented invention to be exploited by non-associated 
companies with patentee - to grant licenses. Thirdly; to import the 
patented product or products made by the patented process. Such 
importation is a direct result of the exclusivity of the right which 
only allows the patentee or his licensees to market the patented 
product. These rights are limited by the principle of territoriality 
to the granting country or countries by obtaining parallel patents in 
those countries. Fourthly, the non-working of the patented invention 
in any of the above forms. 
[23] Watson Hamilton 
AFFAIRS VOL. 28, p587. 
(1945) "Cartels, Patents and Politis" FOREIGN 
[24] For more details on the concentration of patents as a result of 
government financed R&D in US between 1946-1962 see: Donald 
Stevenson Watson and Mary A. Hamilton (1967) "Concentration of Patents 
from Government financed research in industry" The Review of Economics 
and Statistics Vol. XLIX pp375-381, table 2 in particular. See also, 
for effect of the shift in ownership: Vaugham F. L. (1948) "A Patent 
Policy: A discussion "American Economic Review: Papers and 
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Proceedings: Vol. 38, May p218; Khan, A. E., (1940) "Fundamental 
defficiences of the American Patent Law" American Economic Review 
September p485. A UNCTAD study shows that the percentage of 
corporates ownership has increased from 49% in 1937 of which 45% to 
foreign firms to 80% in 1967,78% of which belonged to foreign 
corporation. Equally in the same period patents awarded to 
individuals decrease from 50% in 1937 to 13% in 1967. 
UNCTAD TD/B/C. 11/19/Rev. l/table 10. 
1251 WIPO, Ad hoc Group of Governmental Experts on the Revision of the 
Paris Convention, P? /GE/1/10 21 February 1975 p. 3, UNCTAD, The Role of 
the Patent System TD/ß/C. 11/19 23 April 1974, p123. 
[26] The eight countries with number of patents held and percentage of 
non-worked patents: US 5257 of which 81% non-worked; Mexico 797 
(18.7%); West Germany 454 (84. /1%); UK 333 (82.9%); France 355 
(92.1%); Japan 327 (94.5%); Switzerland 303 (91.4%) and others 777 
(87%). The total of non-worked patents is 6652 UNCTAD TD/B/C. 6/AC. 5/3 
p22 table 7. 
[27] Government of India, 1959 "Official Report on the Revision of the 
Patent Laws" NEW DELHI pp28-29. 
_ 
[281 The 17 countries in which the reporting companies have patents 
are Algeria 264 patents; Libya 238 patents; Morocco 834 patents; 
Tanzania 242 patents and the office Africain et Malgache de la 
Propriete Industrielle "OAMPI" Countries 810 patents (Cameroon Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dahomey, Gabon .. etc see the rest of 
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Ohe list in Annex 2: 3 op cit. ) : HELGE. E. GRUNDMANN (1976) "Foreign 
Patent monopoloy in Developing Countries: An Emprical Analysis" 
Journal of Development Studies Vol. 12 (1975/76) pp186-196. See also 
SANJAYA LALL (1976) "The Patent system and'the transfer of technology 
to less developed countries" Journal of World Trade Law, Vol. 10 no. 1 
Jan-Feb ppl-16. He suggested that with the increase of modern 
technology in the industrialized countries' patents lost much of their 
importance in securing market power and that there is no clear answer 
on why firms which do not depend on patents as a source of market 
power bother to take out patents at all except to suggest the various 
possible motivations: 
-A device to limit areas of operation on cartel-like lines (as in 
chemicals). 
-A legal device to base licensing on and frighten off smaller 
innovators. 
-A monopolistic device to strengthen marketing SANJAYA LALL Op cit. 
pp9-10. 
[291 According to the same questionnaire the companies (20 of them) 
which did not grant licenses, advanced the following motivations for 
not doing so. 
(i) Inadequate market 14 companies, (ii) unfavourable economic 
conditions 8, (iii) insufficient industrialization 6, (iv) inadequate 
patent protection 5, (v)no request 3, (vi) political instability 2, 
(vii) exchange restrictions 2, and (viii) no real interest from the 
patentee side. H. E. Grundmann op cit. p194. 
[301 UNCTAD TD/B/C. 11/19/Rev. 1 1975 op cit. p64. 
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[31] S. LALL (1976) op cit. P10. 
[321 SIEGFRIED GREIF (1981) "Strengthening the Compulsory Working of 
Patents in Developing Countries: Law and the State Vol. 23 p59. 
[33] Such situation may apply to the pharmaceutical industry where 
patents do not add to the effective control of the developing 
countries markets but help to prevent potential threats by the local 
or foreign firms. S. Lall (1976) op cit. p9. 
[341 See Seigfried Grief op cit. p59-61, who argues that more R&D is 
directed towards new products or processes which are predominantly or 
specially for use in developing countries. 
[351 S. Lall (1976) op. cit. p10 Unlike Lall-, both Vaitsos and Penrose 
stress the cost of non-worked patents. C. Vitsos (1972) op cit. 
pp82-83. E. T. PENROSE (1973) "International Patenting and The Less 
Developed Countries" Economic Journal Vol. 83 p778. 
[36] KALTZ "Patents, The Paris Convention and Less Developed 
Countries" Yale University Economic Growth Centre, Discussion paper 
190, Nov. 1974, p67. 
(37] Patel (1973) "Transfer of technology and third UNCTAD" 7 Journal 
of World Trade Law p227. The amount paid by the developing countries 
to seven industrialized countries. Frnace (1977); US (1978); UK 
(1977); Japan (1977); Italy (1975); F. R. of Germany (1978) and 
Netherlands (1977) was 1440 million US dollars of which $530 million 
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came from Latin America; $730 million from Asia and the Middle East; 
and $180 million from Africa. See for more details RENE-FRANCOIS 
BIZEC (1981) "les transferts de technologies" Que-sais-je: Press 
Universitaire de France table 1 and table 2 at 78 and 83 respectively. 
[38] The situation was no better in the Andean Group Countries 
Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru) statistics show that out 
of 451 technology contracts in various sectors, 307 contracts or 68% 
explicitely prohibited any form of exportation. For more details see 
UNCTAD "Policies Relating to technology of the Andean Pact: their 
foundation" TD/1Q7 (29 Dec 1971) paras 14-20. 
[39] C. Vaitsos, (1972) op cit. p81. The same conclusion was also 
reached by others. Example ".... . transfers which simply provided 
enterprises in developing countries with permission to exploit patents 
would-very probably fail commercially" CHARLES COOPER (1970) "The 
Mechanism for Transfer of Technology from Advanced to Developing 
Countries" Science Policy Research Unit - University of Sussex p. 17. 
[40] Percentage of all assets 
ALGERIA 85% 
INDIA 34.4% 
LATIN AMERICA 67.9% 
PHILIPPINES 44.4% 
INDUSTRIALIZED 
81% 
91.9% 
71% 
63.7% 
COUNTRIES 85.5% 37.7% 
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[41] The high level of patents percentage is not due to the high level 
of industrialization, but rather to a different sets of contracts as 
we shall see later. 
(421 The following countries do not as yet have patent laws as in 
1974: Africa (Equatorial Guinea, Ethopia, Guinea and Mali); Asia 
(Bengladesh, Bhutan, Burma, Democratic Peoples Reupublic of Korea, 
Khamer Republic, Laos, Maldives, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Thailand, 
United Arab Emirates & Yamen) See: TD/B/C. 11/19. Annex 1. 
[43] Andean Commission: Decision 85 on Industrial Property May 27 June 
5 (1974): Official text in Grupo Andino separate No. 28 June 1974 
ppll-12. International Legal Materials (1974) pp1489-99. See Also 
Article 3.. 
(44] For more details on non-patentable subject matters see: J. W. 
Baxter (1973) "World Patent Law and Practices" London. Sweet & Maxwell 
Appendix 1 "Chemical and Pharmaceutical Inventions: Allowable Claims" 
pp348-351; UNCTAD "The Role of the Patent System": TD/B/C. 11/19 Table 
14, Field of exclusion from patentability in selected countries p116; 
Notes "Patentable Subject Matters Under National and Multinational 
Systems" Law and Policy in International Business Vol. 2 (1970) 
pp479-504. 
[45] See the Laws of India: Patent Act Law 1970, Ecuador Decree 951 
(1977) where the process to manufacture those products are also 
excluded from patentability; 
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Al-c[eria: Ordonance 66-54 of March 3,1966 
Article 5; 
Mexico: Law on Inventions and Trade Marks 30 Sept, 1975; 
Peru: Law no. 18350 came into force Jan 27,1971; 
Brazil: Law no. 5772 of December 21,1971. 
For selected legislations, policies and practices on the transfer of 
technology: 
TD/B/C. 6/AC. l/2/supp 1/Add 1/(4 Feb 1975) 
TD/B/AC/2 (10 Sept 1976) 
TD/B/C. 6/48 (28 August 1978). 
[461 Algeria Patent Law (1966) Art. 13 which reads as follows: - 
"Le brevet confere a son titulaire le droit: 
- de fabriquer ainsi que d'utiliser, mettre dans le corrnerce 
on detenir a ces dernieres fins le produit couvert par 
le brevet. 
- d'employer, mettre dans le co=erce le procede, objet de 
1'invention brevetes ainsi que d'utiliser, mettre dans le 
commerce, detenir a ces dernieres fins, le produit tel 
qu'il resulte directment de la mise en oeuvre du procede 
sous reserve des dispositions prevrie a 1'Article 5" 
It should be noted, that patents are open only to non-Algerians. 
Algerians can only be granted inventor's certificate which establishes 
the following rights: Article 8 Law (1966). 
- to make the invention public; 
- to receive a remuneration calculated on the basis of the 
economic and social effects of the application of the 
invention. 
- to participate actively in the examination, the initial and 
subsequent development of the invention in the country. 
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[47] Article 28(2) of Decision 85 reads as follows: - 
"The patent shall not confer an exclusive right to import 
the patented product or one manufactured under his 
patented process". 
Decision 85 was adopted by Ecuador on 10 March 1977, Colombia 28 June 
1978; and Peru 15 May 1979. 
[48] See UNCTAD "Examination of the Economic, Commercial and 
Development Aspects of Industrial Property in the Transfer of 
Technology to developing countries" TD/B/C. 6/AC. 5/3 24 Nov 1981. 
[49] The deletion of Article 5 Quarter was proposed by the developing 
countries during the revision of the Paris Convention; See WIPO 
Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the Paris Convention, Geneva 
4 Feb to 4 March 1980, Basic proposals on Inventions (1979) Vol. 1 
Patents (WIPO publication No. 840 (E) for comments on import mcnopoly 
p. 84. 
[501 Andean Pact Decision 85 Art. 29. 
"A patent shall be granted for a maximum of ten years, computed 
from the date of the administrative resolution granting it. 
Initially, it shall be granted for five years and in order to 
obtain an extension, the owner must prove to the competent 
national office that the patent is being adequately exploited". 
[51] Ibid Article 34. 
(521 Ibid Article 39. 
.I 
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[53[ See J. W. Baxter (1973), p334. In the Philippines, special 
compulsory license may be granted to meet investment requirement. All 
processes and products involved in an industrial project approved by 
the Board of Investment shall be deemed products vital to the national 
defence or economy or to public health: PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1263, 
Amending Portions of the Act no. 165,13 Feb 1978 (Art. 34B). 
[54] Algeria's Patent Law Ordonance 66-54 (1966) Art 53. The provision 
would have more impact if Algerians were entitled to patent protection 
as the majority, at least for the time being would not have been able 
to exploit their invention. However, since nationals are entitled 
only to inventors certificate where the right to exploit belongs to 
the state, the provision has no relevance to the foreign patent holder 
- mainly MNCs - as more profitable ways are open to them. 
[55] Decision 85 op cit. Article 29. 
[56] Colombia Patent law, Decree No. 410 (1971) in J. W. Baxter (1973) 
op cit. P331. 
[57] Peruvian Law No. 18350 (1970) in J. W. Baxter (1973) p. 324. The 
Indian Patent Law of 1970 grant patents for the term of 14 years, 7 
years from filing or 5 years from granting whichever is shorter in the 
case of the drug patents. 
[58] Mexican Law (1975) Art. 43. 
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[59] Article 31, Decision 85: "Exploitation shall be understood to 
mean the permanent and stable use of a patented process, or the 
manufacture of a product protected by the patent, to supply the market 
with its final results under reasonable trade conditions provided 
these acts take place on the soil of the Member Nations which grant 
the patent, asame for the stipulation on the sectorial programes of 
industrial development covered under Articles 33 and 34 of the 
Cartagena Agreement". 
[601 According to the India Law (1970) Article 52 (iv) the market may 
include export market as well and to meet such export "to an adequate 
extent and under the right conditions" to markets not covered by the 
exploitation of the market. 
Section 135 of the WIPO (1979) Model Law include importation in 
the definition of exploitation on the grounds that if the patentee 
exploits the patent locally he shall be protected against the sales by 
others of imported products. 
Exploitation was also defined by the Algerian patent law as follows: - 
"Au sense du present Article, on attend par exploitation dune 
invention, brevetee, la fabrication du produit brevete, 
1'emploi d'un procede brevete, ou l'utilization pour une 
fabrication dune machine brevete par an etiblissement existant 
dans le pays et dans une mesure appropries et raisonable" 
Article 44. 
[61] Article 43 of the Mexican Patent law (Preliminary provisions) 
TD/AC. 1/2 p26. See also Article 34.3 of The Philippines Presidential 
Decree 1263; Brazilian Code of Industrial Property Art. 33.2. 
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[62] Article 23 of the Brazilian Code of Industrial Property. 
[63] Under Article 50 of the Mexican Patent Law, gives the patentee an 
opportunity to remedy any defficiency by granting him a preferential 
right to expand exploitation to cover national and international 
market. In cases of failure to comply, the competent authority may 
grant compulsory licenses to any interested person. 
[64] "L' importation ne constitute pas une cause legitime" (Art 44). 
[65] Ordonance 66-54 (1966) Article 45 See Also, Article 48 of the 
Mexican Patent Law on compulsory licensing where the patent lapses if 
within the year following the three years period nobody applied for 
compulsory licenses "The patent shall lapse if more than a year after 
the period referred to in article 41, the patentee has not begun the 
exploitation or if within that time, no application for compulsory 
licenses have been made" Philippines Presdential Decree 1263 of 1978 
made the term shorter from three years to two years from the grant. 
In India, "license of right" as well as complusory licenses may be 
applied for after 3 years. If the -requirement of the public are 
reasonably met and two years after the grant of compulsory licenses, 
the patents can be revoked. 
[66] The increase in patenting in Algeria (see Annex 2: 2) is due to 
the heavy investment in Industrial projects included in the three 
plans: 3 Years Plan (1967-1969); First Four Years Plan (1970-1973), 
and the Second Four Years Plan (1974-1977). 
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[67] See UNCTAD Study "The implementation of transfer of technology 
regulations: A preliminary Analysis of the Experience of Latin 
America, India and The Philippines", TD/B/C. 6/55 and Corr 1 table 2. 
[681 UNCTAD TD/B/C. 6/AC. 5/3 op cit Para 72. 
[69] Ibid, para 74-75 as well as table 6 p20. See also Mexico where a 
survey established that out of 22,736 patents registered in Mexico as 
of Feb 1980 only 1951 patents were worked or 8.6% out of the 20,785 
non-worked patents, 14,133 were revoked in accordance with Art 48 of 
the Mexican Patent law, leaving 8,603 patents in force but not worked: 
ibid table 7 p22 and para 75.80. 
[701 A number of Resolutions calling for the revision of the 
international industrial property system were adopted by various 
agencies of the United Nations and other organizations such as: 
- General Assembly Resolution 1713 (XVI) 19 Dec 1961 request the 
Secretary General to prepare a study on the effect of patents 
on the economy of the less developed countries. 
- UNCTAD Third Session adopted unanimously Resolution 39(111), 
which in para 10 called for a study on the role of the patent 
system in the transfer of technology. 
- General Assembly Resolution 3362 (S-VII) Section 3 para 10 
provided that "International Conventions on patents and trade- 
markets should be reviewed and revised to meet in particular 
the special needs of the developing countries". 
- In December 1975 the WIPO Ad hoc Group of Governmental experts 
on the Revision of the Paris Convention, stated that "The 
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revision of the Paris Convention should aim at contributing to 
the establishment of a new economic order in the world in which 
social justice prevails and economic uneclualities between nations 
are reduced". 
- The Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 held in Manila (Jan- 
Feb 1976) stressed in the Manila Declaration and Programme of 
Action that "the economic, trade and developnent interest of 
the developing countries should be fully reflected in the 
revision of the international system of industrial property" 
See UNCTAD TD/195. 
- See also the views of the experts from Developing Countries who 
participated in the Group of Governmental Experts on the role of 
the patent system in the transfer of technology. Geneva 1975: 
The Report'of the Co anittee on transfer of technology on its 
first session: official records of the Trade and Development- 
Board, Seventh Special Session Supplement No. 4 TD/B/593 Annex 
III. 
[71] The Paris Convention was signed in Paris 1883 and was revised at 
Brussels in 1900; Washington in 1911; The Hague 1925; London 1934; 
Lisbon 1958 and Stockholm 1967. 
[72] One only has to look at the negotiations of the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) to find out how 
lengthy such process is (from 1973 up to the present time). Thus, 
while developing countries are following the international process, it 
is by no means the only way and its about time to begin introducing 
new ideas and principle in their national legislation which would help 
their bargaining position. 
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[73] C. Vitsos (1976) "The Revision of the International Patent 
System. Legal Consideration of the Third World Position" World 
Development Vol. 4, No. 2, p90. 
[74] Article 2 (i) : "Nationals of each of the countries of the Union 
shall with regards the protection of industrial property, enjoy in all 
the other countries of the Union the advantages that their respective 
laws now grant or may thereafter grant to nationals without prejudice 
to the rights specially provided by the present convention. 
Consequently, they shall have the same protection as the latter and 
the same legal remedy against any infringement of their rights, 
provided they observe the conditions and formalities imposed upon 
nationals". 
[75] For more discussion of the national treatment principle, see C. 
Vaitsos (1976) op cit. pp89-90. The role of the Patent systems UNCLAD 
TD/W/AC. 11/19 paras 317-324; TD/B/C. 6/AC. 3/2 paras 76-79. The experts 
of the Group of 77 believe it is indispensible to establish a system 
of non-reciprocal preferential treatment in favour of the developing 
countries involving flexibility concerning the level and type of fees, 
priority, duration of protection: TD/B/C. 6/12 21 Nov 1975. 
[761 UNCTAD "Transfer of Technology: Policies relating to the transfer 
of technology of the countries of the Andean Pact, their foundation" 
TD/107 29 Dec, 1971. TD/B/C. 6/AC. 3/2 paras 26-49. 
[77] Requirement of this type was included in the Brazilian Law No. 
4131 of 1962 on foreign capital, "An application for the registration 
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of a contract for transfer of finance and payment of royalites for the 
use of patents ... shall be accompanied by a certificate of the 
existence and continued validity in Brazil of the privileges granted 
in the case by the National Department of Industrial Property, and by 
a valid document providing that they have not lapsed in the country of 
origin". (Law 4131 (art 11) in TD/B/C. 6/AC. l/2 Supp 1/Add 1). 
[78] See UNCTAD TD/B/C. 6/AC. 3/2 op cit Para 64. 
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ANNEX 2: 1: P1 flO ICN CF PATE! ( SHIP BY ZION-RESIDE TI'S 
IN SELECTED DEVEIGPI1IC AND DEVELOPED CMTMES 
COUNTRY 1965 1976 1979 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES % % % 
ALGERIA 98.4 (1966) 98.3 98.5 (1978) 
ARGENTINA 77.7 (1970) 69.2 n. a. 
BOLIVIA 89.5 (1970) 83.5 84.2 
CHILE 91.5 89.5 n. a. 
COLC IBIA 93.4 78.6 95.7 
INDIA 90.2 82.6 n. a. 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
UNITED STATES 19.5 37.2 37.4 
JAPAN 33.8 19.5 21.0 
F. R. OF GERMANY 40.8 50.4 51.7 
FRANCE 65.1 71.1 72.2 
UNITED KINO 4 74.7 (1970) 77.7 79.9 
CANADA 95.3 94.0 94.0 
Source: various source including: 
- World Intellectual Property Organization "WIPO" "Industrial Property 
Statistics" Annual Issues 1969-1979. 
- BIRPI (WIPO) La Propriete Intellectuel e. Revue Mensuelle of WIPO 
and BIRPI: Various numbers. 
- Ministere Des Industries Legeres: Institut Algerien De Normalization 
et de Propriete Industrielle "INAPI", Activities 1973-1978 Decembre 
1979 p7 (for Algeria only). 
- UNCTAD "The Role of the Patents in the Transfer of Technology to 
Developing Countries" TD/ß/C. 11/19/Rev. 1. 
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ANNEX 2: 2: AMMIAL EVOIMO1 OF FOREIGN PATENTING IN ALGERIA 
1966 - 1978 
CW7 Cý ý 
vdw ý" vi 
1966 90 73 11 5- 20 1 40 240 
1967 132 132 38 7 13 23 17 50 412 
1968 128 77 20 18 18 14 28 71 374 
1969 101 58 40 5 21 20 20 108 373 
1970 121 46 39 60 25 14 8 63 376 
1971 89 82 17 44 44 13 12 65 366 
1972 72 72 24 43 30 10 6 60 317 
1973 94 66 31 46 28 72 71 345 
1974 112 96 41 43 35 16 1 109 453 
1975 174 142 73 30 27 22 11 101 580 
1976 127 84 38 33 27 26 7 116 458 
1977 133 67 62 31 23 17 5 83 421 
1978 138 77 77 29 29 12 4 89 455 
TOTAL 1511 1072 511 394 320 214 122 1026 5170 
in % 29.2% 20.7% 9.90% 7.60% 6.20% 2.40% 2.4% 19.8% 100% 
* "Others" which represent 19.80% of the total foreign patenting in 
Algeria include about 40 countries, some of which are: Spain, Belgium, 
Japan, Canada, Sweden etc. 
Source: Ministere Des Industries Legeres INAPI op cit. P8. 
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ANM 2: 4: RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES INCLUDED IN LICENSItVG 
AGREEM? I5 IN I MIA AND THE PHILIPPINES 
TYPE CF RESTRICTIONS 
NUMBER CF AGREE14E TS WITH 
CLAUSES 
INDIA (a) INDIA (b) 
RESTRICTIVE 
PHILIPPIIIES 
Export restrictions (total) 455 161 82 
Global ban on export 36 3 49 
Export denied to certain 
countries 42 60 4 
Prior approval for exports 149 15 17 
Export through specified 
firms only 20 16 6 
Restriction on trademarks 
in exports 5 5 5 
Other export restrictions 6 2 - 
Other restrictions (total) 295 22 123 
Tied purchase 154 16 67 
Restricted production pattern 65 - 5 
Payments of minimum royalites 55 4 13 
other restrictions 21 2 38 
Total no of agreements with 
restrictive clauses (c) 527 171 126 
Total of effective agreements 1051 342 254 
Source: UNCTAD "Restrictions on exports in foreign collaboration 
agreements in India" U. N. Sales No. E. 72. II. D. 7 (1971). 
- UNCTAD "Restrictions on exports in foreign collaboration agreements 
in the Republic of Philippines" U. N. Sales No. E. 72. II. D. 8 (1972). 
(a) Approved agreements up to March 1964. 
(b) Approved agreement from April 1964 to March 1969. 
(c) The total cannot be obtained from adding export restrictions to 
other agreements since more than one type of restriction can be 
in one agreement. 
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ANNEX 2: 7: FDREIGS! DIRECT UNEMMEW SILO -K IN AI ? TINA. 
QO ßß7A, IVDIA A10 i DWD 
$ 1Iillion CC IPOUND AMMU 
GFä. M RATES (%) 
1967 1971 1976 1967-71 1971-76 
API=RA 1800 2200 2250 5.1 0.4 
COMMIA 728 900 1400 5.4 7.6 
IIDIA 1300 1600 2400 5.3 8.5 
1-miC0 1800 4200 4650 7.4 14.1 
Source: UNCTAD: TD/F, /C. 6/55 Table 3 
(a) 1977 
(b) 1971-77 
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RDGJIATION OF THE TRAT SFER CF TE C v'OIDGY: 
AN E LL TIa[4 of ME IPM L LDGISL TI OF DEVELOPING 
cniJNMIES AND THE UNC1AD's CODE OF CONDUCT 
The discontentment with the present method of the transfer of 
technology "TOT" from developed to developing countries began as early 
as 1961, at the United Nations, in which the Resolution 1713 (XVI) 
called for the study of the effects of the patent system on the 
economies of the developing countries(l]. The developing countries 
maintained that they are the victims of the legacy of colonislism in 
general and rapacious practices of multinational corporations in 
particular. With the growing realization of the fact that traditional 
factors [Labour, capital and land] are no longer enough to ensure 
economic growth, the transfer of technology represented a major hope 
for improving their economic position. In modern economies the value 
of the traditional factors is limited since capital, if not invested 
in technology, would not increase productivity. The physical capacity 
of labour limits the output, and to increase productivity beyond this 
point machines or more systemized work patterns are needed. Finally, 
land and its natural resources can have little value or economic 
growth if the technology to unlock its riches was not available. 
Therefore, the economic growth of a nation is not determined by the 
mere presence of these factors, but largely by the technological 
application of the said factors. 
In an age of multinational corporations "MNCs", which were often 
more powerful than many states, the question of the transfer of 
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technology assumed a further dimension. Because of their bargaining 
power and oligopolistic power, MNCs have' become the source of 
conflict. They have designed TOT contracts to include terms 
favourable to their objectives of maximum profit. As a result TOT 
agreement often included restrictive clauses, directly restraining the 
efforts of the developing countries to increase the utilization and 
absorption of the transferred technologies and to develop local 
technological capacities. 
The multinational corporations are the principal means of 
transferring technology to developing countries and may take one or a 
combination of more than one of the following methods; (1) licensing 
agreements, which involve the connunication of technology protected by 
industrial property and under which the recipient country retains the 
national ownership of the business. A license agreement also enables 
the licensor to reap substantial return in the form of fees, royalites 
and profits from the sale of products, especially if he was unwilling 
to risk his capital or uncertain about the project's profitability or 
in countries where foreign capital participation was excluded. (2) 
Direct foreign investment entails the movement of capital across 
borders. A common form of this method is the joint venture, an 
arrangement whereby the ownership of business is shared between 
foreign investors and local partners, public or private. Direct 
foreign investment may also be a direct result of licensing agreements 
- particularly in the developing countries - because the licensor may 
feel he can exploit his technological advantage better by 
manufacturing abroad rather than licensing foreign firms, or because 
the licensee may lack capital and manufacturing facilitiesE21. (3) The 
transfer of technology may also take place under the form of 
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management contracts including the foreign technical assistance and 
the employment of experts or merely through the purchase of equiranent 
and machineryt31. 
within these methods, multinational coprorations use two 
approaches to maximize profits from the sale of technology to 
developing countries. First, multinationals protect their profits by 
including certain restrictive clauses in the T0I contracts. Second, 
the technology transferred to developing countries cost MNCs nothing, 
since such a technology has been developed for their own interests in 
order to maintain their position in the market. They then try to 
reduce the cost of such activities by selling the technology they have 
already developed rather than develop new technologies that suit the 
specific need of the developing countries. In this way, the 
technology suppliers avoid risks and expenses in developing special 
techniques and equipment where small market can not guarantee profits 
and recovery of R&D cost[41. 
In recent years, the attitude of the developing countries towards 
science and technology have changed. Such change has resulted in more 
and more emphasis being placed on the question of the transfer of 
technology. The process of patent reforms which have occured in some 
developing countries is, on one hand, a clear manifestation of this 
new attitude, and on the other hand, shows that the developing 
countries have not been satisfied neither by the UN Secretary 
General's conclusion and recommendations of 1964151, nor by the 
Stockholm revision of the Paris Convention in 1967. Furthermore, the 
growing realization of the importance of the transfer of technology in 
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reaching development goals and the increasing disappointment with the 
present TOT methods have led to the establishment of specific bodies 
and the enacting of laws for the regulation of TOT agreements. 
Together with the UNCTAD code of conduct, these laws and regulations 
are undoubtedly of highly important significance to the future of the 
international patent law and the regulation of the transfer of 
technology. These regulations are closely linked to patent reforms. 
There have been several attempts by developing countries and 
developed nations to regulate the transfer of technology[61, the most 
complex and successful attempts being those of the Latin American 
countries. These laws and regulations have been used by the 
Intergovernmental Group of Experts as models for the UNCTAD's Code of 
Conduct on the-Transfer of Technology(7] and they are discussed below. 
1. National Regulation ! 
A set of circumstances, during the 1960's, brought the attention 
of Latin P. merican countries to the effects of imported technologies on 
the national economies. Among these circumstances was the weight of 
royalty payments on the balance of payments and the existence of 
substantial number of restrictive business practices in contractual 
agreements concerning the transfer of technology. Equally, 
governments of the region were aware of the need to control technology 
imports on a boarder basis. It was the Latin American countries who 
first initiated state intervention in matters of the transfer of 
technology[ 8]. 
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In Chile, the Board of the Central Bank decided to set up a 
conanission to reveiw royalty payments(91, and to establish the 
registration of licensing agreements. A policy of approving or 
rejecting contracts was also envisaged but only on an advisory basis 
to the Executive of the Central bank. The legislative Decree 444 of 
1967 established a committee responsible for the approval of 
agreements involving foreign transfers with respect to royalites, use 
of patents and trademarks which thenceforth to be registered with the 
Foreign Exchange Office of the Colombian Central Bank (10]" Both 
comanittees have concentrated first on carrying out financial analysis 
of contracts, or in other terms, the impact of royalty payments on the 
balance of payments. Then, gradually took other functions such as the 
evaluation and negotiations of agreements. 
The gained experience in these con¢dttees, especially that of the 
Colombian Committee on Royalites, was a significant factor which have 
led to more complex and systematical regimes, such as the Andean Group 
Decision 24 of 1970(11]. Under Article 102(12] of the Colombian 
Decree 444, the Royalties Committee should take account, inter alia, 
of the following criteria when authorizing or refusing the 
registration of contracts: 
"(a) The importance of contract, in terms of economic and 
social development and the relationship between that 
importance and the disbursement of foreign exchange to 
which the contract may give rise; 
(b) The feasibility of manufacturing the same product under 
similar conditions without the encumbrance of royalties by 
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the "use of normal process available for that purpose in the 
light of the advances in modern technology and the develop- 
ment of national industry"; 
(c) Public treaties entered into by Colombia and prevailing 
international practices in this field; 
(d) The effect of the contract on the country's balance of 
payments; 
(e) The size of the market for which the products manufactured 
under the contract are intended; and 
(f) The period for which the patent is in effect". 
The legal systems which have been adopted by the Latin American 
countries with regards to the regulation of technology transfer, 
through national legislation, have established screening procedures 
through the registration requirement and set-up special machineries to 
deal with TOT contracts. 
Despite the differences between the various legislations of the 
nine countries[13] which have adopted laws regulating the transfer of 
technology, there is a number of common principles concerning the 
manner in which state intervention can be governed in matters of TOºr. 
The first principle to be noted in this respect is state intervention 
which is based on the view that the technology market is imperfect and 
national enterprises are thus in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis 
foreign firms. Accordingly, the state intervention in the TOT 
process, might improve the position of the recipient country and the 
conditions under which transfer occurs[14]. Up to the enacting of 
these laws, the TOT-contracts were subject to the autonomous will of 
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the contracting parties, but now these have become a matter of public 
interest. The freedom to contract itself has not been removed by the 
said legislations, as parties are free to contract or not contract 
certain agreements. It is only after the parties decide to contract 
that the content of such a contract becomes conditional upon the 
authorization of the competent national authority which may reject or 
recommend changes in the terms and conditions of the proposed 
contract. 
This form of state intervention is intended to convert the 
autonomous contractual freedom to a regulated one, the validity of 
which is subject to the government consent. The mere registration of 
contracts will provide governments with crucial information which 
would help the reviewing of proposed or existing contracts. This in 
turn could be of important significance to countries with a conanon 
system, as in the case of the Andean Pact, where at least the 
concerned government could bargain for an equal treatment. 
In general, the regulation of TOT contracts are intended to 
achieve the following objectives: (a) to improve the commercial 
conditions under which contracts are concluded, in particular the 
price charged by the licensors; (b) to eliminate the inclusion of 
restrictive clauses; (c) to unpack technology transfers and to avoid 
the importation of technologies that are locally availabile, and (d) 
to improve the conditions for the adaptation and assimilation of the 
imported technologies 115]. Although the state intervention is 
somewhat limited, since it does not replace the decision of the 
national partner in a contract neither with regards to the selection 
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of technology, nor the firms which will supply it, it is hoped that 
national firms will be encouraged by such intervention to choose the 
technology they need and its suppliers more carefully. Such 
intervention - in so far as it is articulated with appropriate 
policies for the development of technology - is likely to contribute 
to the achievement of the forenamed objectives. As far as it aims at 
certain national goals, state intervention through the evaluation and 
registration of technology transfer contracts can only be considered a 
tool of public interest, inevitably intended to prevail over the 
private views and interests of the contracting parties. 
The second con=n principle concerns the evaluation of contracts 
which implies the possibility of approving or rejecting the proposed 
contracts by the competent authority. Such evaluation comprises the 
following: 
(a) A legal examination of contracts, such as the confirmity of 
contracts with national legislation [civil and conmercial laws], the 
existence of the essential elements of the contract, the applicable 
law in cases of disputes and the identification of restrictive 
clauses; 
(b) An economic evaluation which takes into account and 
consideration the effects of the proposed contract on the enterprise 
and the national economy of the recipient country, including the 
balance of payments, the use of national resources, employment, on a 
cost benefit analysis which would late guide the government in 
reaching its decision; and 
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(c) A technical evaluation of contracts, which remain very 
limited in practice, due to the lack of adequate information. There 
is no technical information in the contracts themselves except when 
disclosed in patents. 
The rights and obligations of the contractors are valid only when 
such contracts have been registered[16]. In Mexico for example, the 
registration is obligatory if the contract was to have a legal effect 
and to be enforceable in the courts[17]. To carry out these 
functions, special machineries were set-up by the respective national 
legislations 118], 
Although the machineries set-up by the Latin American countries 
were well established, there are factors which-substantially limit the 
efficiency of such institutional bodies. Among these factors is the 
shortage of qualified and adequately trained personnel to carry out 
the three forms of evaluation (legal, economic and technical), as well 
as the monitoring of registered contracts. This limitation appears to 
be con= n to all machineries 1191, but differ from one country to 
another. For example, Annex 3: 3 shows a slow start in the evaluation 
of TOT contracts in Venezuela. In fact only 2 per cent of 844 
contracts were reviewed by SIEX, while the higher number of 
"manifestacion de volunted" instead of divestment is a direct result 
of Article 21 of Decree 63 of 1974. Under, the said Article, the 
Venezuelan Government undertakes to grant the status of "national 
investor" to foreign parties who request such status, providing that 
they renounce their rights to exporting capital and remit profits (203" 
In contrast, Annex 3: 4 shows that the process of evaluation was 
proceeding with some dispatch in Colombia. 
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The available information, on the activities of the competent 
authorities is by no means exclusive, and thus, can only shed some 
light on these activities. However, the highest number of 
applications and registrations of the transfer of technology contracts 
appears to have occurred in those countries with higher level of 
industrialization such as Brazil and Argentina[21]. Nonetheless, 
Annexes 3: 3 and 3: 4 confirm that the evaluation and review of TOT 
contracts are now being taken seriously in the Latin American 
countries. Equally important, the regulation of the transfer of 
technology contracts does not suggest that the inflow of technology 
has been hindered. One should also bear in mind that the inflow of 
technology does not solely depend on its regulation but on the 
treatment of foreign investment and the protection of industrial 
property as well. Important set of reforms have been introduced in 
both fields, i. e. the exclusion from patentability in certain vital 
sectors, the working of inventions and the elimination of import 
monopoly from the exclusive right of the patentee[22]. 
Despite the slow progress and the shortage of qualified 
personnel, the regulation of TM contracts constitute a step forward 
in the right direction. In the long run, the experience gained in the 
established machineries and authorities would contribute significantly 
to the negotiating position of those countries who have adopted such 
measures, providing that it is incorporated in an industrial framework 
where different industrial instruments work toward the same goals. 
In India, the regulation of the transfer of technology was 
initiated after independence in 1947, which makes it the longest among 
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the developing countries in the field of technology transfer. TWO 
stages of this can be distinguished: 
The first stage covers the period from 1948 to 1968, and can be 
described as a period of relaxation as far as the entry of foreign 
private investment was concerned. Agreements concluded in this period 
were not regulated, but left to the Central Government to approve in 
accordance with the general industrial policy, which was governed by 
the two Industrial Policy Resolutions of 1948 and 1956. The basic 
tendency of the policy was the Indian ownership, management .. and 
operation of enterprises. The only condition for the establishment of 
coirmercial enterprises was that majority ownership should be in the 
hands of , 
Indian nationals, except where the national interest can be 
served otherwisel231. The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 made 
no reference to technology imports. 
However, by 1956, and after eight years interlude, political and 
economical developments rendered the content of the 1948 Resolution 
obsolete(241. A new Industrial Policy Resolution was issued in 1956, 
narrowing the private sector's field and broadening the base of the 
public sector. It discarded the sectorial breakdown of the earlier 
Resolution, and covered issues in a much wider context(251. Unlike 
the 1948 Resolution, there was no need for assuring to pay 
compensation for the acquisation of private industry. 
The fact that no legislative criteria dealing with foreign 
collaborations was enacted until 1969, and no measures to implement 
the declared policies was advocated may be explained by the 
182 
conflicting objectives. On one hand, there was a need to establish 
and develop the Indian industries, thus requiring the importation of 
technology. Since foreign investment was linked to the inflow of 
certain types of technology, it was considered as an alternative form 
for paying for such technologies. On the other hand, the socialist 
pattern adopted by the Government, meant that the inflow of foreign 
investment into the country had to be consistent with the wide range 
objectives of the national policy. 
The second stage covers the period from 1969 onwards. The Indian 
Government waited patiently until industries have been established in 
the country and then began to legislate. Approval of foreign 
investment by the Government had become more selective, taking into 
account the, capacity to earn foreign exchange through export, the 
saving of foreign exchange by investments leading to import 
substitution and the extent to which the proposed transfer of 
technology is needed in India. However,, foreign investment continue 
to be encouraged in those industries where adequate capacity does not 
exist in India, or in industries considered as basic or strategic, but 
where local investment is unlikely to be forthcoming, and in areas 
where indigenous technology is not being developed. 
The general philosophy in this second stage tend to be the 
realization that a stable economy can only be built through the use of 
local resources, skills and currency. Furthermore, less foreign 
investment and foreign aid leads to self-reliance and accelerates 
economic growth, benefiting more people and creating fewer economic 
and political problems. To achieve these aims, the Indian Government 
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enacted legislations and established boards and comissions to follow 
the implentation of the declared policies: 
(A) Measures relating to the screening and operation of foreign 
investment. To coordinate and supervise the establishment of 
industries, the Indian Government established the Foreign Investment 
Baord on 27 November 1968, and entrusted it with the primary 
responsibility of deciding whether an investment proposal is 
acceptable or not. Before the foreign Investment Board takes the 
final decision, the evaluation and registration of contracts involves 
several competent authoritiest271. Proposals for foreign 
collaboration are first submitted to the Secretariat of the Ministry 
of Industry for industrial approval, which in turn seeks 
recommendations from various technical authorities through the 
technical evaluation committee. Only then, that the proposal can be 
considered by the Foreign Investment Board, and only when the 
technology is suitable and the proposal is in accordance with the 
Government overall policy that the terms and conditions of the 
contract are examined by the Board, which may suggest either 
acceptance, modification of the terms or rejection of the 
proposal[28]. 
A strict industrial licensing was imposed in the core and heavy 
investment sectors[29]1 and hardly allows private investment [foreign 
and local] to grow. Licenses are required for new industrial 
undertakings with an investment ranging between Rs 10 million and Rs 
50 million, and those industries where a significant investment of 
foreign exchange is involved[30]. 
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(B) Policy trends with regards to foreign investment in India. 
Since 1969, the trend towards foreign investment has been more 
selective and restrictive. Thus, when the Foreign Exchange Regulation 
Act "FERA" was adopted in 1973[31], it contained among others, the 
following principles and provisions: (i) As a general rule, equity 
participation can be allowed up to 40 per cent; (ii) all existing 
companies with more than 40 per cent of foreign capital participation 
were required to apply to the Reserve Bank of India for permission to 
continue business giving details of their proposals for increasing the 
share of Indian owned equity in their business; and (iii) foreign 
majority participation may be considered in exceptional cases, i. e. if 
the profits were re-invested in areas of sophisticated technology - 
[high technology concept] - or in export[32]. 
(C) The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act "MRTPA" of 
1969. The Act was enacted in response to the recommendations of the 
Monopolies Enquiry Commission which was established in 1964, and will 
be discussed within the context of restrictive business practices. 
One of the objectives of national legislation has been the 
control of restrictive business practices embodied in TOT contacts. 
Three approaches have been used to control restrictive business 
practices "RBP": The first concerns the screening procedures of the 
transfer of technology contracts through the evaluation system - 
(legal evaluation of contracts], which is widely used by the Latin 
American countries, as previously explained. The second approach 
attempts to achieve the control of PEP through the patent legislation 
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by setting-up standards making nill and void all clauses imposing 
restrictions [331. The third approach uses antimonopoly or anti-trust 
legislation, most of which are comparatively new, except the laws of 
the United States and Canada[34]. 
To promote Science and Technology, patent laws provide inventors 
with a legal monopoly designed to reduce competition as a reward for 
their creative activities. However, patent holders do not only enjoy 
such priviliged position but often try to gain more and more profits 
by imposing certain conditions and restrictions when such patents are 
licensed. The basic test in common law is, that the person imposign 
restraint must have a legitimate right or interest to protect and the 
restraint must be no more than is necessary thereof. The restrained 
person must not be unduly hampered in his ordinary trade, and the 
overall effect must not be harmful to the public interest. Patents in 
themselves inherent restrictions on export and import[35]. Export to 
countries in which the patentee has obtained a patent for the patented 
products may be prohibited unless the patent owner has given his 
consent[36]. According to L. MELVILLLE, "a patentee does not have a 
legitimate interest in restraints of time and territory beyond those 
granted in the patent"[37]. 
Apart from restrictions inherent in patents, there is a 
substantial number of restrictions which have nothing to do with the 
patent grant. The objective of those restrictions embodied in TOºr 
contracts is to build up, or maintain, or enhance a powerful position 
in the market. Whether the intention is defensive or exploitative, 
the classical prescription for improving own position is to exclude 
competitors from the market and confine the available trade as much as. 
possible to a manageable number of participants. 
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Basically, the control of restrictive business practices under 
existing national and regional laws consist of three categories of 
practices. The first category lists restrictions and practices which 
are under absolute prohibition, illegal per se. The second contains 
practices which are prohibited in principle, subject to specific 
exceptions. The third includes optional prohibition at the discretion 
of the competent authorities. In practice, the control of PBP has 
been exercised on a mixture of basis involving strictness and 
flexibility rather than on a strict adherence to one of the three 
categories. However, national and regional legislation on the 
transfer of technology tend to protect wider interests relating to the 
economic and technological development of the recipient countries. 
They promised on the de facto inequality in the bargaining power of 
the contracting parties, and thus the state intervention in this field 
seeks to prevent such practices[381. 
In view of the existence of significant nui±er of RBP in 
licensing agreements in the developing countriest391, and for the 
purpose of this study, restrictive practices are divided into three 
categories: - (a) Territorial restrictions directly related to export; 
(2) Restrictions effecting the economy in general and the 
technological capability of the recipient countries in particular; and 
(3) financial. restrictions. 
1. EXPORT RESTRT(`TT[Y1'S 
Territorial restrictions on exports and which are not inherent in 
the patent right include different types of export restrictions [40]. 
The effect of those restrictions on the economies of developoing 
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countries are of a great concern. They do riot raise the export of 
manufactured products produced under the agreement, which may include 
patents, know-how, trademarks, and industrial designs. Export 
restrictions may be more severe when patents are conbined in the same 
contracts with know-how. The benefits which the licensee may not 
derive because of such restrictions are mainly in the form of foreign 
exchange gains and effects on unemployment in the recipient 
country[41]. In India, for example, 455 agreements included one sort 
or another of export restriction out of 527 agreements with 
restrictive business practices prior to March 1964. Between April 
1964 and March 1969, export restrictions were included in 161 
agreements out of 171 with RBp[421. It was also found by the Reserve 
Bank of India in 1974 that out of 1098 agreements, 564 included export 
restrictions[433. 
Faced with this fact many developing countries began to enact new 
legislation dealing with the transfer of technology, under which the 
inclusion of export restriction in licensing agreement was prohibited 
and may render the licence invalid. In this respect, the law of 
Mexico is the most detailed one and leaves no doubt whatsoever to what 
can not be included in a licence agreement. 
"..... an agreement cannot be accepted when: 
It provides for the total prohibition of exports; 
The licensee is denied the right to export to certain 
geographical areas where the licensee has not previously 
granted exclusive rights to third parties; 
Max mum volumes are prescribed for export sales; 
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The licensee is required to export exclusively through 
the licensor on unfavourable terms; 
The licensee is required unjustivably to pay a large 
royalty on export sales; 
The licensor's prior permission is required before export 
transaction is carried out. 
A contract even though containing export restrictions may be 
registered nevertheless if any of the following circumstances 
are present: 
If the licensor has granted exclusive selling rights in other 
countries; 
If the licensor is not authorized to grant export rights in 
certain areas under his country's legislation. 
If only certain markets are authorized which are, however, 
adequate for the export capacity of the licensee. 
In. general, the contracts should so far as possible grant to 
the licencee enterprises their natural markets, specifically 
the markets in the American Continent"[44]. 
These attempts by individual developing countries to prohibit 
contractual restrictions on exports do not lead automatically to the 
right of export of the patented goods by the licensee if the patentee 
had taken patents for the same invetion in the contries where the 
licensee intends to export. Otherwise the licensor would be entitled 
to sue the licensee for remedies against infringments, because the 
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validity of the patent extends solely within the boundaries of the 
granting country. 
Can the regional level, Decision 24 of the Andean Commission 
permits some flexibility in these areas of the law. However, such 
flexibility does not apply in sub-regional trade "In no case shall 
conditions of this kind be accepted with reference to subregional 
exchange or for exportation of similar products to third world 
countries"[453. 
Export restrictions are not a right conferred by industrial 
property, since national patent systems unfold their effects only 
within the national territories, but not on the export market. 
Despite limitations, on the control of RBP, such as the limited 
bargaining power, dependence on foreign itported technology and 
shortage of skilled manpower in this field. It is evident that a 
number of developing countries in particular those of Latin America 
and India are takin proper action to deal with such restrictions which 
should inspire other developing countries to take similar actions 
according to their own economic circumstances[46]. 
2"M D0RM IN (GRAL ARID E 
A: Restrictions on Research and Development: 
The right conferred by the patent grant does in no way cover 
limitation on R and D of the patented product, therefore such 
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restrictions are usually regarded as invalid. The actual, or 
potential adverse effects of these practices are not difficult to 
visualize. They constitute a serious impediment to the competitive 
freedom of the recipient country. More importantly, they greatly 
limit the diffusion of the dynamic impact of technology on the 
national economy of the recipient country's ability to choose or adapt 
technology in accordance with local needs and resources endowments to 
develop the domestic infrastructure for R&D both for domestic market 
and for export, and to obtain access to inventions or improvement to 
existing technologies on reasonable terms. 
Licensing agreements often contain provisions which limit the 
possibility of developing national technological and scientific 
capabilities. " while these limitations exist in a wide variety of 
formsl each varying in intensity and impact, it is possible to list 
them as follows: - 
- restrictions on the making of improvements in the product or process 
by the licensee; 
- restrictions forbiding the right to initiate R&D programanes in 
connection with new products, processes, or equipment, on the part of 
the licensee. 
- restrictions covering the incorporation of improvements obtained 
from third parties. 
- restrictions forbiding the licensee to initiate R&D programmes on 
the expiry of the license. 
- conditions requiring the licensee to return drawing specifications, 
operating manuals, etc, on the termination of the license. 
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Restrictions on R&D lead to the minimization or suppression of 
competition in the relevant product market by preventing the license 
from exploiting the competing technology. The restriction not to 
undertake own research can either be total or to apply to a particular 
type of research activities, especially those which are in direct 
competition with research undertaken by the licensor. Restrictions 
may also be placed on adaptive research, or on the licensee's freedom 
to make changes in the acquired technology. 
It is clear that such limitations constitute an abusive use of 
the licensor's dominant position, besides being undesirable in their 
effect on the technological progress of the recipient countries. 
Since one of the major objectives of patent laws is to promote 
domestic technological. development, any limitations of this sort, 
either total or partial, should appropriately be prohibited in 
licensing agreements[471. Furthermore, the prohibition should include 
all types of restrictions on the introduction of restrictions of 
changes in products or processes or technology obtained under the 
license. R&D, is the only possible way to reduce technological 
dependency; it is already restricted at the present time in developing 
countries, and should not be restricted further. 
B: Grant Back Provisions: 
A grant back provision in a patent license is an agreement 
between the licensor and the licensee, assigning to the former 
inventions which the latter may make in a particular techological 
field. Such provision establishes a unilateral flow of knowledge and 
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innovations for the sole benefit of the licensor which limit the 
licensee's ability to benefit from research activities, and could be a 
disincentive to the generation of local technological capability. 
Grant back clauses may take several forms, each one varying in 
effect and scope, such forms may include: - 
- reciprocal or non-reciprocal; 
- exclusive or non-exclusive; 
- obligatory or optional; and 
- with or without any payment conditions. 
Under the non reciprocal form the licensee is obliged to grant all 
future improvements to the licensor on a unilateral basis[48]. The 
licensee on the other hand, have no similar rights to information on 
the technological developments at the lincensor's end[49]. 
When grant back clauses are exclusive, this could mean either 
that the patentee acquires sole ownership to any improvements or 
inventions-made by the licensee, or that the licensee is free to use 
inventions and improvements himself, but not free to license 
improvements to third parties. The effect of such clauses which are 
usually of an obligatory nature, is the abusive use of the patentee's 
dominant position and depriving the licensee of any possibility of 
improving his competitive position in the market through the 
development of new technologies and product. It also constitutes a 
burden on the licensee's part when such grant back clause is free of 
charge as the patentee is not sharing in or contributing towards the 
licensee financial burdens spent on R&D. 
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Grant back clauses are dealt with by national legislation in a 
wide variety of ways. In some cases certain laws do not prohibit 
grant back clauses in general, but only the non-reciprocal and 
exclusive forms[50]. There are advantages and disadvantages in grant 
back clauses from the point of view of the public interest. On one 
hand, it enables cooperative improvement or development in a 
particular field in the interest of the public and it is said that 
such clauses restrict monopoly by diluting it between producers in the 
field. On the other hand, it gives the licensee a good reason for not 
engaging in research and incentive activities since the results of 
such research will be turned over to the licensor or shared with him. 
In certain developing countries, the position has been a 
prohibition of grant back provisions in principle. This is based on 
the recognition that all new technologies resulting from license 
agreements are the sole property of the licenseet511. It should be 
noted that exchange of information can only make sense, when they are 
concluded between equal parties. Under the reciprocal form, ' 
developing countries or their enterprises should evaluate grant-back 
provisions from the standpoint of improving the technological 
capabilities and avoid the perpetution of technological dependence. 
In my view, grant back clauses should be allowed in licensing 
agreements if they are on a reciprocal basis and non-exclusive forms 
in certain cases providing that they meet certain conditions set-up by 
the recipient countries, such as: - 
(i) That the improvements or advances which the grant back 
refers to, are the property of the licensee and not the 
licensor; 
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(ii) That grant-back clauses are neither against the industrial 
and technological policies of the recipient country; and 
(iii) That there is a reasonable payment to the licensee on 
additional knowledge passed by him to the licensor, on the 
basis of non-exclusive, optional, reciprocal agreements, and 
also on the importance of the improvements. 
These conditions should be adopted at least as a runimmm standard 
for allowing grant back clauses. Even such conditions may prove to be 
not protecting enough, particularly when the license is concluded with 
large firms, since the balance between such firms and enterprises from 
developing countries is never equal. Such inequality between the 
contracting parties is the main reason for state intervention in this 
area. The least the state can do to protect the national economy, is 
to provide the legal grounds for such protection. A total prohibition 
of grant back clauses may not be in the interest of developing 
countries, since it would mean another license for the improvements 
reached by the licensor and which he may not . grant, or be in a more 
powerful negotiating position. This is due to the fact that important 
improvements are likely to come from the licensors who have financial 
and skilled manpower resources to obtain them, than his contracting 
partner from developing countries who have shortages in either finance 
or skilled manpower resources as well as the low level of inventive 
capabilities. 
C: Restriction on competing technology and products: 
Such restrictions include, the prohibition to co-operate with 
competing firms, the patentee's right to terminate the license if the 
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licensee sells or produce competing goods, prior permission from the 
patentee before entering into licenses concerning competing 
technologies; obligation to pay royalites on the sale of products 
which are competitive with those covered by the patent license. 
Equally, they may include an obligation on the licensee not to 
produce, nor to acquire machines which are in direct competition with 
machines which are the subject of the licence, prohibition upon the 
licensee to do business in any way in the technical field which was 
the subject of the license, within a period of time after the 
termination of the license. These restrictions and others are 
considered to be null and invalid in most recent laws(52]. 
Another clause which may exist in patent licenses is the 
restriction upon the technology already imported. These restrictions 
deal with technology for which the patent protection has expired or 
know-how has lost its character, therefore limitation based on the 
further use of the product cannot be based on the industrial property 
system. Generally speaking the product or process which was protected 
by a patent which has expired shall become a subject of the general 
rule of law which applies to the sale and use of unpatented goods and 
not subject of industrial property laws. 
The legal nature of know-how has not obtained legislative 
backing. There is no place for know-how among the classification of 
"property" in countries with a codified system of law. In this 
context Roubier wrote: - 
"Considering the secret of manufacturing as a property had 
tempted only few writers, and it is only in a very vague 
manner that one can compare the infringement of the manu- 
facturing secret as a proper infringement"[53]. 
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French authorities seem to agree on the exclusion of a property notion 
in respect of know-how, which is deemed to be a matter of 
"appropriation de fait"[54]. The situation in conanon law countries 
does not differ substantially, the concept of property is more 
imprecise and flexible there[55]. In the United States the question 
of property right in know-how is a controversial issue. Although a 
large part of authors favour the non-proprietary doctrine, there is a 
minority which seem to admit the proprietary nature of know-how[56]. 
In the developing countries, the legal nature of know-how has 
frequently been dealt with in connection with the effects involving 
its transfer. The question is whether the transferred know-how can be 
retreived, or whether it becomes a part of licensee's acquired 
knowledge. 
. During the agreement performance, 
the licensee receives 
technical information from the licensor. It is in a sense like the 
knowledge gained by the nationals of the licensee (experience) which 
cannot be returned to the licensor [57]. The most that licensor can 
ask for is a clause not to disclose the know-how to third parties, 
since it is the communication and disclosure of technical knowledge - 
which was until then unknown to the recipient party - which is the 
basis of know-how and trade secrets. 
The report of the Reserve Bank of India gave the following 
samples, with respect to the above restrictions: - 
(i) "The use of patents and trademarks was not generally 
allowed after the termination of an agreement while in 
some cases the Indian company had to return all the 
technical information and gave up manufacture of the 
product altogether"[581. 
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(ii) ".... continuous use of the know-how after the termination 
of the agreement was specifically prohibited under six (of 
19) agreements"[59]. 
(iii) "The use of know-how supplied by the collaborator was not 
permitted in five (of 19) agreements after expiry"(60]. 
(iv) "The use of assets after expiry of the agreement was per- 
mitted only in five (of 13) cases" 16i1. 
(v) "The use of patents and trademarks was not permitted after 
the expiry of agreements except in a few stray cases. As 
regarded unpatented know-how, there appeared to be a greater 
latitutde as its use after the expiry of the agreement was, 
specifically permitted in 47 (of 113 agreements)[621. 
Later, the Indian Government, ensured that proposals for foreign 
collaboration should conform to the policies of the Government, under 
which the payment of royalty for the duration of the agreement would 
also constitute compensation for the use of patent rights till the 
expiry of the patent life and that the Indian party would be free to 
produce the item even after the expiry of the agreement without 
additional payments[63]. Closely connected with the above 
restrictions are other clauses relating to the prohibition of the 
licensee to challange the validity of patent rights belonging to the 
licensor in the licensee's country[64]. 
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3. HF flt[CTIÜN RELATTh)G TO FIN NCIMJ ASPECT 
A: Package licensing occurs when the owner of patents demands that 
the licensee will receive a license for a group of patents regardless 
of whether the licensee uses all of them or only one of the 
patents [65], Package licensing may also include the sale of know-how 
or trademarks as a condition to license the patent(661. It is 
possibly true that the patentee uses the package licenses, when there 
is a doubt of the validity of certain patents in the package. The 
objective behind such package deal' is to close investigations on the 
doubtful patents offered by other competitors, or adoption of his own 
improved processes or products. This type of licensing is condemned 
on the grounds that it prevents competitors from biding for single 
patents on their individual value, and constitute an attempt to extend 
a monopoly of one patent to control others(67]. 
Package licensing is frequently used to force the recipient to 
accept as part of a deal a technology which he neither needs nor 
wants, in order to get that part of technology or trademark, or other 
proprietary asses which he needs. It may also be used to prolong the 
duration of the contract if the main patents are near to expire, but 
deals which include other patents have longer time to run. The 
situation is worse when the licensee only requires the know-how or 
trademarks but not patents. 
The question of package licensing can only be dealt through 
screening procedures where competent authorities should be empowered 
to deny registration of contracts which are exclusive and do not 
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permit the license to sub-license the subject matter of the contract. 
Such screening procedure would be on case-by-case basis, since some of 
the exclusive agreements may be an incentive for the recipient country 
to receive new technology, to engage in expenses which are necessary 
to begin production and to introduce the product transferred through 
the technology. The effect of prohibiting the licensee to sub-license 
the imported technology to any third party, whether before or after 
the expiry of the agreement means that other firms in the same country 
have to acquire the same technology from the same licensor or 
others(681. The case-by-case screening should also be based on, the 
ground of the negative effect on the industrial development policies 
of the concerned countries. Equally, royalties on unexploited patents 
should be prohibited. 
B: Duration of Transfer of Technology Agreement: Most technology 
transfer agreements contain clauses relating to the, duration and 
obligations after the expiry of the agreement or the patent life, such 
as the obligation to continue royalty payments, or the obligation not 
to use or sub-license the technology after the expiration of the 
agreement. 
Generally speaking, the screening authorities accept terms 
between 1 to 5 years. In respect of licenses involving industrial 
property, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico allow the respective contracts to 
run until the expiration of the licenses rights i. e. Mexico 10 
yearsl691, Argentina and Brazil 15 years(701. In cases of the Andean 
Pact countries, Decision 85 allows for a shorter period of 5 years, 
such practice is related to the reevaluation of contracts 
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already in force. However, in some cases the contract may run for 15 
years[711. In India collaboration agreements are normally approved 
for a period of five years from the date of agreement or the date of 
production - (conmenccnent of production cannot be delayed beyond five 
years) . In any event the rraximum period should be 8 , 
years from the 
signing of the agreement[721. 
Post expiration effects of T agreements, have not received 
adequate treatment in the existing legislation. Certain issues arise 
from such an inadequacy, in particular with relation to the use of the 
transferred technology. For example, if the industrial property 
rights remain valid after the expiry of the agreement, in such case 
the licensor is legally entitled to prevent the licensee (or third 
party), from using the patented invention without the licensor's 
consent. Such legal rights means in practice that the licensee can be 
excluded from the market with the loss of investments already made; or 
negotiate from a weaker position, new conditions for continuing the 
license. These risks, has only been foreseen by Argentina which 
attempted explicitely to regulate such a situation[731, and in the 
adoption of "license or right" by the Andean Pact countries Decision 
85 which could contribute towards avoiding those risks[74]. It is 
common that licensing agreements include restrictions on the use of 
unpatented technology after the expiry of the agreement. Such 
restriction is justified by the licensors on the grounds that the 
icensee is a mere leasee and thus obliged to return the object of the 
lease when the agreement expires. Despite. the importance of such a 
restriction on the technology transferred to the developing countries, 
it has not yet received a full attention in national legislations[75]. 
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C: Tie-in Restrictions: A tie in clause in a patent license is a 
clause obliging the licensee to obtain goods from the licensor, thus 
limiting the source of supply of raw materials, spare parts or 
intermediate product [761, creates a monopoly outside the rights 
conferred by the patent, the purpose of which is to achieve a 
monopolistic exploitation by extending the market artificially for the 
tied product or service. The effect of tie-in clause goes beyond the 
licensee to reach third parties, who are excluded by the clause from 
supplying the licensee and thus unable to make use of market 
opportunities. Such restriction tends to raise the cost of production 
and the over-pricing of inputs in the recipient country while ti gives 
an additional income to the licensor. 
Different attitudes have been adopted by national legislation. 
Some developing countries adopted legislation prohibiting tie-in 
clauses in principle, but allowing some exceptions to take place on 
technical grounds. This is because a particular technology cannot be 
worked without additional material input, or to guarantee the quality 
of product, especially if trademarks are involved or if the product is 
destined for export(77l, suppliers and in some cases the recipient may 
insist on such tie in clauses. 
The present state of development in most, developing countries 
allows them to buy most of their needed material from several sources 
in the international market. However when they are tied to a single 
source, they are in fact deprived from exploiting market opportunities 
and become over priced, as the price is determined by a unique 
supplier. In the end, such a situation results in a monopoly control 
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over the supply of equipments and other inputs. Therefore developing 
countries should in principle prohibit the use of tie-in clauses with 
a degree of flexibility to allow for exceptional cases, where the use 
of such clause is in the benefit of the recipient country i. e. as in 
cases where there is no alternative other than to acquire the goods 
from the supplier of technology, or when the price is constant with 
that of the international market, with the right to abolish those 
tie-in clause, if equivalent quality inputs can be obtained at as 
lower price from other sources. In other words, the source of supply 
should always be determined by the recipient of the technology and not 
but its licensor. 
Developing countries are particularly concerned with explicit 
clauses and* implicit practices embodied in TOT contracts, which 
adversely effect the national scientific and technological 
capabilities of these countries. Such awareness is being demonstrated 
at the current negotiations of an international code of conduct on the 
transfer of technology, where a big gap remains between the Group of 
77 on behalf of the developing countries and Group B representing the 
industrialized countries. 
2. The UNCTAD's Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Techno1o4V" 
UNCTAD was the first international organization almost entirely 
devoted to the economic, trade and development problems of the 
developing countries. In 1973, the UNCTAD's Trade and Development 
Board adopted Resolution 104 (XIII) requesting the Intergovernnent 
Group on the Transfer of Technology to study the possibility and the 
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feasibility on an international code of conduct in the field of the 
transfer of technology, and asked the Secretary General of UNCTAD to 
prepare the necessary background papers for this work[791. The 
negotiations of the code is one of the key initiatives associated with 
the establishment of the New International Economic Order (NIFO), and 
as such, it is being regarded by UNCTAD as a landmark in its workI801. 
The tJNCTAD's work in the field of ' the transfer of technology has 
a dual purpose: the revision of the Paris Convention and the 
formulation of an international code of conduct on the transfer of 
technology. 
(A) As far as patents are concerned, the UNCTAD drive to achieve 
effective reform in the field of industrial property by revising the 
existing international patent law - the revison of the Paris 
Convention - which is binding on 85 countries throughout the world[81] 
has been relatively successful. It has been successful not because an 
actual revision of the Convention has been achieved yet[82], 
accommodating the needs of the developing countries, but rather 
because of the considerable attention which the UNCTAD report 
DT/B/C. 11/19 (1974) has attracted and the anxieties which it caused 
among the industrialized countries. 
The report seeks to substantiate the view that the present 
international patent system is tailored solely to accommodate the 
interest of the industrialized countries in a very one sided way. 
Even patents granted by the developing countries are overwhelmingly in 
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the hands of foreign patentees, who often use their patents as import 
licenses, a situation which cannot be improved by revocation and 
compulsory licensing. 
The UNCTAD report continues to suggest that the transfer of 
technology only takes place when patents are being worked. However, 
the cost of such transfer is far too high as a result of high licenses 
fees, restrictive practices and hidden cost in the form of excessive 
prices for imported equipments and technical assistance. Because of 
these reasons, the report raises the question of the treatment of 
nationals and foreigners as one of the utmost importance in the 
revision of the Paris Convention. 
Since 1975, a group of governmental experts have been working on 
a list compiled by experts from the developing countries(831. Among 
other things, the list raises the question, for example, of whether or 
not the developing countries: should be conceded to charge higher 
patent fees from non nationals than from nationals, whether 
non-nationals should be granted shorter protection or even a limited 
protection, and whether stricter obligations to work patents can be 
imposed on foreigners[841. 
The patent system could - according to various UNCTAD documents 
and investigations - if properly designed, contribute towards the 
creation of favourable environment. But as the system exists in 
developing countries it has by and large failed to contribute either 
to stimulate inventions among nationals, or encourage rapid transfer 
and widespread diffusion of knowledge. The low industrial level and 
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the technological structure meant that enterprises from the developing 
countries were placed in a highly vulnerable position when negotiating 
TOT contracts with foreign firms. Patents and other forms of 
industrial property can only benefit the developing countries, if the 
technical knowledge contained in those patents is put to an effective 
use through local production facilities. However, one should not 
over-estimate the significance of the patent system to the 
technological development of the developing countries. The transfer 
of technology is only one of many factors, and the question of patents 
is not decisive in itself, indeed the developing countries need more 
than the patented technology. 
(B) The idea of an international Code of Conduct on the Transfer of 
Technology - as previously mentioned - is only one part of the efforts 
made by the developing countries to construct a New International 
EcQnomic Order, and to restructure the political, economical and legal 
systems in order to further their economic development and political 
autonomy. As far as one can tell from existing drafts, the planned 
code will contain a new and very far reaching approach to governing 
economic relationship between developing and developed countries. The 
present draft of the Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technologyt851, 
which is divided into ten chapters, is exceptionally detailed and more 
like a national legislation than an international convention. This is 
because of the fact that the developing countries wanted a legally 
binding treaty embodying genuine obligations. 
A long list of outstanding issues representing the position of 
the Group of 77 during the negotiation of the Code can be summarised 
as follows: 
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First, the developing countries insist that the Code must be 
legally binding "an internationally legally binding instrument is the 
only form capable of effectively regulating the transfer of 
technology"[86]; 
Second, the Code must apply to all international transactions 
concerning the transfer of technology and not only transfers accross 
national boundaries, but also to boundaries within national boundaries 
if a foreign entity is directly or indirectly involved[87]; 
Third, the Code must apply the law of the acquiring party to 
matters relating to public policy and to sovereignty'881; 
Fourth, the Code must provide that in the settlement of disputes 
"the courts and other tribunals of the technology acquiring country 
shall have jurisidiction over disputes arising from the conditions or 
the effects of the contract which concern public policy or sovereignty 
or conflict or characterization"'891; 
Fifth, the practices listed under the chapter on restrictive 
practices(90] shall be considered as being merely examples of adverse 
practices and not as an exhaustive enumeration of such practices[91J; 
Sixth, the Code must eliminate all restrictive business 
practices,, whether anti-competitive or not, which adversely effect the 
social, economic or technological development of the recipient 
countries 19211 and 
Seventh, in order to implement effectively the code, the group of 
77 proposed the creation of an international body within UNCTAD "which 
shall among other functions, make appropriate recommendations to 
states on the implementation and application of the Code(931. 
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The purpose of the Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology 
is to improve the flow of technology, to enable developing countries 
to obtain technology on terms more conducive to their economic 
development, and to make TOT transactions more free of unfair 
practices. Most importantly, the Code is hoped to give the developing 
countries the chance to regulate what is recongized to be as the 
heretofore unchecked power of M ICs. 
The agreement on an International Code of Conduct has not yet 
been reached because of the unresolved issues. Two of those issues 
concern the legal character of the Code and the applicable law. 
Arguments over the legal character of the Code in international 
law show the-divergence of views among the three regional groups. The 
Group of 77 has never supposed that the Code could be anything but a 
legally binding, meanwhile, Group B has never stated that it would 
accept anything but a non-binding Code. The position of Group D- 
(socialist countries) - on the judicial character of the Code, slowly 
approached that of the Group of 77, and thus by the end of 1970's it 
became two Groups argument on the idea of a non-binding 
instrument(941. 
Since the beginning of the negotiations on the Code, there had 
been no lack of moral initiatives and support, which certainly helped 
to draw attention to the problems of TOr. However, only the law could 
deal with those problems and organize relationships between countries. 
Therefore, what is needed is not a code of moral principles, but a 
binding legal code applicable to all the parties to an agreement for 
the transfer of technology. 
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The position of Croup B is that the code should be a non-binding 
legal instrument. The Group points out that a code in the form of 
guidelines would have such a profound impact that its provisions would 
be broadly applied, and would not preclude the possibility of 
appropriate action at a later stage(961. on the other hand developing 
countries maintain that only the adoption of a legally binding 
instrument would ensure that its objectives ere infact realized[96]. 
Furthermore, developing countries went on to suggest that if the Code 
which covers many aspects of the transfer of technology was acceptable 
only in the form of guidelines, why a similar approach had not been 
adopted to the revision of the Paris Convention. Moreover, since 
patents are the basic element in the TOT, would it not be better"to 
revise the Convention and transfer it, too, into a set of 
guidelines1971. 
The comparison between the legal Charter of the Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property and the future Code of 
Conduct on the Transfer of Technology was not fully exploited during 
the ongoing negotiations by the developing countries. one should bear 
in mind that developed and developing countries generally have 
followed two different approaches in regulating the transfer of 
technology. The developing countries legislations usually seek to 
limit the activities of MNCs, by regulating their control over the 
terms of TOT contracts. On the other hand, developed countries 
legislations tend to protect the technical and industrial property 
rights of MN-Cs and promote their activities. It might be just 
possible that if the industrialized countries were faced with two 
options: either to accept a legal character of the code, or to see 
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developing countries attempting to abolish the patent system or keep 
it merely as a guideline1981, would go for the first option. After 
all the developing countries would not lose much by following such a 
line. 
To adopt the Code as a mere guideline is, to a certain extent, to 
endorse the status quo without meeting the fundamental needs of the 
developing countries. A set of guidelines, means that the "Anglo 
Saxon" orientation of "fair and reasonable" would have to be accepted 
by the developing countries. Such concept does not exist in Roman law 
on which the legislation of many of the developing countries is based 
- (i. e. French speaking countries of Africa and Latin America). Thus, 
what they want is a code that states precisely what is fair and 
reasonable as to remove all grounds for controversy. In an age of 
multinational corporations, which were often more powerful than many 
states, developing countries feel that a code based on vague concept 
of fair and reasonable might fail to meet the problems encountered. 
To solve the differing perceptions of the legal nature of the 
Code, the UNCTAD Secretariat advanced its own combination of 
alternatives and possible solutions to the issuel99]. For example, it 
proposed the adoption of the Code as a set of guidleines in the form 
of a U. N. resolution and, subsequent to such adoption, the Code may be 
opened for accession as a treaty by States. Another alternative was 
the adoption of the Code as a convention containing both mandatory and 
voluntary provisions in all chapters. 
It is unlikely at present that the developed countries are 
prepared to accept a legally binding Code and seems more likely that 
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a two step approach will finally be adopted. The first step would 
consist of adopting the code as a U. N. resolution, and the second is 
to decide the legal character of the code at a review conference to be 
held within a fixed time-frame. This compromise solution can be 
interpreted that the industrialized countries have undertaken now to 
accept a legally binding code at the next revision if the code is 
shown to be unsatisfactory as a non-binding instrument. 
One of the liveliest question at the ongoing negotiations 
concerns the applicable law to the settlement of disputes arising from 
TOT contracts. Once again, the disagreement on this issuel100] has 
been reduced to the two opposing regional Groups namely the Group of 
77 and Group B. The Group D widely recognizes the will of the parties 
to choose the applicable law within the permitted limits of national 
legislation. Such position can be seen as a tacit agreement with the 
point of view of Group B. 
The position of the industrialized countries - (Group B) - is 
essentially that: 
"The parties to a technology transfer agreement may freely 
choose the law governing the formation, the validity, per- 
formance and interpretation of the agreement, provided that 
the law chosen either has a substantial relationship to the 
or to the transaction or therelis other reasonable basis for 
the parties' choice"[101]. 
In other terms, the Group B'desires that the choice of the- applicable 
law be possible between the law of the country of the technology 
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supplier and that of the recipient state. Furthermore, and in cases 
where no effective law was chosen by the parties, the substantive law 
of the country having the closest and most real. connection with the 
agreement should govern such an agreement[102]. Apart from the 
freedom to choose the applicable law, the parties should also be free 
to choose the court before which disputes shall be tried, and 
arbitration or any third party procedures [1031. The Eastern Block - 
(Group D) - consider arbitration as one of the most suitable methods 
of setteling disputes, to the extent of excluding the jurisdiction of 
the ordinary courts[104]. 
By contrast, the Group of 77 maintain that the recipient of the 
technology should unequivocally hold jurisdiction. 
"The law application to matters relating to public policy 
(ordre public) and to sovereignty shall be the law of the 
acquiring country. Any clause to the contrary shall be 
void"[105j. 
The same law of the recipient country should apply to any contractual 
clause which might violate the public policy and sovereignty of that 
country especially in matters concerning its governmental perrogative 
or its legislative, regulatory or administrative powers. Equally the 
jurisdiction over disputes arising from the conditions or the effect 
of the contract and which concern public policy or sovereignty, shall 
be that of the receipient country's courts and tribunals [106]" 
The freedom of the contracting parties, can be permitted in 
matters of the applicable law providing that conflict does not involve 
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questions of public policy and sovereignty[107]. The parties can also 
choose to opt for arbitration or a forum in matters of private 
interest so long as choice does not contain clauses which explicitly 
or implicitly excludes the jurisdiction of the courts and tribunals of 
the recipient country[108]; and providing that the recipient country 
has express rules to the contrary[109]. 
The question of applicable law had sown real panic among the 
technology suppliers, especially M Cs, which feared having to submit 
to the legislation of the developing countries. The legal nature and 
possible form of the code is directly linked with issue of the 
applicable law. In other terms, if the code is to take the form of a 
non-binding character, the question of applicable law would be limited 
to set of guidelines on the subject. On the other hand, if the code 
is to take the form of a legally-binding character, the main 
substantive applicable legal provisions would be the rules contained 
in the code itself. 
The nature of dispute can be indicated by the fact that the 
developing countries, relying on the Calvo doctrine by which the law 
of the acquiring country applies to disputes and the industrialized 
countries rejecting such approach. The latter believe that the 
applicable law or the proper law of the contract should be freely 
expressed by the parties, i. e. a specific national lawl1101. However, 
the developing countries argue that the law of the acquiring country 
proposed by them is in fact favoured by many industrialized countries, 
which applied it in various forms, such as the law having the closest 
link with the contract. Further to accept the choice of 
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the parties, amounts to endorsing existing practices and thus give the 
technology suppliers the whip hand, since the freedom to choose means 
in fact the choice of the most powerful party. 
As far as arbitration is concerned as a means of solving disputes 
arising from TOT contracts, it has often worked against the developing 
countries. For example, in the Abu Dhabi Arbitration, Lord Asquith of 
Bishopstone conceded that "if any municipal system were applicable, it 
would prima facie be that of Abu Dhabi" but the arbitrator rejected 
such law on the basis that "it was fanciful to suggest that in this 
very primitive region, there was any settled body of law of legal 
principles applicable to the construction of modern commercial 
instrument"[111]. Likewise, Sir Alfred Backnill ruled out Islamic law 
as the proper* law despite finding it to be the appropriate law[1121. 
Furthermore, arbitral awards have been criticized in the 
industrialized countries themselves, such as the one in the APflACO 
Arbitration[113], , and more recently in the arbitration between Libya 
and American Oil Companies[114]. 
Arbitration in itself is not held in question, but in the light 
of the de facto inequalities which exist, it is essential that 
precaution be taken in the cases of contracts between companies from 
developed and developing countries. Arbitration procedures which were 
employed almost excessively in Anglo-Saxon countries in the early 19th 
century, gradually extended to European countries and became organized 
as international trade expanded. The interests of the parties were 
similar, it could be said that the parties consitituted a veritable 
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international society of buyers and sellers. Then the industrialized 
nations achieved their desire to possess their own jurisdiction by the 
setting-up of arbitration bodies, thereby themselves determining the 
procedures employed for settling their differences. 
However, international trade is expanding rapidly, in such a way 
that we have entered a new phase. The nature of contracts has changed 
in respect of the legal status of the parties and in respect of the 
content of contracts. The contracts are no longer merely corwercial 
in the traditional sense of the term, their scope has expanded to 
include a variety of services. Trade does not involve the 
industrialized countries - the founders of the arbitration club, but 
also the developing countries who import finished goods and industrial 
units and export their natural resources. 
At present the developing countries are still confined to these 
systems of arbitration, therefore it is perfectly legitimate for them 
to seek the up-dating of these systems by placing greater emphasis on 
the ultimate purpose of the contract. 
Arbitrators and judges belonging as they do to a certain part of 
the world and certain social system, have a conception of the law 
which cannot but reflect their own system. Accordingly they tend to 
consider the arguments of the developing countries as being devoid of 
any legal grounds and inoperative when such argument do not fit in 
with their own conception of law. 
The denationalization or delocalization of settlement of disputes 
means the separation of contracts from any state law runs counter tc; 
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the most classical concept of sovereignty. It is in this context, 
that the latin American countries have asserted the sovereignty aspect 
in their laws and regulations concerning the transfer of technology. 
These laws have provided that the national law should govern the 
interpretation and performance of technology contracts (1153, and 
established the principle of national jurisdiction over disputes 
arising from 'IT agreements [116] . 
Based on the Algerian experience, it is doubtful whether having 
the national law as the proper law of the contract without national 
jurisdiction over disputes arising from technology contracts could 
guarantee the public policy and sovereignty aspects. M. ISSAD argued 
that the optimism raised by the frequenct recourse by the national 
enterprises to the Algerian law is being tempered by the frequent 
recourse to international arbitration [117]. The reasons behind M. 
ISSAD argument is that the Algerian law of obligations is not 
fundamentally different from similar European laws, in particular the 
French civil code[118] Furthermore, technology contracts are not 
limited to the two contracting parties: national enterprises and 
foreign firms, but like most companies'from the developing countries, 
the practice of binding credits efficiently assure the foreign 
constructor or the seller of technology of the intervention of banks, 
and thus transforming the contract from two contracting parties to 
three or more. The effect of this transformation is that banks and 
sometimes countries arrogate to themselves the right to introdue 
between the company or the country concerned and those who are not 
parties to the contract and to admonish them in schoolmastry fashion. 
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Finally, this argument is further enhanced by the lack of 
coherence between the payment of the contracts price and the execution 
of the services by the foreign contracting parties. For example, in 
one of the contracts for the realization of an industrial plant signed 
by Algeria, the payment of the contract's price was scheduled as 
follows: - 
- 5% as initial payment within one month of the entry into force of 
the contract; 
- 1% one raonth after the initial payments; then payments continue each 
two or three months. 
- The final fraction of 0.5% must be paid six months before the expiry 
of the duration of the contract, which was fixed in this particular 
contract at 54 months. 
There was no clause tying the payments to the actual performance 
and execution of the contract's rights and obligations. To make 
things worse, the foreign contracting firm abandoned the work yard but 
had already been paid a substantial proportion of the contract's 
value. In situation like this, even when arbitration awards are 
pronounced against the foreign constructor they do not result in fair 
compensation for the prejudice suffered by the national enterprises. 
The attitude of the industrialized countries with regard to the 
proper alw of the contract and arbitration appears to be based on the 
notion of "civilized nations", which alone have the capacity, and 
other legal systems are regarded as a "legal vacuum"1119]. Thus, they 
consider such regimes as highly dubious systems of law which are 
scarcely suited to the task of dealing satisfactory with the legal 
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issues involved in complicated international trade transactions. It 
is hard to understand the contradictions embodied in the proposals of 
the industrialized nations. On one hand they did all they can to deny 
a binding legal character to the code, and on the other hand, they 
maintained that the developing countries should regulate technology 
within the framework of the applicable provisions of international 
law. The logic requires that the code should become part of 
international law if its provisions were to be adopted by the 
developing countries. 
Finally, it seems that the Code will follow the steps of the "Set 
of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the 
Control of Restrictive Business Practices" , 
[1201, and will be 
submitted for adoption by consensus as a General Assembly resolution. 
The non-binding status of the Code it means that it can only play the 
role of: (i) a model to individual states for national legislation; 
and (ii) recommendations to states and parties to technology transfer 
contracts. As such it is possible that many developing countries will 
adopt the principles embodied in the code, while the laws of the 
technology supplying countries will less likely to be consistent with 
the Code. 
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[1] Resolution 1713 was the result of. a draft submitted by Bolivia and, 
Brazil to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1961. 
[21 Other motives governing the proliferation of MNCs when deciding to 
invest abroad may include: (i) the fear that their present or 
prospective market will be lost to foreign or local competitors; (ii) 
the possibility of lower production cost which makes it cheaper to 
produce components; (iii) the desire to avoid home country's 
regulations. 
[31 Management, technical assistance, equipment and machinery and 
engineering contracts are discussed in details in Chapters 5 and 6. 
(4] "The basic economic calculus of cotranercial technology suppliers 
must be the economic return on their proprietary knowledge, whether 
they are corporate investors, licensors or equipment suppliers. They 
will be motivated to adapt or innovate only if the market or potential 
market is large enough and hence profitable enough to warrant such 
action". DESA (1972) "Transfer of operative technology at the 
enterprise level" UN DOC. ST/ECA, /151 plo, see also S. r2LL (1976) "The 
patent system and the transfer of technology to less developed 
countries" Journal of World Trade Law, Vol. 10, p5. 
[5] Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations (1964) "The 
role of patents in the transfer 'of technology to under-developed 
countries" Document E/3861/Rev. 1. 
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[6] See UNCTAD "Selected Principal Provisions in National Laws, 
Regulations and Policy Guidelines" TD/B/C. 6/AC. 1/2/Supp. l/Add. a/1975, 
which list laws and regulations on 'Itr from several selected countries 
including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, France, West Germany, India, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Romania, Spain, U. K., U. S. and Yugoslavia. Also 
included are the regional regulations for the Andean Pact, EEC and 
DECD. 
[7] UNCTAD "Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on a Code 
of Conduct on Transfer of Technology" TD/B/C. 6/1 Geneva, May 1975. 
(8] The Brazilian law 4131 of 1962 (amended by law 4390 of 1964) on 
foreign investment was the first law which systematically dealt with 
payments for foreign technology. The major innovation of that law was 
the prohibition of a subsidiary from paying royalites on patents and 
trademarks licenses to its parent company, as well as the introduction 
of rules concerning the registration of agreements. 
[91 Decree No. 1272 (1961) Articles 20,30 and 40. 
[10] See UNCTAD "Control of Restrictive Business Practices in Latin 
America" Doc ST/MD/4 (1975) p. 86, and Doc. ST/MD/4/Add. 1. 
[11] Andean Commission, Decision 24 "Standard Regimes for Treatment of 
Foreign Capital and for Treatment of Trademarks, Patens Licenses and 
1myalties", December 31,1970; for the adoption of Decision 24, see 
LYNN MYTEIKA (1977) "Regulating direct foreign investment and transfer 
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of technology in the Andean Group" Journal of Peace Research Vol. XIV 
No. 2 pp138-161; UNCTAD "Policies relating to the transfer of 
technology of the countries of the Andean Pact: their foundation" TD 
107 (29 December 1971), and International Legal Materials Vol. 11 
(1972) p126. 
[12] Decree no. 444 (1967), Article 102 as amended by Article 6 of the 
Decree no. 688 (1967). 
[13] The nine countries who have adopted legislation concerning the 
regulation of To in Latin America up to 1980 are: The Andean Pact 
countries (Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela which 
acceded to the Pact in 1973) , Chile on the other hand withdrew from 
the Pact in,.. 1976, and later denounced most of the provisions of the 
Agreement. The pivot of the treaty of 1969 forming the Pact and the 
cause of internal dissensions was Decision 24 which adopted a common 
policy vis-a-vis the activities of foreign firms operating in the 
member countries and suppliers of technology, see RENE FRTNCOIS BIZEC 
(1981) "les transferts de Technologies" P. U. F. [QUE. SAIS. JE] p109. 
The other countries are Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. 
[14] Lynn Mytelka op cit p156. - However, there are those who argue 
that governmental intereference with commercial activities results in 
decreased business, decreased return on capital and lower level of 
efficiency. Nevertheless the developing countries maintain that there 
is no incapability between promoting TOT and applying regulatory 
measures. They point out to Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome 
and the U. S. Anti-trust laws, see UNCTAD supra note 7, p22. 
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[151 See in particular the Colorrbian Decree 1234 of 1972, Argentina's 
law no. 20794 and 19231, and Mexico's law of 1972 concerning the 
transfer of technology. 
[16] The authorization and registration of contracts is mandatory 
under Decision 24 Articles 6(F) and 18, Argentina law no. 19231, Art. 
2; Brazil law no. 4131 Articles 3 and 9, Mexico law on TOT (1972) 
Articles 1,2, and 4. 
[17] Article 6 of the 1972 law on TOr. Although Decision 24 provides 
no measure for ensuring the registration of contracts, national 
legislation of the member states provides for registration as a 
prerequisite for remitterences abroad. See, CHILE: CENTRAL BANK 
Circular no. 1932 (1972) art. 9, Colombia: Decree 1234 (1972) and 
Decree 688 Art. 6 amending Article 102 of Decree 444. Peru: Supreme 
Decree no. 001-71-IC-DC/71 Arts. 51 and 52 and the Legislative Decree 
no. 18999 Art. 2(b), Venezuela Decree no. 68 (28 April 1974) Arts. 55, 
59 and 63, and Decree no. 746 (February 11,1975) concerns the 
registration contracts on TOT. 
According to the Argentinian law no. 19231 Art. 5, failure to 
register contracts render them invalid with no right of enforcement in 
the courts and no remittances abroad is allowed Art. 12. Under-the 
Brazilian law no. 4131, Art. 9, registration with the Central Bank is 
a must if foreign remittances are to be made, and compulsory when the 
contract relates to industrial" property. Law 5772 Art. 30 
establishing INPI and Normative Act. 015/1975 Art. 1. " Y-. 
[181 See Annex 3: 1 for the different machineries set-up by Latin 
American countries legislations. 
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[19] See Annex 3: 2 of actual personnel employed in these machineries. 
[20] To acquire such status, the applicant must be "foreign 
individuals with uninterrupted residence in the recipient country of 
not less than one year... " Decision 24, Art. 1. 
[21] In Brazil for example, a total of 6503 contracts were authorized 
by the INPI between 1972-1976, representing an average of 1300 
contracts per annum. Between 1972-1974, a total of 4968 contracts 
were evaluated or an average of 1656 per annum. In Argentina, the 
number of authorized agreements between 1972-1979, reached 3150 
contracts, more than half of which was . 
in 1972 (1706 contracts), 
because the figure includes all agreements (existing and new), at the 
time when law 19231 came into force see, UNCTAD "The implementation of 
transfer of technology regulations. A preliminary analysis of the 
experience of Latin America, -India and the Philippines" TD/ß/C. 6/55 
(1980) table 2, p. 9. 
[22] See Brazil's law no. 5772, Andean Pact Decision 85 "Decision on 
Industrial Property" 1974, and other laws in the previous chapter 2. 
[23] India has chosen to develop as a mixed economy, permitting both 
private and public sectors to assist in the country's development, 
with the public sector being given the major role in the development 
process. The need for private investment was recognized by the 
Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 as exceptional. Accordingly, a 
demarcation of industrial fields was initiated between private and 
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public sectors, dividing industrial sectors into three categories: (1) 
the first category is reserved for public ownership (i. e. energy, 
railways, arms), (2) the second category include industries in which 
all new undertakings would be established excessively by the public 
sector (i. e. iron and steel; coal, shipbuilding, aircraft, 
communication), and (3) the last category was left to the private 
sector with the right of the state to acquire any industry (i. e. 
pharmaceuticals). 
[24] In 1954, a socialist pattern of the society was accepted by the 
Government as the ultimate goal, which gave a definite shape to the 
economic and social indeology, and required a change to alter the 
pattern of mixed economy. 
(25] The 1956 Industrial Policy Resolution classifies industries into 
three categories on the basis of their current and future right of 
ownership and on the basis of the role of Government in each category: 
Category A; includes 17 industries in which the public sector will 
have the exclusive responsibility for future development; 
Category B; lists 12 industries which will be progressively state 
owned, and in which the state takes the initiative in establishing new 
undertaking, but in which the private sector will also be expected to 
supplement the efforts of the state; 
Category C; does not specify any particular industry, but states that 
all industries not included in categories A and B will be left to the 
initiative of the private sector. 
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[261 Since 1969, the Indian Government applied the following 
principles to foreign technology importation: 
- where the technology is locally available, it must be preferred to 
the foreign one; if the technology is not available in India, it 
must be imported at the lowest possible price. 
- Once the transfer takes place, the technology becomes Indian. It 
should not be paid for beyond a5 year period, and its use must be 
preferred to the import of similar technology. 
- As a general rule, foreign capital participation in new joint 
ventures should be no more than 40 per cent. 
[27] Authorities involved in the evaluation and registration of 
contracts before their approval by the Foreign Investment Board which 
is headed by the Department of Economic Affairs and include senior 
officials of the Ministries of Industrial Development, Company 
Affairs, the Drectorate General of Technical Development, The 
Department of Science and Technology, The Council of Scientific and 
Industrial Research, and the Planning Commission. 
[28] The National Council of Applied Economic Research (1971) "Foreign 
Technology and Investment: A Study of their Role in India's 
Industrialization" June, Appendix 1, p. 155. 
[29] The restrictions on the private sector were strengthened by the 
announcement of a new industrial policy in February 1970, which 
divided the industrial sectors into: 
(i) a core sector consisting of basic, critical and strategic 
industries; 
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(ii) a heavy investment sector, which in fact a sub-sector of the core 
sector, and where all new investment proposition exceeding Rs. 50 
million are treated as falling within this sector; 
(iii) a middle sector in which both private and public capital can 
operate jointly; and 
(iv) a reserved sector for private investment, which mainly includes 
consumer goods industries. 
[30] A de-licensing system was introduced'for°undertakings with an 
investment up to Rs. 10 million. The system also applied to 
undertakings between Rs. 10 million and Rs. 50 million if the following 
requirements are met: 
(a) do not require marginal assistance by way of foreign exchange of 
capital equipment and where no more than 10% of total capital value or 
Rs. l million whichever was less by ways of foreign exchange for 
imports; 
(b) firms which are not "dominant" undertakings as defined by the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act "MPTPA" of 1969, 
Government of India, Planning Commission "The Fourth Five Year Plan 
(1969-1874)" June 1970. 
(311 UNCTAD "Selected principal provisions in national laws, 
regulations and policy guidelines" TD/B/C. 6/Ac. l/2/Supp. l/Add. l (1975) 
pp92-99. 
(321 Exceptional cases where foreign equity is allowed beyond the 40 
per cent limit are: 
- 100% equity ownership by foreigners in cases wehre 100% of the 
output is for export, 
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- 74% for companies engaged in priorities sectors, such as oil 
exploration, where high techology is involved, and for foreign 
companies exporting more than 75% of their output. 
- 60% for companies exporting between 60% and 75% of. their output. 
- 51% for companies exporting between 40% and 60% of their output. 
[33] See for example, the Nigerian Patents and Designs Decree of 1970, 
section 23 (3): 
"Any clause in a contract for a license ... is null in so far 
as it imposes on the licensee in the industrial or commercial 
field restrictions which do not derive from the rights con- 
ferred by the relevant patent or design or are necessary for 
the safeguarding of these rights". 
(34] OECD (1972) "Restrictive Business Practices relating to Patents 
and licenses" Report by the Cotm ittee of Experts on Restrictive 
Business Practices, Paris. 
[35] Except in countries where importing is excluded from the patentee 
privilege. 
[361 Irrespective of whether licensing agreements or investment 
contracts are involved, containing clauses restricting export to 
certain countries where the patentee has obtained patents, the'export 
of the patented product automatically require prior approval of the 
patent holder. See UNCTAD "Restrictive Business Practices" TD/122 (22 
December 1971) para. 16. 
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[37] MELVILLE expanded the basic test of common law to the following: 
(i) a man is entitled to make his own selection of suppliers of goods 
not covered by the licensor's patent; (ii) a man should be free to 
take licenses only in those patents he uses, (iii) invalid patents 
should not be enforced to make a conclusive agreement; and (iv) 
patents not be used in combination or concentration in a manner likely 
to produce exclusively high profits, L. W. MELVILLE (1972) "Precedents 
on Intellectual Property and International Licensing" Sweet and 
Maxwell 2nd edition p8. 
[38] In the statement of motives that accompanies the Mixan Law on TO 
of 1972, it stated that "the purpose of this law is to eliminate 
obstacles to Mexico's development and foreign trade, to adjust 
technology contracts to the guidelines of the Government's 
industrialization policy and to stimulate the creation of local 
scientific and technological infrastructure that permits the 
adaptation of foreign technology to the conditions and needs of the 
Mexican economy" TD/ß/C. 6/55 op cit. note 68. 
[39] A fairly comprehensive list of RBP may be found in the following 
UNCTAD documents: ONC1 D TD/B/AC. 1l/19 (1974) op cit; "Major issues 
arising from the transport of technology to developing countries" 
TD/B/AC. 11/10/Rev. 1; "Control of Restrictive Business Practices in 
Latin America" UNCTAD ST/MD/4 (1975); "Major issues arising from the 
transfer of technology: A case study of Chile" UNCTAD TD/B/AC. 11/20 
(1974); "Restrictions on Exports in Foreign Collaborations Agreements 
in the Republic of the Philippines" TD/B/388. 
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1401 The following types of restrictions. may be identified in TOT 
agreements: 
(a) Export allowed to certain countries only; 
(b) Export prohibited to certain countries only; 
(c) Export allowed only through the licensors agents; 
(d) Prior approval before the patented product can be exported; 
(e) Total ban on exports; 
(f) Price control of exports; and 
(g) Export quotas. 
[41] In the Philippines, 82 agreements included restrictions out of 
126 agreements in 1970, or 65% of the total. This figure was reduced 
to 25% or 31 agreements out of 124 in 1980, see UNCTAD "Restrictive 
Business Practices" TD/B/C. 2/104 (19 January 1971) table 2: 3 p48; and 
"Transfer of Technology Regulations in the Philippines" TD/TT/32 
(1980) pp24-25. 
[42] Reserve Bank of India Eulletin (1968) "Foreign collaborations in 
Indian Industry: A Survey Report"; UNCTAD TD/B/C. 2/104 op cit. table 
2: 2. 
[431 Reserve Bank of India Bulletin: Survey Report (1974) p1071. 
[44] Mexico's Law of 28/12/1972 concerning the registration of the 
transfer of technology and the use and working of patents, trade names 
and trademawrks, Art. 7 (VII). See also, Argentina's law 21617 (1977) 
Article (c), Brazil's law 5772 (1971) Art. 29(2) and 90(2), Normative 
Act 015 (1975) Articles 2.5.2 (b) (i) ; 3.5.2. (c) (i) , 4.5.2. (d) (1) and 
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5.5.2. (d)(i); India; The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices 
Act (1969) Art. 33 (i) (G) , Guidelines for Industries (1976-77) Chapter 
3.9(V), Portugal, Legislative Decree No. 239 Code of Foreign 
Investment of 6.4.1976 Art. 28, and Spains Ministry of Industry Order 
of 5.12.73 regulating the entry of contracts for TOT in the register 
established by decree no. 2343 of 21 Sept. 1973 section 3(5). 
[451 Decision 24 op cit Articles 20 and 25(a). 
[46] Restrictions on export in a restraint on either exports or 
inports under the Sherman Act of 2.7.1890 Section 1 to 3 in the United 
States. In the EEC, the commission takes the view that export 
prohibition between EEC countries with regards to patented products 
are within the scope of Article 85(1) of the Rome Treaty, even if the 
licensor owns a possible patent covering product in country to which 
the export is prevented. See the official Journal of the EEC. L. G., 
13.1.1976 under which the commission stated its own view on clauses 
restricting exports. 
[47] Restrictions on R&D are prohibited under the Argentinian Law 
21617 (1977) Art 10 (1); Brazil's Normative Act 015 (1975) Arts 2.5.2. 
(b) (iv), 3.5.22 (c) (iii) , 4.5.2. (d) (iv) and 5.5.2. (d) (iv) ; India's 
Guidelines for Industries (1976-77), Chapter III, para 9, item 
(viiii). Item (vii) went further to acquire entrepreneurs that 
agreements: "There should also be adequate arrangements for research 
and development, engineering design, training of technological 
personnel and other measures for the adsorption, adaptation and 
development of the imported technology". Mexico law of 28.12.72 Art 
7(v); Spain Ministry of Industry Order of 5.12.73. 
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[48] Non-reciprocal grant back clauses are prohibited under the 
Argentinian law 21617 (1977) Art. 10(e) , Brazilian law 5772, Art. 
29(3), Normative Act 015, Art. 2.5.1. (d), Mexico law 28.12.72, Art. 
7(iv) and summary of the general criteria for its application issued 
by the National Register of TOT agreements. 
[49] Under the EEC rules, a grant back is not considered a restrictive 
clause, provided the undertakings are not exclusive and the licensor 
has entered into similar undertakings. Grant back clauses are 
unobjectionable under the following three conditions: - 
1. That there is a reciprocalundertaking by the licensor to license 
the licensee in respect of improvements; 
2. That they provide only for non-exclusive license of improvements 
to the licensor; and 
3. That they are limited to experience gained in the use of the 
patented products or related to inventions by the licensee in 
the field of improvements or application of the patented inven- 
tion EEC "Notice on Patent Licensing Agreements", official 
Journal of the European Community No. 139 (27 December 1962). 
[50] The Argentinian Law 21617, Art. 10(e) allows for reciprocal grant 
back clauses; the Brazilian laws insist that the license should 
specify that the licensee owns all the rights to improvements or 
advances incorporated by him, which implies the prohibition of 
non-reciprocal and exclusive grant-back clauses, (as in note 31 op 
cit). Other national legislation generally prohibit the inclusion of 
such clauses, Portugal Decree 239 (1976) Art 28(b), and Andean Group 
Decision 24 (incorporated by the member countries) Art. 20(F). In 
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other cases like the United States, no general answer can be given to 
the problem of grant back clauses. Agreements inhabiting such clauses 
are not necessarily invalid but depend on the mode of operation and on 
the particular circumstances (i. e. the narrowness or breadth of the 
field concerned, the distinction between "developments" and 
"improvements"; the market power of the licensor, exclusive or 
non-exclusive grant-back, the duration of the licence, the importance 
of the improvements and the effect on competition. The rule is that 
grant back clauses are not invalid if they operate to encourage 
invention and that improvements are made available on reasonable terms 
without discrimination. However, clauses with the intention of 
putting the licensor in a dominant position and are used to lesser 
competition are considered invalid. See L. W. Melville "Precedent on 
Intellectual" Property and International Licensing (London, Sweet and 
Maxwell 1972 p21, see also "the effect of the US and EEC antitrust'law 
on International licensing into developing countries". Report prepared 
by M. B. Finnigan, Consultant to the UNIDO (ID/WG. 131/4) 11 July 1972. 
[51] See laws of developing countries cited in note 47 and 50 op cite 
and Venezula's Decree 746 (1975) Article 1(J). 
[52] See Argentina Law 21617 (1977) Art. 10(n), India Patent law Act 
1970, Art. 140(i)iii(c), Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices 
Act (1969) Art. 33 (i) (c) (H) . Mexico Law 28.12.1972, Art. 7 (viii) . 
Under Decision 24 it was simply stated that member states shall not 
authorize Tor agreements or patents "(d) prohibiting the use of 
comepting technology", Art 20(d). In the United States a distinction 
is made on whether the license is exclusive or not. If the patent 
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license was an exclusive one, and the patentee's only payment is 
royalty on sales, no competing technologies clause may be accepted. On 
the other hand, if the license was non-exclusive such restrictions are 
invalid and constitute a patent misuse. 
[53] Roubier (1954) "Le Droit de la propriete industrielle" 'lbme II, 
Receuil SINEY, Paris p371. 
[54] MA IN, F. (1974) "Know-how et propriete industrielle" Librairies 
Techniques p246. 
[55] Ibid p249. 
(56] DESSEMON2EF. F. (1974) "Le Savoire-faire industriel, definition 
et protection du know-how en droit Americain" Librairie DRQZ Geneve 
p271. 
(57] According to DEMIN the transfer of know-how "is neither a "lease" 
nor "concession" d'un bier mobilier nor a "license" "assignment" or 
"sale". DEMIN, P. (1968) "Le contrat de know-how" Ed. Brut' Lant, 
Bruxelles p193. 
(581 1968 Report of the Reserve Bank of India. Restrictions of such 
type were found in majority participation in the transport equipment 
agreements p36. 
[59] Ibid pp37-38, in majority capital participation electrical goods 
and machinery agreements. 
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[60] Ibid p38, in majority capital participation - medicines and 
pharmaceuticals agreements. 
[61] Ibid p66. In majority capital participation in other chemicals 
agreements. 
[621 Ibid p87 in pure technical collaboration agreements in machinery 
and machine tools reproduced in TD/ß/C. 2/104 op cit. p51. 
[63] India Guidelines for Industries (1976-77) Chapter III para 9(ix), 
and (ii); Brazil Normative Act 015/75 Art. 4.5.2. (d)(vi), Art. 
6.5.2. (b), Art. 5.5.2. (d)(vi), and 4.5.2. (d)(vi); Venezuela Decree 746 
(1975) Art. 1(a) , (b) , (c) . 
[64] See UNCTAD TD/B/388 and TT/32. 
[651 Brazils Normative Act 015/75 Articles 2.5.2. (b)(v), 
3.5.2. (c) (iv) , 4.5.2. (d) (v) , and 5.5.2. (d) (v) . 
[66] In the United States a distinction is made on whether package 
licensing was voluntary or compulsory. There is no illegality per se 
if there is no refusal to a request for less than the package. If the 
licensee can prove, that the package was forced upon him as An the 
Automatic Radio MFG case, where the defendent had accumulated 570 
patents relating to radio broadcasting apparatus and was in the 
practise for licensing and all responsible manufacturers at a royalty 
based on a small percentage of net sales. Automatic Radio FMG V. 
HA. ZELTINE REST INC; 339 US 827 (1950). 
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[67] There are other forms of contractual packages, such as the 
"product at hand" form of contract developed by the Algerian 
authorities which not only include patents trademarks and know-how but 
also the supply of equipment and erection of industrial plants, the 
training of personnel as we shall see later in Chapter Five. 
[68] H. R. JOELSON (1973) "International technology transfer and the 
United States anti-trust laws", Journal of International Law of 
Economics, June, ppl02-103. 
[69] See UNCTAD "MAJOR ISSUES ARISING from the Transfer of Technology 
to developing countries" op cit. para 88. 
[701 MEXICO-LAW of 28.12.1972 op cit. Art. 7(xiii). Even when an 
agreement provides for a period less than the maximum of 10 years, the 
agreement may not be accepted, it all depends on whether the 
technology, subject matter of the contract - can be assimulated in a 
shorter period than that of the contract. 
[71] Argentina Law no. 21617 (1977) Art. 13, and Brazil Normative Act 
015/75 Articles 2.4.. (a), (b), (c); 4.4,5.4,6.4. 
[72] In Venezuela the rule is that agreements should not exceed 5 
years, nevertheless the competent authority may exceptionally 
authorize periods up to 15 years. Decree 2442 (6.11.1977) on Common 
Rules for the treatment of foreign capital and on trademarks, patents, 
licenses and royalties (Art. 65(e)), in an earlier Decree 63 
(28/4/1974). The validity period was 5 years (Art. 56). 
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[73] India, Guidelines for Industries (1976-1977) Chapter III(8) and 
(9) (xi) . 
[74] Argentina Law 20794 Art. 7. 
[75] For "license of right" see Chapter Two. 
[761 See Venezuela Decree 746 (1976) Act. 1(a), (b), Brazil Normative 
Act 015/75 Art. 4.5.2. 
[77] See UNCTAD and Major Issue arising f rom the transfer of 
technology to developing countries op cit. paras 45-52, the role of 
the patent system in the transfer of technology to developing 
countries op cit. paras. 192-196. 
(78] For example Argentina law 21617 (1977) Art. 10(h), Brazil law 
no., 5772 (1971) Art. 29(2); Normative Act 015/75 Arts 2.5.2. (b)(ii), 
3.5.2. (c) (ii) , 4.5.2. (d) (ii) and 5.5.2. (d) (ii) ; India Patent Act 
(1970) Art. 140(1)(iii) (a), (b), 4(c), Monopolies and Restrictive 
Trade Practices act (1969) Section 33(1) (a), (b), Guidelines for 
Industries (1976-77) Chapter III 9 (iv); Mexico law of 28.12.72 Art. 7 
(vi), exception to art 7 are found in art 8. Andean Pact Decision 24 
(1971) , Art. 20 (a) and 25(b). 
[791 UNCTAD "Background note by the UNCTAD Secreteriat" TD/CODE /4 
(September 1978). 
[80] Mr., CHIDZEIRO (Deputy Secretary General of UNCTAD) "SELECTED 
DOCUMENTS OF IE CONFERENCE" UNCTAD TD/CODE TOºr/SR. 1 (15 January 1979) 
p2. 
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[81] See Chapter One (the international patent system) - and Chapter 
Two - (Grounds for the revision of the Paris Convention). 
[821 The revision of the Paris Convention is currently being 
negotiated at the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Paris 
Convention. The conference has already held three sessions; the first 
in Geneva 1980, the second in Nairobi (28 September to 24 October 
1981), and the last session was in Geneva (October 4- 30 1982). In 
the third session the principal, question discussed was, whether 
developing countries should be allowed to grant a temporary exclusive 
non-voluntary licenses in case of patents not being exploited in the 
granting country. No decision-was achieved because Group B led by the 
US refused any compromise on this provision. "The Revision of the 
Paris Convention" Journal of World Trade Law (March - April 1983) 
ppl7l-72. 
[83] UNCTAD "The role of the patent system in the transfer of 
technology to developing countries: Conclusion of experts from 
developing countries" TD/WC. 6/12 (1975). 
[84] For further details see UNCTAD "Report of the Group of 
Governmental Experts on the role of Industrial Property System in the 
Transfer of Techology" TD/B/C. 6/Ac. 3/4 (Oct. 26,1977); UNCLAD "Report 
of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Role of the Patent system 
in the Transfer of Technology" TD/B/C. 6/8 (Oct. 21,1975), UNCTAD 
"Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Role of Industrial 
Property in the Transfer of Technology" TD/B/C. 6/24 and Add. 1, 
(1977), and UNCTAD "The international patent system: the revision of 
rý 
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the Paris Convention for the protection of industrial property" 
TD/B/C. 6/Ac. 3/2 (June 1977). 
[85] UNCTAD "Draft of the International Code of Conduct on the 
Transfer of Technology" TD/CODE TOT/33 (12 May 1981). 
[86] UNCTAD "Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on an 
International Code of Conduct on' the Transfer of Technology to the 
United Nations Conference oin an International Code of Conduct on the 
Transfer of Technology" TD/CODE TCIT/l/Add. 1 (July 1978) Annex 1 para 8 
of the Preamble, and UNCTAD "Draft International Code of Conduct on 
the Transfer of Technology" TD/CODE TOT/14 (28 March 1979) p. 2, para 
12. 
1871 UNCTAD TD/CODE TOT/14 op cit. p4, para. 4. 
[88] Ibid, Appendix B, A (1). 
[89] Ibid, Appendix B, B (1). 
[90] UNCTAD TD/CODE TOT/14 op cit. pp12-17 section B. 
[91] Ibid Section A, p. 11. 
[921 Ibid Section A, p. 11. 
[93] Ibid, p. 28, para 1 (a) and 2 (e) . 
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[94] See UNCTAD "Comparative presentation of the position of regional 
groups on major issue outstanding" TD/CODE TOT/28 (19 November 1980). 
To observe the evolution, compare the two summaries of the state of 
the negotiations: P. Roffe (1980) "UNCTAD: Code of Conduct for the 
Transfer of Technology - Progress and Issues under Negotiations" 
Journal of World Trade Law Vol. 14, No. 2 (March-April) pp. 160-172; 
and Jean Touscoz "le code international de conduite pour le transfert 
des techniques" in P. Judet et al (1977). "Transfert de technologie et 
developpement" Libraire Technique, Paris pp197-225. 
[95] See the statement by the spokesman for Group B at the 4th meeting 
of the Conference (first session) in TD/CODE TOT/10/Add. 1 (SR. 4. para 
19). 
[96] See the statement by the spokesman for the Group of 77 at the 11 
meeting (second session) in /CCDE TM /21 (Part two) (SR. 11. para. 
1), and the statement by the representative of Algeria at the 5th 
meeting (first session) in TD/CODE TOT/10/Add. 1 (SR. 5, paras 20-21). 
[97] See the statement by the representative of Cuba "Summary of the 
5th Meeting" UNCTAD TD/CODE TOºr/SR5 (23 Oct. 1978) p. 2, para. 4. 
[98] Although the Group of 77 acts as a block in confronting the 
industrialized countries, it will be too difficult to get a unanimous 
decision on such an issue, becase the most highly developed among them 
are potential exporters of technology, a fact which the industrialized 
countries know quite well. 
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[99] UNCTAD "An International Code of Conduct on Transfer of 
Technology. Report by the UNCTAD secreterial 
"TD. B/C. 6/AC. 1/2/Supp. l/Rev. 1 (Dec. 1973), and UNCTAD "United Nations 
Conference on an International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of 
Technology: Background Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat" TD/CODE TOT/4 
(September 1978). 
[100]No agreement has been reached' on any part of the chapter on the 
applicable law and the settlement of disputes. 
[101] See UNCTAD TD/CODE TM/28 op cit. p. 16, (Group B, 7.1), and 
UNCTAD "Draft international code of conduct on the transfer of 
technology", TD/CODE Tß/25 June 1980 Appendix D. 2. III. 
[102] For Group B, the courts or tribunals in determining the proper 
law should, inter alia, take into account the following factors: (i) 
the principal place of business of the parties, (ii) location of the 
subject matter of the agreement, (iii) place of performance, (iv) 
place of contracting; (v) place of negotiations, and (vi) choice of 
the courts of a certain country. TD/CME Wr/28, p. 16. 
[103] Ibid, p. 17, (7.4). 
[104] Ibid, p. 17, (8.3), and Appendix D. 2. II. 
(105] Ibid, p. 16, (A. 1), Appendix D. 2.1. 
[106] Ibid, p. 17, (B. 1). 
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[107] Ibid, p. 16, (A. 3). 
[108] Ibid, p. 17, (B. 2). 
[109] For further details on the question of the applicable law see, 
Francois Dessemontet (1977) "Transfer of Technology under UNCTAD and 
EEC Codifications. A European view on choice of law in licensing" 
Journal of International Law and Economics Vol. 12, pp. 29-35, 
Jean-Paul Maire (1974) "Problemes de qualification juridique et de 
determination du droit applicable aux accords de cooperation 
economique et industrielle", Annales d'Etudes Internationales Vol. 5, 
p. 95. 
(110] UNCTAD "Conflict of Laws in International Multimodel Transport 
Operation, applicable jurisdiction and arbitration" 
TD/WAc. 15/7/Add. 6. 
[111] PETROLE[ i DEVEIAPMENr LIMITED. V. SHEIKH OF ABU DHABI (September 
1951), International Law Reports "ILR" Vol. 18, pp. 144-161. 
[112] Ruler of Quater. V. International Marine oil Company Ltd. (June 
1953) ILR, Vol. 20, pp. 534-547. 
[113] Saudia Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company "ARMACO" (August 
23,1958) ILR, Vol. 27, pp. 117-233. 
[114] -TEXACO OVERSEAS PEI LEUM Company and California Asiatic Oil, 
Co. V. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
MATERIALS, VOL. 17, PP. 1-37. 
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[115] See for example, Andean Pact Decision 24, op cit. article 51; 
Argentina law no. 20794 op cit. art. 5 (K); Mexico law of December 28, 
1972, op cit. art. 7(xiv). 
[116] For instance the Argentinian law provides that no contract 
should contain a provision permitting a foreign jurisdiction to settle 
disputes arising from TM transactions, art 5(K) op cit. 
[117] M. ISSAD (1976) "les techniques juridiques dans les accords de 
developpement economique" in ONRS "Droit international et 
developpement" Acts d Colloque international tenu a Alger du 11 au 14 
Octobre 1976, pp. 1983-196. 
[118] See Chapter Five below, note 20. 
[119] For further details on the applicable law to international 
contracts and settlement of disputes see: C. H. AIECND ICZ (1974-75) 
"Empirical and doctrinal posivitism in international law", The British 
YEARBOOK of International Law, Vol. XLVII pp286-289; F. A. MANN (1977) 
"The consequences of an international wrong in international and 
national law" BYIL, Vol. XLIII, pp. 1-65; Lord MCNAIR Q> C. (1957) "the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" BYIL, Vol. 
XXXIII, p1-19; and M. SORNARAJAH (1981) "The myth of international 
contract law", Journal of World Trade Law (May-June) pp. 187-217. 
[120] See UN Doc TD/RBP/CONF10/Rev. 1 endorsed by General Assembly 
Resolution UN. DOC. WRES/35/63 (1980). 
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Al ZM 3: 2: ACTLtL PERSCMi L IN ""'^ CF CO CiS LViiU ii ICN 
IN I1IN AMERICA (1373) 
COUNTRY LE CAL EW LWi IOiv ECOL GiIC i; 'v7 LUATI3N TEMMOGICAL 
L'v'AdixATICiv 
brazil 3 LWYERS 16 SC vICHIS1`S ö ENGINEERS 
CCIc IBIA 2 
6 
INiYEM a 
I HERS (b) 
2 
2 
EG NN"IISTS a) 
EcO 1STS (b) 
3 FIZINEERS (a) 
1 TEcHNICIAi' (b) 
ECtx'1C{, I. 1 IANYER 2 ECCi CiIISTS 1 EIZINEER 
I-IXiICO 6 ULOYERS 8 E'CCNC"IISTS 6 E1 WEEKS 
PERU 2 LFW1EM 8 EWLIU; LiSTs - 
VEi¬ZUEIt (C) 4 ECOi'C'tISTS .3 'rAMUI . 
FS 
1 ASSISTAWI 11 SSIST' W 
SORGE: UNCrIUM iD/ß/C. 6/55 (1980) op cit. p. 7. 
(a) oyalites Coýrmittee (Coruite de F<yalias) 
(b) Exchange Office (Officina de Corrbios) 
(c) Legal Evaluation is in the hands of Sir.. 
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ANN 3: 3: Ta FION A REVIEW OF DII ECr F EEIGG law ;rT 
Ali lEMZIlJ(Y COi1Trce3= IN Va' MU'r (AS CF DDC. 1974) 
Nuuber of Registered Percentage 
Received or Corup1 teed of Registered 
Applications Contracts or CcrVleted. 
1. Registration of Existing 
Direct Foreign investri- nt 3635 145 4% 
2. Auti; orization « Registration 
of new Direct Foreign Invest- 
went 84 8 9.5% 
3. Registration of Technology 
31 Dec ºber 1983 644 16 2 
4. Review &F yiscration of new 
Tecb ology Contracts 101 22 
5. ivianifestacio de voluriteü 7500 7425 5y 
SOURCE: SIEX (Superintendencia de Inversions Extran-Jeras) , 1975. GestiOn 
Julio Dicierbre 1974, Caracas p. 33 , as cited by LY1 r. iý; 'IFL 
(1977) 
"Regulating Direct Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer in the i ndeant 
Group", Journal of Peace Research lb. 2, (1977), p. 171. 
ANN X 3: 4: REGISTRrtTIa AIM R VIEW GF `TDCE-iDIO('Y COMPACTS IN COLGBIA 
1973-1975 
FO RI OF EVALUATION AND' APPFOVAL 1973 1974 1975 (a) 
1. Legal Review - 103 24 
2. Economic Review - 356 86 
3. Technical review - 356 86 
4. Number of Contracts Approved 179 359 33 
5. Number of Contracts Rejected 43 44 8 
6. Percentage of Contracts Rejected 16.4% 11% 19.5% 
7. On Site Visits (follow-up) - 120 40 
SOURCE: LYNN X. MYTEM (1977) op cit. P. 172. 
(a) First quarter. 
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PART ZWO 
ME flIXJSTRIAL AND '1'D 7 IDQCAL POLICY OF 
During the second part of the 1960's decade, Algeria has embarked on 
a phase of massive industrialization based mainly on public investments. 
Algeria can be seen as a unique example of an underdeveloped, raw 
material exporting country, attempting to make short way to the 
industrial age, and to benefit from the international circulation of 
technology[l]. The tide of technology importation is principally carried 
out on the basis of incorporating the imported technology, and where 
direct foreign investment has no significant role to play[21. 
Unlike India and Latin American countries, Algeria had little or no 
domestic industrial basis. Accordingly patents and licensing agreements 
did not matter to the Algerian planners as much as the contractual forms. 
Despite the exclusion of direct foreign investment, the impact of the 
multinational corporations is heavily felt in the Algerian experience, 
and makes Algeria for some years to come, more dependent on foreign 
firms. The causes of such dependency are numerous some were the result 
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of the long colonization by the French(31, others, were the result of 
Algeria's technological policy(41. In addition, the heavy level of 
investment had equally contributed in widening the gap between the 
training programmes for sýilled and semi-skilled manpower and the 
required manpower to meet such an investment[5]. 
The uniqueness of the-Algerian experience also stems from the belief 
of the Algerian planners that, progress does not only mean the 
importation of machines and equipment[6], but equally the assimilation of 
these means. In other words, what the Algerian authorities were seeking 
was not the mere purchase of the means of development but rather to be 
taught how to produce these means. Machines and codefied technology 
(i. e. patents, industrial design etc. ) are incomplete without mankind, 
they cannot produce any impact on the environment. Thus, on one hand 
mankind joins his means (machines, licenses, etc. ) in order to produce 
the desired impact. Cn the other hand, mankind without knowledge for the 
application of those technological elements is equally not capable of 
producing any impact. Such situation leads to a necessary dual 
relationship for any real transfer of technology to take place: the 
codefied technology and the knowledgable mankind. In reality, know-how 
constitutes a natural complement of licenses. Generally, know-how is the 
practical experience, and as such, it is considered as the most difficult 
fraction to transfer. The difficulties are derived from the fact that 
despite the codification of certain know-how, it remains attached to the 
behaviour of experts and technicians provided through technical 
assistance. 
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Although for the transfer of technology to take place in the real 
sense, the recipient country must have the capacity to make use of the 
received items according to self-defined goals[71. The Algerian view, is 
that the transfer process will be possible only when a developing country 
joins the industrial process. Since the initiation of the 
industrialization process, will not only apprise a country of what 
measures to take in order to increase its technical experience, but also 
will enable it to receive the transfer of technology'81. Equally, the 
Algerian authorities believe that the acquisation of industrial machines 
and equipnent will also have the effet of gaining technologies which are 
being transformed into formidable means of domination by the 
industrialized countries. 
In order to understand the legal aspects and the way in which 
Algeria is attempting to gain access to technologies and at the same time 
to be able to receive the transfer of technology, it is important to have 
a short background of Algeria's underdevelopment status and the chosen 
technological policy. The main emphasis of such policy is the training 
of manpower - learning by doing - rather than the mere acquisation of 
licenses. The legal aspects will be discussed in Chapter Five. The main 
concern in this chapter is the analysis of contractual relationship 
between the national enterprises - public enterprises - and foreign 
companies, in the majority of cases multinational corporations, in 
particular the contractual form; plant in production - "produit en main". 
At the end, the various problems resulting from the experience will be 
identified by taking the gas industry as a case study. These problems 
relate to technological information, technique adaptation, training, 
maintenance, realization and judicial and contractual aspects. 
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During the French colonization, Algeria was to adapt itself to a 
specialization of colonial type - (i. e. a source of raw material supply 
and agricultural products) -. The structure of the economy was marked by 
strong inequalities and was subjected to the fulfilment of one objective: 
the supply of cheaper labour, raw material, and agriculture products to 
both the modern sector of the European minority191 and to France 
itself [10] 
The accession to independence was the crowning of a long struggle 
which required heavy sacrifices and was a result of a long and painful 
process(11]. From the very day it achieved its independence, Algeria was 
faced with a total disintegration of its administration caused by the 
sudden departure of the colonial rulers and settlers (12]" Up to the last 
years of French domination, the pattern of the Algerian economy was a 
sort of an appendix to the French one, in a sense the former was on the 
whole one of complementarity to the latter. This meant the development 
of Algeria was never promoted,: except when the promotion served the 
French interest. To this extent Algeria had a number. of industries with 
a very low capital/output ratio such as footwear, milling and cement 
works, but no basic industry on any major scale[13]. This position was 
due to the fact that: 
(a) The existence of some industrial activities was necessary, such as 
the extractive industries in the mining sector, i. e. iron-ore, 
phosphate, and oriented towards export. 
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(b) No processing industries for local natural resources existed in 
this period, since those industries were located in France. 
The initial steps towards industrial development were taken in 1958. 
The extent of the liberation war (1954-1962) caused the General De 
Gaulle's Government to set-up a development plan called "PLAN DE 
CONSTANTINE". The declared aim was "In the course of some years, the 
standard of living of Muslims in Algeria should be raised to the level of 
people in France itself"[14]. Such unrealistic and ambitious plan was 
implicitly designed to serve as a political function to win the war by 
economic means, and to manipulate world opinion and sympathies which the 
Algerians led by the F. L. N. were winning all around the world. It would 
be untrue to say that Algerians did not realize the political intentions 
behind such a plan by France. After all one has only to think of the 
fact that it took France 129 years to understand the need for an overall 
economic plan for Algeria[15]. 
For the "'Constantine plan" to succeed, the collaboration of two 
elements was needed. First the collaboration, of local entrepreneurs - 
(European settlers) -; and, second, the collaboration of French financial 
capital. It is these two elements which led to the Plan's failure. The 
increase of living standards for Algerians was considered to be a threat 
to the European settler's privileges and thus their collaboration was 
refused. The intensification of the war, led the French investors to 
think twice before risking their capital[16]. The intensification of the 
war was a deliberate action designed by the leaders of the F. L. N. and 
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A. L. N. to combat the French political aim of the Plan. The French 
investors began to lose interest due to the increased realization that 
Algeria would probably become independent. 
The immediate effects in economic terms of the 1962 political 
independence were; (a) the outflow of capital from Algeria, where the 
credit base of banking system was restricted; and a desperate financial 
situation was created as a result of massive transfer of funds from its 
treasury and; (b) the loss of skilled manpower resulting in the total 
collapse of its industry and agriculture which were in'the hands of the 
European settlers. 
During the transition period 1962-1966, there was no explicit policy 
of development-as such. The policy of the Government in that period with 
regards to private investment was that private investment was allowed to 
invest where the state did not. Such private capital was confined mainly 
to agriculture and light industry. However, the concern of the state at 
that time was directed to foreign capital, since it was felt to 
constitute a limiting factor in the pursuit of an independent national 
development. After all, the political dependence can only be significant 
if it is complemented with a corresponding economic liberation. In this 
context, The Tripoli Program(17] advocated state control of the economy 
as well as economic planning. Equally, it called for setting up of heavy 
industries and the nationalization of the banks, insurance, 
transportation in all its forms, foreign trade and mineral resources1181. 
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Two years later, the Charter of Algiers(191 also called for the 
eventual nationalization of the mineral wealth of the country. The 
absorption of the existing private banks by the public sector was called 
for. The need to nationalize foreign trade on a step-by-step was also 
indicated, as well as the diversification of Algeria's foreign trading 
partners. The Charter further noted the menacing presence of foreign 
capital and the need to neutralize this potential influence on Algeria's 
economic and political life. Above all, the Charter called for the 
setting up of heavy industries in the country and to avoid foreign 
capital participation, except when it was beyond the country's financial 
means[20]. The process of nationalization has been essentially 
completed. As to the industrialization process, this has been 
accelerated during the 1970 decade. An ambitious development policy was 
embodied in three plans 1967-1977. The nationalized assets were put 
under the management of the state owned companies which became the main 
economic agents of capital accumulation and economic transformation [21]. 
Rý Ail3iRTL'C 71,77IKTpTAi. Aýý TFYAIýý(V_{(ýT ^^. *. T! `V 
The Algerian industrial and technological policy or in short, the 
Algerian model of development [22] is based on two concepts; The first 
concept is a strategy deliberately aimed at breaking the vicious circle 
of dependency. The second concept concerns the establishment of key 
manufacturing industries, or what became known as the "industrializing 
industries". 
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FIRST: The vicious circle of underdevelop t_ The vicious circle of 
underdevelopment is a philosophy which supposes that developing countries 
should content themselves with a series of superficial transformation 
such as the assembly, clothing and packing industries. In other words, 
this philosophy-is based on the postulate that the developing countries 
should postpone their development until the production factors become 
comparable to those prevailing in the industrialized countries. For a 
developing country to begin development: (i) The profitability of capital 
must be comparable to that existing in the industrialized countries, (ii) 
The size of the market becomes large enough to allow for the creation of 
basic industries which depend on high production capacities - to wait. 
until the market has developed -; and (iii) A large number of manpower 
have been equipped with advanced training and technical skills. 
Faced with two options, either for the underdevelopment obstacles to 
disappear, or to embark in development from the start, which would make 
the obstacles diminish, Algeria has chosen the latter option and argued 
that the former option is no more than a new form of domination which can 
not be consistent with the struggle for independence. Only industrial 
development can constitute an extention of that struggle. To follow the 
former option would deprive the country from a real possibility of 
creating and promoting its wealth. Such promotion can only exist in a 
genuine industrialization. Then the model goes on to argue that the 
state must control the nation's resources and develop a heavy industry, 
which refines the country's raw materials [23]. 
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"Two choices are present to Algeria for the conception of its 
industrialization: to keep to the network and the industrial 
units that are inspired by the neo-colonialist theories and 
which are. regarded as the only ones corresponding to the 
vocation of the less developed countries, or refuse to admit 
that under development is an indelible weakness for the nations 
who suffer from the imperialist and capitalist alienation, and 
to set up an industrial policy geared towards an intensive and 
global. industrialization. Algeria stands without hesitation in 
favour of the latter alternative"[24]. 
After 132 years of colonization, Algeria found itself with: (i) non 
existence of market, (ii) no capital and if it existed there was poor 
return on it, and (iii) no trained and skilled manpower. Firstly the 
small-size of the Algerian market was not considered as an obstacle to 
development, since industrial complexes were not built on the basis of 
the existing market size, but instead on the future need of the country 
which would be generated by development as well as export [25]. 
Secondly, the low return on capital was considered as the 
consequence of underdevelopment and not the cause of it. As such, 
Algeria did not consider the low return on capital to be incompatible 
with investment, it had to exist in a country with no production units 
and compelled to import all the necessary goods and services. The return 
on capital will start to improve only when the Algerian workers become 
more and more efficient and when the growth of the market makes it 
possible to erect plants of commercial size [26]. 
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Thirdly, a large number of trained and skilled manpower is necessary 
for the type of industries which Algeria intended to set up. Such 
manpower did not exist in Algeria neither in quality nor in quantity. To 
deal with such a handicap Algeria chose industrialization. In other 
words, the industrial process was regarded as a way of adding to the 
technological experience of the Algerian workers. Each operation is 
reflected in the acquisation of technological capital [27]. Such theory 
is explained as follows: 
"Building industrial units, coping with the innumerable problems 
arising throughout construction and operation provide the quickest, most 
dependable and disciplined way of acquiring the know-how and the 
inventiveness which are the true components of technological capital. 
Bringing workers face to face with problems bound-up with the acquisation 
of technology will make them aware of the mastery they stand to win in 
all spheres, and in the first place over themsleves" [28]. 
Algeria is also aware of the fact that to invest in a project before 
the accumulation of the necessary technological capital would be at high 
cost. The cost include the training of personnel, the organization of 
production and the setting up of industrial infrastructure. Equally, 
inefficient management and engineering delays in completion, low 
performance of man and'machines, frequent breakdown and repairs all add 
to higher cost. - However, Algeria is determined that the only way to 
eliminate these drawbacks is the industrialization process itself. 
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SECOND: T'he Industrializing Industries 
The concept of industrializing industries which is much favoured by 
the Algerian planners was first founded by the French economist DE 
BERNIS: - 
The industrializing industries are those whose fundamental 
economic function is to introduce into their current local 
environment a systematic development of the industrial matrix 
and creation of production function which increase the produc- 
tivity of work owing to the placing of a new collection of 
machines at the disposition of the economy" [29]. 
According to -this concept the setting up of industries does not 
necessarily mean industrialization. It is only when the former takes the 
form of industrializing industries that the latter can take place. It 
follows that the establishment of heavy industry represents in the long 
term a certain guarantee against economic dependence on the 
industrialized countries [30]'. The production of consumer goods 
necessitate the availability of machines which can be obtained either: by 
the importation of those machines, in which case technological dependence 
cannot be broken. Or, alternatively, domestic production of these 
machines can be set-up locally, in which case there is a need to 
establish a capital good sector - the priority of priorities sector. 
The concept of industrializing industries proposed two main 
priorities: (i) the priority of the industrial sector over the 
agricultural one [31); and (ii) the priority of the capital goods sector 
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over the consumers sector. Accordingly, the concept is an outright 
rejection of development through substitution, where a consumer goods 
sector is to be established first which ultimately implies the setting up 
of a capital goods sector. The function of the latter is to respond to 
the demand of the former. 
Certain policy measures characterize the setting-up of capital goods 
sectors. These mainly include: (i) the need which such sector has for 
modern technologies implies a heavy dependency on foreign technology - 
(i. e. equipment; machines, patents, know-how, technical assistance etc., ) 
since these are non-existent locally, (ii) to. finance such imports, an 
export sector is required to earn foreign exchange. At the present such 
sector is represented by the hydrocarbons [32] (oil and gas) and (iii) A 
voluntary policy which presupposes. a political and institutional will 
necessitate state intervention on a large scale in order to allocate 
resources adequately. Thus, luxury goods and import substituting 
industries become incompatible with the policy., 
The whole idea behind the Algerian policy is to obtain machines that 
can produce machines, and only certain industries are capable of bringing 
about a progressive industrial integration [331. 
These industries are: 
1. Hydrocarbons, which apart from being the main foreign exchange earner 
are the source of energy and the source of input to petrochemicals. 
2. Metallurgy, steel, mechanical industries which supply technical 
capital to other industries (i. e. semi-finished products for the 
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construction and public works, transportation etc. ). In the words of the 
policy's chief initiator, the late President Boumodiene, there is no 
economic independence without the establishment of heavy industries. 
"There is no economic independence without national heavy 
industries [.... ]. Selling cast iron would earn more than 
selling iron, and selling steel would earn more than selling 
cast iron. This is an elementary truth which we have taken 
account of it [34]. 
3. Chemical industry which provides the necessary inputs for the 
agriculture sector (fertilizers). 
As far as Algeria is concerned, -the, 
industrializing industries 
concept is intended to integrate the national economy - the. creation of 
intersectorial and inter-industries linkage - [35]. Such integration is 
also influence by the introversion theory advanced by Semir Amin [36]. 
The introversion theory supposes two models for capital 
accumulation: the first concerns the periphery's capital accumulation or 
the dependent model; the second concerns the capital accumulation of the 
centre or the independent model. Under the periphery model, the process 
of capital accumulation takes place under the pressure of forces that are 
alien to the periphery. These alien forces are transmitted from within 
the centre. The existence of two sectors export and import of luxury 
goods characterizes this model. Under the independent - sometimes called 
autocentric-model, the determinant factor is the relationship between the 
capital goods sector and the mass consumption sector. Organically, the 
two sectors are linked at the level of production and exchange [371. 
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The Algerian choice of an autocentric economy model has no place for 
a mass consumption sector. It is based on a single sector-capital goods 
sector - [38]. Such choice appears to be a carrier of an industry with 
double objective namely integration and coherence. 
The consequencies of the policy: 
At this early stage, one can only point out to certain critical elements 
of the policy. Fistly, the industrialization policy contains two 
contradictory elements: increased economic independence and outward 
industrialization. As far as industrialization is concerned the policy 
seems to have achieved a number of successes [39], but the same thing 
cannot be said for increased independence. The setting up of ultra 
modern industries and the option of the very advanced techniques carry 
certain risks. Such modern industries require foreign sales markets to 
absorb products which exceeds the local market need. Equally the need 
which those industrial units have for modern technology cannot be seen as 
anything else other than increased dependence which is not temporary or 
transitional as G. DE BERNIS led us to believe [40]. Bernis believes 
that the option-industrializing industries means an: increasing 
technological dependence, and that such dependency is only tencorary and 
transitional. It might be a miscalculation and even more, misleading to 
pretend that the imported techniques and management norms can be neutral. 
The transfer of techniques and norms, conceived in-a particular context 
to 'respond to a particular requirement tend to reproduce the principal 
character of their origin. Accordingly, it is possible to erect an exact 
imitation of industrial plants and machines functioning effectively for 
example in France or in the U. K., However, it would be an illusion to 
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think that one could find the same plant in Algeria simply because these 
plants are identically designed. Production units function differently 
under different socio-economic structure. Since the domestic technical 
capacity to adapt, assumulate and develop the imported techniques remain 
lacking, it is questionable to think of the ability of this approach to 
lead to economic independence. 
A second obvious and serious criticism of the policy is the desire 
to install heavy industries, highly capitalistic, and the desire to 
create jobs. Boumediene was aware of the consequence which modern 
technology would have on the creation of jobs. He refused to accept the 
importation of less modern technologies even if more jobs would be 
created: 
"We cannot accept machineries dating back to 1940, even if 
their handling would allow for the creation of more jobs 
[.... ]. Sometime I was criticised for having ratified and 
even encouraged investments that are reputed for being costly 
and less creater of jobs. I assume the responsibility and I 
assume the social pressure that would sometimes result from 
it" [40] 
Thus the industrializing industries concept appears to be conceived in 
the Algerian experience by its proponent as "industrialization at any 
price". The gigantic investments are poor creators of jobs. For 
example, the cost of the liquefied natural gas complex at ARZEW LNG1 was 
$2400 million and has c reated no more than 1000 jobs - excluding the 
construction stage [42]. The weakness of the policy is the fact that it 
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reduces the question of industrialization to a political one. It implies 
that sacrifices from the masses inevitably leads to a marginalization of 
the majority of the people. 
The attempt to make a short way to the industrial age appears to 
have been subjected to a considerable degree of gambling. The 
international market of technology is a prosperous one, technology has 
become an essential element of maintaining domination. It is through 
this approach which could perpetuate dependency in certain countries such 
as Algeria who have the desire to industrialize. This possibly explains 
the willingness of the foreign companies to accept Algeria's demand for 
public ownership and control. These and other consequences will be fully 
discussed, particularly with the contractual form plant, in production in 
the next chapter. 
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[1] During the 1970's decade, the Algerian leaders boasted to turn 
Algeria into the Japan of Africa before the year 2000. This was 
supported by the existence of Algeria's energy resources. Although 
limited with comparison to those of some of the oil-producing countries, 
these were regarded as enabling Algeria to implement her development 
objectives described as highly ambitious in some quarters. See Francis 
Giles "Algeria has a new sense of Sobriety" Financial Times Feb. 5,1982. 
(2] It, is true that direct foreign investment as traditionally defined 
has no major role to play in the economy of Algeria. However, this may 
be a misleading impression of the true involvement of foreign investment. 
By way. of example, United States investment in Algeria is less than 100 
millioir dollars. Such a modest sum does not represent the US economic 
and commercial activities, which include more than 70 firms with 
contr: ets totalling several US billion dollars. In addition, financial 
institutions, including Eximbank have lent Algeria more than $3 billion - 
(As in. -May 1982) - See U. S. Department of Commerce, OVERSEAS BUSINESS 
REPORTS "MARKETING IN ALGERIA" INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION 
WASHING'IiON D. C. 20230 MAY 1982. 
131 It: is hardly necessary to say that France as a colonial power - from 
1830-1962 had neglected the industrialization of Algeria, since the 
develolment of industry in Algeria would compete with-that of France. 
[41 The technological option chosen by Algeria was to go. for the very 
advanced technologies. Such option meant that the country had to rely 
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more and more on foreign technical assistance in all its forms, to fill 
the gap and the shortage of skilled manpower or rather the lack of it. 
[5] The actual investment in all industrial branches (1967-1979) is shown 
below: (in million of Algerian Dinars "DA") 
3 YEAR PLAN 1st 4 YEAR PLAN 2nd 4 YEAR PLAN INTERPLAN 
1967-1969 1970-1973 1974-1977 1978-1979 
(a) (a) (a) (a) 
4911.8 (53.6%) 20803.0 (57.4%) 74155.3 (60.7%) 67794.7 (61.8%) 
(b) (48.7%) (b) (44.7%) (b) (43.6%) (... ) 
DA = $4.935 DA = $4.185 DA = $4.035 DA = $3.755 
(a) It should be noted that the figures in parenthesis show the actual 
investment percentage of all industrial branches, which is in fact higher 
than the planned percentage share. 
(b) The planned percentage share of all industrial branches. 
Source: MINISTERE DU PLAN ET DE L'AMENAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE - IMF 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS, for the official EXCHANGE RATE OF THE 
DINAR, for the years 1969,1973,1977 and 1979. 
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(61 Available figures show a massive expenditure on equipment and 
machinery for industry, excluding capital goods for agriculture: (in 
million "W') 
1970 : 2238 mDA 
1971 : 2248 rnDA 
1972 : 2367 mDA 
1973 : 3012 mDA 
1976 : 9681 iDA 
1977 : 9858 nM 
1978 : 14060 iDA 
1979 : 11777 inDA 
1974 : 5311 mDA 
1975 : 8972 MM 
Source: MINISTERS DES FINANCE : DIRECTION DU DOUANES. 
[7] HELGE HVEEM (1978) "TECHNOWGY AND THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN 
INI'EMMONALIZATION OF CAPITAL AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: SCME NOTES ON 
THE CASE OF ALGERIA "INTERNATIONAL PEACE -RESEARCH INSTITUTE OSLO (ist 
version pre PUBLICATION Nos. 21/78) presented to the International 
Workshop on "TECHNOLOGICAL DEPENDENCE" BONN/BAD CX OESBEI«G 2-5 Nov. 1978 
p1. 
[8] DEMO PATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA (1974) "P R)LUEM RAW 
MATERIALS AND DEVELOPMENT" MEMORANDUM Submitted by Algeria on the 
Occasion of the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly. 
APRIL 1974 p. 57. 
[91 The European minority in Algeria refers to the European settlers who 
were encouraged to settle in Algeria and were given between 40 and 60 
hectares each as an incentive since- 1864. For more details see R. 
GALLISSOT (1969) "L'EODtu4IE DE L'AFRIQUE DU NDRD" P. U. F. p. 28. 
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[10] NOREDINE CHOUAKRIA (1978) "THE ALGERIAN MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT" 
Unpublished MSc. Thesis QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY OF BELFAST, FEB. 1978. 
[11] The cost of accession to independence in terms of human life was 
expensive. It is estimated that about 1.5 million of Algerians were 
killed between the 1954-1962 war; 300,000 or more joined the National 
Front of Liberation "FLN" - about 10 per cent of Algeria's active 
population, and more 300,000 became refugees in Tunisia and Morocco. 
When the colonial power realized that the Algerian peasants (between 2 
and 3 millions) constituted the backbone of the National Liberation Army 
"A. L. N. ", all peasants were forced from their villages to the "centres de 
regroupments", a sort of concentration camps. See CHOUKRIA NOREDINE 
(1978) op cit. and M. BENNOUN (1973) "FRENCH COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY 
DOCTRINE AND THE ALGERIAN PEASANTRY" MONTHLY REVIEW VCL. 25, DEC. 1973, 
p. 47. 
[12] Thousands of colonials left for France prior to independence clay, 
totalling 135,000 in 1961, in 1962 the figure increases to 651,000. By 
January 1963, out of 1 million French population only 200,000 remained in 
Algeria. Of these 59,000 left in 1963, and 50,000 in 1964. 
[131 For more details on the position of the Algerian industry prior to 
July 1962 see: SEMIR ÄHIN (1970) "The Maghieb in the modern word: 
Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco" PENGUIN AFRICAN LIBRARY, pp, 121-128. BMW 
RQSSIQ OLI (1973) "The Banking System of Algeria" MILAN pp. 16-18. 
[14] P. RDBSON, D. A. LURY (1969) "The Economy of Africa" p. 489. 
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[151 In the words of Semir Amin 
"The technocrats of the Algerian Plan made the optimistic 
assumption that the rebellion would be extinguished (did they 
really believe all the talk about the "last gap" bandied about 
at the time? )... This illusion was doubtless no greater than 
that which foresaw the rapid development of a Muslim 
bourgeoisie". 
SFMIR AHIN (1970) op cit. p124 
[16] The Constantine Plan was initiated to run from 1959-1963 but its 
goals were stated in terms of 25 years. Among the goals it stated for 
the first 5 years were: - 
- to invest $600 million in industry and to double industrial production 
- to create 400,000 new jobs in industry. 
-4 heavy industrial complexes were envisaged, a large steel plant 
(Annaba), petroleum refinery (Algiers), LNG plant of Arzew and the 
exploitation of a new phosphate deposit. 
In all sectors, the Constantine Plan called for an investment of $4 
billion, half of which was to come from the private sector. The results 
of the plan were quickly felt, in the sense that, by 1960, about 500 
companies had applied to invest in Algeria, 417 of which were given 
approval. Nearly all of these companies were process industries 
(chemical, food, construction). However, the actual investment was, $6 
million in 1958, $80 million in 1959; and $115 million in 1960. The slow 
inflow of capital was the result of the liberation war. For further 
details on the Constantine Plan, see Semir Amin (1970) op cit. pp123-126. 
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SENIR AMIN (1966) "L'economie du Maghreb" Vol. 1 pp. 203-213. CHOUAKRIA 
NORIDINE (1978) , op. cit. 
[17] In late May and early June 1962, the members of the Conseil National 
de La Revolution Algerienne (CNRA), a group of political leaders formed 
in 1956 met in Tripoli, to outline a philosophy and a set of goals to 
serve as a platform which became known as the'"TRIPOLI PROGRAM" and has 
served as an ideological basis since independence. 
[18] The TRIPOLI PI GRMM or CHARTER as it is sometimes called, was of 
course written just prior to independence, thus, it was suspected. of 
being emotional rather than having a rational approach. 
[19]- CHEER OF ALGIERS, adopted at the First FLN CONGRESS 16-21 APRIL 
1964. 
[20] Ibid, Part two of the CHARTER, in particular section 6- 
industrialization. It should be noted that unlike the Tripoli Charter, 
the CHARTER of Algiers has nothing to say about the domestic private 
industrial sector. 
[211 For further studies of the Algerian transitional period consult the 
following: M. RAFFINOT, B. JACQUEMOT (1977) "Le Capitalism d'Etat 
Algerien" MASPIO, PARIS; SEMIR AMIN (1970) op cit. pp 129-133; S. Amin 
(1966) op. cit. Vol. 1 pp. 258-279 for the period 1962-3; S. Amir (1966) 
"La colnisation et la decolnisation" Vol. 2, pp. 9-41 for the period 
1963-7. 
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[22] For further studies of the algerian model of development see: J. C. 
MARTNES (1973) "Le Model Algerien de developpement" ALDER; CHOUAKRIA 
NOREDINE Op Cit; A. AKKACHE (1971) "Capitaux etrangers et liberation 
economique: L'Experience Algerienne" PARIS; K. Amour et al (1974) "La 
voie Algerienne" Paris and; H. Larbi (1973) Opinions sur l'economie 
Algerienne" Alger. 
[23] As a member of OPEC, Algeria's industrialization approach is not 
necessarily available to the majority of the developing countries. Since 
such a resource gives it an additional bargaining power not available to 
others, the earning from oil and gas increases its chances of acquiring 
technologies and makes it possible to link the supply of such resources 
to the acquisation of technology. 
[24] LA CHARTE NATIONALE ORDONANCE NO. 76-57 du 5 Juillet 1976, CHAPTER 7 
PART £P - Industrialization p. 166. 
[25] It should be noted that the (HAraER of Algiers had indicated that 
future industries - heavy industries - should be installed not on the 
basis of the Algerian market, but rather on a regional geographical 
market. 
[26] Today the Algerian demand for steel, fertilizers, cement and 
petrochemicals have expanded five folds in less than 10 years, making the 
installed capacities already insufficient. The same capacities were 
described as being out of proportion by experts from the industrialized 
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countries. So, it is not the actual demand what Algeria looks for when 
deciding on projects, but the demand generated by development acts which 
in itself would generate the necessary market for the creation of new 
industries. 
[27] Technological capital may be defined as the total sum of 
non-material resource available to man to enable him to design and 
understand the machinery which is required increasingly to meet social 
needs more adequately. 
[281 Government of Algeria (1975) Memorandum submitted by Algeria to the 
Conference of Sovereigns and Head of States of OPEC Member Countries: 
ANNEX IX ALGIERS, MARCH 1975. 
[29] G. D. DE BERNIS (1971) "Les Industries industrialisantes et les 
options Algeriennes" TIERS MONDE NO. 47 p. 547. 
[30] The long term objective of Algeria's industrial and technological 
policy is the attainment of economic independence which implies that 
Algeria must rely primarily on its own resources for its development. 
According to p. Balta and C. Rulleau, the option of heavy industries is 
based on three ideas. 
"... souci d'assurer 1'independence du pays pour ne dependre 
indefiniment de l'etranger dann les approvisionnements 
essentials a l'economie, alors qu'existait la possibilite de 
transformer sur place des matieres premieres abandants; volonte 
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de disposer dune industrie industialisante aux retembees 
benefiques meme si elle n'etait pas immediate; refus de 
1'industrie legere on de montage importee de l'etranger, 
sensible a la conjucture internationals, jugee "passive" et ne 
permettant pas un reel transfert de technologie". 
Paul Balta et Claudine Rulleau (1978) "La strategie de 
Boumediene". 
La Bibliotheque Arabe Sindbad Paris p. 152 
1311 The priority of the industrial sector over the agricultural sector 
can be seen from the actual and planned investment since 1967 up to 1979 
in both sectors: (in percentage). 
SE MR : 1967-69 Plan 1970-73 Plan 1974-77 Plan Interplan 1978-79 
INDUSTRY : 48.7 (53.6) 44.7 (57.4) 43.6 (60.7) 
AGRICULTURE : 16.9 (20.6) 14.9 (12.0) 13.2 (7.3) 
- (61.7) 
- (7.9) 
The figures in parenthesis show the actual investment while the other 
figures show the planned investment, there is no planned investment for 
the interplan period 1978-79. The priority of the industrial sector is 
further indicated by the fact that only in the first plan 1967-1969 the 
actual investment exceeded the planned investment in the agricultural 
sector. The same can not be said for the industrial sector, where the 
actual investment exceed the planned one in all the three plans (This 
does not qualify for the interplan' period where no planned investment 
percentage is known). Also, Algeria does not believe that agricultural 
output could substantially increase without acquiring the technology 
merely by purchasing fertilizers and tractors and select more or less a 
miraculous seed. One the contrary irrepairable damage may be done to the 
soil by machinery and the lack of knowledge of the soil chemistry. 
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[32] Even the increased prices of crude oil from $2.35 in 1969 to $30 in 
late 1979, Hydrocarbons remain the main foreign exchange earner and 
represent 92.6% of Algeria's export of which 6.2% represents the share of 
LNG and natural gas. Despite such income Algeria's external debts stand 
at $18 billion. This is due to high level of borrowing during the 1970's 
decade to finance. industrial complexes, see the Guardian, Thursday 
December 30,1982, p. 15. 
[331 The NATIONAL CHARTER, focuses on a number of key issues: development 
of a diversified and highly integrated industrial base. CHARTE NATIONAL 
(1976) op cit. pp. 166-168. 
[341 Cited by A. DOUCY and F. MONHEIM (1971). - "Les Revolutions 
Algerienres" Fayard p. 76; Boumediene was also quoted as saying "without 
steel there is no development" EL DJEICH-ALGER July 1972 p. 29. 
(35] For further studies on the integration -theory see G. , D. DE BERNIS 
(1966) "industries industrialisantes et-le contenu dune politque 
d'integration regionale" Economie Appliquee I. S. E. A. no. 3-4 pp. 415-473; 
G. D. DE BERNIS (1968) "Industires Industrialisantes et integration 
economique regionale" Economie Appliquee I. S. E. A. pp. 41-68; G. D. DE 
BERMS (1971) OP. CIT. PP. 545-563. 
[36] Semir Amin (1970) "L'Accum&ulation a Pechelle mondiale" Anthropos 
p. 47 - Semir Amin (1973) "Le Developpetnent inegal" Editions de minuit. 
The introversion theory is well explained in Semir Amin's article: 
"Le model theorique d'accumulation et developpement dans le monde 
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contemporain: la problamtique de transition" TIERS MONDE no. 52, VOL. 13 
(1972) pp. 703-726. 
[37] S. Amir (1972) Ibid pp. 703-705, and M. Raffinot, P. Jacquernot 
(1977) "Le capitalisme d'Etat Algerian" pp. 147-150. 
[381 Although the single sector qualification concerns mainly the period 
1967-1978 [the Three Plans Period], it remains valid under the 5 years 
Plan introduced by the New Government of Chadli Bendjedid (1980-1984) 
with more eiphasis placed on satisfying the social needs. 
(391 A degree of integration has been attained at the level of national 
consumption - that is local consumption covered by local production. The 
symbols of the policy are natural gas complexes at ARZEW and Skikda which 
are among the world's most modern and the steel complex of Annaba one of 
Africa's largest. A number of foreign firms were asked by the Algerian 
Government to anticipate the required national consumption of certain 
products for the period 1967-1977. Such consumption supply was often 
reached and in some cases overpassed by 1974. The estimated consumption 
of steel was 400,000 tonnes for 1980,1,000,000 tonnes of steel were 
consumed in 1973. 
[40] G. D. DE BERNIS (1971) op cit. pp. 552-554. 
[41] Doucy et Monheim (1971) op cit. pp. 76-77. 
1421 For further details on the influence of the Algerian policy and the 
option of advanced techniques on the creation of, jobs in Algeria see, M. 
Faffinot, Pierre Jacquemot (1977) pp. 212-215. 
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THE I ECAL ASPECTS OF TEQ1NO1 Y ACQOISATION: 
IE ALGERIAN 
As indicated in the previous chapter, Algeria's industrial policy 
is not determined by the availability of financial resources but rather 
by a strategy based on the internal utilization of natural resources[l] 
and it is deliberately aimed at breaking the vicious circle of 
underdevelopment. To realize such extremely ambitious strategy, 
Algeria had to turn to the international technology market and in 
particular to multinational coorporations (MNCs). Intervention by 
foreign firms is heavily felt due to the lack of local technological 
capital[21 and little if any of industrial basis. Such intervention is 
evident in all the industrialization phases - from. the evolution of 
projects to the production stage -. To have a better idea of Algeria's 
technological dependence and rely on foreign firms we shall first look 
into the evolution of projects and the contractual procedures. Then we 
look in detail into the various contractual forms used to implement the 
policy. 
The evolution of industrial projects is the foundation of all 
contracts. As it stands now in Algeria this suffers from a number of 
weaknesses which affect to certain extent the realization of projects 
t', 
at one stage or another. This evolution of projects belongs to public 
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enterprises and the ministry concerned[3]. Such evolution of projects 
and the due cost to be allocated to the foreign partners of the 
National Enterprises (NEs) is usually characterized by an insufficient 
mastery of parameters which determine the real cost of those projects. 
Four aspects of project evolution and contracts are of particular 
importance here. First: the individualization of projects: The main 
objective behind the individualization of projects is to allow the 
central services of the Planning Ministry to verify the accounting of 
the project's investment with that of national development plan (i. e. 
the control of norms and location). This process has become 
non-operative due to: (i) the vagueness of project's characteristics, 
in particular the techniques to be employed and the size of project, 
(ii) the slowness of the individualization process coupled with the bad 
evaluation of projects at the national enterprise level and, (iii) the 
non-respect of planning disciplines (i. e. the delay in depositing the 
necessary documents for projects)(41. 
To this end the individualization of projects tend to be 
considered by the national enterprises as a mere administrative 
authorisation. The accumulated delay in this process results in 
affecting to great extent the decision to invest. In other words, the 
time span between the completion of the individualization process and 
the decision to invest, render the financial plan often inadequate. In 
practice this means that the actual cost of project is often higher 
than the planned cost. 
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Second: The choice of techniques: In principle the choice of 
techniques to be employed in a particular project is assured by the 
concerned NEs on the basis of technical and economical feasibility 
studies which the NEs are required to undertake. In practice, the 
intervention of NE at this type of decisions is very weak if not nill. 
This intervention is often limited to the designation of a head of 
project "Chef de projet" who with the assistance of an engineering 
bureaux supervises the realization of the studies. From this moment, 
the national enterprises level of technological capital becomes a key 
factor. The Foreign firms not only supervise but in some cases run all 
operation culminating in the preliminary project. The selection of 
imported techniques are necessarily based on information provided by 
the suppliers of techniques, thus it is difficult to control the 
objectivity of-such information. On the other hand the inefficiency of 
technical information limits the possibilities of selections. Thus, 
choices tend either to reproduce the already established methods, or to 
go without discernment towards technological process presented as the 
more advanced. The risk of choosing the latter option may lead the 
technology suppliers to using NEs as guinea pigs for the 
experimentation of new technologies. The choice of the former method 
is limited in many industries by Algeria's industrial policy - the very 
advanced technologies option. 
The choice of techniques and the technical negotiation of 
contracts are almost excessively assured by foreign companies. In 
practice this means that the techniques chosen are not always 
advantageous to the national economy of Algeria, and more often than 
not are confined to only to commercial transactions. This conclusion 
276 
is apparent from the fact that foreign firms (i) do not furnish neither 
the basic studies which led to the choice of techniques nor the 
calculation method or that of the conception; (ii) do not accept any 
important risk. As a result the forseen penalties often integrated in 
the contract's cost do not cover more than'a small part of the eventual 
damage; and (iii) the refusal to integrate Algerian engineers in their 
studies - bureaux "bureaxu des etudes"; laboratories, or other research 
centres[5]. 
At the organizational level, the mastery of technology implies a 
high level degree of coordination and intersectoral harmonization, 
which can only be assured by an effective co-operation of national 
economic agents - public enterprises - in a unitarian coherent 
framework. The lack of a coherent framework is due to the lack of an 
institutional framework. There is no legislation concerning the 
transfer of technology, no mechanism for framing relation between the 
NE's and the foreign partners. There is no obligation to register 
contracts or even to allow for their prior evaluation or after they 
come into force. In short there is no control of imported techniques. 
Third: the project dimension: The decision on the size of 
projects are not often backed by economic parameters. In such spirit, 
the systematic research for the "economies of scale" or "the size 
effects" is theoretically attached to big enterprises. Such approach 
often translated on the field by "gignatism" as much specticular as 
sterile have caused in. the case of Algeria, excessive delays in the 
realization of the projects, overcost and hazardous mastery of 
management[61. 
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The consequences of the retained choice of plant's size were: (i) 
the grouping of activities of different nature or different 
complexities had made the management of industries more complicated; 
(ii) the existence of different technologies in the same industrial 
branch did not allow the creation of specialized units, which would 
have made the mastery of the imported technology easier, and (iii) the 
initiation of important new actions without any sufficient preparation 
for the condition of their realization, in particular at the economic 
infra-structure level (i. e. the establishment at the same site of a 
number of workshops where the technology did not correspond to the 
product and have created auxiliary. activities for the realization of 
services not assured at the site's environment). 
Moreover, -the search for integration at the level of micro-economy 
had' led to privileging a constant approach of assuring the very high 
level of integration at the project's level. The complexity of the 
erected installations and the difficulty of their mastery - both their 
realization and management - have rendered the sought objectives 
illusionary. 
Fourth, the location of projects. The choice of the project 
location was not given all the considerations it deserves. These 
considerations should have been based on criteria such as the 
socio-political factors, minimal cost and technical considerations. 
Thus, the weaknesses of the economic infrastructure and the lack of 
qualified manpower and management personnel, in the end led NEs, in 
most cases, to concentrate their activities and their units in the 
north of the country. The overall result of this was that it caused 
extensive damage to the agricultural land. 
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To sum-up, it appears that the intervention of national 
enterprises during the evolution of projects leading to the signing of 
contracts is very weak. This evolution includes two stages: the first 
concerns setting optimum targets for production, integration, planning 
and cost. The second stage concerns the approval of preliminary 
projects, and to provide clear technical specifications, the services 
and the goods to be provided by the foreign partners. It is at this 
second stage where NEs technical capacity becomes a key factor. Due to 
the lack of such capacity they are neither capable of providing the 
technical specifications themselves nor able tQ supervise this process. 
The result is that they leave such process to an engineering consultant 
invariably a foreign one. 
It is not, only the lack of technical capacity which render the NEs 
dependent on foreign companies, but equally the lack of a clear 
technological policy of the comparatively short experience, in 
particular the absence of an institutional organism for the 
incorporation and integration of the imported. technology. The absence 
of such organism becomes more apparent when contracts are entered into 
force for the supply of services, goods and the erection of industrial 
plants - realization stage - it is this late stage which is the main 
concern of this chapter. 
Before the discussion of the realization stage and the different 
contractual forms which it involves, it is important to mention briefly 
the question of import and export monopoly. As. far as the importation 
of technology is concerned, almost all major purchasing by the NES and 
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Government offices is done by international tender. There is no 
Central Government purchasing authority[7]. Under the public law of 
1978, exports and imports of commodities and services are the monopoly 
of the state[8]. Such monopoly is carried out by the state or public 
enterprises each within its field of specialization[9]. Prior to this 
law only imports were subject to state monopoly, while exports were 
governed by an export permits regime[10]. As far as import by 
foreign companies is concerned, only those firms who have an agreement 
with the state or its agencies; or in cases where the foreign firm is a 
party to a contract with NEs, whereby it is responsible under the terms 
of the contract to provide equipment, machinery and products for the 
realization of industrial works. 
Even in such cases, the right to import is not automatic but 
subject to import permits (l1]" These provisions implicitly exclude the 
patent owner from importing into the country the patented product. The 
law of 1978 contains two important provisions concerning the conclusion 
of contracts between NEs and foreign firms. On one hand contracts with 
foreign firms can only be concluded by the state or its agencies[12]. 
On the other hand, the intervention of distributors, representatives, 
agents and intermediaries of any kind on, behalf of foreign firms is 
prohibited[13]. The prohibition of intervention by agents is the 
direct result of the discovery of a wide spread of malpractices, 
whereby agents illegally benefited from their intervention[141. 
Apart from the foregoing provisions, the following practices and 
bargaining techniques are used in the negotiation of contracts in 
Algeria: (1) Bid documents and performance bonds. All bids are 
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required to be submitted in a sealed envelopel151. Bid bonds are 
usually not required except when the project is very large. 
Performance bonds, when required, are of two types: (i) unconditional 
bank guarantee to be held until the fixed level of production is 
obtained; (ii) a cash guarantee to be repaid during the life of the 
contract. Firms with previous good record experience in Algeria can 
have performance bonds waived. The imported machinery and equipment 
can not be used to affect 'performance bonds since they, are considered 
as the property of the NEs. Usually the bonds are between 10 and 15 
per cent of the contract's value. 
(2) Performance requirements and penalties: Many performance 
requirements are included in contracts particularly in the contractual 
form "product in hand" or "plant in production" as it is sometimes 
called. Some of these requirements concern fixed deadlines for the 
realization of industrial projects, fixed-, level of production - both 
production quality and quantity - and other obligations. The majority 
of these obligations carry penalties and apply effectively to the 
foreign firms only. Often there are no enforcement clauses with 
regards to the obligations of the Algerian contracting party, if such 
obligations were stated in the contract, the obligations of the. foreign 
contracting party cannot be mitigated by the failure of the Algerian 
party to meet his obligations. For example, the penalty imposed on the 
foreign party, if such party fails to erect a plant or industrial works 
in an agreed period of time cannot be mitigated even though the cause 
of the failure to meet the contracted date may well be the lack of 
adequate delivery of cement which the Algerian party had agreed to 
provide. 
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(3) Price: Two cost's methods are used in contracts passed between NEs 
and foreign firms. The first is the cost-plus-fee method favoured by 
foreign constructors. The second is fixed price contracts often 
demanded by the Algerian party. Increase in project costs due to 
inflation is not covered by clauses, though in practice, inflation has 
been used as a basis for renegotiation of the contract's price (i. e. 
SONATRACH and CHIMICO contract for the erection of LNl at Arzew) [161. 
The cost of equipments and machinery are agreed upon by both parties 
during the negotiation of contracts [17]" on most of the large scale 
projects, the foreign party is often required to guarantee the supply 
of spare parts beyond the period of the manufacturer's guarantee and 
for which a price excalation clause is not possible[18]. 
(4) Training: This is an essential element in plant in production 
contracts but not in turnkey contracts where it is the subject of a 
separate contract. The quality of personnel training associated with a 
given project amount to the same importance of the potential output of 
the contracted industrial work[19]. 
(5) Arbitration and the applicable law: National enterprises often 
prefer the recourse to the national law and going before local bodies. 
Accordingly, the Algerian Law is the most frequently retained and 
rarely there is a recourse to a foreign law and exceptionally custom 
law and the general principles. However, the almost systematic 
recourse to national law - which is supposed to provide minimum 
protection for the NEs - is a misleading optimism. Since on one hand, 
the Algerian law of obligations is not fundamentally different from 
European Laws, in particular the French Civil Law. on the other hand, 
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the application of the retained law is not in most cases under the 
national jurisdiction, but rather belongs to foreigners who, often 
constitutre the arbitration tribunals. Anything which may appear to 
those tribunals as prerogative is often eliminaterd for the sake of 
international commercial customs and the security of transactions. 
Thus what really. matters in this context is not the rules of law but 
their application or non-application[201. 
(6) Force majeure: Force majeure clauses are negotiable. Once a 
definition is agreed upon by the contracting parties it cannot be 
alerted. Generally speaking, such definition typically includes: wars, 
natural catastrophies and new legislation foreclosing the possibility 
of further work. onerous factors are not considered as force majeure, 
though sometimes can be used by the foreign constructors in arguing for 
an extention. of the fixed delay set-up in the contract. Labour 
disputes and congestion of ports are not usually considered part of the 
force majeure. 
Beyond the foregoing mentioned items, it is not possible to say 
with precision what is and what is not negotiable. 
The structure of technology importation in the Algerian 
experience is analysed through the different contractual methods used 
for the realization of industrial works. 
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B: THE QQLN! Rhý ASPEETS ¶E AI RIAN E ERIII IN THE FIND OF 
TEMNDI 
one aspect marking the evolution of the policy of technical 
importation is the particular attention given to the contractual forms 
binding the national enterprises and their foreign partners. Foreign 
firms are required not only to execute properly their contractual 
obligations in matters of the realization of industrial works, but also 
to agree to an effective transfer of their technologies and know-how. 
However, in practice, it must be noted that the contractual 
relationship between national enterprises and foreign firms is 
different from that binding two companies in the same country or 
countries -in the industrialized countries. The contractual 
relationship in the industrialized countries is often between two 
companies of an equivalent technological level. Under such a 
relationship, it is neither possible nor worthwhile for any partner to 
benefit excessively from temporary situational advantage. The 
established relationships are not short lived nor adventitious and it 
is thus guaranteed that there would be no abuse of dominant 
position(2l1. When it comes to technology, the relationship between 
foreign firms and national enterprises is a one way relationship. 
Technologically the contracting parties and their states are on an 
unequal footing with one another. There are intermittent relations in 
which it is customary to exploit the utmost strength of the dominant 
position. National enterprises, because they lack the mastery of 
technology, often do not benefit from the entitlement of the contract 
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provisions. Often they cannot exercise their legitimate and recognized 
rights while an industrial project is in progress, since they are not 
capable to carry out the required controls and insist on the foreign 
partner to take the necessary steps to ratify any errors should the 
need arise. Throughout the duration of the contract, the role of 
national enterprises is altogether passive. Because of the lack of 
technological capital, they resign inadequate to the fact that all 
initiatives must be taken unwarrantably by the foreign partners who can 
act as they think fit. 
The awareness of the unbalanced contractual relationship between 
foreign firms and the national enterprises in matters of technology is 
expressed through the search for new and more satisfactory forms for 
the acquisation of technology. In this context, the choice of methods 
for the realization of industrial projects is characterized by the 
crossing from one method to another. Such crossing concerns the 
following methods: (1) separate contracts, (2) Turnkey contracts; (3) 
plant in production and, (4) mixte enterprises. 
(1) Separate Contracts 
Separate contracts or service contracts isolate the supply of 
equipment from the supply of services (supply of equipment, design 
consultancy, control, expert advice, training, technical assistance, 
plant erection, civil engineering etc.. ). It is a form of contract 
whereby an industrial project is divided into different contracts with 
different contracting parties. Each of the parties is directly 
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responsible to the concerned national enterprise for the supplies or 
performance of the work entrusted to him under the terms of the 
contract. Sometimes there is a combination of two services (i. e to 
award the contract for technical assistance and plant erection to the 
same contractor)[22]. 
Since the national enterprise is the only one contractually bound 
to all other contracting parties, it is its responsibility to 
coordinate all the works in order to ensure that the various parties do 
not hamper each other and that their work is performed in the correct 
sequence. 
An example of this type of contract is represented by one of the 
vast industrial complexes of iron and steel - EL-HADJAR steel works - 
near Annaba in the North East of Algeria (Annex 5: 3). Foreign firm 
partners of the Societe Nationale de Siderurgie (SNS) tend to favour 
separate contracts, because of the limited guarantees which they have 
to provide. 
It is the SNS who may be held responsible for the effects of the 
delays in the performance of work and supplies of one of the 
contracting parties. For example, if the firm which is contracted to 
supply equipments does not observe the time limit, or the equipnent 
which it has supplied were found faulty, this may have an effect on the 
obligations of the other firms responsible for the erection of those 
supplied equipments. Such effects may include time limits and 
consequently penalties for delays. 
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In cases where there is a defect in the plant and where the 
responsibility of one or more the contracting parties prove impossible 
to establish, it is the SNS which bears the financial consequences. 
The SNS is then responsible for anything beyond the limits of its 
contracting parties' responsibilities. To avoid these risks, the SNS 
may insert in each individual contract liability clauses, in particular 
with respect to delays. These liability clauses often go beyond the 
normal guarantee clauses included in the supply and services contracts. 
However, if the delay is due to the inadequate coordination of work by 
the SNS, it will be obliged to accept responsibility vis-a-vis the 
other parties who were affected by the lack of coordination. 
If the delay has repercussions on the work of other firms who have 
performed their contractual obligations, the national enterprise will 
have primary liability for the resulting damages to the affected 
parties. Then it can take actions against the contracting party or 
parties responsible for the delay to recover the sums it has been 
obliged to pay in the compensation to the other parties who performed 
their contractual obligations. 
The establishment of El-Hadjar iron and steel complex represents 
the core of heavy industry in Algeria. Accordingly the iron and steel 
branch absorbed the second highest percentage of industrial investment 
preceded only by the Hydrocarbon sector[231. However, at the time it 
was taken(241, the decision to build El-Hadjar had represented a 
seemingly hazardous choice both in terms of investmentt25] and market. 
287 
As far as the market is concerned, the increased local demand for 
steel has shown the extent to which the choice was justified. Three 
objectives were set-up for El-Hadjar complex: (i) an annual output of 
4000,000 tons amounting to an investment programme of 2000 million 
Algerian dinars[261; (ii) the second objective was the diversification 
of final products and the meeting of new demand 127]; and (iii) an 
annual steel production of two million tons(281. Not only the whole 
range of finished products produced in El-Hadjar complex were locally 
consumed, but Algeria was forced to build another steel complex in the 
West of the country: "We have decided to construct a new iron and steel 
complex in the West of the country, which will have an annual capacity 
of 10 to 12 million tons"(291. 
The result achieved during the three plans period is the very 
substantial development of the SNS which has accumulated experience of 
decisive importance for the future. Like many state owned enterprises 
the SNS, has an engineering department staffed, in part, by expatriated 
engineers. The department (about 200 staff) - is essentially directed 
towards working drawings produced on a subcontracting basis for foreign 
engineering companies. Lately, the department was developed to provide 
all executive engineering services through construction in particular 
for part of the general utilities of the complex. The department was 
formed during the planning stage and started to function in 1969. The 
SNS insisted that its own design engineers should sit-in as 
counterparts to the foreign consultants in order to get experience of 
project planning and design techniques and also gain familiarity with 
the technology of the future enterprise. During my visit to the 
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complex in the summer of 1981, I was told that the department was 
engaged at that time in producing a file on all the different equipment 
and processes. Furthermore, it was stated that such a file would be 
consulted prior to any new acquisation of processes or equipments. 
However, the construction of E1-Hadjar and the training of 
manpower to operate it ran into severe difficulties which delayed the 
execution of the programs and the build-up of production. Thus, at the 
end of 1979,20 medium sized projects in the steel industry had not yet 
been completed representing a total carry-over cost estimated at 6.3 
billion DA[301. Most of those incompleted projects related to the 
extension of El-Hadjar. 
In my view, I think it was possibly wrong for the SNS or any other 
national enterprise for that matter to start its introduction to 
industrialization through this form of separate contracts. Such form 
of contracts though provide additional competence enabling the SNS to 
exercise certain degree to defend and control its interest by being the 
only partner who is contractually bound with all the other parties. 
Such responsibility requires a certain degree of technological capital 
to allow the SNS to control and coordinate the different phases of the 
realization. Neither the SNS which was established only in 1964, nor 
the infant steel industry had the capability to coordinate the 
different types of the imported technology to a single complex 
comprising many units. As shown in Annex 5: 3, the construction of 
El-Hadjar is very diversified in terms of the imported technologies - 
geographical diversification -. Essentially those imported 
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technologies come from the capitalist countries(311. However, such 
diversification which is politically motivated by the oil dispute 
between Algeria and France during the 1960's and early 1970's, could 
only have added more problems to the newly established SNS. More often 
than not, the diversification of supplies appears only at the national 
level, since in many cases it is the same technological process which 
dominate an industrial branch world-wide. Even if the diversification 
of supplies was designed to ease the pressure which a single 
contracting party may hold on national enterprises, it would have had a 
little impact, if any, as foreign companies tend to coordinate through 
tacit market sharing - (sub-contracting) -. 
The weaknesses of the separate contracts method reside in the 
shortage of technological experience and the mitigation of the 
responsibilities of the foreign partners with regards to defects and 
delays. At the time when contracts were signed, the SNS was not in a 
position to benefit from the entitlement of the contracts provisions. 
Further, it did not know how to invest or manage- industrial projects. 
It lacked human resources, not only skilled manpower and technicians 
but also qualified administrative staff. Accordingly it was not able 
to carry the necessary coordination between the different contracting 
parties which is vital in this type of contract. 
Faced with such a situation, the case of El-Hadjar suggested to 
the Algerian authorities the need to acquire industrial units under a 
more packaged form of contracts. It is now, in the 1980's, when the 
SNS and other national enterprises have gained considerable experience 
in the field of technology and management of industrial units that they 
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ought to opt for more separate contracts but not at the time when they 
were newly created. They are in a position, in particular the SNS - to 
do part of the engineering, maintenance and above all have acquired the 
necessary human resources to coordinate and rectify errors. The 
collaboration of foreign contracting parties was no more than a simple 
commercial operation, without any real guarantee to the national 
enterprises. 
2. TURN-KEY CONTRACTS 
In the context of Algeria, a turnkey contract may be defined as an 
undertaking by the foreign contracting party at the time of the 
conception and realization of projects to deliver to the national 
enterprises industrial units as they exist and function abroad. In 
other words, the foreign contracting party is assigned the task of 
providing all the services. Accordingly he is responsible for 
engineering work; purchase and delivery of equipnent; erection of 
plants; supervising the work, start-up trials and technical 
assistance[32]. The choice of patents, fabrication procedures and 
equipments are in principle reserved to the concerned national 
enterprise, but rarely this is the case. 
The idea behind -the introduction of this type of contracts to 
Algeria is to offset the national enterprises own lack of 
qualifications. Turnkey contracts are designed at least theoretically 
to pinpoint easily and rapidly the areas of responsibilities and 
malpractices of the foreign contracting party and any deviation from 
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the contractual specifications for which he can be held responsible. 
Such responsibilities are not difficult to pinpoint to, since the 
foreign partner's responsibility is global as he is the only 
contracting party with the national enterprise - unlike in separate 
contracts formula[33]. Unquestionably, turnkey contracts offered 
greater protection for national, enterprises, who instead of having a 
multitude of partners taking advantage of their incompetence by blaming 
one another for those malpractices to avoid responsibility, national 
enterprises deal with a single partner who is responsible for 
everything. 
The resort by national enterprises to turnkey contracts owes much 
to the comparative failure in El-Hadjar steel complex, as well as to 
the arrival of American and West German firms to. compete for industrial 
contracts in Algeria. Equally, the introduction of turnkey contracts 
was boosted by the increase, in petroleum revenues, since this form of 
contract is-quite costly. 
Although turnkey contracts restored some degree of justice to the 
contractual relationship between NEs and their foreign partners. 
However, such theoretical balance did provide NEs with no more than 
equipment without crew "equipment sans equipage". So what are the 
possible advantages for NEs opting for this contractual form? First, 
there appears to be a clearity in the realization of projects, and 
except for the physical existence of plants, the advantages tend to be 
minimum. To this extent, the widespread option consist of affirming 
that the creation of the same industrial-plants is-the only valuable 
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compensation. The widespread use of turnkey contracts, reached a very 
high level during the First Four Year Plan 1970-73, where 67 per cent 
of all contracts concluded during this period were turnkey contracts - 
(30% integral tunrkey contracts and 37% partial contracts) [341. In 
fact all the contracts in the petrochemical industry concluded between 
1967-1975 belonged to this category[351. 
The construction of these petrochemical plants ran into very 
serious problems. By way of example one could look at the case of the 
Skikda complex for ethylene and PVC which faced a one year delay in the 
execution, the construction of which was entrusted to the TOKYO 
Engineering Corporation and ITOH, both of Japan[363. Apart from the 
delay of one year, there was the problem of the training of personnel 
and skilled manpower. According to a World bank report, the cost of 
technical assistance represented 50% of the running cost of the complex 
in 1980[37]" The ARZEW's first Ammonia plant also suffered from design 
errors by the constructors, TECH NIP and ENSA of France. 
Secondly, a turnkey contract is a means for establishing 
industrial basis in developing countries. It is a way of setting-up 
industries without being obliged to master the techniques of 
conception, realization, control and coordination. As such, it cannot 
be seen as industrialization, but rather the buying of 
industrialization. It also allows NEs to avoid the distribution of 
tasks for the realization of industrial plants. The fact that NEs will 
only have to deal with a single partner enables them to put their 
limited human resources to a better use. In other words; the coherence 
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of the whole operation, due to the uniqueness of the foreign partner, 
means that the concerned NE can have its attention concentrated to that 
single partner. thus it can play a more positive role with regards to 
solving conflicts concerning delays in the realization and performance. 
According to Judet and Perrin, the advantages which a developing 
country can obtain from turnkey contracts are as follows: 
"- The turnkey contract is a means for setting up the basis 
for industrial production without being forced to master 
the techniques of conception and realization. 
- The turnkey contract guarantees a shorter time limit than 
if local possibilities were to be used. 
- The turnkey contract disavows the recipient enterprise from 
responsibility and place it entirely upon the foreign 
contracting party. 
- The turnkey contract hence appears less costly than a locally 
governed contract and integrating national structures of 
conception and realization which have yet to unfold"[38] 
As far as the cost and delays accumulated through the use of 
turnkey contracts are concerned, things are not'what they seem to be. 
It might be true that turnkey contracts are less costly when compared 
with other contractual forms and may also tend to shorten the delay 
period. However, to obtain these advantages, national enterprises must 
not have a shortage of qualified manpower. 
However, these supposed advantages are in most cases disadvantages 
in themselves to the future industrialization in general and to the 
294 
national enterprises in particular. The danger of turnkey contracts 
procedure is that industrial units and plants are only partially 
realized, meaning that only the physical existence of those plants is 
materialized. Against this, there is no guarantee for either 
functioning or production and since the majority of NEs were with no 
industrial experience, the risk of being victim of certain abuses and 
malpractices were very high. In the context of Algeria, turnkey 
contracts are characterized by a number of inconveniences. 
Firstly; the role of NEs is reduced to a role of spectator. 
Turnkey procedure possesses a dangerous virtue of masking the 
incapabilities of NEs to participate in the elaboration of all the 
phases of realization of industrial plants. In other words, this 
procedure deprives NEs of gaining any useful experience. Generally, 
the concerned NE does not intervene at any stage with the conception, 
and realization of its future industrial plant. The same NE is often 
confined to administrative. tasks. In cases where there is a real 
acquisation of technology, through the training of manpower, such 
acquisation is minimum as the training is assured by a foreign partner 
other than that of the plant constructor. To this extent there is no 
continuity between the realization of the plant and the training of 
manpower to operate it. Thus, this method can be described as the 
method determined by the discontinuity of steps. In a sense all the 
phases of conception and realization are characterized by the 
application of commendable techniques by the foreign contracting party. 
As far as the exploitation phase is concerned it could be the subject 
of an improvisation or at tleat empiricism. The discontinuity appears 
flagrant when the foreign partner is absolved from responsibilityt391. 
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It is at this point when the problems of discontinuity will be 
felt heavily by the NEs. The most concerning one is that of qualified 
manpower - which is consequently not solved by turnkey contracts. To 
operate the constructed plant, national enterprises require trained 
personnel for production and maintenance. Zwo options are open to the 
NEs; either the recourse to technical assistance which has its limits 
and above all is costly[401, or to train its own personnel, which in my 
view is the best way(41]. Thus, the absence of an effective transfer 
of technology could only have generated a continuous, technological 
dependency on foreign firms to erect plants, operate them and maintain 
their running. By way of example, the Algerian Government in its 
economic report for the period 1967-1978 which is by far the most 
critical report ever produced by the Government - admits that up to the 
end of this period no record exists of any Algerian team capable of 
repeating the erection of any of the industrial plantsl42]. 
Secondly, the absence of real guarantee concerning the good 
functioning of the plant after its final delivery to NEs. It is true 
that the foreign contractors furnish mechanical guarantee, but these 
are limited in time. The insufficiency of guarantees is a very grave 
one since it risks transforming the realization of industrial projects 
to a mere cash flow and reduces it to a commercial operation. The fact 
that the foreign partner is absolved from responsibility is no remedy 
to national enterprises. The objectives set up by the technology 
receiver - national enterprises - may not necessarily be met by a 
successful start up test. On one hand NEs are obliged to sign final 
acceptance and hence to absolve the constructor from responsibility 
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even before it is possible to carry out tests. Such automic acceptance 
can happen in cases when for reasons directly imputable to NEs and 
indirectly imputable to the foreign constructor - completion of the 
work is delayed beyond the date fixed in the contract. As a result of 
automatic final acceptance, NEs can be deprived of some of their 
contractual rights[431. 
Qi the other hand even if tests are carried out, they are not that 
significant. Contractual clauses allow for tests to be partial and 
instantaneous and only certain qualified parameters undergo tests. 
Accordingly tests have been performed on units and sub-units rather 
than on installations as a whole. The signing of the final acceptance 
does not guarantee the good functioning of non-quantifiable but 
fundamental factors (i. e. sturdiness of equipment; technical security 
of installations; adequate intermediate storage capacity, proper design 
of auxiliary services in particular and distribution of utilities, ease 
of operation etc). These non-quantifiable factors can not be verified 
before the foreign contracting party is absolved from responsibility. 
Further, it is in these factors where foreign constructor tends to take 
full advantage of the ineffectiveness of NEs to control and makes every 
effort to economize at their expense. 
Thirdly, remedies of non-compliance: generally, penalties are 
limited to 5% of the contract's value, which under normal conditions - 
equally developed partners - can constitute a sufficient incentive for 
the constructor. The 5% is rarely attained, since any deviation from 
the contract specification can easily be spotted by the effective 
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control of the equally developed partner. However, this is not the 
case in Algeria, firstly constructors and manufacturers are only 
invited by tender and they often allow for comfortable margins when 
calculating the contract prices. Therefore, even if the 5% penalty is 
reached, the price of the contract remains highly remunerative for the 
foreign partner. Secondly, while construction of industrial plants is 
in progress, the fulfilment of contracts is already marked by 
inadequate control on the part of NEs. Thus, when the 5% is reached - 
which is precisely the case - the foreign contracting partner has no 
further reason to limit malpractices and workmanship. 
Let us for example suppose that a 5% maximum penalty is applied 
for delays in the completion of a gas pipeline. This delay may amount 
to years rather than weeks if this 5% ceiling is reached. The 
prejudice suffered by the concerned NE will be totally different from 
that suffered by a firm in the industrialized countries. A new 
installation often occupies a basic and special place in the economy of 
Algeria, while it is only marginal to what already exists in an 
industrialized country. A delay of one year in the pipeline - which 
forms a part of the overall gas field's equipments - corresponds not 
only to the loss of cash flow, but also to the operating cost. The 
operating cost concerns all the expenses which NE has to meet without 
receiving counterpart (i. e. to pay workers who have to be recruited and 
trained. They will be producing nothing and since no other 
installation may exist, cannot probably be employed elsewhere). 
Furthermore, since Algeria's industrial policy calls for the 
integration of economic activities, the delay in the pipeline prevents 
the putting into force of liquefaction plants and gas fields. In 
short, such delay would effect everything downstream and upstream from 
the pipeline. 
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The fourth inconvenience consists of the foreign constructor's 
total power over the construction of the plant. The majority of 
contracts passed between NEs and foreign firms are based on an 
inclusive amount - fixed contract price - rather than on cost plus fee 
method. This inclusive cost gives the constructor the possibility of 
avoiding all cost details, and since he is the only one to know and 
negotiate the prices of different elements constituting the future 
plant, he can unduly exaggerate the components prices (i. e. civil 
engineering, placing of installations). He can also retain extremely 
costly norms whose efficiency is doubtless or where the price does not 
correspond to the production necessity. 
In this context, the principal weakness of the turnkey contracts 
is the exclusion of the client NE from participating in the negotiation 
of component's prices. Apart from allowing foreign partners to impose 
excessively high prices, it may also generate technological dependence. 
The foreign partner can call upon his own firm or country for the 
supply of technology, rather than those available locally or which 
could be supplied at a cheaper price from the international market. Cn 
the other hand he could create a dependent industrial structure by 
choosing technological processes or equipments corresponding to the 
industrial structure of his own country or industrial plants and 
factories. 
Finally, turnkey contracts are too much concerned with the 
realization phase of projects and gives little if any to the question 
of quality and quantity of production. Above all, the weak 
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intervention of NEs in this type of contracts leaves them with the 
responsibility which was in the first place the cause for granting 
these type of contracts. Since the NEs are excluded from the control 
of the realization process of their future industrial units, and since 
the foreign partners have absolute freedom - (buying material, plant's 
erection, price negotiations, choice of equipments and organising the 
works) - they search to make all the imaginable economies from the 
totality of perceptible elements of the industrial units. Inevitably, 
malpractices and abuses on the part of the constructor are not 
discovered until plants are into production and often after the 
responsibility of foreign partners was terminated. The more grave 
abuses concern production performance and in particular the duration of 
the production life of units. A production unit with too many abuses 
will have a- short production life, due to numerous difficulties met 
during the initial stages of production (i. e. breakdown, 
incompatibility of the employed processes, problems of repairs and 
maintenance etc. ) as well as the weaknesses of possible remedies 
designed to reduce the prejudices and abuses suffered by the NES. Zb 
sum-up, it is the following reasons which have favoured and still do in 
many cases the awarding of turnkey contracts: - 
(i) The shortage of qualified national personnel and 
experienced technicians; 
(ii) The initial weakness of national capacities in the 
fabrication of equipment goods; and 
(iii) The administrative complexities (it is easier to 
administer turnkey contracts than several separate 
contracts). 
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Apart from the administrative problem, the method turnkey failed 
to satisfy the Algerian planners and prompted them to search for a more 
favourable contractual method. The availability of finance - due to 
the increase in oil revenue at the end of 1973 and in particular the 
shortage in skilled manpower precipitated the country and its planners 
to opt for a more alienating and global method of transfer. In order 
to solve the problem of discontinuity between the stage of realization 
and that of production, the new form implies a total abandoning of the 
conception and the realization of industrial plants. Thus they 
launched a new contractual form called "Plant in production" contract 
"PRODUIT EN MAIN" [441. 
3. PIANP IN PRO=ON OONfRACfS 
The method of plant in production "produit en main" is a reaction 
to the difficulties and disappointments of the turnkey contracts. This 
recently developed method engages the foreign contracting party more 
deeply with national enterprises. The foreign partner is not 
systematically absolved from responsibility at a specific date 
following the putting into service of installations, but under 
conditions and at times which are non-existent in turnkey 
contracts[45]. The method plant in production is destined - at least 
theoretically - to ensure total collaboration of foreign firms, and 
where the objectives are to improve sensibly all the delays in; the 
realization of industrial projects; production output; the start-up 
operations, management, the qualified manpower and the efficiency of 
technical transfer. 
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By virtue of contract, the foreign companies contracting under the 
method plant in production "PIP" is required to provide the following 
services to the concerned national enterprise: 
- the delivery of industrial plants in the form of turnkey "TK" 
- the guarantee by the same partner to train Algerian personnel 
both abroad and in Algeria - in plant training -; 
- to furnish technical assistance for the functioning of the plant 
and to guarantee the initial management of the plant up to the 
cruising stage; 
- to organise the plant's manpower - to post technicians and semi- 
skilled personnel in the plant's different services; 
- to guarantee production both in quantity and quality correspon- 
ding to a fixed calender; 
- finally he is under the obligation to comitainicate to the NEs: 
licenses and documentation of fabrication, his show-how and 
know-how in order that the contract results in a transfer of 
technology. 
Though the PIP method is a more global and packaged form of 
technology transfer there are reasons to believe that it is an ideal 
method for those countries such as Algeria who lack local technological 
capital. It coincides with the needs of NEs since the foreign party is 
contractually obliged to execute all the contracts elements in a 
simultaneous manner. 
Apart from the forementioned elements, the discharge given to the 
foreign partner is not carried out only once but rather in many times 
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according to a contractually agreed timetable. In other words, the 
cost of installations and the method of payments are fixed at the time 
of signing the contract, and where payments are not anticipated for 
arbitrary dates, but according to a calender essentially based on the 
appreciated production of a double of parameters - quality and 
quantity. The remuneration of the contract's price to the foreign 
contracting party was in many cases indexed to: 
(i) the smooth planning of, construction, the corm encement of 
production and its gearing up; 
(ii) the quantities of production reached from one year to the 
next at a contractually fixed dates; 
(iii) the qualities of production according to the contractually 
agreed dates; 
(iv) the insertion of the Algerian personnel trained by the 
foreign partner - in the running of the constructed plant. 
The indexation of payments based on the above parameters is not 
opposed to the preliminary fixation of payment at the time of signing 
contracts. Such indexation is designed to provide more guarantees for 
the contracting national enterprise and at the same time to give the 
foreign partner an incentive to meet the contractual comnittments. 
Otherwise the payment . suffers a proportional. -penalty for the noted 
difference. Conversely if the production or the difference is on the 
positive side, the foreign partners receive above the anticipated 
amount, a supplementary payment as a reward for better and faster 
production[461. 
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The foregoing committments required from foreign companies and the 
indexation method of payments meant that the number of offers by 
foreign firms for this new contractual form was limited in many cases. 
Generally speaking, foreign firms have manifested their opposition to 
the "plant in production" method, which may suggest that the method is 
not advantageous or attractive to them[471. 
Despite the inherited common grounds: language, habits of 
consumption and work, as well as France's financial aid to Algeria in 
the 1960's decade, French firms found it most hard to compete for 
contracts of this type: 
"Faced with this type of contract, the French industrialists 
have several objections. 
To start with, the duration of the operation by which an 
enterprise provides services and supplies equipments must 
be prolonged. An average of 3 to 5 years is required to 
gear up production in an industrial plant in the mechanical 
industry. In addition, the functions of the French enter- 
prise are modified. The enterprise does not only proceed 
in installing equipments, but also train the manpower which 
will run the plant at a profit rate and qualities identical 
to those obtained*by the French factories"[48] 
Apart from these reasons which concern the French firms themselves 
such as their capabilities of coming to terms with the responsibilities 
which PIP implies (i. e. to iirw bilize their own personnel to run the 
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plant for a period between 2-3 years after construction). There is 
also a certain lack of enthusiasm in their relation with the Algerian 
national enterprises[49]. 
The introduction of "plant in production" was first sought for the 
construction of the Engine and Tractor Complex at Constantine 150] 
though the contract was first signed as a turnkey contract in 1969 with 
the West German firm DEUICH INDUSTRIEAN LAGEN GESELLSCHFT "DIAG" [51] 
DIAG has manifested the desire and the capacity to coordinate six 
different licensors, preceeded by the traditional reputation of West 
Germany, it went on to penetrate the Algerian mechanical and electrical 
engineering industries [52]. So why was DIAG the first to show its 
willingness to accept this new method while other firms hadreserved 
their position and anticipated that industrialization through 
integration is risky? The reasons could be attributed, on one hand to 
the fact that DIAG is a state controlled company and receives a 
substantial financial loan from the West German Government. Thus the 
acceptance of the new contractual conditions and rules may have been 
politically motivated. On the other hand, DIAG's technical capacity in 
the field of mechanics is enormous. It managed to round-up and 
coordinate more than six licensors in the context of executing plant in 
production contracts. It has in particular obtained the collaboration 
of other West German firms (i. e. KLDDCKNER HU BOLDT--DEUrZ and KLARS), 
in the realization of important industrial projects [53]" 
The method plant in production rests on four major elements - 
apart from those already included in turnkey methods: 
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1. the initial management of the plant or the dualistic 
structure of management, 
2. the training of Algerian personnel (in plant and abroad 
training),, 
3. Guarantee of the result - production -; and 
4. Acquisation of technology. 
FIRST: THE INITIAL MANAGE ELEMENT 
Initial mangenent is an essential and fundamental element of plant 
in production contracts and for the functioning of the industrial 
units. It is designed that plants can function normally under Algerian 
personnel when they are finally delivered to NEs. In principle the 
duration of such management is two years, but sometimes it reaches up 
to 4 years under the entire responsibility of the foreign contracting 
party. He is required to dispatch, place his own personnel and 
supervisory staff to manage the plant which he has built 154]. 
The human resource of the foreign contracting party is doubled by 
that of the national enterprise. Often the contract requires that for 
each member of the foreign team, there should be an Algerian from the 
conerned NE. The advantage of this dualistic structure of management 
is to ensure the progressive transfer of the management of the plant, 
and where the tasks incumbent by the foreign firm's team are 
progressively transfered to the hands of Algerians. Therefore this 
allows the latter to substitute rapidly and effectively the former. Th 
this extent, the dualistic structure is in fact an in-plant training of 
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the NE's future management team and where such team is put face to face 
with the different aspects of running the plant and possible 
implications. 
Bearing in mind the different backgrounds of the two teams, 
conflicts and difficulties are bound to occur. However, the structure 
is extremely important and capital to the final reception of the plant, 
not because of its duration but rather because it is a channel for 
acquiring knowledge. The goal to be obtained from initial management, 
is a complementary practical training which will be added to the 
Algerian team's theoretical training. The advantage of such a system 
can only be multiple: (i) it is considered as a period in which the 
delay in the experimentation for the national personnel, who have been 
deprived of all industrial experience is shortened and reduced; (ii) it 
provides the NE at the end of the initial management with operational 
personnel theoretically and practically trained which will ensure the 
functioning of the plant, and (iii) it is equally appreciated to put 
two unequal teams - technologically - side by side, one foreign and the 
other Algerian. The former is contractually required to train and 
advise the latter and transfer to him his show-how and know-how. Thus, 
it is the best possible way for acquiring management techniques which 
are as important as the installed means of production. 
However, the dualistic management has its own drawbacks. First of 
all there is the inadequacy between the national and the foreign team. 
Has the foreign partner provided a personnel psychologically prepared 
to transmit their knowledge to the nationsal team? Or has the NE 
provided a quality personnel capable of receiving the transmitted 
knowledge? 
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Despite all the precautions taken by the two contracting parties, 
the weaknesses of the structure have been manifested in the enormous 
difficulties which foreign teams find in transmitting their knowledge to 
the personnel of NEs in a comparatively short period. Such short period 
requires a personnel well qualified theoretically in order to absorb the 
practical aspects. 
Since the national team is contractually under the responsibility of 
the foreign team during the initial management and since the personnel of 
the former is evolved under the control of the latter, it has been noted 
that foreign teams have attempted to ruin any Algerian personnel with 
strong character and to place those with weak character in positions of 
heavy responsibilities. Such practices have caused certain conflicts 
between the foreign partners and the NEs. 
SECOND: Manpower training 
The training of pesonnel is one of the intrinsic conditions of the 
plant in production contract and without doubt was the major element 
which has influenced the Algerian planners to initiate this method of 
contracts in the first place. The significance of manpower training is 
justified by the spread of industrial development which has created more 
numerous and more varied opportunities for employment. Furthermore, these 
jobs are not only of a technical industrial nature, but by their number 
and diversity also create a constantly increasing demand for staff and 
qualified manpower in other fields. The level of qualification of 
manpower have not kept pace with the level of sophistication of the means 
of production. 
7 
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Despite the increase in the number of national institutions for 
training and accumulating, the actual number of trained manpower remains 
lagging behind the required number for the production means[55]. The 
following table shows the gap between what the economy requires and. what 
the combined training institutions can provide: - 
Table 5.1: The Algerian Economy Requirements for Manpower 
1970-1977 
Managers Technicians Workers(1) 
and and and 
Executives Supervisors qualified 
agents 
Requirements of the Economy 67,140 94,000 243,000 
Estimated personnel to be 60,180 48,680 232,030 
trained 
Actual personnel trained 48,940 27,950 169,040 
Technical Assistance 14,200 1,500 3,400 
Absolute deficit (including 32,400 67,550 77,960 
technical assistance) 
Deficit (without technical 18,200 66,050 74,560 
assistance) 
(1) Excluding the Agriculture Sector 
Source: Ministere de la Planification et de 1'Amenagement du Territoire 
(1980) "Synthese du Billan Economique et Social de la Decennie 1967-1978" 
MAI p. 172 
Under the contractual clauses of the plant in production method the 
foreign, contracting partner is required to train an Algerian personnel in 
sufficient numbers capable of rapidly substituting his own personnel when 
the plant is finally delivered to NEs. Thus the foreign partner is 
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required to start the training of manpower to function the plant which he 
is contracted to realize. Judicially speaking, this form of training can 
be called an integrated technical assistance which responds to the 
following two conditions: unqiueness of the source of technical 
assistance, and the uniqueness of the judicial instrument. These two 
conditions are exclusively connected with the plant in production 
contracts[56]. 
Manpower training takes place either in Algeria - in plant training 
- or abroad in the contractor's plants. 
(A) Internal training: the first operation which the foreign partner is 
required to execute concerns the construction of a training centre called 
"workshop school" "Atelier ecole" -a sort of technical college - inside 
the same plant which he is contructing. The centre must be an identical 
copy in its equipment, machinery and functioning of the future industrial 
plant. The trainees are required to make parts, which will be in 
principle destined to the production at a very high level of integration 
identical to that of the plant. Each centre must contain specific 
training for different categories of manpower under the responsibility of 
the contractor's personnel in order to have a corresponding technical 
capacity to that required by the plant. The obligation to train and 
prepare the different manpower categories, confer to the foreign 
contractor the right to recruit, select and orient the trainees during 
the phase of realization. Such a right stems from the undeniably 
importance of training and its impact on the responsibility for the whole 
operation. 
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Besides the training, the centre is also designed to familiarize the 
trainees with machines, thus overcoming the eventual frustration and 
giving them a sense of responsibility before the production stage. 
Equally it facilitates the promotion of trainees from one category to 
another. However, the training duration is a central question and raises 
many further questions(571. Firstly it is doubtful whether a qualified 
manpower could be trained in 12 months and whether such training can fill 
the required condition for the success of industrialization. 
Furthermore, can this form of accelerated training substitute for 
universities in the long term. 
(B) External training: As internal training is often limited to 
subordinate manpower, skilled manpower is massively sent abroad. The 
trainees are -directed to the industrial units of contractor who is 
required under the provisions of the contract to train highly skilled 
manpower in his own plants (i. e. managers, executives, engineers, 
supervisory agents and certain specialists such as ironwork, smelting 
work, thermic treatment)[58]. 
Both internal and external training are maintained by a considerable 
financial effort which, represents up to 10 percent of the contract's 
value (see Table 5.2). Such figures show the significance which national 
enterprises attach to acquiring technological capital through 
training [59]. 
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Nature of the expenditure Cost % 
Cost of establishment 33 050 000 6% 
Engineering 2 900 000 0.5% 
Land and infrastructure 29 500 000 5.4% 
Building and civil engineering 91 141 000 16.6% 
Equipment, mobile, & transferable 187 392 000 34.1% 
materials 
Customs and taxes 83 137 000 15.1% 
Building and erection 7 300 000 1.3% 
Patents and licenses 3 304 000 0.6% 
Tool-stock 30 000 000 5.5% 
Technical assistance 26 696 000 4.9% 
Manpower training 50 463 000 } 10% 
Training centre 4 438 000 
TOTAL 549 321 000 (1) 100 
(1) The cost of the complex was estimated to be 960 000 000 dinars in 
another document, see Ministere de 1'Industrie et de 1'Energie, "Couts et 
surcouts de 1' industrialization en Algeria: le cas de la mechanique" 
Alger, Fevrier 1975, p. 37. 
Source: Ministere de 1'Industrie et de 1'Energie, couts et surcouts de 
l'industrialization" Alger (Non-dated document) p. 25. 
The combined cost of training and the training centre in table 5.2 
is more likely to be 96 million dinarsl601 rather than the shown 54.9 
million dinars. This is due to the fact that as in many other cases, the 
actual invested sum of money is often the double if not the triple of the 
planned investment. 
The inclusion of training as an essential element in technology 
contracts by the Algerian was a necessity supported by several reasons: 
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(1) despite the intense efforts in the field of training, the spectacular 
development of different economic sectors, the proliferation of new 
techniques have created a demand for training always higher and larger in 
terms of quality and quantity(61]. 
(2) The diversity of technological processes being used in industrial 
sectors at the same time was also a cause of difficulty. It rendered 
technical training of manpower more complex due to the option of very 
advanced technologies chosen by Algeria. 
(3) The possibility to dispose of qualified manpower, notably the 
requirement of modern technology have created numerous difficulties such 
as the utilization and maintenance of certain systems and 
(4) technical assistance provied in contracts other than plant in 
production is more often limited to the erection of industrial units and 
the start-up operation. Therefore this leaves the national enterprises 
with an additional technological burden, in the sense that their own 
personnel can not really participate in the running of the unit and 
forcing NEs to the recourse more and more to technical assistance to run 
the plant. 
Thus, the element of training in plant in production contracts aims 
at easing the pressure on the training institutions by providing the new 
installations with their own personnel. More important, these new 
installations will have a personnel trained on the same technological 
processes which training institutions may not be able to provide. 
The principal obligation of the foreign partner-the delivery of an 
industrial plant - exercise a major influence on the extent of his 
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contractual responsibilites. Such obligation consists of four elements: 
delay, quality, quantity and the rate of integration. The coexistence of 
these closely connected and reciprocally influenced elements appear to 
contain certain contradictions and where the examination of one element 
may forceably include the others. 
(1) The delay in the realization of industrial units: The agreed delay 
period depends on the importance and the scale of the project, and the 
maximum allowed delay run-up to 5 years. The 5 year maximum delay is 
based on a principle which has a profound significance and ambiguous 
interpretation. Profound significance, because the delay in the 
realization of industrial project is tied to the political project - the 
will of transforming the Algerian society. The latter suffers the 
consequences whenever the former is prolonged, since the latter is 
nothing but 'several technical projects executed by the national 
enterprises and other economic agents. 
Ambiguous, because each of the contracting parties has his proper 
interpretation of the contractually fixed delay. The examination of the 
delay in relation to NEs shows on one hand that the fixed delay is an 
option of buying rapid industrialization. Thus it obliges the foreign 
partner to execute promptly the industrial projects in order that the 
plan's objectives are realized. On the other hand, it is implicitly 
considered as a means of pressure on the foreign partner, in order that 
the latter carries-out the works in accordance with the terms of 
contract. 
In contrast, the assessment of delay in relation to the foreign 
partner reveals that the primordial reason for him is to avoid sanctions 
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if the realization of the project was delayed. The result of this 
equivocal interpretation is that the fixed delay appears to have been 
used as a means which materialize in practice by a hurried work method 
where mistakes and malpractices find their origin. 
(2) The quantity and quality elements: The contract's result - final 
delivery - is equally based on the capacity to produce a fixed quantity 
and quality of products. It seems that this contractual requirement is 
delicate to execute in practice, since no harmony appears to exist 
between the three elements: delay, quantity and quality which are 
conceived in an incoherent manner. If NEs need is to -acquire the 
quantity of production, it is improbable that the fixed delay will be 
observed and that the quality be of the same nature as in the 
industrialized countries. If the priority is given to obtaining quality, 
the fixed delay may be exceeded and the quantity may not be reached. 
Further, if the element of delay is accorded the priority, both the 
quantity and quality would have to suffer. It seems that a success in 
the three elements at the end of the 5 year period is quite impossible to 
obtain and as a consequence a priority choice is imposed. 
The question of delay in the present context is not a determining 
factor except in dividing financial responsibilities among the two 
partners; a delineation between the financial responsibilities of NEs and 
their foreign partners. To my mind the pursuit of the element qualaity 
is a false solution at least in a short term. If the volume of 
production and the quality of the trained personnel are left to be as 
desired, the quality of the product can later be obtained. The 
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observation of the fixed delay in the context of Algeria, is in many 
cases, a disguise of future breakdown of the constructed plants caused by 
the malpractices and mistakes during the hurried realization in order 
that the timetable for the final delivery can be met. 
As far as these three elements are concerned the method plant in 
production attempts to obtain results which are obtainable in the 
industrialized countries in twice the fixed 5 year delay period and that 
has proven to be too ambitious to obtain. 
(3) The rate of integration: National enterprises incorporate in their 
products a rate of integration comparatively superior to that which 
exists in the industrialized countries. Such high level of product 
integration is fundamental in the negotiations of plant in production 
contracts. Before we assess the implications of such a strong rate of 
integration we need to define what is meant by rate of integration. 
Under the terms of the contract "PIP", the constructed ' plant must 
manufacture products with a minimum of 70% local integration from the 
start-up operation. The foreign partner is required to provide in the 
same industrial complex for the manufacturing of subset products, even 
when those subset products are not manufactured in their own plants. The 
plants of NEs fabricate all the mechanical parts in accordance with a 
list provided for in the contract. When the listed parts are produced, 
the proportion of local productions is considered to be reached. The 
limit for reaching such level of integration is the same as that of the 
final delivery of the plant. 
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A second level of integration consists of local sub-contracting. A 
catalogue of mechanical parts which the constructor is obliged to buy 
from Algeria. Such catalogue is only minimum and liable to extension 
whenever the required parts for the plants become locally produced. 
Theoretically, this is based on the import monopoly power of NEs which 
allows them to block the importation of those parts which are locally 
produced. 
The two fractions of integration-plant and local sub-contracting - 
constitute the national rate of integration. At the present the latter 
has not reached the 100% mark. In fact, mechanical parts which are 
neither produced by the constructed plant, nor by the other NFs due to 
the actual state of the Algerian industry continue to be imported. Their, 
importation -is taken as a temporary complementary measure until other 
industrial branches progress. It is certain that the 70% rate of 
integration required by the national enterprises is comparatively higher 
than that applied by certain foreign firms. For example, the French car 
company Renault requires only a rate of 50%. However a comparison of 
this type is quite misleading, since the higher rate in the case of the 
Algerian enterprises is designed to substitute for the lack of national 
sub-contracting, which is in contrast completely the opposite for foreign 
firms where sub-contracting to firms in their own countries is availabe. 
The significance of the high rate of integration in the plant in 
production method is fundamentally politically motivated. It is 
explained in two ways: on one hand it shows the constant concern of the 
Algerian authorities to liberate the national economy from foreign 
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dependence. On the other hand, it is a manifestation of the will to 
industrialize through the production locally of at least 70% of the final 
product. 
The effects of the rate of integration are hoped to place NEs in a 
position where they will not have to maintain any connection with 
international sub-contracting, and thus to escape external pressure with 
regards to spare parts. However, it is imprudent to think, at least in 
the short term that NEs can escape external subordination, for reasons of 
their increasing development which necessitate a constant recourse to 
multinational corporations. Nonetheless, the high level of integration 
or method of independence can materialize for the long term, which is 
probably what the Algerian planners have in mind as an objective. 
Finally, the NEs by choosing a high rate of integration search to 
make industrial plants function at full capacity to provide supplies for 
each other. The implicit objective of such a policy is to stimulate the 
creation of more jobs. 
FOURTH: The acau; sat-; on of technol As it was explained in Chapter 
four, the acquisation of technology in the experience of Algeria is not 
based on the mere acquisation of codified technology (i. e patents, 
licenses etc. ), but more significantly on the training of manpower to 
understand and put such codified technology into useful application. For 
example, the cost of licenses and patents in the Constantine's Engine and 
Tractors complex was only 0.6 percent of the total cost. while the cost 
of training was 10 percent, or sixteen times the cost of patents and 
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licenses (see table 5.2 above). This is not to mean that patents do not 
play a siginificant role in the technology acquisation policy of Algeria. 
On the contrary the Planning Ministry has calculated that for the 1973 
alone, 200 million dollars had been spent on patents, know-bows and 
engineering. Such a figure when compared with 1500 million dollars spent 
by the other developing for the same year on the acquisation of 
technology from the industrialized countries, shows that the share of 
Algeria was 15%, and that can either mean that Algeria is buying more 
technology or paying more than the other developing countries(62]. 
Both propositions can be held true, since on one hand, industrial 
investment efforts in Algeria are higher than any other developing 
country. On the other hand, the high cost is attributed to other factors 
such as the option of advanced technology and the methods of its 
acquisation which resulted on a heavy relying on technical assistance. 
More recent information indicates that the combined cost of patents, 
licenses and manpower training represented only 20% of the whole cost of 
the foreign technical assitance between 1973-1978[631. The tasks of 
technical assistance in Algeria are numerous, and cover all the aspects 
of Algeria's industrialization from feasibility studies and even beyond 
the production phase in the form of maintenance and repairs intervention 
(see ANNEX 5: 6). These additional factors certainly generate a higher 
cost than in other developing countries. 
Under the method turnkey contracts, Algeria reached the conclusion 
that the acquisation of machines and licenses, though essential for the 
fabrication of products - was a false illusion of technology transfer, 
r 
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and that technological capital was more vital, if its industrialization 
policy was to succeed. Such technological capital lies in the close 
relationship between men and machinery which develops only through a very 
large long-drawn-out process. The introduction of plant in production 
contracts was specifically designed to deal with such relationship and at 
the same time attempting to shorten the process. 
Despite the fact that certain parts of know-how have been condified, 
it remains attached to the behaviour of experts and technicians. 
Accordingly, it is difficult to transfer information whether written or 
verbally without a concrete work and more commitment from the know-how 
supplier, which is translated in the case of Algeria into a contractual 
obligation. In the framework of national enterprises, the plant in 
production method provides the following types of know-how. First, the 
contractor provides the following types of know-how for the functioning 
of the plant. Each plant is equiped by its own training centre and the 
personnel of the constructor is contractually responsible for the 
training of the national personnel, and to teach them the practical 
conducts to adopt the necessary precautions. The outcome of this 
coupling is the oral transmission of experience conceived abroad, which 
completes the acquisation of equipment. Simultaneously, and at least 
theoretically it allows the national enterprises to utilize with an 
optimum, the techniques of their plants and to ensure their technological 
autonomy. 
The second is the know-how concerning the management of industrial 
plants, which is relatively easy to transfer. Since the initial 
management, in its dualistic form, backs the NEs personnel and works 
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towards this objective, it is forseable that the industrial units 
transferred under the plant in production contracts will probably be 
managed in the long term according to the same methods and rules as 
applied in the industrialized countries. 
No one can doubt the impact of. plant in production contracts on NEs 
which have applied it. It succeded in transferring a variably important 
technological content. The main cause for such a desirable impact'is 
that the foreign partner is contractually obliged to produce products by 
the means, of his own inventions or those which he gathered for the 
benefit of NEs, to proceed in the execution of certain unknown techniques 
in Algeria, and to assist through the intermidiary of his own personnel 
in the acquisation of such techniques. 
It is yet premature to appreciate the full impact of plant in 
production "PIP"-contracts which seem to be favourable to the case of 
Algeria. Nonetheless and even when it seems to have an impact at the 
technical level, it has not solved the immense problems of technology 
transfer. It is certain that the application of the plant in production 
contract depends solely on the foreign partner who is given the entire 
freedom for the realization of the project. Since the foreign partner is 
in fact a coordinator or representative of several firms it is quite 
impossible to list all the difficulties and drawbacks. But nonetheless, 
we can establish a certain negative aspect common to all the plant 
realized under this contractual form. 
(1) The plant in production is a method of exclusion for the concerned 
national enterprise. After the signing of the contract, the foreign 
partner becomes responsible for all the phases (conception, realization, 
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start-up and the period of initial management). These phases take place 
under his unique responsibility, and therefore excluding national 
enterprises from all the following operations, which are conducted under 
the authority of the foreign partner alone: 
- He is responsible for engineering works, and he establishes all the 
necessary plans and documents for the creation of the industrial 
plant; 
- He proceeds in the definite laying out of site including secondary 
installations and annexes; 
- He determines what are the proper machines, equipments and workshops 
for the plant; 
- He buys and transports the necessary equipments by his own proper 
services; 
- He sets up the installations and proceeds in the start-up operation 
by his own experts and technicians; 
- He organizes and coordinates all the elements of the plant; 
- He selects, trains either in Algeria or in his factories abroad 
of all the categories of personnel. 
These stages though limited in their number, hardly indicate the 
participation of NEs in the realization of their future industrial units. 
The compensation for allowing all the decisions to be taken by the 
foreign partner consist of the guarantee that the result will be obtained 
regardless of the difficulties faced by the foreign contracting party. 
However, such guarantee of the result can be negative if the control has 
not been exercised by the NE from the start of the industrial operation. 
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The problem which is imposed here is, to whose interest are the decisions 
taken? Certain personnel of NEs insisted that the materialization of 
industrial units is concluded in the interest of the foreign party. Many 
other foreign experts share the same view, which is in a sense logical 
and it would be unwise to expect otherwise. others maintain that the 
interests are balanced. 
Whatever the appreciation of interests, the effective control by the 
foreign partner and the absence of control from the client NE has created 
problems from the beginning in matters of technology acquisation, 
especially in the field of plant erection. It is true that the NEs 
through their consulting engineers have the right to check the 
installations, but such right remains limited since it is exercised only 
after the completion of the erection. Moreover, no Algerian personnel is 
integrated in the realization process. It would have been far better for 
the Nes to have attempted to acquire the techniques of the setting up of 
equipment and machinery rather than to claim being the master of the 
plant once it is being realized. 
(2) The plant in production method is an illusion. It delegates power to 
the foreign partner to realize the industrial paradise of the NEs. 
Contractually, it requires a party to the contract to do what the other 
cannot do for himself. This vision contains an illusion; the illusion is 
the result of the vision of those who ignore the mobility of 
multinationals and instinct action of imitation. The illusion grabed by 
the individual when'he assesses that the plant is physically similar to 
that existing in France or West Germany for example, function in an 
identical manner to that in the industrialized countries. 
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No foreign company can guarantee the industrial well-being of 
someone else, even when it's under constraint of contractual clauses. 
What is the significance of a contractual clause in a completely 
disadvantageous climate which ignores all the processes of industrial 
realization? What is the significance of penalty caluses, when the cost 
for such penalties is anticipated in advance and included in the 
contract's cost. Those guarantees, no matter how important cannot 
compensate for the lack of control and the capacity to intervene in the 
realization of industrial units. 
(3) The method plant in production appears to have negatively affected 
the national personnel. It is in particular the high qualified category 
which* feel unhappy about the method. Such feeling is caused by certain 
contractual provisions of the plant in production. Firstly, certain 
personnel of NEs have complained that considerable power and means are 
available to the foreign partner to dissuade the Algerian personnel of 
all negative critiques of his work. -Such a power is derived from the 
fact that the foreign partner grades the national personnel during the 
realization stage. He is also responsible for their selection and 
awarding of the different functioning posts in the plant. He proposes 
the training and the promotion. Thus to oppose him or even to notify 
errors may not be that easy from the national personnel because of fear 
of retaliation which would effect their future in the plant. 
The second is intrinsically to the plant in production method which 
does not imply at all the personnel of NEs in the success of the plant. 
Therefore, a number of personnel feel that the success of the plant does 
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not really depend on their commitments and that the method isolates them 
from start to finish. The extent of such feeling have led to the refusal 
of responsibility as a reaction against a situation of exclusion. In 
order for the nationsal personnel to take interest in the realization 
process, such personnel instead of having their action objectively 
limited by PIP should be given the initiative. 
The third cause relates to another section of the personnel which 
are easily contented from the signing of the contract assigning a foreign 
firm to construct an industrial unit in the country. Such section, 
comfortably find a feeling of satisfaction in the contract, a feeling 
arising from the sense that the result of the industrial operation is 
assured; Thus, mainfesting too much confidence in the foreign partner. 
(4) The method plant in production is costly. It can be said that this 
contractual form makes the cost of investment heavier. However, when one 
takes into account the advantages, which unlike the other contractual 
forms make sure that the industrial units can be effectively operational 
at the time when they are handed over the the Algerian personnel. For 
such an assurance, the method embodies an element of overcost. It is th 
eprice paid by Algeria for ensuring the industrial security of its 
industrial projects. The proponents of the system argue that one cannot 
accept on one hand the system for the security it offers and on the other 
hand criticize it for its consequences. 
But is the cost really high? At first, it appears to be so, when 
compared with other forms of contracts, in particular turnkey contracts. 
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However, the facts are different since the deviations or faults 
separating the cost of the two contractual forms consist first of all of 
the fact that a plant in production contracts contain allowances and 
supplies which are not included in turnkey contracts. The former 
includes supplementary supply of spare parts, certain raw materials, and 
above all a more comprehensive commitment concerning the training of 
production and management personnel which gives rise to complementary 
payments. The question to be asked is whether or not the supplementary 
payments included in the plant in production contracts are economized in 
the turnkey method. Certainly this is not so, because they are simply 
the subject. of additional contracts. The only difference to be seen is 
that under the plant in production, the foreign contracting party assumes 
the responsibility of the results which are left to the national 
enterprise under turnkey contracts. 
One also must bear in mind that the foreign contracting party, under 
the constraint of delays of the realization tends to increase his price 
and includes a marginal price to cover risks of delay and sub-contracting 
in particular to national enterprises. He also tends to favour supplies 
from his own country without due regard to the price offered by firms 
from other countries. He is likely to take financial precautions against 
inflation and other unknown factors when formulating the global cost of 
contract. In return the NEs is legally protected by a contractual 
guarantee situated between 5 and 10 percent of the contract's cost in 
cases of delay, malpractices, non-functioning, non-performance as well as 
the quality and quantity of both products and trained personnel. 
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Despite the guarantee of the result, the cost of the plant in 
production contract remains excessively high. It is estimated by certain 
experts that for the cost of each plant in production contract, three 
turnkey contracts can be provided. To show the excessive cost, the 
Ministry of Industry and Energy, estimated that the cost of building an 
identical complex in France to the ENGINE and TRACTORS Complex at 
CONSTPNTINE would amount only to 273 300 000 dinars. Or third of the 
cost if one takes the actual investment in the Constantine Complex and 
half the cost if we only consider the planned cost (Compare Table 5: 3 to 
5: 2). 
The comparison between the two tables shows that in every 
expenditure, the foreign partner has charged the NE more, particularly in 
technical assistance, equipment, building and civil engineering. The 
only exceptions are to be found in the cost of (i) patents and licenses 
which is twice the cost in table 5: 3; (ii) the cost of building and 
erection which would have been three times the amount had the plant been 
erected in France; This is due to low labour costs in Algeria as compared 
to France, and (iii) The cost of engineering including feasibility 
studies is also six times higher in Table 5: 3. However, the low cost of 
engineering in Algeria is a tactical strategy used by the foreign firms 
to get attention to their bids for contracts. For, example, in the 
phosphate fertilizers complex at Annaba (a turnkey contract), the 
Ministry of Industry and Energy found that the French firm KREBS has 
included in its bill 8 278 000 dinars for the services of engineering, 
while in fact the expenditure was at least' 25 000 000 dinars 1641. This 
does not signify that foreign firms are voluntarily prepared to provide 
engineering services at a lower price in order to obtain contracts, since 
such cost is concealed in the other expenditures. 
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TABLE 5: 3: Estimated Cost of an Indentical Complex to the ENGINE 
AID TRACI'ORS CCMPLIX AT CONSSTANrINE 
(Constructed in France) (Cost in Algerian Dinars) 
Nature of the expenditure Cost % 
Cost of establishment 28 000 000 10.25 
Engineering 20 000 000 7.30 
Land and infrastructure 9 000 000 3.30 
Building and Civil Engineering 45 000 000 16.45 
Equipments 130 000 000 47.55 
Building and Erection 25 000 000 9.15 
Tool-Stock 6 500 000 2.40 
Patent and licenses 3 300 000 1.20 
Technical Assistance and Training 6 500 000 2.40. 
TOM 273 300 000 100% 
Source: Ministere de 1'Industries et de 1'Fergie "couts surcouts de 
1'Industrialization" op. cit. p26. 
Whether or not the guarantee of the result can justify the high cost 
of plant in production contracts is a matter still open to debate in 
Algeria. However, one apparent thing is that, the method appears to have 
limited international competition and confined it to a restricted number 
of large firms. The method, by the nature of its obligations is 
exclusively reserved for multinationals. To confine all the tasks of 
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realization and functioning of the plant (i. e. engineering and training 
etc) to a single contracting party seems to pose multiplying questions to 
the foreign firms competing for contracts. It has discouraged small and 
medium size firms who may have a high level of technological competence 
in certain industrial sectors. These firms may not be in a position to 
respond to the requirements of the plant in production contracts, for 
gathering the necessary civil engineering and training of personnel, let 
alone the capacity to coordinate the activities of up to six firms. Even 
the large firms who accept the requirements of this contractual form, 
practice sub-contracting at a very high level (mostly from companies of 
the same origin). 
There is no doubt that the global cost of plant in production can be 
reduced if only a more positive role can be found for the national 
enterprises, especially in the negotiations between the foreign 
contracting party and sub-contractos in matters of equipment and 
machinery prices as well as other services. Until Algeria acquires the 
necessary technological capital, I favour the option of paying a slightly 
increased price for a plant in production contract rather than to end up 
with all the hazards left to INEs by the mentod of turnkey which could 
turn the whole industrial project to a disastrous failure. The problem 
here is not the choice between the two contractual forms, but to what 
extent each of the contractual forms will make it possible for the 
Algerian enterprises to replicate the plant. In other words to reproduce 
the imported technology in a new plant by own means. 
To sum-up, the plant in production method converts an obligation of 
means into an obligation of results, and that the marginal price for the 
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assumed risks is not an arbitrary one if it was coupled with more 
provisions allowing for the participation of the NEs. Due to the 
technological incapability of national enterprises, the marginal price is 
a part of negotiations process which the NEs cannot do without at the 
present time. 
(5) The plant in production contract is a packaged form of technology 
acquisation, and as such it implies technological dependence. Regardless 
of the contractual method, technological dependence already exists in two 
forms: (i) The need to import technology (i. e. machines and licenses) 
though commonly traded in the industrialized economies, it remains in the 
case of Algeria and for sometime to come a one way traffic; and (ii) 
Algeria as a developing country with no technological capital need to 
import the ability to utilize and apply the imported technology (i. e. 
consultant services and technical assistance). 
The existing technological dependence when tied to plant in 
production contracts produces a double dependence. First, the training 
of manpower and the initial management furnish the basis for the 
beginning of a durable technological dependence. Cn one hand, national 
technicians and personnel are subjugated to foreign firms, to its nehtods 
of action and reaction, and more largely to the occasion of the training 
abroad, or what can be called the "Western way of life". On the other 
hand foreign firms do not hide the fact of implicitly using the training 
to exclude competitors. 
"For us, the training is nothing but the tuning on the 
machineries. Thus, it would be a pity if we do not provide 
it, because it helps us selling our products. The higher 
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the training is, the more expensive and elaborate machineries 
we sell. By training people we sensitize them to our norms, 
which later makes it easier for them to turn to us rather than 
to our competitors" [65] 
Moreover, the training, a vital question and central to development seems 
to be insufficient and inadquate. The personnel seems to. have knowledge 
of functioning the machines without being able to face serious incidents. 
In other words, their training is limited just to the functioning of the 
plant and to assure its production. 
Second, the engineering department "Bureau d' etudes" which is the 
brain of all innovations and modifications of products and processes. It 
can be called the national enterprise's specific technological knowledge, 
or the ability to use general technological knowledge in developing and 
operating specific industrial activities[661. Engineering departments are 
almost non-existent and without structure, and at the present time they 
represent no more than a belt of transmission of the foreign partner's 
engineering to the NEs. Their present position does not allow them to 
contribute towards innovation, which inevitably leads the foreign firms 
to continue to be the technology supplier to NEs and remain the master of 
technological innovation. Since engineering- is weak within the context 
of NEs, the accumulation of the construction experience belongs to the 
recruited foreign technical assistance hired from foreign firms. It is 
likely that the information of the experience will be relayed back to 
their own firms to be used in R&D activities. In other terms, the 
relying on foreign engineering provides the concerned foreign firms with 
a free channel for the technical knowledge gained from the Algerian 
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experience. Such knowledge then becomes centralized and monopolized, and 
sold back to the NEs reproducing technological dependency. 
The lack of strong engineering can be explained on one hand by the 
hazards resulting from the realization, and on the other hand, from the 
fact that no priority is given to engineering in the plant in production 
contracts[67]. It is only during the present Five Year Plan 1980-84 that 
engineering is given the place it deservest681. One of the factors 
contributing to the lack of interest in engineering is the fact that the 
foreign contracting party in the plant in production contracts is 
required to communicate to the NEs the technological innovation he 
applied in the plant. 
In return the NE shall not, for ten years from the start of 
production, modify the products manufacturered under license nor disclose 
the technical details of the plant and its processes except with the 
prior consent of the foreign partner. From the few contracts I was able 
to see, this restriction applies even to other national enterprises. 
This means that the same process or technical information can be bought 
by different NEs from the same technology supplier. 
In reality the question of technological innovation cannot be faced 
in the first decade of the plant. The intensity of this question will be 
faced when the ten years period expires. From then on, the existence of 
a well structured engineering department becomes a necessity, in order 
that it might bring changes to the product's characteristics. It is 
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almost certain that the engineering departments of NEs cannot fill such a 
task, neither at the present time nor in the near future. It follows 
that the NE cannot possibly know about the technological changes 
concerning its products. Thus, they would be forced to conclude 
technolgical contracts with the same contractor who had accumulated the 
experience, in order that its products will not be out-dated. In this 
sense, the continuity of technological dependence is assured, since on 
one hand the NE is assured of new inventions. On the other hand, the 
foreign partner is guaranteed that the products of NE are not modified 
outside his own technological circuit. 
Zoo conclude, the plant in production contract, ties the national 
enterprise technologically to the foreign partner for a longer period. 
Also it appears that, too much confidence is being placed on the foreign 
partners. In my view, there are limits to what the foreign partner can 
and cannot transfer to NEs. In principle, technological. elements written 
or physical do not suffer from any limitations except: (i) When the 
technological element belongs to the contractor, it is doubtful whether 
he will be prepared to transfer such an element; (ii) Certain 
technological elements may belong only to one or two multinationals. 
These elements constitute an element of power and negotiations and their 
transfer is unlikely. 
Another element of continuous technological dependency, which the 
plant in production totally ignores, relates to the question of spare 
parts [69]" The problem is not of supply, since the supply of spare parts 
is guaranteed for at least two years after the plant comes into operation 
by the foreign partner. However, this relates to the fact that 
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the national personnel are trained to acquire the knowledge of the 
external functioning of machines which they operate and not the knowledge 
of the composition of machines and especially their inner functioning. 
In other words, foreign partners are contractually required to transfer 
the technology concerning the production of one articel (i. e. the 
fabrication of tractor) but not the technology concerning the imported 
machines which produce the tractor. As a result the NEs continue to be 
dependent on the foreign partners for their spare parts and their 
technical assistance in cases of breakdown and even maintenance. 
4. Mixte Enterprises 
Since foreign investment is interested in financial return, Algeria 
had decided in its early stages of development to do without direct 
private foreign investment. And thus, has transferred to the newly 
created state-owned companies the full responsibilities and all the risks 
of its industrial future. Such policy was outlined by the late President 
Boumediere in 1968 as follows: 
"We cannot, at any time, collaborate with the exploiting foreign 
capital. Any other position would mean poverty and destitution. 
We have undergone in this field, an experience that ended in a 
failure, because the foreign capital, despite the facilities and 
guarantees that were granted to it could not rid itself of its 
two effects: exploitation and fear. [.... ] 
This is why in the light of our experience, we have founded our 
policy on a strict cooperation with the foreign partners who accept 
it within. the framework of our fundamental options and revolutionary 
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orientations [.... ] Therefore, the foreign capital can only play a 
complementary role, according to clearly defined conditions that 
inhibits it from exploiting our country's economy[70]. 
A striking example of Algeria's refusal to cooperate with direct foreign 
private investment, unless the conditions'are acceptable to Algeria, is 
the Airanonia and Ammonium Nitrate Complex at ARZEW(71]. The complex was 
originally sought to be realized in association between SONATPACH and the 
French company, the Societe Nationale des Petroles d'Aquitaire "SNPA". 
However, the conditions required by the latter were considered to be 
outrageous by SONAMCH and thus it was rejected. 
Since independence, Algeria expressed the desire to install a 
petrochemical industry in the country. French companies in this field 
did not hide their opposition and put forward a less convincing argument 
based on: (1) world production of petrochemical products is already high 
and since the prospects in Algeria are very limited, Algeria could not 
possibly compete in this field with products from the industrialized 
countries, (2) the local market is too weak to absorb the output, and (3) 
there is a shortage of specialized manpower in Algeria and that could 
only increase the price of products. 
As soon as the decision to construct the Ammonia complex was made 
public, foreign firms in the field could not accept that such a plant 
could be constructed in Algeria without being under their control and 
management. At first, the representatives of teh office National des 
Industries de 1'Azole Francaise "ONIA" and the SISAL of France proposed. 
to the Algerian authorities the construction of the plant where the 
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capital whould be shared by SONATPACH on one hand and ONIA and SNREPAL on 
the other hand. Unfortunately the negotiations only confirmed the 
hegemonist intentions and attitudes of both ONIA and SNREPAL. Among 
other things, they required in particular that: (a) the Algerian 
Government would not authorise the construction of other similar plants 
without the prior consent of the two firms, (b) the proposed capacity 
should only be 400 tons a day rather than the 1000 tons advanced by 
Sonatrach. The French companies accepted the fact that the low 
production capacity would mean high prices for the products, but the 
representatives of the two firms suggested that such high prices could be 
supported by the Algerian agriculture; and (c) they also required that 
their monopoly over export and commercialization of products should be 
recognised, which means in practice the control and management of the 
enterprise(721. These proposals were rejected outright by SONATRACH. 
Once more, Algeria understood that it must count on its proper 
forces. Thus, after a precise technical and economical studies, 
SONATRACH launched the construction of the projectE731. These studies 
were jointly conducted by SONATRACH and SNPA, the latter has proposed to 
the former on April 6,1966, the setting up of an industrial pool in the 
ARZEW area which will include: an LNG complex with a capacity of 6 
billion cubic meters a year; an Ammonia plant (1,000,000 tons a year ; 
Ethyelene plant of 50,000 tons a year. To convince Sonatrach to launch 
such an industrial operation, the representative of SNPA indicated, that 
the preliminary studies conducted by its engineering services had arrived 
at the conclusion that such operation should provide excellent 
profitability, because of Algeria's rich hydrocarbon resources and its 
geographic situation put it in a position where it could provide 
petrochemical products at competitive prices. 
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Despite previous let-downs by French companies, SDNATRACH accepted 
in principle the launching of such operation, hoping that these companies 
might have finally understood that it was necessary to maintain a new era 
of cooperation with Algeria. SONATRACH'S hopes were suddenly swept away 
when, around the end of June 1967 and while both SONATRACH and SNPA were 
still conducting further economic and technical studies to determine the 
precise conditions for the realization of the industrial pool SNPA made 
it known that the realization of thee projects no longer interested it. 
To explain this decision SNPA put forward the following arguments: 
(1) The Algerian-French agreement on the sale of Algerian liquefied 
natural gas to France of June 15,1967, calls for the creation of a mixte 
enterprise between SONATRACH and ERAP (50% Capital participation for 
each) called SCt1ELCA Z, implicitly exclude SNPA from Gas liquefaction (741. 
(2) The SNPA is not specialized in Ammonia products; thus it seems 
preferable not to venture in this field which it does not know about. 
(3) The chosen production capacity for ethylene is very low and could 
only lead to higher prices. Moreover, world production of ethyelene is 
quite high and dumping prices are currently practised. 
The argument advanced by SNPA is no more than a pretext put in 
advance to explain the sudden withdrawl. The truth of the matter was 
that NSPA had decided not to collaborate anymore with SONATRACH, when it 
became apparent that the latter has decided to have majority capital 
participation in the mixte enterprise to be purposely created to run the 
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plant. As well as to keep the monopoly to commercialize the products 
within SONATRACH, the arguments put forward by SNPA could not be 
supported by other relating facts: (1) Certainly, the Algerian-French 
agreement on the sale of LNG to France calls for the creation of a mixte 
enterprise SCMELQAZ between SONATRACH and ERAP. Such agreement did 
neither explicitly nor implicitly exclude SNPA from gas liquefaction, 
since SNPA is no more than a subsidiary of ERAP and at that time the two 
firms had the same chairman. After all the two companies ERAP and SNPA 
could be classified, either as two sister companies with an identical 
interest or two distinct companies with totally different interests, 
depending on the argument one needs to develop. (2) If we were to believe 
SNPA that it was not specialized in ammnia products, how could the 
company explain: that it was originally responsible for suggesting in the 
first place to Sonatrach the construction of the ammonia and nitrate 
plant?; jointly conducted with Sonatrach the technical and economical 
studies? and even conducted its own studies before any initial discussion 
took place with Sonatrach. (3) Certainly the production capacity of 
50,000 tons of ethylene a year was relatively low but let us not forget 
that such capacity was calculated in accordance with the joint studies of 
which SNPA played a significant role. Moreover, it was the 
representative of SNPA who refused to consider seriously a higher 
production capacity, advocating the narrow local market and high 
production of ethylene worldwide. (4) If world production of ethylene 
was as high as SNPA claimed it to be, and had reached a level where 
dumping prices were practiced, how come that existing facts were 
indicating the opposite. First, the same company SNPA was at that time 
carrying a feasibility study for a petrochemical project in LibyaE751. 
5c . ord, E ? Z, the parent co=p any of SNPA was contem. plating to do:: ble the 
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production capacity of the steam-cracker of Feyzin in order to be able to 
produce ethylene from petrol. Third, the claim of dumping pricet761, is 
also contradicted by the fact the Companie Francaise de Raffinage and the 
companies SHOLVEN CHEMIS and CHEMISCHE WERKE HEILE had decided in 1968 to 
construct an important complex of polyethylene at the HavreI77]. 
Faced with these demands and lack of cooperation, Sonatrach decided 
to set-up the project without any private foreign investment at all. The 
foregoing manipulations by the French companies were by no means the only 
obstacles faced by SONATRACH in setting-up the an=nia and nitrate plant. 
To cover for its . financial handicap, Algeria submitted a request for a 
loan to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devlopment "IBRD". 
After the Bank's experts visited Algeria, the loan was refused on the 
grounds 
"that Algeria would first have to produce a contract of sale of 
the products to be manufactured by the plant, which at the time 
was considered too large for the need of Algeria, whereas once 
built solely with national financing, the same is not even 
sufficient to meet half of those needs" [79] . 
The Bank's attitude was seen by Algerian officials as a confirmation 
of being an instrument of the major powers which finance it, and designed 
to cause the failure of the country's socialist experiment. According to 
the Industries and Energy Minister, the articulated technical form of 
rejecting the request was a "profoundly disappointing and in many aspects 
dangerous"[80] and "discriminating" 1811. The truth is that the IBM 
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up to 1972 was unwilling to finance industrial projects in the public 
sector. The Bank's advice to Algeria was against setting up heavy 
industries, on the grounds that Algeria's need could be met by the 
already established capacities in the industrialized countries. A senior 
Algerian official said that the Bank did try to influence policies, but 
Algeria insisted that it could not be pushed around(821. 
Though the hostility of IBRD to financing the public sector played 
an mportant role, the refusal of the loan was mainly motivated in this 
case by Algeria's refusal of capital participation from the French firms. 
According to the Chairman of SONATRACH "The Bank refused to intervene if 
Algeria does not accept the foreign private participation" [831. The 
IBRD's objective was clear: to force Algeria to the allegiance towards 
capitalism, and to make it turn to private foreign capital for financing 
industrial projects[84]. However, the Bank's policy of not lending to 
Algeria had no effect either in forcing Algeria to change its industrial 
policy, or to accommodate private foreign investment[851. 
The lack of local technical capacity in particular, and foreign 
exchange in general, whatever the degree of mobilization, could not have 
assured the realization of industrial projects., As far as finance was 
concerned (in terms of foreign currency) Algeria's political stability 
and its oil and gas revenues have made many countries and financial 
institutions willing to lend it money[861. In any event, much of the 
public enterprises investment is financed by domestic saving and not more 
than 24% during 1975-1980 was foreign financing[87]. 
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As to the local technological capacity, Algeria resorted to the 
association with foreign firms. Such association was limited to certain 
industrial activities (i. e. drilling, engineering, plant's 
construction)(88] with at least 51% capital participation reserved to the 
national enterprises, "Whatever form retained, the investment share of 
the national enterprise SONATRACH must be at least 51%" [89] . Under the 
investment code of 1966[90], which consequently ignores the question of 
capital participation, foreign capital could either invest in industries 
or tourism[91], and all other fields were excluded from the application 
of the code. Although private capital, foreign or national can invest in 
both industries and tourism, this does not mean that it can enjoy a total 
freedom of intervention in these branches. The Code, under Article 2 
provides that "The initiative for effecting investment projects in vital 
sectors of the national economy belongs to the state and its dependent 
organisms"[92]. Even when the intervention of private capital does not 
involve the vital sectors, it is up to the Commission Nationale des 
Investissements established under Article 27 of the code, to decide on 
applications. 
In the context of Algeria, two types of mixte enterprises can be 
distiguished. First is the engineering enterprise. Any developing 
country which aims at obtaining the necessary technological capital can 
either establish its own engineering enterprises; such option requires an 
enormous qualified manpower which Algeria does not have at the present 
time. Or, to have an association with foreign engineering companies. In 
many cases, this mixed engineering enterprises are designed to compensate 
for the exclusion of national enterprises from participating in the 
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realization of industrial plants under both turnkey and plant in 
production contracts. The integration of the national teams with the 
foreign engineering teams aims at least to achieve what the initial 
management of plant in production has achieved. Nonetheless, the 
transfer of know-how can only be realized progressively and that such 
progressive transfer is only possible when there is a real participation 
in the conception and realization of industrial units by the two teams. 
It is doubtful whether foreign partners would really contribute to the 
development of their competitors. This form of mixed enterprises is by 
far the most practiced one in Algeria[931. 
The second is the production enterprises. Production enterprises 
can be considered as a step further towards technology transfer. It is 
based on the assumption that in return for the local market, raw material 
and human potential provided by. NEs, the foreign partner will be well 
placed to transfer his technological elements (patents, know-how, 
personnel and equipments). This form of mixed enterprises is used in 
particular by SONATRACH in the field of hydrocarbons (i. e ALFOR, ALGEO, 
ALFLUID, ALTEST) [94] . 
In practice, the recourse to joint ventures is a recognition of 
Algeria's technological incapability and a widening of dependency. The 
presence of the foreign firms as partners is because of their services 
and it is for this same reason, it is unlikely that these firms would 
allow the national personnel to master the technology being used in the 
joint venture. To do so is to contribute to their own disappearance. 
Accordingly foreign companies (almost all MNCs) are known to have used a 
342 
technique called double agreements. Under this there is an association 
agreement as well as a second agreement concerning patents, licenses and 
management. The latter agreement, through which technological assistance 
is provided, is drawn up in a manner where it would cease to exist in 
cases of a serious disagreement concerning the former. 
To sum-up, the contractual methods and their evolution confirm 
beyond any doubt, the weakening of any possibility of mastering the 
imported technologies. The evolution shows a clear crossing from one 
form to another, and where the tendency was as follows: - 
(a) A net increase of turnkey contracts during the first Four Years Plan 
1970-73, such an increase continued to rise and more than doubled in the 
second Four Years Plan 1974-1977, where it reached 59 contracts compared 
to 25 in the previous plan. This increase may not have happened had the 
national enterprises been able to persuade more foreign firms to be a 
party to the newly introduced plant in production form of contracts. As 
a result only one plant in production, contract was concluded in the 1st 
Four Year Plan and 16 in the 2nd Four Year Plan (See Annex 6: 8). 
(b) The tendency also shows a slight reduction in the number of supply 
and plant erection contracts from 33 contracts in the 1st Four Year Plan 
to 21 contracts in the second Four Year Plan. However, such reduction 
was expected, since equipment's supply and plant's erection are 
fundamental elements in both turnkey and plant in production contracts. 
As we cross from one contractual form to another, it becomes more 
evident that these forms are a clear manifestation of neutralizing the 
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potential qualified manpower (see Annex 6: 10). The evolution of 
contracts shows that it is in fact opposed to the declared technological 
policy of Algeria. Such policy, as we have seen in chapter four1951, 
assumes that the building of industrial units and the coping with 
innumerable problems arising through the construction will in the end 
provide the quickest most dependable way of acquiring technological 
know-how and inventiveness which are the true components of technological 
capital. But how can such technological capital be acquired, when the 
national manpower is excluded by virtue of turnkey and plant in 
production contracts from the phase of construction? It is true that a 
significant number of industrial projects have been realized during the 
period 1967-1979, reaching a total of 459 projects (see Annex 6: 9). But 
the intervention of the realization of these projects is very limited 
(Annex 6: 10). Despite the enormous efforts and investments by Algeria, 
the country does not actually have a single team which is capable of 
reconstructing anyone of the industrial units already realized1961 (as in 
the end of 1978). 
To acquire technological capital, a high level degree of 
coordination and intersectional harmonization is necessary, and can only 
be assured by an effective cooperation of national economic agents in 
unitarian coherent framework. It also calls for the setting-up of an 
institutional framework, which would develop mechanisms allowing for the 
establishment of firm and best conditions for the framing of relations 
and negotiations with foreign firms. At the present time, the icak of a 
clear policy of accumulation of experiences and the lack of an 
institutional framework have contributed significantly to the existing 
problems. 
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The policy is also based on the assumption that mistakes in the 
management of projects and production units, however costly they maybe, 
steer the national enterprises towards the core of technological 
difficulty and enable them by relying on national means to break down the 
technology into components which are easier to grasp. Once it is broken 
down into its components, the term technology - so frightening at the 
outset - is reduced fro factory workers to a certain number of clear and 
attainable objectives (97]. The transfer of technology does not consist 
only of the purchase of patents and licenses. Such purchase corresponds, 
at most, to the right to understand, but not to use the technology. A 
patent document, which may be sufficiently clear to an experienced 
manufacturer is of no practical use to the national enterprises who has 
then to spend yet more money and sign more contracts in order to obtain 
technical assistance, skilled personnel, and know-how. Dqually, the 
transfer of technology does not mean the mere physical transfer of 
industrial plants as they exist in the industrialized countries, which 
turnkey contracts attempt to achieve. 
Any real transfer of technology ought to include (i) production and 
maintenance know-how, (ii) managerial organization and plant expansion 
know-how, and (iii) product design and innovation know-how. Certainly to 
acquire such necessary know-how is a very long term objective of Algeria, 
it cannot be developed'or acquired within a prefixed period of time as 
the history of the industrialized countries shows. From all the 
contractual forms, the plant in production - though not without criticism 
- is the only form so far which comes close to any real technology 
transfer. Although this method is costly and long, it seems to be the 
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only possible way for Algeria of breaking into the technological world 
and for which the efforts involved cannot be shifted to anyone else. As 
to its cost, in the long run the price paid for acquiring the technology 
embodied in it will be sum total of costs accumulated through the 
process. If used sensibly, plant in production method would have a more 
positive impact than it had so far. If an Algerian team could co-exist 
with a foreign team during the initial management, it is possible that 
when the former takes charge of the plant, another team would replace it. 
In other terms, the trained management team, while running the plant, 
could at the same time train another team. The same would apply to the 
"workshop school" provided under the plant in production contracts. 
However, the usefulness of this approach may be limited to the same 
industrial branch or branches using the same machinery and technologies. 
Equally, it would reduce the massive sending of Algerian trainees to the 
industrialized countries in connection with the signed contracts, which 
has not been efficient. It has neither been profitable in comparison 
with the committed expenditures, nor from the point of view of the 
training's content. Such training in the industrial units of the foreign 
contracting parties did not also help from the point of view, of the 
return of the trainees to Algeriat981 nor from the point of view of the 
conditions of the reinsertation of those trainees in the work which they 
have been trained for. Of course, trainees will continue to be sent 
aborad, but will have first to prove their capabilities during their 
initial training in Algeria. 
The question of participation in the realization of industrial units 
which is neglected in all the previous contractual forms remains a very 
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critical element to any possible acquisation of technology, can also be 
accommodated in the plant in production method. It can be, for example, 
enlarged to include a dualistic structure for the construction of 
industrial units, in the same manner as in the initial management. 
However, this suggestion apart from being costly, may not be accepted by 
foreign firms, particularly when industrial secrets are involved. This 
is the case when the foreign partner insists on the insertion of a clause 
in the contract prohibiting the client enterprise from carrying-out 
maintenance or adjustment, or to have systematic recourse to the 
technology lessor's personnel. Thus, even if the foreign firms were to 
accept such obligations, the training would possibly be extremely limited 
to defined techniques, so that the trainees are taught purely and simply 
to perform the necessary functions and thus remain tied to the services 
of the foreign partner when faced with serious challenges (i. e. 
breakdown). 
However, the question of participation in the construction stage may 
be more effective if the various tasks were to be contractually 
distributed among the partners(99]. The distribution of tasks may 
contain the following categories. First, a category of tasks reserved 
the NEs such as civil engineering, transport, organization of the plant, 
customs clearance of equipments and the training of junior staff and 
manpower. Certainly many enterprises will face difficulties in 
conducting these tasks, but temporarily they can call upon engineering 
services of other national enterprises, or foreign engineering firms, 
only when the former are not capable of conducting the assigned tasks. 
In this case, they can either call upon the services of the same partner, 
or preferably conclude a separate contract with another foreign 
engineering firm. 
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Second, a category of tasks reserved for the foreign partners, such 
as patents, licenses, know-how, technical assistance and the training of 
highly qualified personnel in their industrial factories. 
The third category of tasks may be accorded to both partners and 
include the negotiation and the buying of equipment and machinery. The 
joint negotiations would allow NEs to know the technology market, as well 
as to gain negotiation experience. The presence of NEs at the same 
negotiation table may contribute to reducing the cost of equipments and 
eliminate abuses which may occur in their absence with regards to 
equipment's costs. The two partners, may also select jointly the 
trainees who require further training abroad. 
The benefits of dividing the same contract between the two partners 
is that tasks can be moved from one category to another, depending on the 
capacity of the concerned NE in conducting these tasks. In this manner, 
NEs can acquire gradually all the necessary tasks for the realization of 
industrial projects. 
Finally, taking into account the evolution of contracts for the 
realization of industrial projects, the high level of investment in a 
relatively short period, the lack of local technological capacity, and 
the option of high technology, one cannot fail to come to the conclusion 
that instead of developing the local technological capacity Algeria was 
rather buying development. As a result, instead of decreasing 
technological dependence the country became more dependent on the 
services of foreign firms, especially technical assistance intervention 
to run or to repair the industrial plants constructed unde turnkey 
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contracts. At the present and for some time to come turnkey contracts, 
realistically should not have a place in the industrialization of 
Algeria, except in small scale projects. Equally, in attempting to 
acquire foreign technologies Algeria seems to have taken the other way 
around. In other terms, it might have been better if it had started with 
the more packaded form of technology - plant in production - and not the 
opposite (see Annex 6: 10). 
The Algerian technological dependency is mainly on the capitalist 
countries since the most noticeable trend of Algeria's policy of 
diversification of the source of supplies[100] is that such trend tends 
to stop at the frontiers of the capitalist countries. If we take the 
case of the light industries, for example, we will find that during the 
second Four Year Plan 1974-1977, the share of 11 firms from the socialist 
countries was no more than 362.27 million dinars or 1.58%, while the 
share of capitalist countries was 18657.64 million dinars or 81.52% of 
the total investment allocated for light industries and where the only 
sectors that the socialist countries have participated in were mining and 
steel[102] (see Annex 6: 11). This weak participation in the realization 
of Algeria's industrial projects is a result of Algeria's industrial 
policy on one hand, and on the other hand a direct result of the employed 
contractual forms. 
First, the Algerian industrial policy, which as explained before is 
subjected to a considerable degree of gambling. In this sense the 
proposed technologies by the socialist countries generally remains not up 
to the standard which Algerian set-up for itself. This situation can be 
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explained by the fact that in many industrial branches, the socialist 
countries themselve, continue to rely on the technologies of the 
capitalist countries. 
Second, the contractual forms. Enterprises from socialist counries 
appear to be always reticent and refuse, to commit themselves to the forms 
of contracts which Algeria required at different stages, in particular 
turnkey and plant in production contracts. They prefer a simple market 
for the sale of their services (i. e. technical assistance, equipment) 
which have no global responsibility at the end of the works. This is 
possibly the main reason for the decrease of their participation since 
1970, where 67% of signed contracts in the first 4 Year Plan 1970-73 were 
turnkey. 
Apart from the above two reasons, financing contracts also plays an 
effective role in weakening the position of enterprises from the 
socialist countries. Algeria's position as an oPEc country and a very 
good future prospects as one of the main suppliers of natural gas, place 
in in a better position than many other developing countries. Despite 
this fact, public enterprises rely on foreign capital for about one fifth 
of their investment [103]. Thus external financing can be a deciding 
factor in contract's negotiations. Unlike the capitalist countries, 
socialist countries do not support a 100% finance by foreign currencies. 
In particular they do not support finance covering the indirect foreign 
exchange contained in local expenditure and down-payments. ' Once again, 
as in certain technologies, the socialist countries also call upon the 
international finance market to satisfy their own need in foreign 
exchange. 
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As to the participation of developing countries, it seems at the 
present time, that they have no role within Algeria's technological 
policy. Much of the previous reasons apply here as well. 
The concentrtion by industrial branch and the concentration as a 
whole on the capitalist technologies leads to a concentration in the 
supply of technical assistance. This is partly because due to the fact 
that technical assistance is integrated in both turnkey and plant in 
production contracts [l04]" Also partly because the technology suppliers 
may not allow the national enterprises to recourse to services other than 
the particular supplier. 
Even in pure technical assistance contracts, 93% (in monetory 
values) was-shared by capitalist countries, of which 63% was held by four 
countries: France, USA, West Germany and Italy, between 1973-1978. While 
the share of socialist countries was only 4%[105]. 
Since the geographical diversification of technology and technical 
assistance are almost concentrated within the capitalist countries, it 
may not be that important after all. On one hand, the production of 
technology in the industrialized countries leads to the domination of one 
or more firms of an industrial branch world-wide. Thus the recourse to 
certain technologies is limited from the beginning. On the other hand, 
multinationals and non-multinational firms from the capitalist countries 
often tend to cooperate among themselves through a tacit sharing of 
markets. 
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Planification et de 1'Amenagement du Territoire (1980)" SYNTHESE DU BILAN 
Economique et Social de la Decennie 1967-1978" ANEP ROUIBA MAI 1980, 
pp320-345. 
[51 Ibid p326. 
[6] The result of gignatism projects and enterprises led the Governemnt 
of Chadli Bendjedid to set-up a national Committee under the chairmanship 
of the Planning and Regional Development Ministry, Decree 80-242 of 
October 4,1980. Among the principles adopted for the restructing of 
national enterprises is the principle limiting their size to a maximum of 
about 30,000 employees. See Ministere de la Planification. 
Restructuration des Enterprises" November 1980 (a document prepared by 
the Committee) . 
[7] Each ministry has its own procurements office and it is responsible 
for meeting its own requirements under the allocated budget. 
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[8] Public Law No. 78-02 of February 11,1978, concerning state monopoly 
of external trade (import and export). Journal Official de la Republique 
Algerienne (J. O. R. A. ) no. 7 (1978) ppl7l-175 Article 1. 
[9] Ibid, Article 3. 
[10] Ibid, Article 18 of the 1978 Public Law. See also credit LYON\IAIS 
International (1982) "La Reglementation Algerienne relative aux 
importation" Novembre 1982. 
[11] Ibid Article 22(a) Another exception to state monopoly concerns 
import permits which can be granted by the state to Algerian private 
companies for the importation or products if those products are not under 
the monopoly of any of the state agencies and only when those products 
concern production. In any case, no import permits shall be granted for 
importation of goods and their resale without any modification. Article 
22(b). 
[121 Ibid Article 2. 
[131 Ibid Article 9. 
[14] Those practices concern agents, mostly Algerians who set-up 
engineering consultant companies abroad and who used to work or have 
strong ties with public enterprises in Algeria in particular SONATRACH 
and later became agents for National enterprise; for example, the ex-vice 
chairman of SONATRCH Ait LABUSSINE who was accused of setting up a group 
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of experts in association with a responsible from the American company 
EL-PASO, which had a that time a big contract for the supply of Algerian 
ING. However, Ait Laoussine denies any association and claims that he 
only has his own consultant firm in Geneva. One can only ask from where 
he obtained the financial resources to set-up a consultant firm in 
Geneva. It is not difficult to see the connection between his last job 
in SONATRACH and his present situation. See Le Monde 10 Fevrier 1982 p5 
and 7-8 Mars 1982 p4. 
[15] All bids are governed by "Code des Marches Publics ordinance" no. 
65-182 of July 10,1965. 
[16] See Chapter 6 which follows. 
[17] F. O. B. "Free on board" and C. I. F. "Cost, insurance and freight" 
costs are reimbursable. 
[18] The non-existence of inflation clause, price escalation, training 
and comrodities prices makes the plant in production contracts by far the 
most costly form. 
[191 Equipment brought into Algeria by foreign firms for training 
purposes cannot be re-exported. 
[20] The Algerian obligations Law, provide under Article 18 of the "Code 
Civil" that contracts are governed by the Law of the place where it is 
signed unless the parties agreed otherwise. The table below shows the 
recourse to the national law and arbitration in 17 contracts: 
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APPLICATION LAW JURISDICTION TRIBUNAL ICCATION 
ALGERIAN LAW 11 International Chamber of Commerce GENEVA 4 
ENGLISH LAW 1 Arbitration 10 ALGIERS 2 
SWISS LAW 1 Ad-hoc Arbitration 2 ZURICH 2 
Custom & General Algerian Jurisdiction 3 LAUZANE 1 
principles 1 
English High Court 1 FDME 1 
Source: M. ISSAD (1976) "Les Techniques Juridiques dans les Accords de 
developpement Economique" in Droit International et Development: 
Collected Papers of an international Seminar held in Algiers 11-14 
October 1976. Published by the Office Des Publication. Universitaires, 
HYDRA, ALGER. 
[21] Although states in the industrialized countries protect and 
safeguard their companies rights from other states, abuse of dominant 
position is exercised in some sectors such as aviation and electronics. 
This domination is equal to that exercised over companies from the 
developing countries. The cause is the same: too wide technological gap. 
[22] See Kamel Bouguerra, Hubert Michel (1976) "Essai de develoPPpement 
par consomanation massive de technologies: Le cas de 1'Algerie" Annuaire 
de 1'Afrique du Nord. Vol. 15 pp123-134. 
[23] The investment share of the iron and steel branch in the 3 plans 
period 1967-1977 was as follows: 
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PLAN 
3 Years Plan (1967-69) 
1st 4 -Year Plan (1970-73) 
2nd 4 -Year Plan (1974-77) 
(A) in million of DA. 
ACTUAL INVESTMENT (A) PERCENTAGE (1) PERCENTAGE (2) 
935.0 19.0 39.1 
2885.8 13.9 26.2 
7416.7 10.0 19.4 
(1) percentage according to the total industrial investment. 
(2) percentage according to the total excluding hydrocarbon sector. 
[24] The idea to establish a steel complex in the region of Annaba goes 
back to 1957. In fact, in this same year the SERISAL: Societe d'Etude 
pour la Realization d'Installations Siderurgique en Algerie was created at 
the initiative of French steel companies including Usinor, De Wendel, 
Lorraine-Escaut. See A. GUESMI (1967) "Un complex siderurglque a 
El-Hadjar (Annaba)", memoire de these, Ecole Superieure de Commerce 
Universite d'Alger ppl-11. The chief instrument in heavy industry, the 
SNS, was set-up on September 3,1964. In 1964 the Societe Francaise 
d'Etudes d' Installations Siderurgiques SOFRESID was granted the contract 
for The civil engineering for the blast furnace plant. 
[25] The total amount of investment in El-Hadjar iron and steel complex 
from 1964-1975 was 4702 million Algerian Dinars compared to 2048 million 
dinars in other steel plants. However, this cost'of contracts is by no 
means the actual cost since it only represents the cost at that time when 
contracts were signed, and since it does not include technical assistance 
cost and other services. 
[26] The choice made by the Algerian authorities was for the rolling of 
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flat products, thus meeting the basic needs of the national economy and 
initiating a whole series of processing industries. The 650 m3 blast 
furnace can produce 1200 tons of cast iron per day for supplying the 
steel-works. The hot rolling mill can produce either heavy gauge sheet or 
steel coil. The cold rolling mill is essential for mass consumption 
steel. (See table 5: 3 contracts 1,2,5,6,8 and 9). 
[27] In 1969, the largest plant in the world for producing helically and 
electrically welded spiral pipes from steel coil with a capacity of . 100 
000 tons per year of large diameter pipes (up to 1.20ým) became 
operational, (Contract no. ý 7 Annex 5: 3). These pipes are mainly used for 
hydrocarbon piplines and water mains. The quality of the pipes was soon 
demonstrated as being the only one which stood to the rigorous start-up 
test without failure from all the pipes of the Hassi Messoud-Skikda oil 
pipeline. At the same time SNS has built a plant for the production of 
seamless pipe, and a wire and rod mill plant. The first is essential in 
the fields of petroleum, surveying, mining and hydraulic engineering 
whilst wire and rod are required in the building and civil engineering 
industries (contracts 12,13 and 11 respectively Annex 5: 31'. 
[28] In 1971, the SNS decided to increase production capcity to 2 million 
tons by 1977 involving a capital investment of 1500 million dinars 
(contract 11). 
[291 President Houari Boumediene May 1,1974. 
[30] Government of Algeria. ministere de la Planification et de 
1'Amenagement du Territoire (1980) "Pi xi r DE PLAN QUINQuENNAL, 1980-84" 
MAI (1980) pp423-42. 
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[31] More than 20 foreign firms were contracted to either supply 
equipments, or to erect plants, or for civil engineering work or 
feasibility studies or to provide technical assistance representing 8 
capitalist countries (France, Italy, UK, Japan,. Belgium, Austria, Sweden 
and West Germany) and only two socialist countries, USSR and East Germany 
(see table 5: 3) for details. 
[32] In certain turnkey contracts, if the concerned national enterprise is 
capable of doing part of the work or providing the services, that 
particular work of service is excluded from the turnkey contract; for 
example, the 1975 contract between SONATRACH and the French firm 
CREUSOr-LOIRE ENTREPRISE for the construction of Annaba's ammonia complex 
at a cost of 401 million DA which exclude general services (civil 
engineering) also the cement works of Constantine and Beni-Saf awarded to 
the same French firm at the cost of 450 m DA each and both excluded civil 
engineering. 
[33] For further details see L. Talha and others (1976) "Les strategies du 
matiers premieres au Maghreb" CNRS, Paris pp148-151, Kamel Bouguerra et 
Hubert Michel (1976) op cit. pp129-130. 
[34] DERSA (1981) "L'Algerie en Debat: Lutle et Developpement" Francois 
Malpro, Paris p96. 
(35] Petrochemical plants are concentrated in three Industrial pools: 
(1) Arzew's complex which comprises two ammonia and ammnium nitrate 
plants for the manufacture of nitrogen fertilizers, a methanol plant and 
resins plant; 
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(2) Annaba's complex which focusses on fertilizers, comprises an ammonia 
and ammonium nitrate plants -a duplication of ARZEW's second plant and a 
phosphate complex; and 
(3) The Skikda complex consists of a plant producing 120,000 tons a year 
of ethylene and another plant producing 35,000 tons a year of polyvinyl 
chloride (PCV). 
See Ministere de l'Information et de la culture: Visage de l'Algerie "Les 
Hydrocarbures" No. 15, pp72 74, for the list of contracts see Annex 5: 4. 
[36] See Skikda in Annex 5: 4. 
[37] World Bank (1982) "Algeria, the Five Year Development Plan and the 
Medium term prospects for 1980-1984" Vol. 2 June 25, p106. 
[38] P. JUDET; J. PERRIN (1971) "A propos du transfert des technllogies 
pour un programme integre de developpement industriel" Institut de 
Recherche Economique et de Planification, GRENOBLE Juin p24. 
[39] A turnkey contract is considered to be judicially fulfilled as soon 
as the start-up operation is successfully conducted. 
[40] See Annex 5: 6. 
[41] For training see "plant in production" contract. 
[421 Republique Algerienre Democratique et Populaire: Ministere de la 
Planification et de 1'Amenagement duterritoire (1980) "SUNTHESE DU BILAN 
EWNCMIQUE ET SOCIAL DE LA DECE NIE 1967-1978" Mar p311. 
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[43] Although no figure can be advanced for cases where final acceptance 
were signed without any test at all, I was told by an Algerian official 
that these are by no means rare. 
[44] "Produit en main" can either be called "Plant in production" or 
"run-in" or "product at hand" contracts. 
[45] By way of example, the foreign contracting party is not absolved from 
responsibility after the test of the quantitive parameters, but after the 
national enterprises check and make observations of such terms and 
references which they consider of special importance,. such as the overall 
functioning of industrial complex - not of subunits as in turnkey - or 
after the installations have been working for a fixed period of time under 
the NEs and local personnel whom the supplier is partially responsible for 
training-not after start-up tests-. In other words, the responsibility of 
foreign contracting parties under the "plant in production" method is not 
limited to the stage of realization or to the mere physical delivery of 
industrial plants. 
[46] The penalty system also applies in cases where there are dealys in 
the setting up of the industrial units, malpractices, the falling of 
production short of the indexed quality and quantity. In such cases the 
payment would be less than the agreed amount scheduled for such a period. 
[47] In the Franco-Arab seminar in Paris Juin 16,1975, organized by the 
Franco-Arab seminar chamber of commerce, the delegates of construction 
firms were either very reserved or frankly very hostile to the method 
"plant in production" Le Monde 11 Ocxtobre 1975 p30. 
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[48] DIMITRI GERMIDIS (1976) "Le Maghreb, la France et l'enjeu 
technologique" Editions Cujas p77, also see "les societes de service: un 
an apres le choc: Etude realisee par le Ministere de 1'Inudstrie et de la 
Recherche (France)" Enterprise no. 1019,21 Mars 1975; G. LAUZUN "Contract 
produit en trains attention, casse-coul" Les Informations no. 1558,24 Mars 
1975. 
[49] At the end of 1974, the ex-Algerian Minister for industry and energy 
declared: "Nous avons les impression que certain industriels Francais ne 
croit pas a nos projets ambilieux. "Ce scepticisme conduit a la 
temporisation. Beaucoup de projets ont ainsi ete manques, par les 
industriels Francais. Par example, it ne you lairent pas croire a notre 
usine d'engrais. Nous l'avons faite Nous-memes. meme chose pour le 
complex petrochimique de Skikda; meme chose pour le 1'usine de tracteurs 
de Constantine, Berliet a rattiape le train... " Les Informations no. 
1539-1540 du 23 Novembre 1974. 
[50] Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire; Ministere des 
Industries legres (1979) "Rapport Sur les problemes financieres de 
1'industrie socialiste" Volume 2 "Inflation et Financement du 
developpement" Premiere Partie: "les facteurs d'inflation en Algeir", 
November 1979. 
[51] The contract was signed in 1969 as a turnkey contract between 
SONACOME and DIAG and later in 1974, it was converted to a plant in 
production contract, at a cost of 535 million dinars. 
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[52] The penetration of the Algerian mechanical industry by the West 
German firm DIAG can be seen in terms of contracts awarded to foreign 
firms by SONACOME. Out of 11 contracts signed between 1969-1977 in this 
sector, DIAG was awarded 4 contracts while other firms were awarded no 
more than one contract. See Annex 5: 5. 
[53] The collaboration of the West German firms led by DIAG can also be 
seen in terms of the importance of the contracted industrial complexes. 
The Constantine's Engine and Tractors complex has an annual capacity of 
5,000 tractors, but in reality such a capacity was never reached. During 
my visit to the plant in the summer of 1981, I was told that the main 
causes for the low level of production were: (i) the high level of 
integration 70% which was consequently reached in 1979; (ii) the large 
scale of the project, (iii) the required high level of skilled manpower 
and (iv) technical problems concerning the second model of tractors, which 
was found not to be suitable for the Algerian soil. 
1541 The cost of such managements, though included in the contracts price 
remains a source of discomfort and dissatisfaction within the NE 
personnel. 
[55] The major national training institutions are: - 
(A) ROCARBON SDCrOR: 
L'Institut National des Hydrocarbures et de la Chemie (INHC) (National 
Hydrocarbon and Chemical Institute) created in coopertion with the higher 
education institutions of USSR. 
L'Institut Algerien du Petrol, dus Gaz, des Matiere Plastiques, et des 
Moteurs (IAP) (Algerian Institut for Petroleum, Gaz, Plastic Chemicals and 
]Engines) created in cooperation with IPF of France. 
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(B)Heavy Industry: 
L'Institut National pour les Mines, la Metallurgie, les Materiaux de 
construction Mecanique (IMA) National Institut for Mining, Metallurgy, 
Building Materials and Mechanical Engineering, established in cooperation 
with USSR. 
(C) Light Industry: 
L'Institut National des Industries logeres (INIL) National Light 
Industries Institute, maintains exchange relations with France, USA and 
USSR. 
(D) Industrial Develoinent: 
L' Institut National de la Productivite et du Developpement Industriel 
(INEPD) National Institute for Productivity and Industrial Dewvelopment, 
for advanced and industrial management training, and technical-economic 
studies. 
(E) Institut du Genie Mecanique (I(24) Mechanical Engineering Institute, 
set up in collaboration with France. 
(F) Institut pour 1'Electricite et 1'Electronique (IEE) Institute for 
Electricity and Electronic, build with the collaboration of USA inside the 
SONELDC complex at Tlemcen. 
Apart from the above mentioned institutes, 33 technological and education 
institutes were planned for the period 1967-1978, bnut only 12 of these 
were in fact realized. See Republic Algerienne (1980) SYNTHESE DU BILLAN, 
op cit. p163. 
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[56] See Chapter 6; and also see Mohamed Salem (1978) "Assistance 
Technique Industrielle: Modeles et Regimes Juridiques" in "Droit 
International et Devellopenment" published by the Organisme National de la 
Rocherche Scientifique et Institut de Droit de l'Universite D'Alger: CPU 
1978, op 249-266. 
[57] The duration of training in the centre differ according to the 
category: 
3-6 months for specialized workers; 
6-12 months for professional manpower; and 
about 2 years for supervisors. 
[58] The duration of training abroad is often 3 years. 
[59] For further details on the question of training see; Ministere de la 
Planification (1979) Annuaire Statistique de 1'Algerie op cit pp184-190; 
SYNTHESE DOBILAN (1980) op cit pp158-175 PROJET DE PLAN QUINQUENNAL 
1980-84 op cit 157-158. World Bank (1982) op cit pp5l-57, and table 11: 2 
p244; table 11: 3, p245 for cost of training. 
(601 The 96 million dinars constitute the 10% of 960 million dinars cost 
of the project see table 5: 2 (1). 
[61] HELGE HUEEM (1978) op cit p10. 
[62] A simple calculation shows that while Algeria represented 0.5% of the 
third world population in 1973, it consumed about 15% of the volume 
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of technology exported by the industrialized countries. In other terms, 
Algeria imported by inhabitant about 25 times more technology than in the 
other countries of the third world. See DARSA (1981) "L'Algerie en 
debate: luttes and developpement" FRAM IS MASPRO p98; DEMITRI GERMIDIS 
(1976) op cit p66. 
[63] Ministere de la Planification (1980) "SYNTHESE DU BILLAN" op cit 
p308. 
[64] Ministere de ]. 'Industrie et de ]. 'Energie "Couts et Surcouts de 
1'Industrialization" Alger p4 (non-dated document). 
[65] A survey of ACTIM, as cited by DERSA (1981) "L'Algerie en Debat" Op 
cit. P99. 
[66] Engineering or "Bureaux d'Etudes" is a strategic industrial activity. 
Except for separate contracts, it is solely reserved for foreign partners 
of NEs in turnkey contracts up to the start-up tests, and to the. final 
delivery in plant in proudction contracts. The influence of foreign 
partners through technical assistance is also felt heavily when plants are 
delivered to NEs due to the shortage of highly qualified personnel in this 
field. Engineering consists of five different phases: - 
(1) PRELIMINARY STUDIES: Concerns the choice of products, methods of 
production and the size of investment. These studies include market 
surveys, comparison between different production methods and their effect 
on the need. 
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(2) FEASIBILITY STUDIES: its aim is to determine precisely: production and 
products capacities; production processes; equipment and machinery 
investment; localization, size and employment. It requires a personnel 
with a well developed knowledge about existing machinery, potential 
suppliers and production methods. 
(3) SPECIFICATIONS: It is the phase where the selected alternatives are 
examined to determine what is needed to carry them out. To provide the 
basis for the bids that foreign firms or national enterprises will make. 
It is by far the most difficult phase, ' and requires very detailed 
technical knowledge about the existing alternatives and their eventual 
possibilities. 
(4) ORGANISATION AND CONTROL: This phase relates to the control of the 
time plan, construction and cost. It takes place during the construction 
process. 
(5) EVALUATION: It begins when industrial units are realized and in 
operation. Its main function is to correct mistakes, to analyze and 
evaluate experiences, and to examine the possibilities for extension. 
More important, it is the phase where experiences can be accumulated to be 
used in other projects. 
[67] Although engineering departments were created and developed with many 
national enterprises (i. e. SNS, SNMETU, SONALGAZ and sONATRACH), it was 
quite impossible to provide each NEs with its engineering department. The 
tasks of following industrial projects were given to the Societe Nationale 
D'EIUDE ET REALISATION INDUSTRIELLES "SNERI". 
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[681 The 1980-84 Plan calls for the creation of autonomous engineering 
departments within each industry rather than to have engineering tied to 
the structure of production enterprises. See Ministere de la 
Planification (1980) "PRQJET DE PLAN" op cit. p379. Many of these 
autonomous engineering departments have already been established as a 
result of the Comite National pour la Restructuration des Enterprises set 
up by Decree 80-242 October 4,1980, which is chaired by the Minister of 
Planning and drawn-up from 11 Ministries: Examples for this would be; 
- The Energy and Petrochemical Industry (e. g. SONATRACH), which now has 
its own Enterprise National d'Engineering, created in 1982 at Skikda. 
- S. N. E. R. I. was divided into 5 national enterprises in 1981: 
(1) National Enterprise for Engineering (At ALGIERS) 
(2) National Enterprise for technical installations (at BLIDA) 
(3) Three Regional Enterprises for Realization: Centre (ALGIERS), 
East (AN BA); and West (ORAN). 
- S. N. S: Three regional Engineering departments to beset up at' ALGIERS 
(1983), ORAN (1984), and JIJEL (1984). 
For further details and list of all the new engineering, enterprises and 
departments (established or to be established), consult Ministere de la 
Planification: Comite National Pour la Restructuration des Enterprises 
(1982) "Localisation des Sieges des Nouvelle Enterprises" Mars (1982). 
(69] The cost of`tne imported spare parts is quite considerable within the 
Algerian industries. It amounted to 5832.5 million dinars between 1967 
and 1978 excluding spare parts for transport and representing an average 
annual growth rate of 24. 
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1967 1970 1974 1978 Average Annual 
Growth Rate 
imports(') index imports index reports index importgAndex 1967-1978 
331.3 100 873.0 294 1347.3 407 3280.9 991 24 
(i) imports in Million Algerian Dinars. 
Source: World Bank (1982) op cit p260 table 12: 12. 
[70] Paul Balta et Claudine Rolleau (1978) "La Strategie de Boumediere" La 
Bibliotheque Arabe Sindbad, PARIS pp160-161. 
[71] See Annex 5: 4 and note 35 above. 
[72] Other firms, in particular Americans, advanced identical proposals. 
Six foreign firms responded to the 1965 tender; 3 Americans and 3 
Europeans. See El-Moudjahid of 30.9.1967. 
[731 The signal to start work was given by the Presiden Boumediene on 
Septeirber 28,1967. See EL-MOUWAHID 28.9.1967. 
[741 For a background and the negotiation of the Gas agreement between 
Algeria and France, see SONA'r Qj (1972) "La Politque petroliere de 
1'Algerie: Events, Etudes, Declarations" Tom e1 1965-1967 pp186-198, and 
E1-Moudjahid of 3.6.1967. 
[75] See El-Moudjahid of 17.10.1967. 
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[76] According to the Bulletin Industrial de Petrole no. 1139 of July 30, 
1968 the demand for ethylene and products derived from it did not seem to 
be weak. 
[77] Le Monde 30.9.1968. 
[78] The realization of the project was awarded to the French companies, 
TECHNIP and ENSA. The work-yard started on September 29,1967. The site 
of Arzew was chosen for the simple reason that there was an LNG plant 
functioning already (CAMEL) and a gas pipeline was also running. The 
project employed 2500 workers for the construction phase, and currently 
employs 360 production personnel. The training of manpower was also 
granted to Technip, which was required to train 300 nationals of which: 35 
were engineers, 35 supervisory staff and 230 qualified and specialized 
manpower. See El-Moudjabid of 28.7.1966; 19.10.1966,15.9.1967; 28.9.1967 
and 30.9.1967. Le Monde 29.7.1966,16.9.1967. 
[79] Democratic And Popular Republic of Algeria (1974) "Petroleum, Raw 
Materials and Development: Memorandum submitted by Algeria on the occasion 
of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly April 1974" 
published by SONATRACH para 58 p40. 
[801 Le Ministre de 1'Industrie et de 1'Energie, Le Monde 15.4.1968. 
[81] Le Ministre de Finances: EI-MOUDJAHID 11 octobre 1969. 
[82] See TERESA HAYTER "Bank's red Button-Hole" The Guardian. Friday 
11.11.1982. 
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[83] Sid-Ahmed Gosali, Le Monde 20 Juin 1970, M. MEKIDECHE (1980) "Le 
Secteur des Hydrocarbures: Quelle Contribution Au DEVELPPE1ENT ECONOMIQUE 
ET SOCIAL DE L'ALGERIE? " Revue TIERS-MONDE no. 83 (Speciale- Algerie) VOL 
XXI p520. 
[84] "Le capital prive etranger, auquel vent nous acculer la Bonque 
Mondiale, se presente comme un agent zele de la politique 
neo-colonialiste, qui consist pratiquement a vous retirer dune rain plus 
quelle ne vous a donne de lautre" El-Moudjahid 5.9.1967. 
[85] It is estimated that by the setting up of ammonia plant Algeria had 
in fact saved up to 150 million dinars which would otherwise be marked for 
fertilizers imports. E1-Moudjahid 28.9.1967. 
[861 Among the international financial institution who lent money to 
Algeria we find IBM which changed its policy after the arrival of 
McNamara as Chairman: For example, three loans of a total of 157 million 
dollars in July 1974: (1) A $70 m to help finance construction of a new 
$293 m port at Bothiona for the export of LNG; (2) A $49 m to assist in 
financing a $127.3 m railway rehabitation and modernization, and (3) A 
$38.5 m to help finance a power project involving the installation of 
three 40,000 KW gas turbine. The US Export-Inport Bank (Exiabank) has 
also been a prominent lender to Algeria. Its two biggest loans have been 
$240 million to Sonatrach for Arzew's second liquifaction plant LNG2 in 
1978. For further details on loans to'4lgeria- (Bilateral and 
multilateral) see; LLOYDS BANK LIMITED: Overseas Department Export 
promotion, International Aid Bulletin from -1970-1981; The World Bank 
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(1982) op cit., table 4: 1,4: 2, pp189-191; MIDDLE EAST DCONCMIC DIGEST 
(1978) [Special Feature Algeria] November 24, ppll-12; TAHPR BENHOURIA 
(1980) "L'Economie de l'Algerie" Francois Aaspro, PARIS for a detailed 
list of loans from France, Italy, West Germany, Japan, US, UK and their 
banks: pp 307-310. US Department of Commerce, Industry and Trade 
Administration, Foreign Economic Trends and their implications for the US: 
Algeria (Washington D. C. 1979) p2; Nicole Grimaud (1973) "les finance 
publique en Algerie" Maghreb-Macherek no. 65 p31. 
[87] The Algerian public enterprises rely on foreign financing for about 
one fourth and the rest is supplied from'domestic savings. Between the 
two, they are industrializing Algeria. The investment of the state 
enterprises between 1975-1980 was as follows: - (in million of dinars) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Total investment of 
public'Enterprises 16,739 23,652 31,757 40,519 40,178 38,135 
Long-term loans 8,251 11,981 18,095 23,886 24,455 25,554 
Short-term loans 2,846 3,811 4,535 2,418 1,171 1,352 
External Financing 5,642 7,861 9,127 14,215 14,552 11,229 
SOURCE: Ministere de Finance 
Ministere de la-Planification (1980) "SYNTHESE DU BILAN" op cit. 
for the period 1967-1978 Annexes IV: 12, IV: 13 pp274-275. 
The most important Algerian borrower is SONATRACH, which needs enormous 
amounts of capital to finance the construction of refineries, pipelines 
and liquid natural gas plant. For example, 34133 millions of dinars was 
borrowed by 90IATRACH during the period 1975-1980 or more than the half. 
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[881 See Annex 6: 7 for SONATRACH'S subsidiaries. 
[89] Ordonance no 71-22 du Avril 1971 Diffinissant le Cadre Bans lequel 
s'exerce l'activite de societes etrangeras dans le domaine de la Recherche 
et de l'exploitation des hydrocarbures lequides Articel 3, Journal 
Officiel du 13 Avril 1971 p366. 
[90] Ordonance no 66-284 du 15 September 1966 portant Code des 
Investissements. Journal official du 17 Sep 1966 p901. im vol(6) 1967 
pp92-99. 
[91] Ibid, Art. 4. 
[92] For further details on the Investment Code and the fundamental law 
for Hydrocarbons see, Nour-Eddine TERKI (1976) "Les Societes Etrangeres en 
Algeries" OFFICE DES PUBLICATIONS UNIVERSITARIFS pp148-187. 
[93] For example in The Steel Industry there are four mixte enterprises 
Genisider, Sidal, Realsider, Casider. See also note 88 above. 
[94] The machine-tools'complex at Constantine was for example realized by 
Alm which is a subsidiary of Sonacome 75% and Warner 25% (a subsidiary of 
DIAG). See also Kamel Bouguerra, Hibert Michel (1976) "Essai de 
developpement par consomation massive de Techinologie" Annuaire De 
L'Afrique du Nord Vol 15. 
(95] See Chapter 4 above. 
[96] Ministere de la Planification (1980) "SYNTHESE DU BILAN" op. cit 
p327. 
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[971 Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (1975) "Memorandum 
submitted by Algeria to the conference of Sovereigns and Heads of States 
of OPEC Member Countries": Annex IX The Acquisation of under-developed 
countries of the Techology needed for their development" MARCH 1975. 
[98] According to the Planning Ministry a substantial number of those 
trainees, often remain in the countries where they have been trained after 
their period of training comes to an end, representing a quite significant 
loss of trained manpower, see Ministere de la Planification "SYNTHESE DU 
BILAN" op cit p327. 
[99] The Ministry of Planning, in analyzing the period 1967-1978, 
concluded that a portion of the construction work must be conducted under 
an Algerian team responsibility. See "Bilan de Synthese" (1980) op cit. 
p327. 
[100] A major element of the development process of Algeria's industrial 
sector is carried out on the basis of diversification of technology 
supplies (See Annex 6: 3 for example). Such diversification, as Helge 
Hveem put it "was literally speaking oiled by the conflict with France 
during the 60's and early 70's". Helge Hveem (1978) op cit, p9. The 
examination of contracts concluded between 1967-1977 shows that the 
decrease of France's share of contracts from 60% in 1962-1966 to 33% in 
1974 (in monetary value terms) has been mainly to the benefit of other 
capitalist countries from Western Europe and North America. It also shows 
that despite the geographical diversification of technology supplies, such 
diversification appears only at the national level, but not at the level 
of industrial sectors; examples: 
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- French companies dominate the branches of petrochemicals, textiles, 
wood, and to less extent the construction materials industries. 
- West German firms have established a strong position in the mechanical 
and electrical engineering industries. 
- American firms occupy a dominating position in the gas liquefaction, 
wood, and electrical industries. 
(See Annexes 6: 3,6: 4,6: 5,6: 7 and 6: 11). 
[101] See Annex 6: 12 for detailed investment in the light industries 
during the second 4 Year Plan 1974-1977. 
[102] In the mining sector the participation of socialist countries was 
evident up to 1968 with 5 contracts amounting to about 400 million dinars. 
As far the steel industry is concerned see Annex 6: 3, plus the M'sila 
Aluminium plant which cost 1500 million dinars. 
(103] See note 87 above. 
[104] See Annex 6: 6 - Technical assistance as part of the transfer. 
[105] The cost of technical assistance between 1973-1978 (excluding 
integrated assistance) amounted to 28600 million dinars shared by France 
20%, USA 17.6%, West Germany 13.9%, Italy 11.7%, Japan, Canada, Belgium, 
UK, Switzerland, Netherland and Spain shared 30%, socialist countries 4%, 
and developing countries 3%. Ministere de la Planification (1980) 
"SYNTHESE DU BILAN" op. cit. pp307-309. 
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ANNEX 5: 2 
ME IMPORT' MONOPOLY ENTERPRISES IN TM 
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR IN M MIA 
ENTERPRISE 
SONATRACH: Societe Nationale de 
Transport et de Commercialisation 
des Hydrocarbures. 
FIELD OF MONOPOLY 
Responsible for exploitation, 
research, production, refining 
and marketing of oil and gas. 
Import monopoly for certain 
chemicals, petrochemicals, 
petroleum derivaties and petro- 
leum exploitation equipments. 
SNS: Societe Nationale de Siderurgie 
SONACOME: Societe Nationale Algerienne 
de Construction Mechaniques 
SONELEC: Societe Nationale de 
Fabrication et Montage du Material 
Electrique et Electionique 
Import monopoly on iron and steel 
products. 
Monopoly on imports of all sorts 
of mechanical equipments including 
cars, trucks, industrial vehicles 
and spare parts, machines, tools 
agricultural machinery and pumps. 
Monopoly on imports of electronic 
equipment, electrical wire and 
cables, generators, spark plugs, 
coin unication equipment, micro- 
phones, radio-telephones, trans- 
mitters and receivers. 
SDMC: Societe Nationale des Materieux monopoly on the production of de construction construction materials, and the 
importation of building materials 
of zinc, wire gauze, cement, 
bricks. 
SNIC: Societe Nationales des Industries Monopoly on the imports and the hemique production of chemical products. 
SNCdrEC: Societe Nationale de 
Commercialisation des Textiles 
Monopoly ixort on cotton thread 
yarn textile, shoes, skins and 
leather. 
SWrA: Societe Nationale des tabacs 
et des Allumettes 
Monopoly on imports & manufacture 
of tobacco products and matches. 
SOURCE: Collected from different sources in particular custom services. 
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ANNEX 5: 4 
BEY cxx 1crs IN THE AMERIAN PETIROCHEKICAL Il USfll 
(in million DA) 
INDUSTRIAL YEAR OF TYPE OF SUBJECT - MATTER FOREIGN COST 
ZONE CONTRACT CONTRACT OF THE CONTRACT PARTNER 
1967 TURNKEY AMMONIA & AMMONIUM TECHNIP (F) } 267 
NITRATE PLANT ENSA (F) 
1967 TURNKEY METHONOL PLANT HUMPHREY AND 36 
GLASGOW UK 
1967 TURNKEY RESINS PLANT ITALCONsum (1) 17 
1974 TURNKEY AMMONIA PLANT CREUSUIL-LOIRE 321 
(F) 
1974 TUPIZEY NITRATE FERTILIZERS KREBS (F) 116 
PLANT 
1969 TURNKEY PHOSPHATE FERTI- KREBS (F) 214 
LIZERS PLANT 
1974 TURNKEY NITRATE FERTILIZERS VOEST-ALPINE 116 
PLANT AUSTRIA 
1975 TURNKEY AMMONIA COMPLEX CREUSOT-LOIRE 401 
(F) 
1975 TURNKEY E'THYELENE PLANT TOKYO- 1 410 
PVC PLANT ENGINEERING 
CORPORATION & 
ITCH (JAPAN) 
1. Excluding general services. Source F. YACHIR (1980) op. cit pp683-4. 
ANNEX 5: 5 CONTRACTS ANAMED TO DIAG IN THE ME NICAL INDUSTRY 
YEAR TYPE OF CONTRACT SUBJECT MATTER SOIAOOME'S PAF ER COST 
1969 THEY converted Engine & Motors DIAG and KLOCKNER 552 into plant in Complex at Humboldt DEUTZ 
production Constantine 
1970 TURNKEY CYCLE & MOTORCYCLES DIAG, FICHTEL 89 
Complex at Guelma SACHSZWEIRADUNION 
1973 PLANT IN Agriculture Machinery DIAG AND RALAS 
PRODUCTION Complex at Bel-ABBEs 
MIXTE ENTERPRISE Machine Tools Complex AIMOW1W 129 
at Constantine 
(1) A* subsidiary of SONACOME 75% and FRITZ WARNER 25% which is a 
subsidiary of DIAG. Source: F-YACHIR (1980) op cit. p692. 
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ANNEX 5: 12 
SHARE CF CDUNITIES IN UIIE RF2LIZATICN (P INVESIM TP IN TM 
L, l IMXJSTRIES 1974 - 1977 
ORIGIN OF FIRMS AND EI ERPRISES 
SHARE 
(in millions 
dinars) 
of % 
NUMBER 
of 
COMPANIES 
ITALY 4499.19 19.66% 30 
FRANCE 4381.27 19.14% 83 
ALGERIA 3868.20 16.90% 191 
WEST GERMANY 3772.32 16.48% 53 
JAPAN 2218.19 9.69% 5 
BELGIUM 2039.56 8.91% 16 
SWITZERLAND 891.68 3.90% 18 
SPAIN 614.88 2.69% 9 
OTHER CAPITALIST COUNTRIES 240.32 1.05% 15 
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 362.27 1.58% 11 
TOM 22887.22 100.0% 431 
(1) Comprise firms from Sweden, UK, Austria, Canada, and USA, 4,4,1, 
3,3 firms respectively. 
(2) Include 11 companies from Hungary (4), Poland (2); China, Romania, 
USSR, East Germany, Bulgaria one company each. 
SOURCE: Ministere des Industries legeres: Deuxieme Plan Quadrienal 
1974-1977: Evolution des Engagements Contractuels des Entreprises 
Socialists sous Tutelle du Ministere des Industries legeres en Matieres 
d'Investissement Planifiee" Fevrier 1979. 
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CTIAPrER SIX 
ACASESTmDYCF TM 
AI RIAN GAS INDUSTRY 
Since October 12,1964, when the world's first commercial cargo 
of liquefied natural gas "LNG' was successfully delivered to Canvey 
Island in the United Kingdom from an Algerian liquefaction plant 
"CAMEL" at ARZEW, Algeria's policy towards gas liquefaction in 
particular and gas industry in general has proven to be more 
ambitious. The transfer of gas liquefaction technologies, which were 
at their early stages of development and were available only to few 
highly industrialized countries1l1, to a country with no industrial 
. 
history is the root of the difficulties which a transfer of this type 
has created in matters of technology acquisation. To set-up 
liquefaction plants, Algeria needed to import techniques and experts 
whose collaboration was necessary. These techniques concerned all 
activities and related to: techniques of construction and assembly; 
technological processes; know-how, equipment and management of 
production units. To plunge rapidly into the industrial world, 
through massive importation of advanced technologies and without being 
prepared for it cannot be done by the gnashing of teeth. 
A transfer along these lines has its success as well as its 
failure. Success, because the gas industry is now one of the greatest 
national assets and far more developed than that of potential gas 
producing countries, placing the country in a better position to meet 
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the projected growth of demand for natural gas. To export the 
country's proven recoverable gas reserves of nearly 3,000 billion 
cubic meters, the only available means was to liquefy it in order to 
get it to the consumer markets of West Europe and North America(21. 
It is mainly because of the heavy investment in gas liquefaction 
industry undertaken by Algeria in the 1970's that it is today able to 
withstand the worst effects of oil glut[3]. 
The 'gas industry occupies a strategic place in the economic 
development of Algeria, for it will be the mainstay of the economy 
when oil production run down. It is planned to become the country's 
main energy export and foreign exchange earner in this decade. Gas 
export (up to this moment in the form of LNG (February 1983) has 
already allowed the Algerian authorities to introduce a hydrocarbon 
conservation policy, especially oil. The policy is designed to assure 
adequate domestic supplies for the long term and to maintain a 
sustained growth of export volume over a longer period as well as the 
development of export altervatives to hydrocarbons. The decline in 
oil production and prices are being offset by the rise in gas prices, 
for which the Algerian authorities have dug in their heels to obtain a 
parity export between oil and gas. Such a rise enabled Algeria to 
absorb the downturn in export revenues from oil, better than many 
other oil producing countries, and not to curtail the 400 billion 
dinars (US $100 billion) expenditure allocated to the 1980-84 
development planE41. 
However, the overall success is not matched by an equal success 
in the field of technology transfer. If the former can be regarded as 
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a success, the latter can only be considered a failure. Taking into 
account Algeria's status of under-development, the major cause of such 
a failure can be attributed to the employed method for the transfer, 
namely the transfer in the form of turnkey plants. The transfer by 
means of turnkey plants, especially when it necessitates the 
calling-up on autonomous foreign engineering companies and experts not 
only, to construct industrial units but also to run them, is not an 
easy path f or the training of manpower. In other terms the 
technological problems being faced today in most of Algeria's 
liquefaction units have their roots in the method under which the 
technologies have been transferred. 
The technological difficulties of the gas industry can be 
. advanced as, a*total dependence on foreign technical assistance at the 
production level. The causes of such dependence are on one hand, the 
imported technologies do not only require a substantial amount of 
investment but are also very complex and capital intensive. On the 
other hand, the development of liquefaction units require highly 
qualified manpower, and their sophistication has made their mastery 
more and more arduous. As a result, Algeria had to resort to massive 
importation of technical assistance from a very limited number of 
multinationals "MNCs" whose supremacy is recognised world-wide. 
Unlike other industrial branches where the recourse to technical 
assistance of the same constructor or autonomous firms is in most 
cases limited to the realization of industrial projects, the gas 
industry relies heavily on the continuous existence of technical 
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assistance at the production stage. If, for example, all foreign 
experts were to leave the liquefaction units, the production of LNG 
will be brought to a standstill. The realization of production units 
under turnkey contracts can not give a sense of technology transfer 
unless the recipient enterprise has the necessary manpower to run the 
constructed units. Technology is not only the acquisation of licence, 
know-how and erection of production, but more significantly the 
acquisation of the undocumented knowledge concerning the functioning 
and the management of the imported technological elements. Thus, the 
rely on foreign technical assistance, in the case of the gas industry, 
has only served to mask the proper failure which is expressed by the 
high cost burden. 
." The cost'of technical assistance within the gas industry reached 
an unprecented level rendering the establishment of liquefaction units 
to no more than a waste of non-renewable resources, and an employment 
agent of foreign enterprise. In 1980 the Algerian Minister of Energy 
and Petrochemicals M. BELKACE14 NABI declared that the gas production 
for 1978 and 1979 was exchanged for the services of technical 
assistance. In other words, in these two years, the expenditure on 
technical assistance was equal to the revenue obtained from gas: 
"In 1978, we had exchanged men for gas. In other words, the 
Algerian gas revenues were equal to the expenditure on 
technical assistance. This is also true for 1979"151. 
The main concern of this chapter is the liquefaction unit at Arzew 
known as LNG1, which was the result of a contract for the supply of 
LNG to USA between the Algerian state owned oil company SONATRACH and 
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the US firm EL-PASO Corporation. However, first a brief summary of 
Algeria's gas installations and related difficulties will be given 
which would facilitate a better understanding of the problems of 
technology transfer within the industry. The transfer of advanced 
technology to a country with no industrial experience means that a 
country may financially be capable of buying the latest of equipments 
and process, but not the industrial knowledge and expertise, 
especially when they concern a monopolized technological field by few 
MKS. 
FR: LiouefaS ion plants. A liquefaction plant is the heart of any 
LNG project. Normally, it is located at the LNG loading port - either 
ARZEW or SKIKDA in the case of Algeria - and linked to the gas 
'Producing fields - Hassi R'Mel - by pipelines. The plant itself is 
concerned with the basic processes of gas purification and then 
liquefaction[6]. An LNG plant also requires a huge power station and 
cooling water facilities, as well as a loading harbour, which are an 
integrated part of any projected LNG plant. 
Unquestionably, Algeria has at present, at least in terms of 
seniority and number of launched projects, the more complete 
experience in the field of gas liquefaction. However, being the first 
in the field for a country with no industrial expereince is no remedy. 
As a result of neither being able to design or construct, nor manage 
the liquefaction units, the country had to face many difficulties and 
abuses by the foreign firms. 
391 
(A) THE CAMEL PLANT: (Now renamed GL4Z) 
CArlEL (Campagnie Algerienre de Methane Liquide), the world's 
first gas liquefaction plant was built with French and English 
capital (71. The foundation stone of the plant was laid on September 
14,1962 by BenBella, the Algerian President at that time. It is 
thought to have cost 31 million pounds[8]. The plant was constructed 
by TECHNIP (France) and PRITCHARD RHODES (UK). Using the French 
liquefaction system "Cascade", the plant was designed to liquefy 1.8 
billion cubic meters per yeart91. Two thirds of the output were 
allocated to British Gas Council (Canvey Island) for 15 years and the 
rest to Gaz de France (Le Havre) for 25 years (see Annex 6: 1 and 6: 2). 
Although the production started in 1964, the construction 
operation in fact ran into 2 years of delay and was not completed 
until 1966. Apart from some temporary problems between Algeria and 
France after the 1971 nationalization, the plant by any standard has 
been successful. Nonetheless, the formerly technologically leading 
installations are regarded today as being rather out of date. New 
facilities require 30% lower investment. At the end of 1979, there 
was a possibility that SONATRACH may shut down the plant due to the 
weaknesses of equipment. However, since the plant employs 474 
personnel [101, SONATRACH seems to have decided to replace the 
equipment. The decision may also have been influenced by the 
cancellation of LNG3 at Arzew. 
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(B) LNG SKIKDA (The first three production lines) 
Algeria's second liquefaction plant was completed in 1973, but 
things did not go as smoothly as in the Camel plant. The plant 
suffered considerably from technical difficulties after the French 
shares in the mixed company SCMELGAZ were taken over by SONATRACH[11]. 
The feasibility studies for the construction of the first three 
production lines started in 1966. Two firms competed for the bid to 
construct the plant: the West German firm MESSER, which proposed an 
intermediary system of liquefaction process, the classical "CASCADE" 
process, and the French firm TEAL - (grouping two French companies 
TEcHNIP and AIR LIQUIDE), which proposed an incorporated new "cascade" 
system called TEAL112]. The latter process was retained. 
The construction was awarded to TECHNIP under a turnkey contract, 
which sub-contracted the construction of the "heat exchanger" to TEAL, 
the "boiler" to STEIN who supplied it jointly with ROUBAUX (both 
French companies). A unique prototype turbine for the compression was 
constructed and supplied by CEM (France) and BBC (Switzerland). The 
installation and the supply of the alternators was sub-contracted to 
the West German firm AEG. Only the excavation works were 
sub-contracted to Algerians - (to the military civil engineering). As 
the contract was in the formlof a turnkey plant, TECHNIP was in charge 
of coordinating and supervising the works of the sub-contracted firms. 
(see Annex 6: 1). 
The, construction of the plant was not exempted from conflicts 
between the two contracting parties. Under the terms of the contract, 
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the delivery of each of the three production lines could only be made 
when at least 80 percent of the anticipated capacity is reached. The 
conflict rose when one of the production lines functioned at full 
capacity, but only for a short time. TECHNIP, considered its 
contractual responsibility as being absolved. The view of SONATRACH 
was that TE HNIP could not be released from its contractual obligation 
while certain weaknesses were still noticeable and where certain parts 
of the installations needed to be repaired. It threatened not to sign 
the documents absolving TECHNIP from any responsibility. This 
conflict brings to light the question of start-up tests. On one hand 
it shows the non-significance of these tests when they are carried out 
on subunits basis rather than on the whole installations as it is the 
case here. On the other hand, even if tests were carried out 
successfully, " problems could appear a long time after the final 
delivery of plants. Such a conflict can only prove the inconvenience 
of turnkey contracts and their application in a strategic and large 
scale industrial complexes by national enterprises who lack the 
technical capacity to check the abuses and mapractices which in many 
cases are disguised until the constructing firm's responsibility is 
absolved. 
When the plant went into production during the summer of 
1g72[13]ß it was the biggest and most modern plant of gas liquefaction 
in the world[14]. This technological advance explains the technical 
difficulties caused mainly by the introduction of the new liquefaction 
process and its incorporation to equipments supplied by different 
foreign firms. 
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"... This factory had known many misfortunes. Put into service 
in the summer of 1972, it broke down in December of the same 
year, due to troubles that occured in the compression system. 
After restarting the factory, it broke down once again in 
December 1973, as the heat exchangers were failing. Soon after 
it started functioning in February, the production was inter- 
rupted at a request of Sonatrach. Unexplainable marks of mercury 
were found in one of the production lines which had functioned 
the longest out of the three lines, and the Algerians were 
willing in this case to assert that it was not a matter of 
default in the manufacture" [15] . 
The technical difficulties which the plant had seen, provoked 
' delays in the supply of LNG to Gaz de France (®F). For example, in 
1978, ®F received only 2.55 billion m3, instead of the contracted 
volume of 3.7 billion m3, or about 73%. the 2.55 billion m3, 
represents in fact only 56.6% of the installed capacity of 4.5 billion 
m3. However, the anticipated capacity of the three production lines 
was fixed at about 80%, in order to satisfy the GDF contract[16]. 
The Skikda's liquefaction plant supplies about 15% of France's 
need of gas. Thus, as a result of the three production lines being 
put out of action in December 1973(171 and then the break down of the 
first line in February 1974(181, SONP, TRACH ordered the shut down of 
the whole plant. It led to speculation that Algeria may be purposely 
delaying the supply of gas in order to ask for a big increase in the 
price of, LNG. The shut down was originally planned 
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for the summer of 1974 in order to allow for the overhaul of the 
plant, and it coincided with labour disputes in the French coalmining 
industry. The cut in gas supplies caused power shortages, where the 
badly hit industries were fertilizers, petrochemicals and steel. To 
allow for industrial production to continue, the French Government 
introduced gas rationing measures[191. The speculation was also based 
on the report of TECHNIP's engineers who were sent to investigate the 
operating problems of the plant and reported that the two other 
production lines were in working order. As well as this, a delegation 
from ®F visited the plant and received no indication from Sonatrach 
of when supplies could be expected to be resumed. 
Although the overhauling of the plant, discovered traces of an 
' explainable-mercury in three proudction linest201, the shut down was 
seen not much as a coincidence, but rather as poker tactics employed 
by SONATRACH over the gas prices. The speculation may not be without 
foundation, since on one hand, a few months later, President 
Boumedienne called for a just financial remuneration for the huge 
investment in gas developments in his message to the Fourth Liquefied 
Natural Gas "LNG" Congress which concluded its four day meeting in 
Algiers on June 27,1974[21]. At the same time negotiations were 
underway between SONATRACH and several US gas distribution companies, 
where the former was seeking a 400% increase in the price of LNG. On 
the other hand, SONATRACH had infact cut supplies to EL-PASO in 
support of prices increase in 1980. The same tactics were employed in 
the negotiations with ENI of Italy, Algerian approved the trans 
mediterranean gas pipeline, which was completed in September 1981, but 
it did not settle a firm price until February 24,1983(22]. 
396 
The difficulties mentioned above may also have been the result of 
the shortage of qualified manpower to run the installed technologies. 
The efficiency of these sophisticated technologies was not proven 
prior to their introduction in Algeria and in some cases were not even 
mastered by the experts of the constructing firm. Thus, whenever a 
breakdown occurs in the plant SONATRACH calls directly upon the 
sub-contracted firms who are sometimes the donors of licenses instead 
of relying essentially on the services of TECHNIP[23]. 
When the plant went into service the exploitation was initially 
assured by Algerian personnel with A-levels (Baccalaureat) level of 
education and complementary technical training provided for by the 
contract. However, the advanced and complex technologies of gas 
' liquefaction called for a team of engineers and technicians of high 
skills which were not locally available and had to be hired directly 
from abroad. The majority of which were hired from the constructing 
firm TECHNIP, but on January 14,1979 SONATRACH concluded an agreement 
with Gaz de France, a technical assistance agreement under which the 
latter would supply the former with a hundred engineers and 
technicians to run the plantE241. 
(C) The Cancellation of the VALHYD PLAN[25I 
In the previous development plans, the development of industrial 
basis was placed by Algeria as a top priority[261. Although the 
present plan 1980-84 reflects a slowing down of investment in 
industrial projects, nonetheless the role assigned to industry remains 
397 
an essential one since the planned investment is 154.5 billion dinars 
(about US $40 billion), representing a share of 38.57%, compared with 
an actual share of 43.55% in the 1974-77 plan. However, the scheduled 
investment of 38.57% for the present plan may in fact be greater than 
anticipated. The causes of this overcost are multiple and include: 
lack of infrastructure, large scale projects, sophisticated 
technology, complex integration of production systems, complexity of 
the procedures which the executing agencies had to follow to obtain 
financing and to import the necessary equignent for projects, and 
above all, the shortage of qualified manpower which meant that workers 
and supervisors had to be trained during the construction of 
projects[27]. 
The review of the industrial situation, conducted in the first 
two years of the President Chadli Bendjedid's Government (1979 and 
1980) attributed the appearance of these problems and their 
exacerbation to two main factors. On one hand, the boom in 
hydrocarbon exports and revenues and an industrial investment beyond 
the physical capacity of the Algerian economy to accumulate capital, 
and, on the other hand, the dearth of planning resources and the lack 
of social mastery of development meant that the boom could not have 
been corrected in time[28]. What the review failed to mention is the 
fact that industrial planning and execution during the same period was 
centralized and highly concentracted in the hands of few bureacrats; 
and thus, leaving wider room for corruption especially in the awarding 
of contracts to foreign firms for the realization of industrial 
projects. 
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The overall slowing down of investment embodied in the 1980-84 
development plan is intended to bring about a realignment of the 
economy, whereby the sectors in difficulty - (housing in particular) - 
will be brought into step with the industrial development. Thus, most 
of the investment is being allocated to foster the light industries 
that meet consumption and demand as well as to complete the on-going 
projects in order to achieve linkage with existing industries and 
relieve strains on the use of existing facilities. Emphasis is also 
given to the agricultural sector and generally to projects that are 
labour intensive. It is important to note that during the previous 
plans, and despite the fact that the actual cost was higher than the 
planned one - (in terms of monetary value), the percentage of actual 
investment decreased in all sectors except in hydrocarbons and 
non-hydrocarbon industriest291. It is such a situation which the 
present plan intends to redress. To sum-up, there is an apparent 
indication that the policy under the plan is bringing about an 
inhibitory effect on the policy of industrialization. 
The slowing down is more evident in the hydrocarbon sector where 
the allocated investment to the development of hydrocarbons is the 
lowest since 1970 (in terms of percentage) 63 billion dinars (about US 
$ 15 billion) was allocated to the sector representing 15.73% of total 
investment. However, the planned investment is in fact lower if we 
consider the 28.4 billion dinars designated for the completion of 
projects from earlier plans[30]. 
In 1979, the Government decided to correct the economic and 
social imbalances inherited from the previous regime. This decision 
399 
first became evident in the revision and the postponement of some 
industrial investment projects. 
The main action was the halting of the Hydrocarbon DeveloFnent 
Plan (Valorisation des Hydrocarbures) known as the V1'IIWD PLAN. The 
Plan was prepared in 1977 for SONATRACH by BECHTEL International 
Coorporation of the US[31]. Its objectives include; the recovery and 
utilization of gas associated to the production of oil, and to 
maintain a volume of gas sales as stable as possible and over the 
longest period possible[32]. 
To realize these objectives and in accordance with the VALHYD 
PLAN, SONATRACH must undertake the following programmes between 
" '1976-2005: 
(i) The drilling of about 2760 wells for developmnt (Gas and 
Oil) ; 
(ii) The installation of appropriate collection and servicing 
systems; 
(iii) The construction of 11 treatment units of non-associated 
gas (5 at Hassi R'Mel alone) of a total capacity of about 
150 billion cubic metres a year; 
(iv) The construction of 8 reinjection stations of a total 
capacity of about 84 billion 0 per year, out of which 
60 billion cubic metres at Hassi R'Mel; 
(v) The construction of 7000 kilometer (4375 miles) of pipelines; 
(vi) The construction of 5 or 6 new gas liquefaction plants; 
(vii) The construction of separating units for liquefied Petroleum 
gas "LPG" of a capacity of 9 million tons a year as well as 
the facilities for stocking and loading; and 
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(viii) The construction of 4 new refineries with a total capacity 
of 29 million tons a year[33]_ 
The estimated cost for the VALHYD PLAN is 140 billion dinars 
(about US $ 33.4 billion) at 1976 prices. Two thirds of the required 
investment was allocated for gas development. An important part of 
the investment has to be provided through foreign borrowing, about US 
$ 17.4 billions, or 52%; of which US $ 12 billion will be for gas, or 
69%. The mobilization of external borrowing was expected under the 
VALHYD PLAN to reach 3 billion dollars a year between 1978-1980, or 
half of the borrowing, while reimbursement of debts (principal and 
interest) was scheduled at US $ 250 million in 1979 and only reaches 
US $ 2.7 billion in the years of 1983-1986[34). 
At first sight, the VALHYD PLAN appears to be quite attractive to 
Algeria. Since, on one hand, it would lead to the development of the 
hydrocarbon sector - in particular the gas industry - and thus 
resulting in higher production and, on the other hand, higher 
production would lead to higher revenues. The latter being projected 
to continue rising each year, to reach US $ 37,6 billion during the 
period of 1978-1982[35]. 
The other side of the coin projects the rundown of production as 
well as the entry of cash flow by the year 2005. In following the 
Plan's projections, the accumulated debts of US $ 17.4 billion 
(excluding interest rates) would be repaid at about the same time of 
the running down of production. 
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In balance, the Plan is in fact more disadvantageous to Algeria 
than it seems to indicate at first. It can be criticised on the 
following grounds. 
Firstly, the VAIIIYD PLAN not only fails to take account of 
Algeria's future need for non-renewable natural resources, but rather 
seems to aim at exhausting the existing reserves in a record-time of 
25 years, without denunciation that the country may find itself 
without raw materials for its industries and without energy (the same 
industries for which the sales of hydrocarbon is designed to 
implement). Gas is not only an energy resource but above all a raw 
material from which numerous products are derived (i. e. fertilizers 
for agriculture). In the words of a trade unionist: 
"' "The VAIHYD PLAN aimed at exhausting our resources in a record 
time. Had we not been able to denounce it in time, we would 
have found ourselves without raw materials for the industry and 
without energy"[36]. 
Secondly, it is unrealistic to suggest the installation of more 
advanced technologies while the existing plants are neither completed 
nor efficient. Furthermore, investment in the hydrocarbon sector is 
often higher than anticipated due to: (i) trial and errors in the 
introduction of new technologies, especially for gas liquefaction, 
(ii) delays in execution which entailed overcost, and (iii) high 
running cost because of heavy reliance on technical assistance. 
Thirdly, it is not in the national interest to overproduce so 
that the consumer countries are assured of future supplies, since gas 
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is a difficult fuel to replace on short notice and unlike oil there is 
no spot market. Furthermore,. it is much more expensive and 
technically challenging to hold large strategic stocks of gas as 
compared to oil. Of course, Algeria will continue to produce and sell 
hydrocarbon resources but the volume of export of these resources will 
have to be in parallel to the country's need for import and foreign 
currencies, and taking into account the future domestic demand and 
supply for these resources, as well as the development of 
non-hydrocarbon industries. Such industries would be called upon to 
ensure the transition when hydrocarbon will feature less prominently 
in Algeria's external trade. 
Finally, it is equally unrealistic to develop the hydrocarbon 
'sector to the projected level and to end up in 25 years with 
industries which the country may not have any use for or are too 
costly to run. It is also not economical to add $17.4 billion in 
debts to develop the sector so that such debts can be repaid at the 
end. Moreover, while the sector's investment was the highest, there 
is no evidence to the contrary which may suggest that the cost of the 
Plan will be limited to 33.4 billion dollars. Higher investment was 
not matched by higher employment. In fact, the share of the sector 
was relatively small, 2.8% in 1977[37]. For example, for each $2.5 
million invested in the LNG1 plant at Arzew, only one single job was 
created, half of which are occupied by foreign personnel mostly 
Americans [38] . 
It may be possible that the scenario for the VA LHYD PLAN was 
prepared under the following assumption by BEcHTEL. In order to 
ensure 
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the supply of gas to Western European countries and United States, 
Algeria has to develop its hydrocarbon resources, so that the Western 
European countries would-not become vulnerable to Soviet gas leverage. 
The Americans believe that the Algerian gas is one of the 
alternatives, which could serve better European economic security and- 
political interests(391. 
However, for Algeria to be in such a position it has to develop 
its hydrocarbon resources. In doing so, numerous oil and gas 
equipment would have to be bought from MNCs. To set-up the imported 
technologies, the country would call upon the services of the same 
MNCs, since local capacities cannot fulfil the task by themselves. At 
the same time, Algeria would have to borrow from the international 
financial market - so that financial institutions will make profit 
through interest rates - to buy these equipments, so that these MNCs 
would keep their labour force on the pay roll. Furthermore, to make 
additional profits, they will provide Algeria with their engineering 
and expertise services. 
At the political level, the VAII3 YD PLAN may also have been 
designed to steer Algeria away from its radical- position in 
international affairs. It would have made Algeria more vulnerable to 
pressure from the technology suppliers whenever there is a breakdown 
or even from the consumer countries through the cancellation of gas 
supply contracts. 
It is no wonder when the new government under Chadli Bendjedid 
took power in February, 1979, considered the short and long term 
404 
economic and political impact of the Plan on Algeria and carne to the 
conclusion that investment in the processing of natural hydrocabrons 
prior to export will have to be suspended if not abandoned. 
Accordingly, the Algerian Government cancelled GNL3 in 1980 for which 
the construction contract was already awarded to Foster Wheeler in 
1976 at an initial cost of $1200 million(401. Plans have also been 
abandoned for the construction of LNG4 at Arzew and a second 
liquefaction plant at Skikda LNG2 as well as the liquifaction plant at 
Isser near Algiers[411. Apart from the reasons mentioned already, the 
decision to halt investment in gas liquefaction plants was also 
influenced by the higher. than originally anticipated cost of 
liquefaction facilities, and the reorientation of gas export towards 
European markets through the trans-Mediterranean pipeline to Italy. 
SECOND: Gas Transportation[42] 
(1) HASSI R'MEL-SICILY TPANSMED PIPELINE: 
The first underwater pipeline was constructed in 1981 and cold 
have -become operational had it not been for a price dispute between 
SONATRACH and ENI of Italy. The pipeline provides a physical link 
that promises to bind the economic interests of Algeria and Italy 
together. The project was first conceived 22 years ago by Gaz de 
France when Algeria was under the French colonial. Gaz de France 
experimented in 1960, with the laying of 228 millimetres diameter 
pipeline at a depth of some 2000' metres between the Algerian and 
Spanish coast[43]. 
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flexible laying. This section is jointly owned by SONATRACH and SNAM 
PE GE= (a subsidiary of ENI). 
4. The Italian section joins MAZZARA DEL VALLO in Sicily with 
Minerbio (near Bologna) on the Italian mainland. To cross the strait 
of Messina, the pipe is divided into four sections which joins again 
on the mainland. The line runs for 1050 kms and is owned by ENI(44]. 
The underwater section was engineered by SNAM PROGETTI, which was 
awarded the construction contract on October 22,1977. The successful 
laying of the line at a record depth not only gave SHAM PICGEII an 
experience which no other company in the world possesses, but above 
all it opened the possibility for a second pipeline under the Western 
Mediterranean between Algeria and Spain. 
The estimated cost of the pipeline is $2500 million, or one 
million dollars for each kilometre. The estimated cost is in fact 
equivalent to the construction of Arzew LNG1. Algeria's share of 
total construction cost is $1400 million, of which $1030 million was 
obtained as a loan from Italy(45]. 
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The commercial success of frozen gas LNG temporarily put the 
pipeline project into shade. In 1970, a further study undertaken by 
an Italian firm showed that there was no advantage to be gained at 
that time, and no overwhelming cost advantage in delivering gas direct 
from pipeline rather than LNG. However, the project of connecting 
Hassi R'Mel gas field to Sicily in Italy became firmer when the 
Italian company ENTE NAZIONALE IDRUCABURI "ENI" and SONATRACH signed a 
contract under which the latter undertook to supply the former with 
12000 million cubic metres a year of pipeline gas for 20 years. The 
construction of the pipeline involved 2500 kilometres, divided into 
four sections: 
1. The Algerian section which runs from Hassi R'Mel gas field to the 
" Tunisian border for 550 kms long in a single pipeline. The line is 
1219 mm in diameter and climbs to a height of 850 metres in the 
foothills of the Atlas mountains. This section is owned by SONATRACH 
and was constructed by ENI. 
2. The Tunisian section runs from the Algerian frontier to Cap Bon, 
which is 370 km. Then, the pipeline plunges into the Mediterannean 
sea. This section is owned by Tunisia. 
3. The Trans-Mediterranean section runs underwater from Cap Bon in 
Tunisia to MAZZARA DEL VALID in Sicily. The section is 530 kms long 
and consists of three sealines of 580 man in diameter. The three 
parallel lines serve the purpose of reducing the effects of breaks or 
other difficulties during operating as well as to allow for more 
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The initial capacity of the pipeline is 12000 million m3 a year 
but according to SONATRACH the capacity may be raised to 18000 million 
m3. The duplication of the pipeline is almost certain to take place, 
since on one hand Italy has already made it known that it is willing 
to double the Trans-Med. capacity depending on the quantities of 
Algerian gas available for export in non-liquefied form and whether 
customers from Central and Northern Europe prefer to import via 
Italy[461. On the other hand, Greece has already decided to opt for 
an Algerian pipeline gas. In the words of Greece's Energy and 
Minerals Minister, Miltiades Evert "We have studied the Trans. Med 
extension project submitted in March (1980) by Italy's Snam Progetti. 
We think this is a good and feasible option; ... We are trying to 
limit our dependency on oil imports and Algerian gas looks like the 
good solution". [471. 
(2) ARZEW (ALGERIA) - ALICAME (SPAIN) PIPELINE: 
In 1980, the feasbility study-for the construction of the second 
under water pipeline was completed. A pipeline company Societe 
d'Etudes du Gazodue de la Mediterranee Occidentale (SEGAMO), was 
established for the purpose of studying the project(481. The pipeline 
will serve the Spanish and the French markets, though it won't be 
constructed until the Hassi R'Mel - Sicily becomes full operational. 
It should be noted here that the pipeline was originally projected to 
connect Hassi R'Mel-Tangier-Gibralter-Spain and France t49]. However, 
the dispute between Morroco and Algeria over the Western Sahara, led 
Algeria to opt for a direct connection between ARZEW and ALICANTE. 
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SONATPACH-EL PASO COLTRACT 
Prior to the signing of the contract on October 9,1969, the 
French advanced a theory called the "Algerian captive gas", founded on 
arguments taking into account economical, technological, geographical 
and political elements. It pretended to establish a double postulate; 
First, the Algerian gas is necessarily destined for the European 
market, such market being the natural and possible outlet and 
consequently a condition for its promotion. Second, the supply of 
Algeria's natural gas to the European market was not conceivable 
except when combined with the French market, presented here as 
essential. 
Obviously, the French interests are cleverly hidden in such 
theory. Since, in practice the theory means that Algeria cannot sell 
its gas except through the French market, this gives the French 
companies the first role of buyers. It is designed to give impression 
to the might be clients of Algeria's gas, or even to the Algerian 
authorities for that matter, that to promote the Algerian gas, such 
gas has (i) to pass through the French market, (ii) technologically 
use French patents, know-how and liquefaction processes; (iii) 
financially through French banks; and legally through the French oil 
companies who held concessions of Algeria's deposits[50]. 
Equally, the French strategy appeared to have been based on 
freezing the sale of Algerian gas to Europe. As a result, Algeria did 
not sign a single contract up to 1969, apart from the CAMEL 
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contracts[51]. Not surprisingly, the French Government and Gaz de 
France, played a leading role on promoting the sale of gas of 
Algeria's competitors. For such a role, they were assured of the 
cooperation of the Italian group ENI[52] and the American corporation 
Esso. 
The camapaign against the Algerian gas and its corranercialization 
to Europe was based on the following themes: - 
(1) Algeria cannot dispose of its gas since the gas belongs to 
concessionaries and nothing can be done without their consent and 
participation. This falsehood was designed to make the might be 
European client hesitate, and presents Algeria as a country who has 
wealth which it does not own. 
(2) Algeria - according to the campaign - does not offer sufficient 
guarantee of stability and to sign an agreement with it is to be on 
the losing side. In other words, the multinational oil companies were 
attempting to substantiate the idea that they are the only ones 
capable of assuring regular supplies to the consumer countries. At 
the same time, to brush off any direct relationship between sovereign 
states (producers and consumers) which would reduce if not eliminate 
their role. Therefore, the argument of political stability is only a 
means by which MNCs would extend their power over the producing 
countries. 
(3) The third theme of the campaign was that Algeria is unable to 
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realize gas liquefaction projects since it has neither technicians nor 
the necessary capital. The oil companies, thus, presented themselves 
as the only ones who are capable of furnishing these means to Algeria 
and wanted to anchor the idea that they are essential to the 
realization and development of gas projectsl53]. 
Certainly, Algeria did not ignore the fact that for the 
realization of industrial projects it must obtain technical 
assistance. However, such assistance was not the monopoly of oil 
companies and could be obtained from constructors as well as friendly 
countries where the technological level is quite high. To ensure the 
financing of projects complementary financial capital is needed to be 
raised. Here again, the oil companies, despite their wealth and 
influence, did not have a total monopoly over the international 
capital market. It is important to note the manouvres employed by 
certain companies - especially American ones - with the World Bank. 
The World Bank has in fact showed interest in the Algerian projects 
for the exportation of natural gas which Algeria had submitted during 
the sumner of 1966[54]. However, American companies pressurized the 
World Bank to adopt an attitude of wait and see. To see whether 
Algeria could finally acconmrodate the foreign private sector, it was a 
long wait. The purpose behind such attitude was to subordinate 
Algeria and force it to accept an eventual intervention of the Bank to 
an agreement between Algeria and the private sector, under which the 
latter would get advantageous terms and a dominant position[55]. 
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The campaign against the Algerian gas, nonetheless, succeeded in 
organizing a veritable blockage which managed to fail all attempts by 
Algeria to penetrate the European market. Such blockage"was helped by 
gas suppliers from the Soviet Union and Libya[56]. The commercial 
attitude of the Soviet Union was in particular denounced by the 
Algerian authorities during 1967. Such attitude was supported by the 
fact that the Soviet Union was importing Iranian gas and exporting it 
to Europel571. It is difficult to find the real intention behind'the 
Soviet's attitude, except to suggest that the gas prices were 
sacrificed in order to obtain a share of the European markets. Such 
share would allow the Soviet Union to gain access to techniques and 
technologies which may not be developed in USSR. 
- The critical problem which faced Algeria then was to find a way 
of getting out of the blockage. A unique chance presented itself when 
a Canadian firm proposed to SONATRACH in 1968, the setting-up of a 
sale operation of gas in the East of Canada with the possibility of an 
important operation to sell gas to the American market. To Algeria 
the possibility of a deal represented more than the sale of gas. 
Firstly, in the economic field the deal would have meant the 
realization of a gas project which by its exceptional size constituted 
a vehicle for the launching of the development of gas reserves. 
Secondly, in the comunercial field, a share of the American market 
not only would enlarge the possibilities for the expansion of the sale 
of gas which was arbitrary and confined to the Mediteranean basin, but 
may also serve as a starting point to attract more American firms to 
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join Algeria's industrialization process which would significantly 
contribute to the diversification of technology supplies adopted by 
the country as a result of the oil conflict. If the deal was to go 
through, it would prove wrong the theory of "the Algerian captive 
gas", and increase Algeria's negotiating power vis-a-vis the might be 
European clients. 
Thirdly, at the political level the deal would demonstrate 
Algeria's willingness to take charge of the development of its 
hydrocarbon resources, rather than the oil companies. Equally, it 
would de olish the technical, commercial, and financial myth which the 
French oil companies pretended to exercise over the exploitation and 
exportation of Algeria's gas. 
The SONATRACH-ELPASO NAIL GAS contract which was signed on 
October 9,1969, involved more than the supply of 10 billion 0 of LNG 
a year for 25 years to the United States. For such a quantity to be 
delivered, an industrial chain had to be set-up first which included 
the following: - 
(i) The construction of a six lines liquefaction plant at 
Arzew LNG1, covering about 70 hectares, with 10.5 billion 
0 capacity a year; 
(ii) A plant at Hassi R'Mel gas field for the extraction and 
treatment of gas; 
(iii) A pipeline for forwarding gas from Hassi R'Mel to Arzew, of 
511 tans; 
(iv) Three storage tanks of 1000,000 ra3 of LNG each; 
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(v) A power station for the production of electricity; and 
(vi) The construction of a new methane port at Arzew (ARZEK 
ELJADID) (581 . 
Since the signing of the contract, both Gaz de France and the 
French Government tried to persuade EL-PASO officials to drop the 
deal. They argued that the Agreement of 29 July 19651591, does not 
give Algeria the right to sell its gas without the consent of the 
French oil companies. In other terms, Algeria'had to get first the 
green light from the French Government and its oil companies. one has 
to remember, that it was not only gas which the French were worried 
about, but also French technologies; finance, and the prospect of 
losing part of the Algerian market to American companies (e. g. the 
-'supply of industrial machinery, equiFinent, and manufactured durable 
consumer goods). However, such agreement backfired, since one year 
later, Algeria replied by taking 100% control of all gas reserves and 
pipelines[60]. 
The French oil companies did not give up easily. They threatened 
to take legal action against EL-PASO. The latter replied through its 
chairman who declared that. the French oil companies had no legal 
grounds for taking action against the American buyers of petroleum and 
gas to which the former retained ancient interests [61] . Even if the 
nationalization did not take place, Algeria would have been able to 
sell gas. Since the French have accepted in the 1965 Agreement that 
Algeria had the exclusive right of buying gas from the French partners 
at wellhead. 
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Furthermore, the right of a state to nationalize its natural resources 
is well recognized under international law. 
Then French Petroleum Company (Campagnie Francaise des Petroles) 
"CFP", tried to intervene in the debate of the Federal Power 
Commission (FPC) in the beginning of June 1971, and to oppose the 
projected importation of Algerian LNG by Et-PASO[62]. 
The French Government also played its role. It took steps with 
the US State Department to ensure that the US EXJMBAM< rejects the 
request by SONPTRACH for the financing of the project. The Bank had 
already accepted in principle to finance the project "engagement 
preliminaire"[63]. 
The scheme to import gas to US was without precedent in the 
history of The United States. Never before had anyone imported LNG to 
the East Cost in volumes big enough to provide utilities with a base 
load supply of gas. Until 1973, all that existed was the contract. 
This is due to the fact that the importation of gas to US needed to be 
submitted to the approval of the US Federal Power Commission. The 
Commission took four years to give its blessing. The project was 
described by one observer "as a long trail of tears. The first drop 
descended when the company set out to clear the necessary hurdles. 
EL-PASSO naively assumed the pathbreaking venture would glide past the 
Federal Power Commission without undue incident in less than 18 
months" [64] . 
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The delay of the process for the approval of the deal was due to 
the bureaucracy of the Commission on one hand, and on the other hand, 
due to the many arguments advanced by those who objected to the deal. 
American mining and oil companies claimed that the Algerian Government 
cannot be relied upon to honour its international commitments [651 . 
Others claimed that the import price was unreasonably high and 
contrary to public interest[66]. Other oil companies, including the 
Sierra club and Superior Oil Corporation argued that the price was 
unfair to the domestic producers[67]. 
From all the industrial chain which needed to be realized before 
any supply could take place, the liquefaction plant required more 
time. The construction of the plant LNG1 was awarded to Chemical 
. 
Construction Incorporation of the United States on April 6,1971[68], 
under a turnkey form of contract. The process belonged to Air Product 
(US), which is the same process employed in the Libyan liquefaction 
plant at MARSA EL BOUGHA. A total of 17 firms from the United States 
supplied the equipment for the plant and thus making the fears of the 
French come true[69]. 
The construction did not start until 1974 instead of the planned 
start in 1972 because of the delay by the FPC. By the end of which, 
it became apparent that, there were difficulties and delays in the 
construction. In May 1975, CHEMICO asked SONATRACH for a 
renegotiation of the contract terms. It asked in particular for the 
contract's value to be raised and argued that events have changed 
(inflation, increase of petrol prices, and binding bureacratic 
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procedures by Algerians... ). After three months of negotiations, 
SONATRACH became convinced beyond any doubt that CHEMICO was not only 
less qualified but dishonest as well. Its personnel were exercising a 
veritable change in order to exploit for their benefit financial 
stakes which the achievement of the plant would represent. 
Although the change of events which CHDIICO based its argument 
did prevail prior to the start of construction and would have made it 
more appropriate had CHEMICO evoked them then, and despite the fact 
that improvements were needed as early as 1975 of the work then 
conducted under the responsibility of CHEMICO, Sonatrach accepted in 
principle to renegotiate the value of the contract. For this reason, 
Algerian and American experts gained access to CHEMICO's account 
documentation in its Head Quarters in New York. The investigation led 
to the discovery that CHE24ICO had inserted expenditure undually put 
as expenditure on the plant but which were totally strange to the 
contract's terms. 
At one stage of the re-negotiation, CH124ICO asked for an increase 
of US $70 million and ended up by raising its demands to ask for 
nothing less than the total allowances of the contract. The value of 
the contract was 2000 million dinars ($540 million)[70]. In order to 
continue the work, it required that SONATRACH would accept a new 
contract which will not commit CHENICO in anyway neither in delays nor 
in price. 
The behaviour and practices of CHE}IICO constituted a reason for 
SONATRACH to fire the former after it became clear that it could not, 
meet the contracts terms [711. 
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The cancellation of CHEiICO's contract was the second crisis 
which the contract SONATRACH-EL-PASO had gone through. The conflict 
which marked the financial negotiations gave SÖNATRACH a second chance 
to show its American partners of its willingness to continue with the 
realization of the project so that supply of LNG can start but not in 
1976 as originally agreed. Also, that it can not go beyond the fixed 
limits of Algeria's legitimate interests. BECHTEL (US) was chosen at 
the end of 1975[721 to replace CHEMICO. BECHTEL took one year to 
finish its feasibility and survey studies which'is a relatively short 
period considering the mess which CHE4ICO had left behind. BECHTEL 
was able to conduct the construction up to the starting-up operation 
with exceptional success. 
The accumulated delay by the first constructor, as well as those 
inherited when the work was abandoned, and the changing of constructor 
up to the final completion by BECHTEL was 18 months altogether. To 
appreciate the work accomplished by BECHTEL, one only has to measure 
such delay against delays accumulated in other projects, for causes 
less serious than those seen in LNG1. For example, the liquefaction 
plant at Skikda (the first three lines) which is twice less important 
than LNG1, the construction of which was started in 1969 by TECHNIP 
but did not reach full capacity production until 19751731. 
The collaboration with American capital and firmst74], which 
increased greatly in the 1970's decade led some people to claim that 
Algeria was just changing one capitalist country by another. However, 
according to Boumediene if Europe was capable to equal the US, the 
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situation would possibly have taken a different way from what it is. 
Also if for sometimes Algeria collaborates with US firms in different 
fields, it is simply because the American firms have 'shown superior 
initiative, efficiency and competence to that of European enterprises. 
"In some economic and political spheres, some strive here and 
there, to make it a belief that with her gas, Algeria is 
filling her soul with American capitalism and so believing that 
they could influence us by attempting to denature us in the eyes 
of others. The operation is evidently nothing but a co nercial 
transaction in the full and strict sense of the term [.... ]. 
Algeria as every one knows would not sell her soul to anyone, 
embarks on this transaction with full awareness of her interests, 
knowing clearly what she gives as well as what she receives in 
return" [751. 
Before analysing the positive and negative effects of 
SONATRACH-EL-PASO contract, one has to bear in mind the fundamental 
differences between the gas and petroleum markets. While the 
petroleum market is based on a wide network, constituted of hundreds 
of ports, thousands of ships, and the manipulation of petroleum 
products, it allows international transaction to be conducted at a 
short term notice. In reverse, the natural gas market requires the 
existence of specific installations for each transaction (pipelines, 
liquefaction plants, storage rooms, LNG carriers, methane ports and 
regasification centres). Moreover, the liquefaction 'plants and LNG 
carriers require an important investment which can only be amortized 
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in many years. Thus, both the seller and buyer of natural gas may not 
find it easy to change their partnership as in the oil market. 
Contracts fo gas transaction are often between 12 and 25 years, such 
length when added to specialized installations makes the contracting 
parties less and less free, as compared with petroleum contracts. 
In order to determine the merits of the contract we need to 
analyze its conmercial, financial and technological effects on the gas 
industry and the national economy. 
Commercially, the SONATRACH-EL PASO contract allowed Algeria to 
widen the market for the Algerian gas from 14 billion m3 to 80 billion 
nr3. From 1975 to 1978 SONATPACH signed a total of 13 contracts, the 
basic price of-these contracts was $1.30 per million B. t. u. 
From the financial point of view, both the liquefaction plant and 
the contract SONATRACH-EI, PASO were short of a disaster. The final 
cost of LNG1 was $2400 million or four times what was originally 
planned[76]. The price introduced in the contract was very low, 
$0,305 per million British thermal unit B. t. u., as a result of which 
Algeria is estimated to have lost $290 million[771. 
The negotiators of SONATRACH have accepted concession clauses in 
favour of the client ELI-PASO, in other terms, the price of Algerian 
gas was connected to the internal movement of internal prices in the 
United States. Unfortunately, such vision did neither correspond to 
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the general orientations of that time, nor to the need to balance the 
balance of payments. This attitude was considered by the Planning 
Ministry in 1980 as deliberately autonomous, less thoughtful to the 
rest of the economy and from which all errors were trickled: 
"From this deliberately autonomous attitude, which is little 
concerned with the rest of the economy, from which all mistakes 
were trickled, where the coefficient of liquefaction capital, the 
long delays in maturation and concessions on prices and guaran- 
tees are only few aspects among the many that are costly to the 
economy in the same way as are the foreign debts or the wide- 
spread disequilibrium"[78]. 
The relatively punctual economic and financial situation of 
Algeria during 1969 does not explain the rationality behind the 
acceptance of disadvantageous contractual conditions for a very long 
period of 25 years. However, the low prices(791 might have been used 
to attract financial and American technologies, and at the same time 
to escape the blocakge over the Algerian gas. In other terms, the 
contractual concessions were the political price paid by Algeria, 
especially when one knows that there was no diplomatic relations 
between Algeria and US at that time. 
If such political price can be advanced as a justification in 
1969, one may wonder why no negotiation of the contract's price took 
place until January 1979? Certainly the conditions had changed as 
early as 1974, when the oil prices increased. In 1979, the price of 
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the contract was $0.37 in real terms1801, and comes to $3.43 per 
million B. t. u. in the US after transport and regasification, while the 
Mexican gas was priced at $4.47 per in. b. t. u. at the frontier and the 
Canadian gas $4.5 m b. t. u. when pipeline cost for inter nal 
distribution is added, the implied advantages to EL-PASO from the 
Algerian LNG is more confirmedt811. 
In January 1979, SONATRACH asked for a revision of the contract's 
price. However the increase of oil price from $14.80 a barrel in the 
first term of 1979, to $30 later [821 in the year, and the change in 
the international energy market made the earlier revision not 
sufficient. In October 1979, EL-PASO was notified by SONATRACH of its 
displeasure with the terms of the renegotiated contract which put the 
price at $1.95 per million b. t. u. or more than five times of the 
original price. The new price was adopted by the Energy Department's 
Economic Regulatory Administration on December 29,1979. On March 6, 
1980, the Algerian Government rejected the new price and asked for the 
price of LNG to be equivalent to the price of crude oil. Furthermore, 
such parity between oil and gas needs to be realized-at Arzew and not 
at the point of use-in US. In practice, this means $6 per million 
B. t. u. 's which was unacceptable to the Americans, since in their view 
it would effect both the Canadian and Mexican deals. The Assistant 
Secretary Leslie J. Godman, who was the Engergy Department's Chief 
bargainer argued that parity at the well-head is "completely off the 
map"[83], and "with shipping and storage, $6 gas in Algeria would be 
$7 or so in the East, and I can state categorically that LNG at $7 
delivered is not going to fly"[84]. 
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To justify the Algerian Government's position, Belkacem rabi, 
advanced the following arguments. First, Algeria did not want to be 
treated less important than any other supplier, and that the US had 
admitted the correlation between oil and gas(851, in their gas deals 
with Mexico and Canada. It is worth noting that while the US Energy 
Department was resisting the parity deal for LNG imports from Algeria, 
Phillips Petroleum and Marathon oil had been exporting 140 million 
cubic feet a day from Alaska to Japan since 1969, the price of which 
was directly linked to the price of crude oil and was close to what 
the Algerians were demanding 1861. Second, a higher price for I14G is 
justified by the huge investment undertaken by Algeria in gas 
liquefaction facilities and by the security of supplies for the 
client, assured by the long duration of the contract[871. A Sonatrach 
" official professed astonishment at the US insistence on cheap gas "It 
is as if an eccentric farmer were to claim that because he wishes to 
feed cavier to his chicken, the price of that cavier should be the 
same as that of corn" (881 . 
Sonatrach set 31st March 1980 as a deadline for El-Paso to meet 
its terms. When the deadline was reached, without an agreement gas 
supplies were cut off at El-Paso's request[89]. The request to 
cut-off might have been used by El-Paso to put pressure on Algeria to 
settle the price[90]. EL PASO was banking on the fact that the 
shut-down of LNG1 Arzew would amount to a loss of $3 million per day 
for SONATRACH[91]. Furthermore, because of the nature of the natural 
gas market, it would have been quite difficult to find an alternative 
client to take a 10 billion m3 of LNG a year. Even if such a client 
was to be found, no country at that time had terminal facilities to 
handle the 125,000 m3 LNG carriers except Japan (Montoire-de-Bretagne 
terminal of France was not ready at that stage). 
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The American negotiators appear to have underestimated the 
determination of the new team at the head of Sonatrach led by the 
Energy and Petrochemicals Minister M. BELKACEM NMI and fully backed 
by the new government of CHADLI BEN-DJEDID. Algeria was prepared to 
keep its gas in the ground until an acceptable price agreement was 
reached not only with EL-PASO but also with Gaz de France and ENI of 
Italy. 
In the case of Gaz de France, gas was not cut off but continued 
on the basis of a price of $4.45 per million B. T. U. 's from July 1980 
until a final agreement was reached. After more than two years of 
negotiations Algeria succeeded in getting the highest current F. O. B. 
netback price achieved by any producert921. The deal with France 
. 
clearly represents a compromise by the both sides. Although SONATRACH 
did not achieve full parity for gas with its light Saharan crude oil, 
it has set the stage for the resumption of LNG sales after successive 
falls in 1980 and 1981 because of the cut-off to EL-PASO. The Gas 
Agreement of February 3,1982, put the price of Algerian LNG at $5.10 
per million B. t. u. 's at Algerian ports. Such price contributed 
significantly to Algeria bargaining position with ENI of ITALY. 
The supply of Algerian natural gas to Italy, through the Hassi 
R'Mel SICILY pipeline could have started as early as October 1981. 
However, a disagreement over the revision of gas prices between 
SONATRACH and ENI delayed the operation. The conflict concerned the 
contract for the supply of 12 billion m3 of pipeline gas which was 
signed in October 22,1977. The contract stipulated a basic price of 
$1 per million b. t. u's. During the renegotiations it became evident 
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that the major striking point was the price difference calculated by 
the two companies. 
SON1TRACH's view was that it inteneded to sell its gas to its 
customers without discrimination. Therefore, it was fair to ask ENI 
to pay at Sicily an equivalent to what Gaz de France pays for LNG 
imports after transport and regasification. For example, if we 
consider that the F. o. b. price for Gaz de France at Arzew or Skikda is 
$5.10 per million b. t. u., plus $0.70 per m b. t. u. as the cost of 
transport and regasification, the price comes to $5.80 per m b. t. u. 
The transport cost from Hassi R'Mel to Sicily will be between $1.30 to 
$1.40. Thus the price which ENI should pay will be between $4.40 and 
$4.50 per m b. t. u. 
PRICE CALCULATION 
SMAMACH per million b. t. u. ENI , per mi] 
lionb. . u. 
F. O. B. price (GAZ DE $5.10 $5.10 FOB PRICE FOR 
FRANCE) 
Transport and re- 
gasification 
Pipeline transport 
to Sicily 
FOB price for ENI 
should be 
®F 
$0.70 $1.35 liquefaction 
cost 
$1.30 (or $1.40) $0.20 pipeline trans- 
port to liquefaction 
- $0.20 plants pipeline 
$3.75 to Tunisian 
$4.40-$4.50 frontier. 
The Italian view was that ENI should not be required to pay what 
Gaz de France pays after regasification, but the well head price. In 
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other terms, to deduct $1.35 the cost of liquefaction and the pipeline 
transport cost from Hassi R'Mel to either Arzew or Skikda $0.20 from 
the FOB price of $5.10, to come to a $3.55 at Hassi R'Mel to the 
Tunisian frontier. ENI insisted that it should only pay a FOB price 
of $3.75 per million b. t. u. and not the $4.40 or $4.50 asked for by 
SONATRACH. 
To counter balance the Algerian-French deal, the Italians 
advanced their own deal with the Soviet Union with an agreed price of 
$4.70 per million b. t. u., and suggested a similar deal with the 
Algerians. Another argument was the fact that investment in pipeline 
gas is considerably less than gas liquefaction projects, and that this 
differential should be reflected in price. 
Algeria remained unmoved from its original position and insisted 
that the price it was asking was reasonable and thaty it was neither 
asking for charity nor gifts but only exercising its legitimate 
rights. 
"We have required reasonable prices, similar to those demanded 
in other regions. We have asked-neither for charity nor gift, 
but only required our rights"[93]. 
Like the French deal, the negotiations between SONATRACH and EM 
reached a stage where the intervention of both the Algerian and 
Italian Governments was required. In February 24, 1983, the double 
negotiations[941 which took almost a year, succeeded in reaching an 
agreement. Under such agreement, the FOB price for' natural gas is 
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believed to have been settled at $4.41 per million b. t. u. In return 
it was agreed that Algeria would open the door to $1.5 billion of 
Italian export[951. 
It is conceivable that the failure of SONATRACH-EL PASO 
negotiations and the financial penalties caused by the stopping might 
have led Algeria to pull out altogether of LNG. Such possibility was 
raised by the price agreement with Italy and the proposed second 
pipeline to Spain, already on the drawing board. The cancellation of 
the VALHYD plan, and the fact that 20% of gas is being lost in the 
liquefaction process makes the future of LNG in Algeria very doubtful. 
Also, at the technological level, the case of gas liquefaction 
appears to have no bright side in the context of Algeria. The 
characteristic of gas liquefaction have obliged the country to iirort 
the totality of processes, equipment and technical services from few 
MNCS who specialised in this branch of industry. The risk involved is 
that the industry may become totally dependent, on what can rightly be 
called the Americanization of the gas industry. The power of economic 
integration of this type of development is practically nil, since the 
technology is imported (equipments, machineries, process and patents), 
the skilled personnel to construct and exploit those installations is 
foreign. The lack of domestic technical capabilities reduce the 
controlling power of the State. 
Moreover, the high level of investment combined with the methods 
of realization of industrial projects - turnkey - condemned any real 
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possibility of a progressive mastery of the imported technologies. 
Such situation can only strengthen technological dependence on 
multinationals, by calling upon them to provide technical services 
(i. e. maintenance, experts, spare parts etc. ). It is the extent to 
which the liquefaction of gas relies on technical assistance which 
makes it inappropriate for Algeria or any other developing country 
with similar underdevelopment status. 
If we take the case of the LNG1 plant at Arzew we find that: the 
plant employed 1600 workers in 1980 out of which 500, were foreign 
technical assistance[95], working under the supposition of functioning 
the plant and facilatating the transfer of technology. The director 
of Arzew's industrial zone estimated that for each expert provided to 
the Algerian hydrocarbon sector, multinationals gained between $15,000 
and $20,000 excluding wages(971. In other terms, technical assistance 
services are used by the technology suppliers as an additional source 
of income, and as such, instead of preparing the way for its own 
disappearance by traning the Algerian personnel, it does all it can to 
prevent such eventuality. 
Technical assistance, as it functions in INQ plant, controls 
almost everything. The two key departments of the plant: production 
and maintenance are exclusively reserved for it. It is true that the 
director and vice-director of the plant are Algerians. However, 
technical' assistance is also represented at this high level in the 
form of the "Plant Manager" who is the counterpart of, the vice 
director. Only the departments of personnel and general services 
(transport, canteen, and cooperative) are Algerianized. 
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The massive recourse to foreign technical assistance "ETA" during 
the 1970's decade was often justified by the accelerated expansion of 
the hydrocarbon sector in particular, industrial development in 
general, and by the difficulties of mastering very new and 
sophisticated techniques in a short term[981. 
The argument for the justification of FTA is essentially based on 
two interlocked elements: advanced technologies and the lack of 
indigenous technical capacities. In other terms, for Algeria to 
develop its potential gas reserves, advanced technologies are needed 
to be imported. To establish and run these technologies, technical 
services of the technology suppliers were a necessity which the 
country could not have done without, since qualified national 
personnel was not available. 
Bearing in mind the lack of any real industrial experience, the 
reality which we can depart from is that the technological choice 
operated at the production level, might have made the imported 
technologies almost uncontrollable. Thus, these two elements might 
have contributed significantly in increasing the number of ETA. But, 
other factors might have also contributed as much if not more. 
First, the concentration of the planning and execution on 
industrial development in the hands of few bureaucrats may have led to 
the misuse of funds and abuse of. power for personal, gains. For 
example, one cannot explain what the maintenance of a spare parts 
stock and even worse, sweeping floors have anything to do with 
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advanced technologies. Both jobs were in early 1980's occupied by 
foreign technical assistance, at LNG1 Arzew[99]. Or, how come that 
the same study (economic and technical) was requested six times in the 
space of six years, three times of which were from the same foreign 
engineering company. It is significant to note that the price paid 
for the first request was 550,000 dinars (about $125,000) and jumped 
to 111,117,000 dinars[100] (about 25,253,863) or an increase of 202 
folds in the space of six years. The secrecy which surrounded 
industrial development might have allowed such abuses to go on 
unchecked[101]. These examples and others makes it hard to believe 
that they were the result of an accelerated development or even 
ignorance. On the contrary, they appear to suggest that they were the 
result of a deliberate policy to transfer public money abroad for 
personnal benefit by certain bureaucrats [102]. These personnal gains 
may also explain the hostility shown by some of the hierarchies to the 
method "plant in production", under which FTA[103] is an integrated 
part of the contract. Further, they appeared to favour the method 
"turnkey", under which, part of ETA (i. e. management, training, 
functioning of industrial units) are provided under separate 
contracts. The distinction between the two forms is that the latter 
provides more room for manoeuvres and for abuses to take place. 
Second, the lack of national policy for the consumption of 
foreign technical assistance. Like most developing countries, the 
recourse to FTA should serve as a means of increasing the technical 
capacities of the recipient countries in specific techniques not yet 
locally available or fully mastered. In Algeria, despite the policy 
embodied in the National Charter "La Charte Nationale" of 1976 , FTA 
continued to be unregulated: 
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"The call for technical assistance must be made within the 
scope of a national policy which is carried out in close 
correlation with the needs of the national personnel [.... ] 
Cooperation with foreign countries must be called for, 
channeled and used with strict respect to the country's 
options. It must lie within the framework of a policy that 
maintains the balance of exchange and safeguards the partners 
mutual interests"[104]. 
In practice, however, no global rules governing ETA were ever 
defined or established. Often, it was the necessity to respond 
urgently to the increasing demand to solve production problems, which 
dictated the situation. The increasing demand for FTA, might have 
-been itself one of the factors which have limited the possibilities 
for establishing such rules. There has never been an Algerian policy 
with regards to the recourse to technical assistance services nor have 
there ever been any defined objectives [105] , or any procedures 
adopted. 
In the absence of a rational policy, the objectives of M were 
not clearly articulated the one to the other. The activities and 
durations of FTA have never been, neither investigated nor-scrutinized 
prior to 1979. 
In the previous chapter, we have seen that national enterprises 
have in principle the power to choose autonomously the techniques and 
technologies. Due to the lack of industrial experience and the 
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shortage of national competences such decentralization can only be 
described as excessive, since in practice it meant the delegation of 
those powers to foreign engineering firms. It was an illusion on the 
part of Algeria to rely solely on the services of foreign engineering 
firms, since those firms were in many cases no more than a vehicle of 
investment transfer and promoters for the sale of equipments. Thus, 
engineering firms may have been formally or informally bound to 
special suppliers, and intentionally favour techniques which rely 
heavily on the services of FTA. Moreover despite the absence of 
conenon rules of conduct or guidelines, national enterprises were 
entrusted with the task of negotiating and concluding ETA contracts. 
As a result, ETA services were multiplied, adding to the existing over 
cost of industrial projects. One can safely say that FTA instead of 
creating the proper conditions for its own disappearance, it created 
the need for more recourse to it. 
In the context of Algeria, three types of foreign technical 
assistance can be distinguished. First, tied or integrated technical 
assistance. By integrated assistance, we mean assistance which 
responds to the followign observations (i) the uniqueness of the 
source of techical assistance. In the sense, the contractual 
relationship is limited to two contracting parties, even if the 
furnisher sub-contracts a part of the services. There is no 
separation of equipment, technology and technical assistance services, 
they are both included in the same package. (ii) The uniqueness of the 
legal instrument in the sense that integrated technical assistance 
exclude the intervention of a proper legal instrument, it is formally 
translated in the global contract. As a result, the guarantees 
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provided by the suppliers cover all the operations included in the 
contract. The singleness of the legal instrument make the integrated 
assistance correspond exactly to the "plant in production" method of 
contracts where the essential characteristics are related to the fact 
that the client requires two main things: a turnkey plant 
corresponding to well defined critera; and a transfer of technology 
with the necessary training for running the realized plant in a 
defined time, the products corresponding to standards and quantity 
established in the contract. Finally, integrated technical assistance 
is exclusively connected with "plant in production" contracts, and 
thus, so far in practice, limited to Algeria[106]. 
Foreign technical assistance included in turnkey contracts can 
, 
either be classified as tied assistance, in the sense that it 
constitutes an essential part of the same contract, or as a specified 
assistance since it relates to the supply of equipnents and their 
setting up in a functioning order. The task of the constructing 
foreign firm mainly concerns the conception of the construction and 
the starting up operation. Around these tasks a number of technical 
assistance services are articulated. For example, the starting up of 
industrial production which is a very advanced stage of the execution 
of the contracts and precedes the final delivery of the plant to the 
client is conducted under the constructor's own personnel and the 
client's. personnel [107]. 
Second; specified technical assistance which is connected to the 
contractual form "separate contracts" and in most cases linked to 
engineering contracts. The engineering firm's assistance allows the 
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client to operate his choice among the different offers of equipments 
and techniques and often include: 
- comparative studies of the gathered offers and propose the choice of 
offer to be retained. 
- detailed statement of the retained offer(1081, and assist the client 
firm in the attribution of transactions. 
- provide a list of the project materials and contractual documents 
(i. e. patents, know-how). 
The contracts for the supply of equipments and other services are 
concluded directly between the client and other firms and outside the 
intervention of the engineering firms. However, the real intervention 
has in fact occured during the selection of techniques and 
equipments [109], since it is the suggestions and proposals of the 
engineering firm which are translated by the client enterprise into 
contractual obligations. 
Third; autonomous technical assistance. The autonomy of this 
type of assistance is the result of the fact that the contracting 
parties are not contractually related to each other in any other 
commercial operation, concerning the plant for which the technical 
assistance is destined. Therefore, the exclusive subject of the 
contractual relationship is the required assistance. This form of 
assistance can be advantagenous to national enterprises, in the sense 
that it allows for a direct choice of the supplier. As we have seen, 
in "turnkey" and "plant in production" contracts, the constructors are 
not necessarily the owners of the provided services. More often than 
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not, the foreign parties to these type of contracts conclude 
agreements with the real owners of processes, patents and engineering 
methods. Thus, autonomous assistance excludes the intervention of the 
intermidiary firm between the lessor and the recipient. It is in the 
interest of NEs to negotiate directly with smaller firms, rather than 
large multinational corporations. On the other hand it may be 
disadvantageous in terms of guarantees, since under "turnkey" and 
"plant in production" contracts the assistance formulates a part of 
the contract obligations. As such, and in particular under "plant in 
production" contracts, the penalties are higher. 
Technical assistance, when integrated, tends to be subordinated 
to the fundamental obligations of the constructor, to an extent that 
It is considered as a secondary act in the sense that it, ceases to 
exist when the other obligations are fulfilled. Under the autonomous 
form it loses such secondary status to become fundamental. The 
difference in status is translated in practice by the duration of FTA, 
which is generally long, between 4 and 6 years. However, it is not 
easy to give precise duration for integrated assistance. 
Both specified and autonomous ETA can be called pure technical 
assistance and may also include management and direct intervention of 
foreign exports (i. e. for repairs and maintenance). 
Available statistics show that between 1973-1978, a total of 4912 
contracts for technology transfer were concluded between national 
enterprises and foreign firms at a cost of 103.5 billion dinar's 
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(around $24.5 billion). Such figure is not far from constituting a 
record expenditure among developing countries, especially with regards 
to foreign technical assistance, which shared 55.4% or 57.4 billion 
dinars of the total expenditure[110]. 
As far as the diversification of technology supplies is 
concerned, it is not perhaps surprising to find that the supply of 
technical assistance services tend to follow the same pattern as that 
of technology imports[111]. 
Based on the combined expenditures on pure and integrated FTA 
(Annex 6: 6), and the number of contracts during the six years period, 
it is possible to conclude: 
(1) The massive recourse to FTA is an indicator of the extent of 
Algeria's technological dependence and at the same time disguises the 
national handicap in the realization of industrial projects and the 
management of the constructed units. If we look at the expansion of 
the gas sector [112], it appears that the Algerians may have been led 
to believe that industrial development can be bought and that 
development consisted of grafting industrial complexes, utilizing peak 
technologies which Algeria is not capable of managing. However,, the 
reality of a genuine economic and social development can only be the 
fruit of domestic efforts and above all must lean on internal 
capacities. Innovation, adaptation and technical progress remain the 
keys to sustained increase of individual productivity and thus to 
social changes at all levels. 
The Algerian industrial. development has and still being realized, 
under the incorporation of technical processes conceived and produced 
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in the capatalist countries. Therefore, it is a "derived" method of 
development in the sense that it is fundamentally based on the 
assimulation of technologies which are not a direct result of internal 
mechanism of capital accumulation. 
In order to break away from the classical dependencies 
(financial, commercial and cultural) which characterizes developing 
countries, Algeria had firstly to adhere to a new kind of dependence, 
technological dependence. Algeria's technological dependency consists 
of two interlocked elements: first, pure and simple importation of 
machineries and equipments; second, the intervention of foreign firms 
through the supply of technical services, under the contractual forms 
turnkey, plant in production, and engineering contracts. The 
systematical, utilization of advanced technologies cannot be seen as 
anything else other than increased dependence. The lack of domestic 
capacity to assimulate adapt and develop the imported technological 
know-how means that technological dependence is no longer transitional 
or temporary but rather a long term problem. 
The rhythm of industrial investments which has often been blamed 
for the lack of domestic assimulation and adaptation of imported 
technologies should be brought into line with the availability of 
national skilled manpower. Such manpower must necessarily be trained 
to conceive, realize and utilize the tools of production, if ETA 
services and thus technological dependence are to be partly reduced. 
The more the country relies on ETA, the further technological and 
economical independence becomes an illusion. So far the recourse to 
FTA has only served to strengthen rather than lessen economical and 
technological dependence. 
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(2) The absence of a national policy and an institutional framework, 
to coordinate and regulate the consumption of foreign technologies and 
technical assistance appears to have had a significant impact on the 
multiplication of the cost of the industrial projects. In return the 
high cost indicates that the benefits dervied from ETA services were 
in fact minimum when set against its cost. The prevailing situation 
amounted to a "laissez-faire; laissez-aller", which in practice meant 
that the state control over such imports was almost non-existent. The 
effects of the absence of such a policy were summarized by the 
Planning Ministry in 1980 as follows"- 
".... the absence of an institutional framework has resulted 
in the multiplication of external technical assistance 
services which were similar or even identical and sold to each 
of the. different Algerian buyers. It is not uncomnn to find 
one Algerian buyer purchasing the same services from different 
suppliers [..... ]. Finally it is not exceptional to find 
foreign engineering firms "bureaux d'etudes" intervening to 
provide services which have alredy been supplied by their 
predecessors" [113]. 
(3) Unlike other developing countries such as India and Latin 
American countries, where the regulation of technology transfer is at 
quite an advanced stage, regulations concerning such transfer are 
non-existent in the case of Algeria. Technology import are not being 
regulated in the sense that there is no compulsory evaluation or 
registration of technology transfer contracts. The fact that no 
mention of restrictive clauses was included in the case of Algeria 
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does not necessarily mean the country's bargaining position was so 
strong as to exclude their application. It simply means that no 
precise view can be advanced about restrictive clauses or to the 
extent of their application, since the contracts for the transfer of 
technology are one of the most secretly guarded documents. 
4. The resort to foreign technical assistance is supposed to 
substitute for the qualitive and quantitive inefficiency of local 
technical capacities. However, the examination of the contents of FTA 
showed that its field of operation was so flexible that in many cases 
it was possible to incorporate local competences. The exclusion of 
local capacities by the proponent of FTA lended those competences in 
administrative tasks. Even more, the phenomenon rapidly took the form 
of a vicious circle, whereby nationals were trained by ETA (in Algeria 
or abroad) but once they become qualified, they were not given the job 
which they were trained for. After a short period, they either 
emigrated or were hired by foreign firms to work in other developing 
countries or even in their own headquarters. In either case, the 
country stands to lose. It is an accepted fact that, the local 
competences were rarely allowed to integrate in the development 
experience or to serve it[114]. 
Foreign technical assistance has strong interest in restricting 
the integration of local competences into the development experience. 
FM often tends to extend the duration of training, or block the 
granting of tenure to Algerians, so that their own duration is 
extended. An American who was sitting in the privy for granint tenure 
to Algerian trainees at LNG1 was quoted to have said: 
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"If the incombent is an Algerian, it would mean that an American 
will take the plane back home"11151. 
In other terms, if an Algerian becomes qualified, it is an expatriate 
who takes the plane. Generally, it is often the more qualified 
personnel, or those who are near the end of their training who break 
off with the system. Those who leave are replaced by young trainees 
requiring more training and thus extending the duration of ETA. 
(5) Finally, as far as the access to foreign technologies is 
concerned, the Algerian experience appears to have been successful. 
The concept of the "industrializing industries", necessitated the 
investment in a technical base compatible with those prevailing in the 
world market. ' Thus, the productive combination of the Algerian 
industrial sector tend to identify with those dominant abroad, mainly 
in the capitalist countries. In the privileged industrial branches, 
steel; petrochemicals; electrical and mechanical construction 
industries only the most advanced technological processes were 
acquired. In the case of gas liquefaction, Algeria even played the 
role of a guinea pig for processes conceived in Europe and US (LNG 
Skikda) . Thus, and in so far as the mere physical acquisation of 
foreign technologies, the policy can claim to have been successful. 
However, the physical transfer of technology cannot in my view 
constitute a solid base for genuine and continuous development. In 
the beginning of the 1970's decade, the Algerian were persuaded to 
believe that the building of industrial units provides the quickest, 
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most dependable and disciplined way of acquiring know-how, industrial 
experience and inventiveness by Algerian workers. The concept of 
"learing by doing" was theoretically designed to bring workers face to 
face with the problems bound-up with the acquisation of technology, in 
order to make them aware of the mastery they stand to win in all 
spheres. The policy also implied that industrial process in itself 
generates experience, and each operation is reflected in the 
acquisation of certain amounts of technological capital. As a result, 
the access cost of technology acquisation will be cut with each 
successive operation. We must bear in mind that the technological 
capital which Algeria stood to accumulate was not limited to recent 
technologies, nor to purely technological inputs. It embraced 
production; innovation; products design, and management. In fact, it 
included every day to day economic activities, since every activity 
called for efficiency even if it did not involve industrial secrecy or 
protection, or high level of scientific knowledge. 
In practice, the theory of "learning by doing" suffered from a 
number of limitations in the case of Algeria. First,, the nature of 
imported technologies (advanced and capital intensive) meant that only 
a relatively small number of workers could benefit from the 
application of this theory. Second, the insufficient methodsd of 
project realization, lack of domestic means, collaboration with 
foreign firms and above all the policy of turnkey plants have not led 
to the hoped result. Both contractual forms "turnkey" and "plant in 
production" meant that national enterprises have acted as a mere 
spectators during the construction phase, and thus excluding any 
chance of applying the learning by doing concept. The same exclusion 
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can be found at the level of production - though to a less extent - 
especially in those plants constructed under turnkey contracts (i. e. 
gas and petrochemical branches). Third, the rhythm of investment in 
industrial projects, the weaknesses of planning, in terms of creating 
big and large enterprises, resulted in a weak degree of specialization 
among national enterprises and reduced any real opportunity of 
mastering the imported technologies. 
Finallly, excessive centralization in the structure of decision 
making. In theory it is recognised that a centralized structure of 
decision making may lead to optimum economic results, providing that 
an effective administrative machinery exists. The less effective the 
administrative machinery the more dangerous and excessive 
centralization become. If such machinery cannot fulfil its tasks, it 
becomes a structure which can lead to erroneous decisions and delays 
in the intervention of the guardian authority at the level of 
enterprises. 
Such is the situation in Algeria, where the inefficiency of 
information is quite apparent at the level of central authorities as 
well as national enterprises. Describing the acrninstrative potential 
of Algeria, J. R. NELLIS wrote in 1980: 
"In an increasingly regulated, increasingly supervised and 
increasingly inefficient world, the Algerian bureaucracy main- 
tains its standing as one of the most difficult with which to 
deal and one of the least productive in terms of output"[116]. 
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Under such conditions, accessive centralization of the structure of 
decision making, coupled with unregulated and undesirable accessive 
decentralization with regards to the choice of technical processes by 
national enterprises, erroneous decisions may have been allowed to 
take place. By undesirable, I mean, the weak negotiating position of 
most national enterprises (lack of administrative personnel, 
information about alternative technical processes) which led to a 
total relying on foreign engineering companies and thus to negative 
economic results. The impact of the inefficient and centralized 
administrative machinery of Algeria might have helped to create a 
category of an economical bureaucracy with interests different from 
those of the national economy. Such bureaucratic category may have 
acted as an obstacle against the embodied concept of "learning by 
doing", by opting form more foreign technical services, despite the 
availability of local competences and therefore excluding those 
competences from furthering their technical knowledge. 
The concept of "learning by doing" was made totally unworkable, 
in the industrial sectors which relied on advanced technologies. 
Algeria did not only use prototype technologies, but was also used as 
a training ground for foreign companies own manpower. This question 
is particularly highlighted in the gas liquefaction industry, where it 
is widely believed by the trade union of ING1 ARZEW that 9 out of 10 
technical assistance who work at the plant are in fact handymen hired 
to further their own technical knowledge in specific fields. 
Regardless of whether the ratio of 9 to 1 might be exaggerated, or 
even reversed, the fact remains that less developed technologies were 
bought, where the supplier's own personnel had not mastered the 
"being-developed technique". By buying such technologies which the 
supplier knew in advance that Algeria could not operate due to the 
newness of the technology, the supplier made sure it did not allow for 
the intervention of any foreign personnel other than his own. Thus, 
the supplier's own personnel is sent to help national enterprises in 
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the good running of plants. But implicitly the foreign personnel is 
there to detect any weaknesses in the newly introduced technology and 
to report back whatever modifications or readjustments may be 
necessary. In such a case, it can be said that Algeria was not only 
paying foreign technical assistance to further their training at the 
expense of excluding national competences, but also contributing 
indirectly to R&D expenditure of the technology suppliers, without 
receiving anything in return. 
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MYPFS: g_flb= SIX 
1. The technology for liquefying gas dates back nearly 200 years. 
M. Van Marum and A. P. TROOSIWIJK of Netherlands were probably 
the first to liquefy air under laboratory conditions as long 
ago as 1787. The first patent liquefaction was granted to 
Godfery Cabot of Boston in 1917, to liquefy gas under a 
combination of pressure and cooling. 1917 had also seen the 
first scale of natural gas liquefaction by the United States 
Bureau of mines. The objective was to separate Helium from 
natural gas in order to use the former as a lifting agent in 
airships. Liquefied natural gas was first transported in an 
experiment between US and UK in a joint effort between the 
British Gas Council and Constock Liquid Methane Corporation. 
The first trial left Lake Charles in the US on 28 January 1959 
with a full cargo and reached Caney Island on 20th February 
1959. For further details on liquefied gas and its sea 
transportation see MALCCM W. H. Peebles (1980) "The Evolution 
of the gas industry" MACMILLAN PRESS LTD., Chapter 7 pp185-210. 
2. With a proven reserves of 2,974 billion cubic meters, a 
probable reserves of 520 billion cubic meters and possible 
reserves of 299 billion cubic meters, Algeria is believed to be 
the fourth largest in the world, and with 1,023 million metric 
tones of crude oil occupies the fourteenth place. These 
reserves were made at Algeria's request by the US firm of De 
Golyer and MacNaughton: Report of the oil, gas, condensate and 
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LPG Reserves of Algeria, August 1,1977. To get such reserves 
to the consumers market, the gas has to be liquefied. However, 
in 1981 the first trans- Mediterranean pipeline connecting 
Hassi R'Mel gas field in Algeria to Sicily in Italy and passing 
through Tunisia was completed. 
3. See National Westminster Bank (1982) "ALGERIA" An Economic 
Report December 1982. 
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Development Plan and the Medium Term Prospects for 1980-84" 
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5. As Cited by ZIANE BRAHIM (1980) "GNL-ARZEW" ALGERIE-ACTUALITE 
NQ 765 (12-18 June) p. 8. 
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CASCADE process which involves successive cooling of, natural 
gas by three different refrigerants (propane, ethylene and 
methane) while passing through three different heat exchanger, 
to a temperature of minus 1610C. See EDWARD FARIDANY "LNG 
MARINE operation and market prospects for liquefied natural gas 
1972- 1990" The Economist Intelligence Special Unit - Special 
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CONCH with 40%, SOCALDEX 2.4%, Le Methane liquide 5.6%; COFIDAL 
1.6%; and SDRS 1.1%. In 1975, all French interest in CAMEL 
were taken over by SONATRACH which increased its share to 60%. 
Finally, on May 10,1977, the remaining 40% of CONCH were 
acquired by SONATRACH. See MALCOLM W. H. PEEBLE (1980) op cit 
pp190-194; Rabah Mahiout (1974) "Le Petrole Algerien" Editions 
EN. A. P Alger p183; The Middle East and North Africa (1978-1979) 
p218, Revolution Africaine NQ 412, March 2,1972 and nQ 839, 
March 21,1980 p22. 
8. Malcolm Peeble (1980) op cit p192. 
9. Abdelkader Sid-Ahmed (1980) "L'OPEP Passe, Present et 
Prospective" O. P. U. ALGER p343; Middle East Economic Digest 
(MEID) (1978) "ALGERIA" (Special Feature) p7; The World Bank 
(1982) Vol. II op cit p67. 
10. See Annex 6: 3. 
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11. In 1968, the Societe Mixte Algerienne du Gaz (SCNIALGAZ) was 
founded with the participation of SONATRACH 50% and ERAP 
(France) 50%. On February 3,1971, SCMALGAZ, the holding 
company for the Skikda liquefaction plant, signed a contract 
with Gaz de France (®F) , for the supply of 3,7 billion cubic 
metres of LNG a year, from Skikda (Algeria) to Fos sur mer 
(France) for 25 years starting from 1972. Later in 1971, and 
after an agreement between SONATRACH and ERAP, S(}IALGAS became 
100% owned by SONATRACH. See Rabah Mahiout (1974) "Le petrole 
Algerien" Editions En. A. P. ALGER p190; SONATRACH (1972) "La 
politique petroliere de 1'Algerie: Events, Etudes, 
Declarations" Volume I p259, and Volume IV pp597-599; EL-DJEICH 
NN 142 "L'Usine de Liquefaction de Skikda" Mars 1975 pp21-24; 
Revolution Africaine (1980) "Le Gaz: Une industrie 
d'integration" nQ 839 (du 21-27 Mars 1980) p23. 
12. Unlike the classical "cascade" process which involves three 
refrigerants, the "teal" process involves only one refrigerant 
consisting of nitrogen and hydrocarbon materials derived from 
the incoming gas (the gas entering the liquefaction units 
consist of propane; methane; and methylane) and works under two 
levels of - compressures: medium compression for. the mixte 
refrigerant, and a low compression, where the actual 
liquefaction of gas takes place. 
13. The first line for the production of LNG went into service in 
the summer of 1972, the second line in July 1973, and the third 
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14. Dimitri Germidis (1976) op cit ppl07-108. 
15. PH. LABARDE, Le Moude PARIS, 28 Mai 1974, p14. 
16. From 1973 to 1978, the anticipated 80% capacity was only 
reached once in 1976. 
17. MEID 21/12/1973. 
18. MEED 22/2/1974. 
19. MEID 22/3/1974. 
20. PH. LABARD (1974) op cit p14. 
21. The Fourth LNG Congress, sponsored by three international 
organizations L'Institut International du Froid; L'Union 
internationale de 1'Industrie du Graz, and the Institute of Gas 
Technology; held its 4th meeting in Algiers from 24 to 27 June 
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See MEID 5/7/1974, and El-Moudjahid 28/6/1974. 
22. See below, the Trans-Mediterranean gas pipeline and Gas prices. 
23. Abdelkrim Abib (1976) "L'acces a la technologie; Le cas 
Algeries" Juns-Druck, Ver Lag Zurich p66. 
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25. The Plan de Valorisation des Hydrocasbures known as the VALHYD 
PLAN. 
26. See Chapter 4 above - the industralising industries - and Annex 
27. See Chapter 5 above - (projects evolution and contracts 
procedures). 
28. See, Ministere de la Planification (1980) "SYNTHESE DU BILAN 
Economique et Social de la Deconnie (1967-1978)". Mai 1980 
pp304-351. The 1980-84 development plan proposes a 
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to facilitate internal financing of development, by improving 
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can be completed rapidly (see the number of non finished 
projects at the end of 1979, Chapter Five Annex 5: 9) ; (c) to 
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"PROJECT DE PLAN QUINQUUEtIAL 1980-1984" Orientations Generales 
des Developpement ppl-59. 
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not less significant in the hydrocarbons. At the end of 1979, 
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31. BECHTEL (1977) "The Hydrocarbon Development Plan of ALGERIA: 
Financial Projections 1976-2005" CALIFORNIA. 
32. Other objections include (i) the treatment at viable economic 
conditions of associated and non-associated gas for the 
recovery of condensate and LPG (essential for butane and 
propane); (ii) reinjection of gas and notably of associated gas 
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optimise the recovery of condensate by cycling either totally 
or partially deposits of condensate gas; and (iv) A 
systematical recovery of LPG at the level of gas treatment 
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of course at the level of refineries. See CHAKIB KHELIL and 
Abdallah Harouka (1979) "Plan Global de developpement des 
Hydrocarbure on Algerie" EL-HINRISS N3 January February 1979 
p38 (published by the Algerian union of Engineers). 
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34. Ibid tables 2; 3; 4 pp39-41; MEER (1978) "ALGERIA" Special 
feature p9. 
35. See Annex 6: 5 for details. 
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37. Ministere de la Plannification (1980) "Bilan de Synthese" op 
cit p136. 
38. According to M. Mekideche (Director of the Arzew industrial 
zone), the plant cost was $2.5 billion. M. Mekideche (1980) 
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of carry-over cost in the hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon 
industries: See: Ministere de la Planification (1980) "Project 
de Plan Quinquennal" op cit pp408-410; World Bank 1982, Volume 
2, op cit p79. 
42. In order to convey crude oil, natural gas and condensate to the 
processing and refining centres at Arzew, Algiers, Skikda and 
Bejaia an extensive pipeline network has been constructed. All 
the network is 100% owned by SONATRACH. 
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ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW No 3 November 1981 pp71-72. 
44. Revolution Africaine "LE GAZ: Une Industrie d'Integration" I 
839 (21-27 Mars 1980) pp23-24. 
45. Ibid p23. 
46. Negotiations are taking place between SONATRACH and FERNGAS 
(Austria) and Yugoslavia for possible supply of gas through the 
pipeline (see Annex 6: 2). 
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The agreement has yet to be finalised. See -MEER of 
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49. PETMLE: STATISTIQUE DE L'Industries Petrolieres (1978). 
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transportation. After the nationalisation of February 24, 
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SONATRACH (1972) "La politique petroliere de l'Algerie" op cit 
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51. See above p4 and Annex 6: 2. 
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equipments to the refinery, it is hard to imagine any loss to 
ENI. See Hamid Mazri (1975) "Las Hydrocarbures dans l'economie 
Algerienne" SNED ALGER pp180-81; El Maudjahid 14.3.1967; 
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monde" No 423 (6/4/1972). 
For the role of ENI and Esso in the Algerian gas see SONMCH 
(1972) "La politique petroliere de L'Algerie" Vol. 1 op cit 
ppl07-132. 
54. Ibid p128. 
55. 
" 56. 
See the attitude of the World Bank towards financing public 
sector in Algeria in Chapter 5 (Mixte Enterprises, Ammnia 
plant) . 
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to Algeria. He is believed to have suggested to the Algerian 
authorities that the Algerian gas has a big future in Europe, 
and implicitly implying that in any event the Soviet gas should 
pass before the Algerian. See Hamid Mazri (1975) OP cit 
pp179-190. The same attitude was taken by the Soviets in 1981 
when they were urged by Algeria to seek parity with oil prices 
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"Algerian Gas Undercut by the Russians" December 5,1981 p81. 
58. See SONATRACH (1972) "la politique petroliere de l'Algerie" 
Vol. 4 op cit p403-4; El-Moudjahid (27/4/1971). 
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For further details on 1965 Agreement see SONTRACH (1972) Vol- 
1 op cit pp2-15. 
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69. The American firms which participated in the supply of 
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70. A. ATERAD (1979) op cit Annex I table 2. 
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10,1975 p50. 
72. F. YA(HIR op cit p681. 
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at constantine and Guelma; and 3 years in the case of SONL'I'D 
at TIERT. However, one should not forget that the delay in the 
case of LNG 1 was relatively short but the, cost increased 
almost fivefold. See MALIKA ABDELAZIZ in ALGERIE-ACTUALITE No_ 
765 (12-18 June 1980) p7. 
74. For the realisation of SONATRACH-EL PASO contract, the 
following loans were granted to SONATR1ICH: Exim Bank (US) $157 
million; US Banks (the First National City Bank, Bank of 
America, First National Bank of Chicago) $157 million, First 
Boston Company CHEMICAL BINK $250 million; European Bank $42.5 
million guaranteed by Exim bank; Marine US: $52 million for 3 
LNG carriers; and the financing HassiR'MEL-Arzew gas pipeline 
by General Electric. See A DJERARD (1979) op cit, MEID (1978) 
"ALGERIA" (Special feature) op cit p12. 
75. PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE. INAUGURATION speech of the first 
production line of GNL 1 at Arzew, February 21,1978. 
76. The figure of $2400 million was advanced by the Minister of 
Energy and Petrochemical Industry M. BELKACEK NABI to the 
National Assembly. MIDDLE EAST ECONCMIC SURVEY Ng 1 January 7, 
1980, p6. The figure of $2500 million was also advanced as the 
final cost by the director of Arzew's industrial zone M. 
MEKIDECHE (1980) "le secteur des Hydrocarbures" op cit p511. 
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78. The Anaysis of the Algerian economy between 1967-1978 was 
conducted by the new team of, the planning Ministry and Other 
Ministries who contested the economic choices of the previous 
regime. See Ministere De la Plannification (1980) "SYNTHESE DU 
BILAN" op cit p72. 
79. The price of gas under the SONATRACH-EL PASO contract was 
$0,305 per million B. T. U., which is lower than the price 
charged to Gaz de France $0,40 million B. T. U. in 1964, and 0.15 
cents lower than that of the same Algerian gas to Distrigas and 
Trunkline (both US firms). 
80. PAUL BALTA, CLAUDINE MILLEAU (1981) "L'ALGERIE DES ALGERIENS: 
VINGT ANS APRES" PARIS ßa131. 
81. MINISTERE DE IA PLANIFICATION (1980) "SYNTHESE DU BILAN" Op Cit 
PP72-73. 
82. The World Bank, Vol. 2 op cit p71. 
83. As cited by ALEXANDER ST WART: "EL-PASO comes in from the cold" 
FORTUNE March 23,1981 p56. However, and in the interest of 
getting the project running again Algeria was willing to 
consider setting aside the goal of parity. Thus as a result, 
the asking price dropped to $3.50 in early 1980. However, 
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SONATPACH-GAZ DE FRANCE Contract, the latter was billed $6 per 
million B. T. U. but in fact paid only $4.20 until July 1981 and 
then $4.45, until a final agreement was reached in February 
1982 between the two governments setting the price at about 
$5.10 at Algerian ports. 
84. As cited by ALLIDER STEWART: Fortune (1980) op cit p74. 
85. BELKACEM NABI, The Algerian Minister of Energy and 
Petrochemical Industry as qutoed by Paul Balta, Claudine 
Rolleau (1981) op cit p132. 
86. Alexander Stewart (1980) Fortune op cit p73 and 75. 
87. For further details see the following articles in Revolution 
Africaine: January 1-7,1982: - G. Boutaleb "La promotion du gaz 
et la bataille de prix" pp24-28; M. GHELLAL "La 
commercialisation du GNL et l'adaptation des contracts aux 
circonstances nouvelles" pp46-49. 
88. Maurad Beldjoudi, SONATRACH's director of gas export in a 
speech on April 1980, cited by ALEXANDER STEWART, FORTUNE 
(1980) op city p74. 
89. "C'est a la demande de la campagnie Americaine (EL-PASO) que 
les livraisons du gas ont ete inter-rompus" declare BELKACEM 
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NABI Revolution Africaine 1-7 Janvier 1982 p38. 
90. The Chairman of EL-PASO, TRAVIS PETTY, predicted that the 
rhetoris will soon die down, and SONATRACH will settle after 
the fourth session, which was to be held on June 25 and 26, 
1980. 
91. The shut down of LNG 1 ARZEW may represented a missed chance by 
SONATRACH to earn $3 million per day, or $2 million as 
estimated by others, but certainly not a 'loss since the gas 
will remain in the gas field. Only the running cost will be 
lost by SONATRACH. 
92. The price paid to Algeria by the Agreement of February 3,1982 
was superior to world market.. It is in fact a political rather 
than commercial and was the result of M. MEr ID's visit to 
ALGERIA at the end of November 1981. The main provisions of 
the Agreement were: 
(a) the revision of the price of the two contracts signed in 
1964 and 1972 totalling 4 million m3 
(b) to put into force imanediately a third contract of 5.1 
billion m3 per year (the three contracts were linked in a 
single contract of 9.1 billion 0 per year) 
(c) to put into function the terminal at montoire-de-Bretagne, 
which has an annual capacity of 10 billion m3 LNG. The 
terminal will receive 5.1 billion 0 for Gaz de France as 
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transmitted through France. 
(d) The price of Algerian gas sold to France will be indexed to 
petrol and superior to world Harket price. - Gaz 
de France will 
pay 86.5% and 13.5 by the French Government. 
(e) to pay Algeria 6 billion Francs (about £572 million) to 
make up for the difference between the price paid by Gaz de 
France and that billed by SONTXTRACH since 1980. 
In return, the deal is linked to a deal worth 12.5 
billion Francs for orders by Algeria from French companies 
which include: 500,000 Renault lorries, railway equirnent, the 
construction of Algiers underground and 50,000 houses per year. 
See JEAN GLOAGUEN "UN PRIX POLITIQUE" EXPRESS, PARIS, 
(12-2-1981) p38; Revolution Africaine "Algerie-France: La 
Relance? " (27 Nov Dec 3,1981) pp23-38; Le Monde, Paris, 
September 17,1981 p41, and February 22,1982 p42. 
93. The President CHADLI BENWEDID'S speech during a visit to BATNA 
(East Midlands of Algeria) February 26,1981. 
94. From April 15,1982, negotiations were conducted at two levels: 
Ministrial level between Nabi (Algeria) and Capria (Italy) with 
occasional intervention by the two foreign affairs ministers, 
and at companies level between SONATRACH and ENI. 
95. E1-Moudjahid February 26,1983 pl and 4; The Financial Times, 
February 21,1983 p2. 
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96. Ziane Brahim (1980) "les travailleurs du gaz a Arzew" ALGERIE - 
Achialite No 764 (5-11 June) p8; 'GNL ARZEW" No 765 (12-18 June 
1980) p8. However SONATRACH's own statistics shows that only 
948 were employed (see Annex 6: 3). Whatever the real figure 
may be, trade union leaders confirmed that the number of 
Foreign Technical assistance at LNG-1 is almost 500, mostly 
Americans. 
97. M. MEKIDECHE (1980) "Le Secteur des hydrocarbures" op cit p112. 
No figure can be advanced for the wages, except that it is 
possible that they are higher than the 31000 to 47500 dinars 
paid as monthly wages to foreign experts from capitalist 
countries at EL-HADJAR STEEL works near Annaba. 
98. Industrial and energy sectors, shared 96% of the expenditure on 
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99. ZIANE BRAHIM (1980) ALGERIE-ACTUALITE 1765 op cit p8. 
100. MALIKA ABDELAZIZ (1980) "Quelques Verites" ALGERIE-ACTUALITE N9. 
765 op cit p7. 
101. These are only a few of the examples which were allowed to 
surface under the new Government which took power in February 
1979. 
102. It was mentioned in Chapter Five that the former vice chairman 
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of SONATRACH Ait LAOUSSINE has managed to set up a consultant 
company in GENEVA (Chapter 5 note 15). The connection between 
his former job and the present one may not be difficult to 
reach. Furthermore, several former. Ministers and Civil 
Servants of the Boumediene regime are under investigation for 
corruption and misuse of public funds and it is more likely 
that many of them will face trials. The list includes the 
former Foreign Minister Abdel Aziz Boutaflika for 12 years up 
to 1979, Belaid Abdelslam former energy minister, Ahmed C, hazali 
former Director-General of Sonatrach. All were expelled from 
polit-buro and the central Committee of the FLN. 
103. There is no precise definition of the content of technical 
assistance, however it may include the following services: 
construction of industrial plants; repairs, maintenance, 
engineering, training; know-how and show-how and studies of 
general character. 
104. Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire (1976) "La 
Charte Nationale" Ordonance nn 76-57 du 5 Juillet 1976, section 
(vii) "la cooperation avec l'etranger". 
105. Except the above mentioned policy in the National Charted ibid. 
106. For further details see "plant in production" contracts in 
Chapter Five above. 
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107. The tasks of the contracting foreign firm may also include the 
selection and the recruiting of national personnel, the 
establishment of the training programme and the training of 
such personnel in its own plants. For further details see 
Chapter Five "turnkey contracts". 
108. In practice and in the case of Algeria the criteria under which 
engineering firms select offers is never supplied to the 
client, whcih further shows the implicit ties between foreign 
firms (suppliers of equipments and technologies) and 
engineering firms, and the reduction of the role of the latter 
to a simple salesman for the former. 
109. For detailed technical assistance included in the different 
forms of contracts see Annex 5: 10 in Chapter 5. 
110. See Annex 5: 6 for details and Annex 6: 6. 
111. See Annexes 5: 11 and 6: 6 where for example, during 1973-78,92% 
in capitalist countries. For technical, scientific and 
cultural cooperation between socialist countries and Algeria 
see A. WERARD (1979) op cit; ZELACI C HAMS EDDINE (1980) "les 
relations de l'Algerie avec les pays sociailstes d'Europe" 
Memoire pour la DEA de politique internationale, PARIS 1. 
112. See both Annexes 6: 1 and 6: 7. 
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113. Ministere de la Planification (1980) "Synthese du Bilan" op cit 
p310. 
114. Ibid p314. The present Five Year Development Plan 1980-84, 
also admits that not only the services of FTA were multiplied 
but also touched fields where real local competences have 
existed. See Ministere de la Planification (1980) "Projet de 
Plain Quinquennal 1980-84" p566. 
115. As reported by the trade untion at LNG 1 plant Arzew, cited by 
Ziane Brahim (1980) op cit ALGERIE-ACTUALITE No 765 p8. 
116. J. R. NELLIS (1980) "Maladministration, cause or result of 
underdevelopment: the Algerian Example" Ruvue Canadienne des 
Etudes Africaine, (Mars 1980) pp410-411; and "Socialist 
Management in Algeria" Journal of Modern African Studies, 
April, 1977. 
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